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The New Corporate Migration
TAX DIVERSION THROUGH INVERSION
Cathy Hwang†
INTRODUCTION
Watson Pharmaceuticals was an American success
story—until it became an Irish success story.
Taiwanese-American Allen Chao founded Watson in
1983, after cobbling together $4 million in start-up funds from
family, friends, and acquaintances.1 Chao helmed Watson for a
decade and a half. By the time he retired in 2007, Watson was
the third-largest generic-pharmaceuticals manufacturer in the
United States, with annual revenues of $2.5 billion.2 In 2012,
Watson adopted the name Actavis for worldwide operations.3
The following year, Actavis debuted in the Fortune 500.4 At the
† Academic Fellow, Stanford Law School, Rock Center for Corporate
Governance. I thank Jonathan Abel, Afra Afsharipour, Kelli A. Alces, Douglas G.
Baird, Joseph Bankman, Jordan M. Barry, Neil H. Buchanan, Michael J. Caballero,
Laura Napoli Coordes, Lynne L. Dallas, Steven Dean, Benjamin P. Edwards, Jared
Ellias, Lisa Fairfax, Tom Ginsburg, Joseph A. Grundfest, Sarah C. Haan, M. Todd
Henderson, Emily Hite, Thomas J. Hughes, John Patrick Hunt, Sloan G. Speck, Thea
Johnson, Cortelyou Kenney, Ruth Levine, Seth Oranburg, Amanda K. Packel, Elizabeth
Pollman, Jacob Hale Russell, George Triantis, and participants of the Junior Faculty
Workshop at the Center for Law, Economics & Finance (C-LEAF) at George Washington
University Law School, the Stanford Law School Fellows’ Workshop, and the 2014 Junior
Scholars Virtual Colloquium for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks also to the
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. This article is licensed
under a Creative Commons Non-Derivative, Non-Commercial 4.0 License.
1 Damon Darlin, Still Running Scared, FORBES, Sept. 26, 1994, at 127-28
(describing Allen Chao’s background and the founding of Watson Pharmaceuticals).
2 Press Release, NexBio, Inc., Dr. Allen Chao, Founder & Former CEO of
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Joins NexBio Board of Directors (Jan. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dr-allen-chao-founder—former-ceo-ofwatson-pharmaceuticals-joins-nexbio-board-of-directors-82057617.html.
3 Press Release, Watson Pharm., Inc., Watson Announces New Name—
Actavis—for Global Operations (Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1752588 (announcing that Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. would adopt the Actavis name effective in 2013).
4 Actavis: What It’s Like To Join The Fortune 500, FORTUNE (May 10, 2013),
http://fortune.com/2013/05/10/actavis-what-its-like-to-join-the-fortune-500/ (reporting on
an interview with Actavis CEO Paul Bisaro at the time Actavis joined the Fortune 500).
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end of 2013, Actavis reported annual revenues of $8.6 billion5
and employed 19,200 people.6
In late 2013, Actavis acquired Ireland’s Warner Chilcott plc.7
In doing so, Actavis moved the jurisdiction of incorporation of its
parent company to Ireland through a corporate inversion.8 In a
corporate inversion, a corporate group with a common parent
incorporated in a domestic jurisdiction9 reshuffles its corporate
structure or acquires a foreign company in order to end up with a
common parent incorporated in a lower-tax foreign jurisdiction. In
Actavis’s case, inverting from Nevada to Ireland was expected to
lower its effective tax rate from 28% to approximately 17%.10
Corporate inversions are not new. U.S. oil and gas giant
McDermott was the first to invert when, in 1982, it inverted to
Panama by making one of its Panamanian subsidiaries the
corporate group’s parent company.11 Since then, there have
been about 75 inversions.12 In 2014 alone, numerous domestic

5 Actavis plc, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 57 (Feb. 25, 2014) (disclosing that for
the year ended December 31, 2013, Actavis plc had net revenues of $8,677.6 million).
6 Id. at 25 (disclosing that as of December 31, 2013, Actavis had
approximately 19,200 employees).
7 Actavis, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 1, 2013) (announcing the
completion of the acquisition of Warner Chilcott plc, a public limited company
organized under the laws of Ireland, by Actavis, Inc., which was, at the time of the
announcement, a Nevada corporation. As a result of the transaction, both Actavis, Inc.
and Warner Chilcott plc would become wholly owned indirect subsidiaries of a newly
formed Irish company called Actavis plc).
8 Id.
9 The Tax Code classifies taxpayers as “domestic” (for corporations, this means
a corporation incorporated in a U.S. jurisdiction) or “foreign.” Thus, for the purposes of
this article, corporations incorporated in U.S. jurisdictions are generally referred to as
domestic corporations. See Classification of Taxpayers for U.S. Tax Purposes (May 28,
2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Classificationof-Taxpayers-for-U.S.-Tax-Purposes (last accessed Mar. 8, 2015).
10 Actavis Ltd., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-4) 70
(Jul. 31, 2013) (disclosing that Actavis expected to lower its effective non-GAAP tax
rate from approximately 28% to 17%).
11 Hal
Hicks, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical,
Contemporary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 899, 903 (2003); see also
infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
12 Professor Mihir A. Desai at Harvard Law School has compiled the most
comprehensive list of inversions to date, and his list includes approximately 75
inverted companies. See Colleen Walsh, Getting a Handle on Inversion: A Q&A with
Mihir Desai, HARVARD L. TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014), http://today.law.harvard.edu/harvardgazette-mihir-desai-getting-handle-inversion (click “these inversions” in Mihir Desai’s
first answer). This number comports with other commentators’ estimates. See also
Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the
Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 418-20 (2002);
Andrius R. Kontrimas, Presentation at the 13th Annual International Tax Symposium,
24-25 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.texastaxsection.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=t2ZqNOMHQA0%3D&tabid=59; MARSHA HENRY, Mergers of Equals: Getting
Caught in the § 7874 Corporate Inversion Web—Change the Rules or Change the Game
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corporations, including iconic American brands like Pfizer and
Walgreens, publicly contemplated inversions.13 In the second
half of 2014, Burger King announced that it would invert to
Ontario, Canada through an $11 billion acquisition of
Canadian chain Tim Hortons.14 Congress’s Joint Committee on
Taxation has estimated that stopping inversions could result in
a total tax revenue gain of approximately $19.5 billion over the
next ten years.15
Inversions have gained attention from many corners.
Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon called last year’s inversion
activity “a feeding frenzy . . . . Every investment banker now
has a slide deck that they’re taking to any possible company
and saying, ‘[Y]ou have to do a corporate inversion now,
because if you don’t, your competitors will.’”16 Around the same
36-37 (Dec. 4, 2013) (unpublished research paper, Fordham University), available at
http://marshahenry.blogs.com/files/corporate_inversions_december_2013.pdf.
13 See David Gelles, New Corporate Tax Shelter: A Merger Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, at B1 (citing independent tax advisor Robert Willens, who
estimated that there had been about 20 inversions in the last year and a half); Ashley
Armstrong, American Companies Target the UK for Tax, TELEGRAPH (May 3, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/pharmaceuticalsandchemicals/108068
40/American-companies-target-the-UK-for-tax.html (describing the competitiveness of
the pharmaceuticals industry and the prevalence of corporate inversion transactions in
the industry).
14 Burger King Worldwide, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 12, 2014)
(announcing the completion of Burger King’s acquisition of Tim Hortons). Through the
transaction, Canadian-incorporated Tim Hortons Inc. and Delaware-incorporated Burger
King Worldwide, Inc.—the parent company of the Burger King corporate group—would
both become indirect subsidiaries of an Ontario, Canada-incorporated corporation and an
Ontario, Canada-organized limited partnership. Tim Hortons itself has an interesting
incorporation history. Originally a Canadian company, it became part of American
restaurant chain Wendy’s in 1995. Tim Hortons became a public company incorporated in
Delaware after its spin-off from Wendy’s in 2006. In 2009, Tim Hortons announced that it
would move back to Canada by merging with a newly formed Canadian subsidiary in
order to, among other things, take advantage of lower Canadian tax rates commencing in
the year following implementation. Tim Hortons Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June
29, 2009) (attaching the company’s press release announcing its intention to become a
Canadian company through a merger with a newly formed subsidiary); see also David
Friend, Tim Hortons Returns Officially to Canada, TORONTO STAR (Jun. 30, 2009),
http://www.thestar.com/business/2009/06/30/tim_hortons_returns_officially_to_
canada.html (reporting the company’s incorporation history).
15 Letter from Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, to
Karen McAffee, Democratic Chief Tax Counsel, House Ways and Means Committee (May 23,
2014), available at http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.
house.gov/files/113-0927%20JCT%20Revenue%20Estimate.pdf. Note, however, that while this
is a large number, it is not a particularly large percentage of the United States’s gross domestic
product. According to the World Bank, the United States’s gross domestic product in 2013 (the
last year for which data is available) was $16.77 trillion. See United States, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
16 Mark Garrison, Corporate Inversion: An Expensive Way to Save on Taxes,
MARKETPLACE (Jul. 15, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/
corporate-inversion-expensive-way-save-taxes (reporting on recent inversion activity
and quoting Professor Davidoff Solomon).
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time, Professor Edward Kleinbard, former chief of staff of
Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation, predicted that there
would be a “sharknado of inversions.”17
In response to the surge in inversion announcements in
2014, President Obama’s administration proposed tightening
anti-inversion rules, the Treasury Secretary made a plea to
Congress to pass anti-inversion legislation, and bills were
proposed in both houses of Congress.18 In late September of
2014, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
Service (the IRS) issued Notice 2014-52, announcing
immediately effective promised regulations that reduced some
of the tax benefits of inversions.19 President Obama appears to
have discussed inversions again in the State of the Union
address in 2015, noting that “lobbyists have rigged the Tax
Code with loopholes that let some corporations pay nothing
while others pay full freight,” and calling for the closing of
loopholes “so we stop rewarding companies that keep profits
abroad, and reward those that invest in America.”20
So far, the conversation, especially in the popular
consciousness, has been dominated by the tax story: corporations
save millions on their tax bills by inverting, correspondingly
causing the U.S. government to lose billions in tax revenue. But
there is more to the inversion story. This Article considers the
collateral effects of inversions, both for corporations and for the
public, and proceeds in four Parts.
17 Lori Montgomery, U.S.
Policymakers Gird for Rash of Corporate
Expatriations, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/us-policymakers-gird-for-rash-of-corporate-expatriations/2014/08/05/
4898ca5e-18d9-11e4-9349-84d4a85be981_story.html (reporting on the surge of
inversions expected to come in late 2014 and quoting Professor Kleinbard).
18 U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 64-65 (Mar. 2014), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2015.pdf [hereinafter TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS] (explaining the current
corporate inversion law, the proposed change and the rationale for the change); Press
Release, Ways and Means Comm. Democrats, House Democrats Introduce Legislation to
Tighten Restrictions on Corporate Tax Inversions (May 20, 2014), available at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/press-release/house-democrats-introducelegislation-tighten-restrictions-corporate-tax-inversions (providing coverage of H.R. 4679,
which mirrors Senator Levin’s proposal to tighten existing corporate inversion rules);
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Merger in a Race With Congress, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Jun. 16, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/a-merger-in-a-racewith-congress (providing coverage of two corporate inversion proposals in the U.S.
Senate: Senator Harry Reid’s tax holiday proposal, and Senator Carl Levin’s proposal to
tighten existing corporate inversion rules).
19 I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712 (Sept. 22, 2014).
20 Press Release, Remarks of President Barack Obama—As Prepared for Delivery
State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/01/20/president-obamas-state-union-address-prepared-delivery.
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Part I introduces the current discourse about inversions.
Overwhelmingly, corporations cite the United States’s high
statutory corporate tax rate, and the lower tax rates of other
countries, as reasons for inverting.
Part II provides a robust overview of previous
generations of inversions in the United States, highlighting the
evolution of inversions from internal reorganizations to today’s
complex business-combination transactions. This section provides
necessary background for understanding how inversions—and
inversion policy—can affect business decisions and the public.
Part III considers how today’s complex businesscombination inversions can affect inverting corporations
themselves and potentially create collateral consequences for the
public. To be sure, economists and tax policymakers understand
that tax policy, including inversion tax policy, changes behavior in
potentially costly ways. This Article considers the specific
potential hidden costs of inversions for corporations and the
public. For corporations, inverting can change business decisions;
for instance, companies may deploy capital in potentially suboptimal ways in service of chasing tax benefits. For the public, the
availability of corporate inversions undercuts tax policy, creates
distributional consequences across industries and company sizes,
and may drive over-consolidation. To craft sound policy,
policymakers need to understand inversions’s potential for
driving these hidden costs and begin to investigate the
magnitude of these effects.
Part IV analyzes potential policy solutions, including a
theoretical outright ban on inversions, comprehensive tax
reform, and middle-of-the-road or temporary solutions.
I.

THE CURRENT DEBATE

The Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy defines
a corporate inversion as “a transaction through which the
corporate structure of a U.S.-based multinational group is
altered so that a new foreign corporation, typically located in a
low- or no-tax country, replaces the existing U.S. parent
corporation as the parent of the corporate group.”21 For
example, a company that has a Delaware corporation as its
21 Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
107th Cong. 10-11 (2002) (statement of Pamela F. Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (providing a primer on the tax policy
implications of corporate inversions in conjunction with a previous generation of
corporate inversion transactions).
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parent company may invert by setting up a new corporation in a
tax-friendly jurisdiction like Ireland and engaging in transactions
to make that new Irish corporation the company’s top parent
company. Inverted companies can save tens of millions—if not
hundreds of millions—of dollars in taxes through an inversion
and the related restructurings that follow it.
Recently, corporate inversions have kicked up a storm of
interest amongst the press, legislators, and policymakers.
President Obama, the Treasury Department, and both houses of
Congress have discussed inversions.22 At the same time, corporate
inversions are under-explored in the legal academic literature—a
handful of articles form the entirety of the literature, and nearly
nothing has been written about the current generation of
inversion transactions. This Part provides an overview of
current discussions, including a summary of what corporations
say drives their inversion decisions.
A.

The Case for Inverting

Many corporations assert that they invert to take
advantage of another jurisdiction’s lower statutory corporate
tax rate.23 For instance, in 2014, Mylan, Inc. announced that it
would invert to the Netherlands in conjunction with a purchase
of a portion of Abbott Laboratories. At the time, Abbott’s Chief
Executive Officer wrote in The Wall Street Journal that, “[i]n
terms of global competiveness, the U.S. and U.S. companies are
at a substantial disadvantage to foreign companies . . . . Our
disproportionately higher tax rate [puts] foreign companies at a
huge advantage competitively.”24 The Mylan inversion is
expected to lower Mylan’s global effective tax rate from 25% to
21% in the first year, and to the high teens over time.25 This
22 See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 18; see also supra text
accompanying notes 19-20.
23 Michael J. Graetz, Inverted Thinking on Corporate Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 16,
2014, 7:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/michael-j-graetz-inverted-thinking-oncorporate-taxes-1405554359 (“At 35%, [the United States] now ha[s] the highest statutory
corporate [tax] rate in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which
has 34 developed countries as members.”); see Hearing, supra note 21 (noting that U.S.based companies reincorporate abroad to take advantage of tax savings).
24 Miles D. White, Ignoring the Facts on Corporate Inversions, WALL ST. J.
(Jul. 17, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/miles-d-white-ignoring-the-factson-corporate-inversions-1405638376.
25 Anna Prior, Abbott Labs to Sell Generic Drug Assets to Mylan, WALL ST. J.
(Jul. 14, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/abbott-laboratories-to-selldeveloped-generics-business-to-mylan-1405335643 (reporting that, as a result of
Abbott/Mylan deal, Mylan would lower its global effective tax rate from about 25% to
about 21% in its first year, and even lower in subsequent years).
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particular justification for inverting—the desire to chase a
lower statutory tax rate—is often viewed as simplistic. While
the United States’s statutory corporate tax rate is high—at
35%, it is the highest corporate tax rate among developed
countries—its effective tax rate is similar to the average of
developed countries belonging to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).26
Inverting companies also cite the United States’s worldwide
tax regime as a driver of inversions.27 Domestic corporations pay
taxes on the entirety of their income, regardless of where it is
earned—a worldwide tax regime.28 At the same time, if foreignearned income is taxed in the foreign jurisdiction, domestic
corporations can claim a foreign tax credit on their U.S. taxes
for taxes already paid to foreign jurisdictions on foreign-earned
income, which mitigates some of the effect of a worldwide tax
regime. When that foreign-earned income is brought back into
the United States, however, it is taxed at the higher U.S. rate.29
In practice, the United States’s worldwide tax regime means
that no matter where a domestic corporation earns its income, the
income will be taxed at the higher U.S. rate once repatriated to
the United States. Many other developed countries have
territorial, rather than worldwide, tax regimes—that is, only the
income a corporation earns within the territory is taxed by that
26 The average effective tax rate of OECD countries is approximately 27.7%, and
the United States’s effective tax rate is approximately 27.1% (both figures are weighted
effective tax rates, which are adjusted to account for the size of the economies). Moreover,
the United States collects less tax as a percentage of gross domestic product than the OECD
average. MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42726, THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM, 13 tbl. 2 (2014).
27 Stuart Webber, Escaping the U.S. Tax System: From Corporate Inversions
to Re-Domiciling, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 273, 277 (2011) (describing that many inverting
companies do not articulate any operational benefits generated by their corporate
inversions; rather, the rationales for inverting are entirely tax-driven).
28 KEIGHTLEY & SHERLOCK, supra note 26, at 6 (“The United States taxes
American corporations on their worldwide income.”); Elizabeth Chorvat, You Can’t
Take It With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 453, 460 (2003) (describing the worldwide tax system); Michael Kirsch, The
Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and
Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 484-85
(2005) (describing the United States’s corporate tax system as one that generally taxes
worldwide income, regardless of the source of the income).
29 Chorvat, supra note 28, at 459 (“Any income that arises from cross-border
transactions is potentially subject to tax in two more jurisdictions: the residence country
and the source country.”) and at 463 (“[T]he U.S. tax system allows a limited credit
against U.S. tax, available for certain income taxes paid to foreign countries, thereby
mitigating the double taxation of U.S. taxpayers on foreign source income.”); see I.R.C.
§ 901 (setting forth how the taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code shall be credited
with certain allowances, and the amount of such allowances); KEIGHTLEY & SHERLOCK,
supra note 26, at 6 (describing that under current tax law, “corporations are allowed a
credit, known as a foreign tax credit, for taxes paid to other countries”).
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territory. By escaping the United States’s worldwide tax regime to
a jurisdiction with a territorial tax regime, corporations can also
save on taxes.30
Because the United States taxes income at the higher U.S.
rate when it is repatriated, corporations can defer paying U.S. tax
by keeping foreign-earned income overseas indefinitely.31
Bloomberg recently estimated that U.S. companies kept about
$2 trillion of foreign income overseas in order to avoid paying
U.S. taxes upon repatriation.32 According to commentators,
inversions allow corporations to access this cash “trapped”
overseas.33 When American medical device maker Medtronic
announced its inversion to Ireland through the purchase of
Irish company Covidien, Medtronic’s former CEO told The New
York Times that “[t]he only reason [Medtronic is] doing the
inversion is to free up the cash overseas . . . . That money today
can’t be put to good use right now.”34 Medtronic will use that
trapped cash to buy Covidien.35 In the process, Medtronic will
invert to Ireland and also gain access to Covidien’s cash flow,
which is generated from earnings taxed at the lower Irish
rate.36 That cash will not need to be repatriated to the United
States and taxed at the higher U.S. rate. Note that if Medtronic
had acquired Covidien in a more traditional, non-inversion
30 Chorvat, supra note 28, at 460 (describing the two main ways of dealing with
double taxation as the “‘worldwide’ or ‘credit’ method, in which the residence country
taxes foreign source income but provides a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions,”
and the “‘territorial’ or ‘exemption’ method, under which the residence country cedes all
taxing jurisdiction to the source country.”).
31 Chorvat, supra note 28, at 465 (“[I]ncome that U.S. corporations earn
through foreign subsidiaries is not subject to tax in the United States until the income is
repatriated back to the U.S. parent corporation.”); Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions:
The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 333
(2004) (“Income earned from non-U.S. operations of foreign corporate subsidiaries of a
domestic parent corporation is generally subject to U.S. tax only when distributed as a
dividend to the domestic corporation.”).
32 David Welch & Manuel Baigorri, Offshore Cash of $2 Trillion Sparks Hunt for
Tax-Friendly Deals, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jun. 16, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2014-06-16/offshore-cash-of-2-trillion-sparks-hunt-for-tax-friendly-deals.html.
33 Vanessa Houlder et al., Tax Avoidance: The Irish Inversion, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
29, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d9b4fd34-ca3f-11e3-8a31-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz37x2JQScc (describing the phenomenon of U.S. companies “shifting their
headquarters abroad to protect growing overseas cash piles.”).
34 David Gelles, In Medtronic’s Deal for Covidien, an Emphasis on Tax
Savings, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jun. 16, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/06/16/in-medtronics-deal-for-covidien-an-emphasis-on-tax-savings
(describing
Medtronic’s focus on tax savings and accessing trapped cash in its acquisition of
Covidien and quoting former Medtronic CEO Bill George).
35 Id.; Lee Schafer, A Move to Ireland Lets Medtronic Move Its “Trapped
Cash,” STAR TRIB. (Jun. 17, 2014, 5:38 AM), http://www.startribune.com/
business/263378681.html.
36 Id.
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transaction, Covidien’s earnings may have been passed
through Medtronic and been used to pay dividends to Medtronic’s
shareholders. This would have subjected Covidien’s earnings to
U.S. tax.
According to some commentators and inverting companies,
the trapped cash problem has ripple effects on the economy. A
domestic corporation may keep and invest its money outside of the
United States in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes on that foreignearned income. As a result, the U.S. economy does not benefit
from foreign-earned income being invested back to the United
States. However, the extent of the trapped cash problem is
disputed. A 2011 study on offshore cash held by large
corporations commissioned by Senator Carl Levin found that
about 46% of those corporations’ tax-deferred offshore funds
were actually held in bank accounts in the United States or
invested in American assets.37 In addition, about a third of the
companies surveyed “had placed between three-quarters and
half of their tax-deferred offshore funds in U.S. assets.”38 These
results suggest that a substantial amount of “trapped cash” is
already back in the United States and being invested in U.S.
assets or held in U.S. bank accounts.
Companies also use inversions to add intercompany
debt and “strip earnings” from their U.S.-taxable income. Postinversion, the foreign parent company loans money to its
domestic subsidiary, and that domestic subsidiary takes a tax
deduction for interest paid to the parent.39 One accounting
study notes that “[d]espite managements’ claims that
inversion-related savings will be due to the avoidance of U.S.
tax on foreign earnings, . . . most of the tax savings is
attributable to avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings [through
earnings stripping].”40 The Treasury Department also noted in
a 2002 report that corporate inversions facilitate earnings
stripping, and in a 2007 report that “[i]nversion transactions

37 Offshore
Funds
Located
Onshore
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/new-data-showcorporate-offshore-funds-not-trapped-abroad-nearly-half-of-so-called-offshore-fundsalready-in-the-united-states.
38 Id.
39 Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings
Stripping Through Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805, 806 (2004) (describing the
prevalence of earnings stripping among inverting companies).
40 Id. at 807.
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provide evidence that the earnings stripping rules are not fully
achieving their intended purposes.”41
B.

Government Responses to Inversions

Since a corporation’s tax savings is a government’s loss,
policymakers have taken notice. In response to three previous
generations of corporate inversions, legislators and policymakers
have imposed a number of rules that make it impossible for
corporations to leave the United States only for tax purposes, as
they did in earlier generations of inversions. Current rules ensure
that companies incorporated in domestic jurisdictions can invert
out of the United States only in connection with a foreign
acquisition.42 Despite this rule, inversion activity is once again on
the rise. In response to the inversion activity in the past few
years, the President, Treasury Secretary, and members of
Congress have proposed tax-based policy solutions.
President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget included a
proposal to strengthen and expand current anti-inversion rules.43
Senator Carl Levin introduced a bill mirroring the President’s
proposal.44 In the press release accompanying the proposed
legislation, Senator Levin described corporate inversions as
“about tax avoidance, plain and simple.”45 Senator Sheldon
Whitehouse called the Levin bill a “common sense tax fairness
bill” and declared that “[m]ergers should be driven by
economics, not tax avoidance.”46 Senator Tim Kaine echoed the
sentiments, saying that the bill was about “rooting out flagrant
abuse in our system that could lead to billions of dollars of lost

41 U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EARNINGS
STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 1-2, 10 (2007),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ajca2007.pdf.
42 See infra Part II.
43 TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 18, at 64-65 (describing the
current provisions of Section 7874, with a particular focus on the ownership test prong,
and outlining the federal budget’s proposal).
44 Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360, 113th Cong. (2014)
(proposing “[t]o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the rules relating
to invert[ing] corporations”).
45 Press Release, Senator Ben Cardin, Senators Introduce Bill to Clamp Down
on Inversions Tax Loophole (May 20, 2014), available at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/senators-introduce-bill-to-clamp-down-on-inversions-tax-loophole
(announcing the Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 and quoting Senator Levin).
46 Id. (quoting Senator Whitehouse).

2015]

THE NEW CORPORATE MIGRATION

817

revenue.”47 Representative Sander Levin also introduced a
companion bill in the House of Representatives.48
In July of 2014, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew sent a letter
to the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee,
urging Congress to pass anti-inversion legislation and to enact tax
system reform. Secretary Lew noted that “these [inverting] firms
are attempting to avoid paying taxes here, notwithstanding the
benefits they gain from being located in the United States,” and
called for “a new sense of economic patriotism, where we all rise
or fall together.”49 Later in July, Senator Levin—along with
Senator Dick Durbin, and two Democrats in the House of
Representatives—introduced another anti-inversion bill: The No
Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act.50 The LevinDurbin anti-inversion bill aimed to expand existing limitations on
awarding federal contracts to foreign corporations.51 Separately,
Senators Harry Reid and Rand Paul advocated for a one-time tax
break to allow companies to repatriate foreign-earned income to
the United States, which may reduce some corporations’ incentives
to invert, at least in the short term.52
Former Treasury Department official Stephen Shay has
also joined the fray, arguing that the Treasury Department is
empowered to and should take action—specifically, by reclassifying
interest from intercompany debt (which is deductible) as equity
(which is not).53 This may significantly reduce the savings from
inversions, much of which comes from post-inversion
restructurings that take advantage of interest deductions.
Likewise, Senator Charles Schumer’s anti-inversion proposal also
tackles the intercompany debt and earnings stripping issue by
Id. (quoting Senator Kaine).
Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, H.R. 4679, 113th Congress (2014)
(proposing “[t]o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the rules relating
to invert[ing] corporations.”).
49 Letter from Jacob J. Lew, U.S. Treas. Sec’y, to Dave Camp, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Ways & Means (Jul. 15, 2014), available at http://im.ft-static.com/content/
images/89217f94-0ca4-11e4-943b-00144feabdc0.pdf.
50 David Gelles, New Legislation Targets Inversions from Different Angle,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jul. 29, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
07/29/new-legislation-targets-inversions-from-different-angle/.
51 Press
Release, Office of Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro, Leading
Congressional Democrats Introduce The No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters
Act, (Jul. 29, 2014), available at http://delauro.house.gov/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=1662:leading-congressional-democrats-introduce-the-nofederal-contracts-for-corporate-deserters-act&catid=2&Itemid=21.
52 Jonathan Weisman, Plan to Refill Highway Fund Stokes Conflict in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 10, 2014, at A15 (providing coverage of plans to replenish
the Highway Trust Fund, including the tax holiday proposal).
53 Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate
Expatriations, 144 TAX NOTES 473, 475 (2014).
47
48
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limiting interest deductions.54 Senator Schumer’s plan “would
reduce the amount of deductible interest for inverted
[corporations]” and restrict corporations’ ability to carry forward
deductions to future years.55
After months of debate and proposed legislation, in
September of 2014, Treasury and the IRS issued Notice 2014-52,
announcing planned regulations aimed at reducing the tax
benefits of inversions.56 The promised regulations attempt to
combat inversions in three major ways.
First, and most significantly, the regulations eliminate
the benefits from so-called “hopscotch loans.” Hopscotch loans
are intercompany loans that allow domestic corporations to
avoid certain taxes. Prior to the Notice, domestic corporations
that received loans from their controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs) had to treat the loans as if the money had been
repatriated to the United States as a dividend, and therefore
had to pay taxes on that dividend. Using a hopscotch loan, a
corporation avoids those taxes by causing a CFC to make a loan
to the domestic corporation’s new foreign parent company,
rather than to the domestic corporation directly. The promised
regulations eliminate the benefits of hopscotch loans by making
these loans subject to the same tax that would be owed if the
CFC had made the loan directly to the domestic corporation.
Second, the promised regulations reduce the tax
benefits of typical post-inversion restructuring strategies. For
instance, many post-inversion restructurings cause former
CFCs of the domestic corporation to become direct subsidiaries
of the new foreign parent—a technique known as “out from
under planning.” The promised regulations will treat the new
foreign parent as continuing to own the CFC indirectly through
the domestic corporation. This means that the subsidiary
continues to be a CFC subject to U.S. taxation.
Third, the new regulations strengthen existing
requirements regarding the size of merger partners. Modern
inversions are accomplished through cross-border business
combinations, and existing rules specify that shareholders of
the U.S. inverter cannot hold more than 60% or 80% of the
54 S.
2786, 113th Cong. (proposed Sept. 10, 2014), available at
https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2786/BILLS-113s2786is.pdf (last accessed Jan. 6, 2015).
55 Richard Rubin, Schumer Details Interest Deduction Limits in Inversions,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0814/schumer-details-interest-deduction-limits-in-inversions.html.
56 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, supra note 19; Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to
Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx.
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stock of the combined company post-combination. (Certain
restrictions apply if shareholders hold more than 80% of the
combined company’s stock, and additional restrictions apply at
the 60% threshold.)57 In order to meet the 60% or 80%
thresholds, companies sometimes manipulate the size of the
target foreign business partner—for instance, by paying a
special “skinny down” dividend prior to the inversion in order
to reduce the target’s size. The new regulations disregard many
of these efforts to manipulate the computation of whether the
60% or 80% thresholds have been met.
The Notice ends with a note that the IRS “expects to issue
additional guidance to further limit inversion transactions,” and,
“[i]n particular, . . . guidance to address strategies that avoid U.S.
tax on U.S. operations by shifting or ‘stripping’ U.S.-source
earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions, including through
intercompany debt.”58
The Notice, like several previous generations of
inversion policy, is precisely calculated to reduce the benefits of
present-generation inversion transactions. Practitioners have
noted that the Notice “takes a significant step in eliminating
many of the tax benefits that could be derived from postinversion transactions with the U.S. company’s new foreign
affiliates,”59 and “threatens the possibility of future restrictions
on [earnings stripping].”60
C.

Inversion Scholarship

While it is clear that policymakers and the press have
spilled much ink about corporate inversions, these transactions
are under-explored in the legal academic literature. Among the
most comprehensive doctrinal articles on corporate inversions
is a decade-old student note that explains features of the U.S.
corporate tax system that motivate corporate inversions and
advances a behavioral finance theory to explain inversion

See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
Id.
59 KIM BLANCHARD & DAVIS BOWER, WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, TAX ALERT:
IRS ISSUES MORE RULES AFFECTING INVERSIONS (Sept. 29, 2014), available at
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/tax_alert_irs_affects_inversions_v41.pdf
(summarizing key components of Notice 2014-52 in a notice to clients).
60 MICHAEL L. SCHLER, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, NEW TAX
RESTRICTIONS ON INVERSIONS, available at http://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/
Documents/Publications/3494991_1.PDF (last access Mar. 22, 2015) (summarizing
Notice 2014-52 in a notice to clients).
57

58
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activity.61 Another decade-old article compares differences in
corporate governance law between the United States and
Bermuda (a popular inversion destination for prior-generation
inverters).62 Professor Michael Kirsch also contributed an article
in 2005 focusing on Congressional responses to corporate
inversions, analyzing the symbolic and social-norm aspects of
the responses.63 On the empirical side, Professors Mihir A. Desai
and James R. Hines’s article tracing the empirical determinants
of corporate inversions, with a focus on the then-in-progress
Stanley Works inversion (which was later canceled due to
public pressure), is particularly thorough.64 Professors Jim A.
Seida and William F. Wempe’s accounting scholarship provides
insight into how inverters use intercompany debt to strip
earnings during and after inversions.65
In contrast to previous work, which generally focuses on
individual clusters of inversion activity, this Article considers
the development of inversion activity in the United States over
several decades. It also contributes an analysis of the tax and
non-tax collateral consequences of inversion activity and
considers how inversions impact corporations and the public.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Inversions have collateral consequences for both
corporations and the public, and these consequences ought to
be considered as policymakers grapple with the next generation
of inversion policy. Since the first inversion in the early 1980s,
corporations have tried to save on taxes through corporate
inversions, and the government has battled inversion activity
with tax laws and regulations. The result has been four
generations of inversions, in which the hidden costs of
inversion policy have risen steadily. Analyzing the history of
61 See generally Chorvat, supra note 28 (arguing that the corporate inversions
of the late 1990s and early 2000s may be explained by corporate managers exploiting
market imperfections to reduce the cost of inverting to a level that makes it profitable for
companies to invert). Chorvat also followed up with a work in progress that argues that
policymakers are incorrectly penalizing inversion activity by designing the tax penalty
around the stock price at the time of inversion. See Elizabeth Chorvat, “Looking Through”
Corporate Expatriations for Buried Intangibles (University of Chicago, Public Law
Working Paper No. 445, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2309915.
62 See Kun, supra note 31.
63 See Kirsch, supra note 28, at 483-84.
64 See Desai & Hines, supra note 12.
65 See Seida & Wempe, supra note 39.
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these transactions is critical to addressing future generations
of corporate inversion activity. This Part overviews the four
generations of corporate inversion activity and government
responses.
A.

The First Generation

Tax has always been the centerpiece of the corporate
inversion conversation. The early 1980s saw one of the first
corporate inversions: McDermott Inc.’s move to Panama.66
McDermott was a Delaware-incorporated, Texas-headquartered
public company that provided engineering and other services
related to offshore oil and gas operations.67
In 1982, McDermott announced that it would invert to
Panama.68 One of McDermott’s Panamanian subsidiaries,
McDermott International, launched a public tender offer for
McDermott Inc.’s shares, offering to buy shares of McDermott Inc.
from McDermott Inc.’s public shareholders in exchange for
newly issued shares of McDermott International and cash.69
When the transaction was completed, McDermott International
was the parent company, and McDermott Inc. was one of its
U.S. subsidiaries.70
McDermott enjoyed many tax benefits as a result of
inverting to Panama: in its disclosures, McDermott noted that the
inversion “enable[d] the McDermott Group to retain, re-invest
and redeploy earnings from operations outside the United States
without subjecting such earnings to United States income tax.”71
The company cited mounting global competition as a driving factor
66 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Corporate Inversion
Transactions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1793 (2002) (describing the McDermott corporate
inversion as “[t]he first well-known corporate inversion from the U.S.”); Hicks, supra note
11 (describing McDermott’s corporate inversion as “[t]he first inversion transaction that
generated a significant amount of government and tax community attention”); Kirsch,
supra note 28, at n.1 (describing the “first modern inversion” as having occurred in 1983);
Steven Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self-Help International Tax Reform for U.S.
Multinationals?, 92 TAXES—THE TAX MAG., Mar. 2014, at 63, 64-65 (describing
McDermott’s corporate inversion as “[o]ne of the earliest and most well-known corporate
inversion transactions” and outlining the structure of the transaction).
67 Surdell, supra note 66, at 64.
68 Because McDermott’s shareholders received some cash in the transaction,
the corporate inversion was taxable to McDermott’s shareholders—however, most
shareholders recognized a loss. See id. at 64-65; Hicks, supra note 11, at 903.
69 Hicks, supra note 11, at 903; Surdell, supra note 66, at 65.
70 After the transaction was completed in 1983, public shareholders owned
about 90% of McDermott International’s stock, and McDermott International owned
most of the stock of McDermott Inc., which was at that point a U.S. subsidiary of
McDermott International. See Hicks, supra note 11, at 903-04.
71 Surdell, supra note 66, at 59.
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in its decision, stating that the inversion “will enable the
McDermott Group to compete more effectively with foreign
companies by taking advantage of additional opportunities for
expansion which require long-term commitments, the
redeployment of assets and the reinvestment of earnings.”72
McDermott’s corporate inversion kicked off the first
generation of inversions. McDermott reveled in its tax savings
(estimated to be about $200 million73), accomplished through a
transaction that was tax-free to the corporation. Congress
responded by adding Section 1248(i) to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 (the Code), making McDermott-like transactions taxable.74
Here, we pause to take a deeper dive into some of the
technical details of the McDermott transaction. First, how was
McDermott able to “redeploy earnings from operations outside the
United States without subjecting such earnings to United States
income tax” after its inversion?75 Generally, U.S. companies can
defer payment on their foreign-earned income until that income
is repatriated to the United States. However, the so-called
subpart F anti-deferral rules provide that certain types of mobile
subpart F income earned by CFCs are taxed when earned, not
when repatriated into the United States.76 Before its inversion,
McDermott International was a CFC—it could not defer paying
taxes on subpart F income. The inversion allowed McDermott
International and its foreign subsidiaries to shed their CFC
statuses.77 As non-CFCs, these foreign companies were no
longer subject to subpart F rules, so they did not have to pay
taxes in the United States on subpart F income.
Id.
Hicks, supra note 11, at 904.
74 Initially, the government responded by suing McDermott and trying to
impose a shareholder-level tax, but that case was unsuccessful. See Bhada v. Comm’r,
89 T.C. 959 (1987), aff’d, 892 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1989). In Bhada, the IRS argued that
McDermott shareholders received a taxable distribution from McDermott under a Code
Section 304(a) transaction, which would have negative tax consequences for
McDermott’s shareholders. Code Section 304(a) applies when a subsidiary acquires a
parent company’s stock from parent shareholders in exchange for property. For a
detailed discussion of Bhada, see Surdell, supra note 66, at 66.
75 Surdell, supra note 66 at 65.
76 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.951-1-1.964-5 (2012). “Subpart F rules” refer to rules
under Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part III, Subpart F (§§ 951-65) of the Code.
77 McDermott International was, prior to the corporate inversion, a CFC of
McDermott Inc. When McDermott International’s stock became widely held by the
public and fewer than 50% of the company was owned by shareholders who owned 10%
or more of McDermott International, McDermott International and the foreign
subsidiaries organized under it ceased to qualify as CFCs. Hicks, supra note 11, at 904
(describing the mechanism by which McDermott International ceased being a CFC); see
also I.R.C. § 957(a) (defining a CFC as a foreign corporation if more than 50% of the
corporation is owned by U.S. shareholders who each own 10% or more of the company).
72
73
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Anti-deferral rules explain why McDermott’s inversion
was not taxable to the corporation. Section 1248 is an antideferral rule. If Section 1248 applies to a particular transaction,
the income from the sale of stock in the transaction is taxed:
specifically, a foreign corporation’s earnings are treated as though
they were distributed as a dividend to the corporation’s U.S.
shareholder (in tax parlance, these earnings are “deemed
dividends”).78 At the time McDermott inverted, McDermott-like
transactions were not subject to Section 1248. The addition of
Section 1248(i) ensured that de-controlling transactions like
McDermott’s were subject to Section 1248. Recall that in the
McDermott transaction, McDermott Inc. owned all of McDermott
International, and McDermott International bought its
McDermott Inc. stock directly from McDermott Inc. Post-Section
1248(i), those types of transactions would be recharacterized, and
for tax purposes, the IRS would pretend that two things had
happened: (1) McDermott Inc. had first received McDermott
International stock, and (2) had then transferred the stock to
McDermott Inc.’s shareholders. Thus, McDermott Inc. would
need to recognize and pay taxes on dividend income with
respect to the previously untaxed earnings and profits of
McDermott International under Section 1248(f).79 In effect, for
de-CFC-ing transactions, Section 1248(i) treated that foreignearned income as repatriated to the United States and taxed it.
However, Section 1248(i) did not remove all of the potential tax
benefits: the taxable amount is limited by several factors, such
as the foreign tax credit position of the former U.S. parent
company. In addition, Section 1248(i) does not require the
former U.S. parent company to recognize gain in excess of the
former CFC’s earnings and profits.80
Section 1248(i) was the government’s first tax-based
attack on corporate inversions, but it would not be the last.
78 Specifically, if a U.S. person (such as a domestic corporation incorporated
in a U.S. jurisdiction, like McDermott Inc.) satisfying certain ownership requirements
sells or exchanges stock in a CFC, then the gain recognized on the sale or exchange is
included as a dividend in the gross income of the U.S. person, up to the amount of the
earnings and profits of the CFC. See WILLIAM R. SKINNER, FENWICK & WEST LPP,
SECTION 1248 AND DISPOSITIONS OF CFC STOCK (Jan. 18, 2013), available at
http://content.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Section_1248_Outline.pdf
(describing
Section 1248 and dispositions of CFC stock thereunder); see also I.R.C. § 1248 (2012).
79 Hicks, supra note 11, at 904; see generally I.R.C. § 1248 (2012) (providing
the rules under which gain from certain sales and exchanges of stock in certain foreign
corporations will be taxed). Additionally, because McDermott “transferred” the stock to
its shareholders, the stock issuance to its shareholders would be a transaction that was
taxable to McDermott Inc. under Code Section 311. See Surdell, supra note 66, at 66.
80 Hicks, supra note 11, at 905.
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The Second Generation

Corporate inversion activity quieted for nearly a decade
after McDermott. Along with the addition of Section 1248(i),
bad press related to inversions may have also played a role in
slowing inversion activity: a failed lawsuit against McDermott
by the IRS earlier in the corporate inversion process drew
negative attention from the press and public. But in the mid1990s, Helen of Troy Corporation inverted to Bermuda.
Texas-incorporated Helen of Troy got its start selling
wigs in El Paso, Texas in the 1960s.81 To say that Helen of Troy
“grew over the years” would be an immense understatement:
today, Helen of Troy calls itself a “consumer products”
company,82 and distributes a variety of everyday products,
including products marketed under brands like Dr. Scholl’s,
Vidal Sassoon, OXO, PUR, Braun, and Vicks.83
In 1994, Helen of Troy inverted to Bermuda. Like
McDermott before it, Helen of Troy noted in its public filings
that the transaction would provide “greater flexibility in
structuring its international business activities to minimize its
non-U.S. income taxes.”84 The transaction was tax-free to the
corporation. To avoid Section 1248(i)’s tax on the earnings and
profits of CFCs, Helen of Troy set up a brand-new non-CFC
corporation that had no earnings and no profits.85
The government, as before, waged its war on tax
grounds. In 1996, the IRS issued regulations under Section
367(a) of the Code.86 Unlike Section 1248(i), which taxed the
inverting corporation, the new regulations targeted shareholders
by imposing a shareholder-level tax on inversions.87
81 Vic Kolenc, Momentum: New Brands Put El Paso Company Helen of Troy on
Path to $1 Billion (May 29, 2011, 12:00 AM), EL PASO TIMES, http://www.elpasotimes.com/
business/ci_18162555 (describing Helen of Troy’s acquisition of several new brands);
Surdell, supra note 66, at 67; Investor Relations—General, HELEN OF TROY,
http://www.hotus.com/investor-relations/general/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (describing
Helen of Troy’s founding).
82 About Helen of Troy, HELEN OF TROY, http://www.hotus.com/about/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2015) (providing an overview of Helen of Troy’s business and products).
83 Our Brands, HELEN OF TROY, http://www.hotus.com/our-brands/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2015) (providing a list of some of Helen of Troy’s current brands).
84 Surdell, supra note 66, at 67 (quoting Helen of Troy’s prospectus).
85 Hicks, supra note 11, at 905.
86 The IRS previewed its response in 1994 by issuing Notice 94-46, which
announced that new corporate inversion-related regulations would be forthcoming
under I.R.C. § 367(a). In the meantime, it issued interim guidance, which was
substantially similar to the final regulations. See I.R.S. Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356.
87 Hicks, supra note 11, at 905; see Surdell, supra note 66, at 68-70; see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) (2014). I.R.C. § 367(a) taxed transfers of U.S. stock
“outbound” to a foreign corporation and did not apply to U.S. persons who owned less
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For readers interested in the technical workings of the
Section 367(a) regulation, an understanding of Section 367(a)
prior to Helen of Troy is necessary. Under general “nonrecognition rules,” certain types of corporate transactions can be
accomplished tax-free: tax-free liquidations,88 tax-free transfers of
property in exchange for control in a corporation,89 shareholder
tax-free exchanges in a reorganization,90 and a few others. Section
367(a) overrides the non-recognition treatment afforded to these
transactions in cases where a foreign corporation is involved. At
the time of Helen of Troy’s corporate inversion, Section 367(a) did
not apply to transactions like Helen of Troy’s—that is, Helen of
Troy’s type of transaction would have been tax-free. Specifically,
Section 367(a) did not apply to U.S. persons who transferred stock
to foreign corporations if the U.S. person owned less than 5% of
the foreign corporation’s stock after the transfer.91
After the new Section 367(a) regulations went into
effect, avoiding shareholder-level taxation under Section 367(a)
became harder: several additional requirements had to be met.
First, all of the U.S. persons transferring stock to the foreign
corporation must, as a group, own 50% or less of the resulting
foreign corporation’s stock.92 This is a big deviation from before
the regulation, when a U.S. transferor’s individual tax liability
was determined based on individual ownership, rather than
ownership as a group. Second, certain U.S. insiders cannot, as a
sub-group, end up owning more than 50% of both the voting
power and the value of the foreign company after the
transaction.93 Third, each individual U.S. transferor must either

than 5% of the vote and value of the foreign corporation immediately after the transfer.
Even those who owned more than 5% of the foreign corporation after the transfer could
side-step tax liability by signing a special agreement with the government. So Helen of
Troy’s shareholders were able to avoid paying taxes on the transfer, even though they
had helped transfer stock of a domestic corporation to a foreign corporation, which was
helping money leave the U.S. tax net. See Hicks, supra note 11, at 905; Surdell, supra
note 66, at 67; and Willard B. Taylor, Corporate Expatriation—Why Not? 78 TAXES—
TAX MAG. 146, 146-47 (2000) (describing the Helen of Troy corporate inversion and
related regulations).
88 I.R.C. § 332 (2012).
89 Id. § 351 (2012).
90 Id. § 356 (2012).
91 And to the extent some shareholders ended up owning more than 5%, the
government imposed an additional anti-abuse requirement: those shareholders were
required to file a gain recognition agreement—an agreement in which the shareholder
agrees to recognize some or all of the gain realized on a transfer if certain gain
recognition events occur during a certain amount of time following the transfer—in order
to avoid taxes. See Surdell, supra note 66, at 68-69.
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) (2014).
93 Id.
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(a) own less than 5% of the foreign corporation immediately after
the transaction or (b) file a gain recognition agreement.94
The fourth requirement, colloquially referred to as the
“active trade or business test,” requires that the foreign
company (or qualified subsidiary, or qualified partnership) be
engaged in an active foreign trade or business outside of the
United States for 36 months prior to the transaction, and have no
plans to dispose of or discontinue the business.95 Helen of Troy’s
inversion would have been subject to a shareholder-level tax,
and Helen of Troy’s newly established subsidiary would not
have passed the active trade or business test.96
Finally, transactions must pass the “substantiality test.”97
Broadly speaking, this test requires that the foreign acquirer
must be at least as big98 as the U.S. target company—no foreign
minnows swallowing domestic whales, because minnows
swallowing whales are presumably doing so for tax reasons.99
The government’s tax-based response to Helen of Troy’s
corporate inversion was meant to halt inversion activity—a
shareholder-level tax was meant to make public-company
inversions very unpalatable to shareholders. Other factors may
have also contributed to the slow-down in inversions. Previous
studies, for instance, have cited increased visibility of inversions
in the public eye as a factor. Government action may have also
raised the profile of corporate inversions, causing corporations to
reconsider whether inversions are worth the potential backlash
from shareholders, customers, and the public.100
Id.
Id.
96 This test is considered the most complicated factor—what qualifies as a
“qualified subsidiary,” “qualified partnership,” and “active trade or business outside of
the United States” are all carefully defined in the regulation. Recall that Helen of
Troy’s corporate inversion skirted section 1248(i), enacted in response to McDermott’s
corporate inversion, by setting up a brand-new Bermudan subsidiary with no earnings
and no profits. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.367(a)-3(c)(3)(i).
97 Id.; Hicks, supra note 11, at 906.
98 Size is based on fair market value, which is not carefully defined.
99 Hicks, supra note 11, at 906.
100 See Kirsch, supra note 28, at 520-24. Note that after Section 367(a), a few
self-inversions went through, using exchangeable shares as a way to defer immediate
payment of the shareholder-level tax. Hicks, supra note 11, at 907. Exchangeable
shares are shares of a corporation with economic entitlements that closely resemble
those of another company. For instance, when Triton Energy Corp. decided to invert to
the Caymans in 1996, Triton Energy bought its shareholders’ shares, and gave
shareholders a choice of what they could receive in return: (1) Class-A ordinary shares
of the newly formed Triton Cayman or (2) an “equity unit” that consisted of a bit of
Triton Delaware preferred stock plus one Class B share of Triton Cayman. Both
options were of approximately equal value. U.S. shareholders who chose the first option
would have their gains taxed (i.e., Section 367 would apply), but U.S. shareholders who
chose the second option would be able to defer a substantial portion of their taxable
94
95
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The Third Generation

The third generation of corporate inversions began in the
early 2000s with the self-inversions of Ingersoll-Rand, Nabors
Industries, Noble Drilling, and Cooper Industries, and ended
with Stanley Works’ announced-but-canceled inversion in 2002.
Once again, companies chased the promise of tax
savings. Houston-headquartered, Ohio-incorporated Cooper
Industries, Inc., which announced its inversion to Bermuda in
2002, was one such company.101 Brothers Charles and Elias
Cooper founded Cooper Industries in Ohio in 1833 and sold
plows, hog troughs, kettles, and stoves.102 By 2002, Cooper
Industries had over $4.2 billion in annual revenues103 and
employed over 30,000 people.104
Like its corporate inversion predecessors, Cooper
Industries cited tax reasons for its corporate inversion: it noted
that inverting would improve its global tax position and reduce
its effective tax rate from about 35% to 18-23%.105 In order to
invert to Bermuda, Cooper Industries formed a new Bermudan
subsidiary, and under it, a domestic subsidiary corporation,
U.S. MergerCo. U.S. MergerCo merged into Cooper Industries,
and Cooper Industries survived. In the merger process, Cooper
Industries’s public shareholders received stock in the
Bermudan subsidiary, and shares of U.S. MergerCo’s stock
previously held by the Bermudan subsidiary were converted
into shares of Cooper Industries. After the transactions were
completed, the public owned the Bermudan company, and the
Bermudan company owned Cooper Industries.106
Several factors may have worked together to account for
the increase in popularity of inversions. First, the early 2000s’
dip in stock prices107 simultaneously made corporate inversions
cheaper for shareholders and more important for corporate
managers. From the shareholders’ perspective, lower stock
prices meant that the shareholder-level tax was a smaller
gain by retaining interest in the U.S. company. See Triton Energy Corp., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 2, 35-36 (Feb. 23, 1996).
101 Cooper Indus., Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 2 (Jun. 11,
2001) (offering securities in connection with the formation of a holding company).
102 History, COOPER INDUS. PLC, http://www1.cooperindustries.com/company/
company-history.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2015) (providing information on the history of
Cooper Industries).
103 Cooper Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11 (Feb. 20, 2002).
104 Id. at 3.
105 Cooper Indus., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), supra note 101, at 13-14.
106 Surdell, supra note 66, at 73-74.
107 Hicks, supra note 11, at 907.
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amount in absolute terms (or even zero, for those shareholders
who had losses).108 Many shareholders were also tax-exempt or
tax-indifferent. At the same time, managers felt pressured to
increase shareholder value, and inversions could bump up
stock prices.109 Transactional innovation also played a role.
Although transfer pricing and intercompany debt helped make
second-generation corporate inversions worthwhile, empirical
studies show that third-generation corporate inversions really
made use of intercompany debt to strip earnings from the
United States. In practice, this meant that the new foreign
parent extended an intercompany loan to its U.S. subsidiary.
The U.S. subsidiary then deducted interest paid on the loan
from its taxable income in the United States. Meanwhile, the
foreign parent’s corresponding interest income was realized
abroad, where it was taxed at a low or zero foreign rate and
subject to no U.S. tax.110
Several public companies announced corporate
inversions between 2000 and 2002, but this third generation of
corporate inversions abruptly stopped in 2002, a few months after
Connecticut-incorporated hand-tool company Stanley Works
announced in February of 2002 its plan to invert to Bermuda.
Unlike many prior inverters, Stanley Works was an iconic
American company and a household name—today, it is known as
Stanley Black & Decker, and its products line the aisles of homeimprovement stores. After Stanley Works announced its intention
to invert, it endured months of press frenzy, public protests at
company headquarters, and political pressure to stop the
inversion. Finally, in August, before a final shareholder vote111
could be held, Stanley Works withdrew its inversion plan, stating:
Id.
Id. In their 2002 empirical study, however, Desai and Hines found that
corporate inversion announcements do not always drive up stock prices. They studied 19
companies that made corporate inversion announcements between 1993 and 2002, and
found that only eight of the 19 companies had positive abnormal returns on stock price
the day after the announcement, and only 10 had positive abnormal returns on stock
price during the five-day window around the time of the corporate inversion
announcement. They conclude that “[c]learly, the stock market is concerned in many
cases either that the costs of inverting exceed the benefits under current law, or that
future tax or regulatory changes might reduce the benefits of inverting.” Desai & Hines,
supra note 12, at 430.
110 See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EARNINGS
STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 2 (Nov. 28, 2007),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ajca2007.pdf; Seida &
Wempe, supra note 39, at 806-07 (finding that for several inverters that inverted in
2001 and 2002, intercompany debt played a big role in U.S. earnings stripping and
contributed to lowered effective tax rates); Surdell, supra note 66, at 73.
111 Stanley Works’ shareholders initially approved the transaction in May.
However, Stanley Works’ board of directors voided the first vote, citing shareholder
108
109
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We [Stanley Works] have been asked by the Congressional
leadership on both sides of the aisle to support their efforts toward
rectifying this situation by enacting legislation that will create a
level playing field for companies incorporated in the U.S. We have
honored their request, and the ball is now in their court. We
sincerely hope that Congress will agree to a solution. Ignoring this
problem will not make it go away, but can only accelerate the trend
of fewer U.S. headquartered companies.112

In its cancelation announcement, Stanley Works called
the United States’s tax system “archaic” and accused the
system of “putting U.S. companies that compete globally in an
untenable position.”113
As it did in response to previous generations of inversions,
the government changed the rules in 2004 to disincentivize
inversions. Congress added Section 7874 to the Code as part of
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, making it harder for
domestic companies to invert.114 Under Section 7874, a domestic
corporation that engages in a cross-border business
combination and that attempts to end up incorporated in a
foreign jurisdiction must make sure that after the acquisition,
less than 60% of the combined company’s stock is owned by the
former shareholders of the domestic company by reason of their
holding stock in the domestic company.115 In inversion parlance,

confusion about the voting procedures. See Stanley Works, Prospectus (Form 425) (May
13, 2002) (canceling the initial shareholder vote while citing shareholder confusion
about procedures). There was supposed to be a second shareholder vote, but the
corporate inversion plan was aborted before it could take place. Dan Ackman, Stanley
Works Stays Home, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2002, 8:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
2002/08/02/0802topnews.html.
112 Stanley Works, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 1, 2002) (announcing the
cancellation of its previously-announced plan to invert).
113 Id.
114 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
115 Section 7874 applies when all three of the following criteria are met:
(1) A foreign corporation acquires a U.S. corporation or partnership (often
called the “acquisition test”); and
(2) after the acquisition, at least 60% of the foreign corporation’s stock is
owned by the former shareholders of the U.S. company by reason of their
holding stock in the U.S. company (the “ownership test”); and
(3) the corporate group controlled by the foreign corporation does not have
business activities in the foreign corporation’s country of incorporation when
compared to the total business activities of the group worldwide (the
“substantial business activities test.” Note that this analysis is done on the
activities of the corporate group the year before the acquisition).
See 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2012).
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a company that has less than 60% shareholder overlap is said to
have less than 60% “ownership continuity.”116
Ownership continuity triggers two levels of penalties for
an inverting corporation.117 Inverting corporations with more
than 80% ownership continuity will continue to be taxed as
domestic corporations. If ownership continuity is between 60%
and 80%, Section 7874 imposes a gain recognition requirement,
which restricts the inverter in some ways—for instance, by
limiting the inverter’s use of certain tax attributes to offset gains
in the years after the inversion.118 In addition, the inverting
corporation’s ability to use net operating losses to reduce taxation
of its inversion gain is limited.119
The exception to ownership continuity is the “substantial
business activities test”: if a corporation has substantial business
operations in its new foreign jurisdiction, it can invert despite
substantial ownership continuity.120 A corporation has substantial
business activities in a country to which it is moving its
incorporation jurisdiction if it meets the “25% test”:121
•

at least 25% of its employees are located in the new foreign
jurisdiction,

•

at least 25% of its employee compensation is attributable to the
new foreign jurisdiction,

•

at least 25% of the multinational group’s asset value is located
in that country, and

•

at least 25% of the multinational group’s total income is derived
in that country.122

116 See Hal Hicks & Oshan James, Select Corporate Migration and
Combination Considerations in an Ever Changing Environment, INT’L TAX J., MayJune 2014, at 25, 30 (2014).
117 See Surdell, supra note 66, at 74; Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions
Under 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699, 704 (2010).
118 Surdell, supra note 66, at 74-75; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7874(d)(2).
119 VanderWolk, supra note 117, at 704 n.24.
120 This tightening of the rule may have been in response to a number of selfinversions, including Aon Corp’s and Rowan Companies Inc.’s, that relied on a previous
(and more flexible) “facts and circumstances” test. See Bret Wells, Cant and the
Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429 (July 2012)
(discussing the facts and circumstances test for the substantial business activities test
under Section 7874).
121 See Surdell, supra note 66, at 78-79; Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T(a)-(b)(3) (2013).
122 Surdell, supra note 66, at 78-79; Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T(a)-(b)(3) (2013)
(establishing the 25% bright-line test).
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The Fourth Generation

Although corporate inversion activity slowed for some
time after Section 7874, it has picked up again in the last halfdecade. Because inverting companies have a hard time escaping
Section 7874’s applicability through the 25% substantial business
activities test,123 many fourth-generation inverters have focused
on making sure that there is not too much ownership continuity
between the old U.S. company and the new combined company.
In order to have low ownership continuity, fourth-generation
corporate inversions are accomplished through business
combinations with non-U.S. companies.124
Actavis’s corporate inversion is a good case study, as it
is fairly representative of the current generation of inversions.
In May of 2013, Actavis, Inc., a Nevada-incorporated company
headquartered in New Jersey, announced its intention to
purchase Ireland’s Warner Chilcott plc in a stock-for-stock
transaction valued at about $8.5 billion.125
To complete the transaction, Actavis formed an Irish
company (New Actavis) and a number of wholly owned
subsidiaries under New Actavis.126 Then, Actavis merged with
and into one of New Actavis’s wholly owned subsidiaries,
cancelling Actavis’s shares and giving its shareholders the
right to receive shares of New Actavis.127 At the same time,
New Actavis acquired Warner Chilcott. In the process, Warner
Chilcott’s shares were also canceled and Warner Chilcott
shareholders received the right to a fraction of a New Actavis
share for each Warner Chilcott share they previously held.128 At
the end of the transaction, New Actavis was the parent
company of both Actavis and Warner Chilcott. Former Actavis
shareholders owned 77% of the New Actavis shares, and former
123 Even some companies that have significant operations abroad may have
difficulty meeting the 25% bright-line rule because the assets of the post-combination
company do not include intangible assets in the calculation. Thus, companies with
large amounts of assets abroad—but largely comprised of intangible assets—will have
trouble meeting the 25% bright-line rule. Surdell, supra note 66, at 79.
124 Id.
125 Press Release, Actavis, Inc., Actavis to Acquire Warner Chilcott to Create
Premier $11 Billion Revenue Global Specialty Pharmaceutical Company (May 20, 2013),
available at http://ir.actavis.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=irol-newsarticle&ID=1821961;
Actavis, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 1, 2013) (noting Actavis’s place of
incorporation and headquarters location).
126 Actavis, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424b3) 12-15 (Jul. 31, 2013) (describing
and illustrating the pre- and post-transaction structures of Actavis, New Actavis, and
Warner Chilcott).
127 Id. at 14.
128 Id. at 13-14.
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Warner Chilcott shareholders owned 23% of the New Actavis
shares. Because ownership continuity between former Actavis
shareholders and New Actavis shareholders was only 77% (and
thus did not reach 80%), Actavis successfully inverted out of
the United States, although it was still subject to the tightened
rules because ownership continuity exceeded 60%.129
Like previous generations of corporate inverters, the
current generation of inverters cites tax savings, including
savings realized by accessing trapped cash, as a key reason for
inverting. In public filings, Actavis noted that inverting would
lower its effective tax rate from 28% to 17%.130 Actavis CEO
Paul Bisaro also told investors that Actavis expected
“substantial operational synergies and some tax synergies and
overall tax structure benefits,”131 and that the acquisition would
allow us to use our balance sheet and our tax structure to go and get
many more of those assets that we were handicapped trying to get
before . . . . So if we’re looking now at assets that are overseas and
we can bring to the U.S., further enhancing our pipeline, we now
have a vehicle to do that . . . .132

In other words, Actavis’s corporate inversion was motivated, in
part, by the desire to access cash trapped overseas.
Likewise, when Minnesota-based Medtronic, Inc.
announced its decision to invert to Ireland by acquiring Irish
company Covidien plc., commentators emphasized that the deal
was driven by Medtronic’s desire to “bring the amount of [its]
‘trapped’ offshore cash down to about 40 percent of its total
cash, from 60 percent as a stand-alone firm.”133 U.S. companies
Id. at 15.
Id. at 70 (noting that “the expected combined company effective non-GAAP
tax rate of approximately 17%, as opposed to the current non-GAAP effective tax rate
of Actavis of 28%”). Note that Actavis’s pre-inversion corporate tax rate was already
lower than the oft-quoted 35% U.S. corporate tax rate, because it had already engaged
in prior transactions that lowered its tax rate.
131 Actavis, Inc., Prospectus (Form 425) 2 (May 20, 2013). In response to a
question asked during an investor call in conjunction with the deal, Actavis CEO Paul
Bisaro stated that, “I think I again would come back to the fact that as we looked at the
strategic value of Warner Chilcott in Actavis’ hands it became a compelling story for
us. It was compelling from a commercial perspective.” In the same response, Bisaro
stated, “[a]nd then, finally, we will receive the benefit, the combined company will
receive the benefit of a better overall tax structure . . . .” Id. at 15.
132 Id. at 15. In response to a question asked during an investor call, Bisaro said
that the Warner Chilcott acquisition “was the perfect opportunity for that for all the
reasons we’ve already discussed and had the added benefit of being able to deal with
something that was always troubling to me, which was the tax structure, and I think
we’ve really found a way to deal with that and make us competitive in a global
environment.” Id. at 20.
133 Gelles, supra note 34.
129
130
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with a lot of intellectual property, especially, have moved their
intellectual property abroad so as to avoid paying high U.S.
taxes on the income generated by that intellectual property.134
By inverting, many companies are able to access trapped cash
that they were otherwise unwilling to bring into the United
States.
Inverting companies have asserted that tax reforms
abroad play a role in driving recent inversions. For instance, the
United Kingdom recently adopted tax reforms, including lower
corporate tax rates, in part because many U.K. companies were
inverting to tax-friendly Ireland.135 When Ensco International
Incorporated left the United States for the United Kingdom in
2010, it noted that
the U.K. has taken steps to decrease uncertainty about its international
tax regime by proposing the liberalization of certain of its international
tax provisions to better harmonize them with the foreign dividend
exemption system recently implemented in the U.K.136

Recent inversions may also be driven in part by the fact
that inversions to Europe may be easier to sell to the public
and shareholders than inversions to traditional tax havens.
Stanley Works’s corporate inversion to a traditional tax haven
played a big role in drowning its inversion and spurred the
addition of Section 7874. Inverting to jurisdictions that are not
considered tax havens means that corporations can avoid some
public stigma.
President Obama and both houses of Congress proposed
anti-inversion actions in 2014. President Obama’s 2015 budget
134 Jonathan D. Rockoff, Why Pharma is Flocking to Inversions: Deals Enable
Companies to Take Advantage of Lower Tax Rates Overseas, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 14, 2014,
1:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/why-pharma-is-flocking-to-inversions-1405360384
(“Even companies that haven’t done inversions have used other methods to cut their taxes.
Biogen Idec, Celgene Corp. and Gilead Sciences Inc. have ‘domiciled’ the intellectual
property for various drugs outside the U.S. to lower the taxes they pay on sales,
according to RBC Capital Markets”).
135 Steven Surdell discusses the “liberalization” that Ensco mentions in its
prospectus. Specifically, after seeing several prominent U.K.-incorporated companies
reincorporate in tax-friendly Ireland, the U.K. reformed its tax system to lower corporate
tax rates and to more closely resemble a territorial system. Surdell notes that

[t]he activity across the pond was not lost on U.S. multinationals with large
U.K. operations. If the U.K. reformed its international tax system to resemble
a territorial system and also lowered its corporate rate, U.S. incorporated
multinationals could consider unilateral inversions to the U.K. rather than to
traditional “haven” jurisdictions like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands.
Surdell, supra note 66, at 76.
136 ENSCO International Incorporated, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 13,
29 (Nov. 20, 2009).
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proposal, introduced in March 2014, included a provision to
strengthen current anti-inversion rules. Under Section 7874, if
there is ownership continuity of 60% or more, tax penalties
apply. If there is ownership continuity of 80% or more, the
inverting company will not be treated as a foreign company at
all after its corporate inversion—the United States will tax it
as though it had never left the country. The budget proposes
doing away with the 60% to 80% threshold and replacing both
with a 50% threshold.137 Thus, an attempted inverter will still
be taxed as a U.S. corporation if there is ownership continuity
of 50% or more.
In addition, regardless of the level of ownership
continuity, “an inversion transaction [will occur] if the affiliated
group that includes the foreign acquiring corporation has
substantial business activities in the United States and the
foreign acquiring corporation is primarily managed and
controlled in the United States.”138 In other words, if a big Irish
corporation gobbles up a smaller domestic corporation and the
resulting company has substantial business activities in the
United States, and the foreign corporation is “managed and
controlled” in the United States, this transaction will be
considered a corporate inversion, regardless of shareholder
continuity. Finally, the budget proposes an amendment to
Section 7874 so that a corporate inversion could occur if there is
an acquisition of substantially all of the assets of a trade or
business of a domestic partnership.139
Senator Carl Levin’s Stop Corporate Inversions Act of
2014 largely mirrors the budget’s proposals,140 but sunsets in
two years, giving Congress two years to consider comprehensive
tax reform.141 Senator Levin’s bill proposes to lower the ownership
continuity threshold to 50%.142 It also quantifies the “management
and control” sentiment of the budget proposal: a company will
continue to be treated as a U.S. company for tax reasons if “either
25% of its employees or sales or assets are located in the United
States.”143 On the same day that Senator Levin introduced the
bill in the Senate, his brother, Congressman Sander Levin,
introduced a companion bill in the House of Representatives.144
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 18, at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360, 113th Cong. (2014).
See Press Release, Sen. Ben Cardin, supra note 45.
Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360.
See Press Release, Sen. Ben Cardin, supra note 45.
Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, supra note 48.
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After the Levins’ anti-inversion proposals failed to gain
traction, both the executive and legislative branches took further
action. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew sent a letter to the House of
Representatives, urging anti-inversion legislation and corporate
tax reform.145 Shortly thereafter, Senator Levin co-sponsored a bill
with Senator Dick Durbin that would prevent inverted
corporations from obtaining federal government contracts.146
There were also several proposals targeting trapped cash
and earnings stripping. Senators Harry Reid and Rand Paul have
also proposed legislation that may deal with the trapped cash
problem. They have been “quietly pressing for a one-time tax
‘holiday’—a special and lucrative tax deduction—to lure
multinational corporations to bring profits home from overseas,
producing a sudden windfall.”147 This may also reduce some
corporations’ incentives to invert, at least in the short term.
Former Treasury official Stephen Shay has also urged
regulatory action to reduce the incentive for corporations to
invert. Shay argues that the Treasury Secretary has “direct
and powerful regulatory authority to reclassify debt as equity
and thereby transform a deductible interest payment into a
nondeductible dividend,” and notes that under Section 385 of
the Code, “it is possible and appropriate to identify cases in
which the use of related-party debt exceeds thresholds that
should be acceptable in a particular case.”148 Shay proposes
regulations that would cause inverted corporations to reclassify
as equity any intercompany debt issued to a related foreign
entity that is not a CFC, up to a certain amount.149 Since much
of the tax-saving value of corporate inversions is derived from
earnings stripping by injecting intercompany debt, removing
the benefit of that interest deduction takes much of the shine
off of inverting. By way of example, Shay notes that, had a
rumored Walgreens inversion been completed, Walgreens could
have exempted 50% or more of its taxable income from U.S.
income tax by injecting intercompany debt, leading to a tax
savings of $783 million.150 Treasury action reclassifying
intercompany debt as equity, however, would have reduced
See supra note 49, and accompanying text.
See Office of Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro, supra note 51, and
accompanying text.
147 Weisman, supra note 52.
148 Shay, supra note 53, at 474-75 (arguing for regulatory action to reduce the
benefits of corporate inversions).
149 Id. at 475.
150 Shay, supra note 53, at 474.
145

146
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that savings “by hundreds of millions of dollars . . . chang[ing]
the calculus of a decision to expatriate.”151
Like Shay’s proposal, Senator Charles Schumer’s
proposal also tackles the earnings stripping problem by
limiting interest deductions.152 In addition to other technical
aspects, Senator Schumer’s proposal reduces an inverted
corporation’s permitted net interest expense from 50% to 25% of
its net adjusted taxable income. The proposal also repeals the
corporation’s ability to carry forward excess interest deductions
into future years, which is currently allowed. Additionally, an
inverted corporation will need to obtain IRS pre-clearance on
transactions with its parent company for 10 years after the
inversion, which would possibly allow the IRS to limit the
amount of intercompany debt injected, and therefore the amount
of earnings stripping that occurs.153
As with previous generations of inversions, the
government continues to wage war on tax grounds. Once again,
corporations have stated that they invert for tax reasons: to
lower tax rates, to access trapped cash, and to inject
intercompany debt in order to further reduce tax burdens. And,
as before, the government has responded on tax grounds: it has
proposed tightened tax-based restrictions and introduced the
“management and control” concept in order to make it even
harder for corporations to escape the U.S. tax net.
From the perspective of both parties, the war is a zerosum game. For corporations, increasing global competition against
companies that have smaller tax burdens makes inverting out of
the United States an attractive way to lower taxes and access cash
trapped overseas. For the government, every dollar of a
corporation’s tax savings is a corresponding loss in government
tax revenue. As a result, the government has implemented a
series of policies that lower the tax benefits of inverting and
make inverting complicated and difficult. But the Code is
complicated, and corporations are nimble. Whenever a new
generation of anti-inversion policy is enacted, it is only a
matter of time before corporations find a way to invert. And
while comprehensive tax-system overhauls like the United
Kingdom’s—including a move to a territorial system or
Id. at 475.
Rubin, supra note 55.
153 Siobhan Hughes, Q&A: Schumer’s Proposal to Strip Benefits of Corporate
Earnings Stripping, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2014/08/14/qa-schumers-proposal-to-strip-benefits-of-corporate-earnings-stripping/
(reporting on Senator Schumer’s proposal to cap interest deductions).
151
152
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lowering the corporate tax—have been proposed in the United
States and may work in theory, they may be too politically
fraught to be practicable or realistic. In the best of times, a
comprehensive overhaul of the corporate tax system requires
Herculean Congressional effort. And with today’s gridlocked
Congress, many commentators have noted that even the Levin
brothers’ relatively middle-of-the-road proposal is unlikely to
find support on both sides of the political aisle.154
III.

CORPORATE INVERSIONS’ HIDDEN COSTS

The reality that corporations can use inversions to save
on taxes changes corporate behavior, which has non-tax
consequences for the corporation. Inversions also cause negative
externalities—costs borne by the public. These consequences for
the corporation and for the public are exacerbated by the
complexity of modern business-combination inversions. This
Part begins to consider some of the hidden costs of inversions
both for inverting corporations and for the public. In doing so,
this Part reveals a range of under-considered factors that are
relevant to the inversion discussion and begins to consider
whether and to what extent these factors should be considered
in future policy decisions.
Ultimately, while inversions create costs for corporations,
the non-tax hidden costs may not, for each individual inverter,
be sufficient to outweigh an inversion’s tax benefits. However,
the cumulative costs of inversions for the public are worthy of
further research.
A.

Costs to the Inverting Corporation

Tax laws—like all laws and regulations—often have
unanticipated consequences. In this case, the current corporateinversion-related legal and regulatory landscape, combined with
154 See Wendy Diller, Congress And Tax Inversions: A Wall Streeter’s Take On
2014, FORBES (Jul. 16, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wendydiller/
2014/07/16/congress-and-tax-inversions-a-wall-streeters-take-on-2014/ (opining that
“hardliners” are unlikely to support the Levins’ proposal, instead preferring to hold out
and pass comprehensive tax reform when there is a Republican majority in both houses
of Congress); Gelles, New Legislation Targets Inversions From Different Angle, supra
note 50 (noting that the Levins’ bill “failed to gain traction”); Danny Vinik, U.S.
Corporations Are Exploiting a Huge Tax Loophole, but The GOP Doesn’t Want to Close
It, NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117843/levinbrothers-want-end-tax-inversion-gop-refuses (opining that although the Levins’ bill
“has 13 Democratic co-sponsors in the Senate and nine in the House, [it] is unlikely to
find much support among Republicans”).
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the corporate inversions that are executed because of it, creates
costs for inverting corporations. This sub-Part unpacks some of
the ways that inversions and inversion policy can change
corporate behavior, revealing factors that are under-discussed.
While these non-tax factors may not be sufficient to outweigh
inversions’s tax benefits, they are worth discussing and certainly
worthy of consideration by potential inverters.
1. Transition Costs
Currently, corporations can leave the United States for
lower-tax jurisdictions by inverting. For some corporations, a
desire to lower their tax bills may be the primary driver of a reincorporation decision. The act of reincorporation abroad,
however, comes with transition costs.
These transition costs include the costs associated with
learning a new corporate law and corporate governance regime.
A corporation that has spent decades incorporated in Delaware
is already familiar with the nuances of Delaware corporate law.
A corporation that inverts to Ireland or the United Kingdom
incurs the cost of learning a new body of law, and the
differences may be substantial.
In the everyday governance context, for instance, there
are material differences between dividend payout rules in
Delaware and in Ireland. Under Delaware law, a corporation
can pay out dividends if it has surplus—a fairly squishy concept
that allows a corporation a great deal of leeway in dividend
payments.155 In contrast, under Irish law, dividend payouts are
based on the concept of distributable reserves.156 Capital
reduction is one way to create distributable reserves, but capital
reduction requires shareholder approval and approval by the
Irish High Court.157 While this approval may be a rubber-stamp
process, it is still an additional restriction to dividend payments
that is not imposed on a Delaware corporation.
Shareholder derivative suits are also handled
substantially differently in the United Kingdom. Shareholder
derivative suits—lawsuits in which a corporation’s shareholder
sues (often a corporation’s management) on behalf of a
155 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170 (providing for the distribution of dividends of
Delaware corporations).
156 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1983, § 45 (1983) (providing restrictions of
profits and assets).
157 Companies Act of 1963, § 74 (1963) (describing the process by which the
court approves a capital reduction).
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corporation—are common in the United States.158 In the United
Kingdom, there is relatively limited access to such suits. Until the
passage of the Companies Act 2006, shareholder derivative suits
were governed by complex common law and were therefore
rare.159 The Companies Act 2006 established a new two-stage
procedure to obtain court permission to continue derivative
actions, eradicating the common law procedures for bringing a
shareholder derivative suit. This change was thought to make
shareholder derivative suits slightly easier to sustain,160
although the two-stage court-permission process is still
cumbersome relative to the United States’s process. In the
United States, a shareholder need only first demand that
management bring a suit, and can then sue if management
refuses.161 Evidence from the years directly after the U.K. laws
went into effect also did not indicate a great uptick in the number
of shareholder derivative suit opinions reported.162 The United
Kingdom’s relatively cumbersome shareholder derivative suit
rules, combined with the relatively low numbers of derivative
suits reported, suggests that shareholders of corporations that
have inverted to the United Kingdom may have less access to
derivative suits than if the corporations had stayed in the United
States. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that many U.S.
derivative suits are dismissed early, and a very small percentage
of these suits—around 1%, or much lower, depending on the type
of company involved—generated a judicial opinion.163 Thus, while
shareholders may find it less cumbersome to file derivative suits
in the United States, the shareholder’s probability of litigating a
case to opinion-generation in the United States is also very low.

158 Ann M. Scarlett, Investors Beware: Assessing Shareholder Derivative Litigation
in India and China, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 173, 178-79 (discussing the frequent use of
shareholder derivative suits in the United States).
159 See SLAUGHTER & MAY, COMPANIES ACT 2006: DIRECTORS’ DUTIES, DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS (June 2007), available at
http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39392/companies_act_2006_-_directors_duties_
derivative_actions.pdf (describing provisions of the Companies Act 2006).
160 John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 687,
695 (2009).
161 Thomas P. Kinney, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility
Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 173 (1994).
162 See STUART PICKFORD & RANI MINA, MAYER BROWN, DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
IN THE US AND THE UK: THE STORY SO FAR (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/d44e695d-fca6-422e-bf0c-73918a8abff3/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/731b55c0-0c92-42b4-9e72-84f930d78b77/ART_
PICKFORD_MINA_DERIVATIVE_CLAIMS_APR09.PDF.
163 Armour, et al., supra note 160, at 706.
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There are also substantial differences between U.S. law
and foreign law in the mergers and acquisitions context, and,
specifically, in the takeover protection and deal protection
contexts, which can add to deal cost and deal uncertainty.
Many U.S. states, including Delaware, have long
allowed companies to adopt takeover defenses, like stockholder
rights plans (commonly called poison pills).164 A typical
stockholder rights plan may be triggered if a certain event, like
a hostile takeover, occurs—for example, when one shareholder
buys up 30% of a company’s shares. When the plan is triggered,
the other shareholders will have the right to buy newly issued
shares of the company at a discount, which dilutes the 30%
holder’s shares and makes the takeover more expensive. In
Moran v. Household International,165 the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a stockholder rights plan as a
takeover defense mechanism. The Delaware Court of Chancery
has also recognized stockholder rights plans as acceptable
responses to activist shareholder threats.166 In contrast, both
Ireland and Britain generally prohibit takeover defenses and
expect companies to “fight these bids by lobbying shareholders
directly.”167 Under both Irish and British takeover rules, subject
to certain exceptions, a board of directors cannot take any
action that might “frustrate” an offer for shares once the board
of directors has received an approach that may lead to an offer
or has reason to believe that an offer is or may be imminent.168
And while some Irish corporations listed in the United States

164 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Elan Finds Creative ‘Poison Pill’ to Defend Against a
Hostile Bid, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jun. 6, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/06/06/elan-finds-creative-poison-pill-to-defend-against-a-hostile-bid/ (noting that “the
states where American companies are organized freely allow companies to adopt takeover
defenses, like a poison pill,” and that “Ireland, like Britain, takes a different approach.
Takeover defenses are generally prohibited. Instead, companies are exposed to a hostile
takeover and are forced to fight these bids by lobbying shareholders directly”).
165 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (holding that Household’s rights plan was a
legitimate exercise of business judgment by the company).
166 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2014) (refusing to enjoin Sotheby’s annual meeting based on claims from
activist Third Point that Sotheby’s board breached its fiduciary duties by adopting a
shareholder rights plan).
167 Davidoff Solomon, supra note 164.
168 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS, rule 21 (11th ed., 2013), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf (providing rules that govern takeovers and mergers in the
United Kingdom); IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL, IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL ACT, 1997: TAKEOVER
RULES AND SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION RULES, rule 21 (2013), available at
http://irishtakeoverpanel.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ITP-Takeover-Rules.pdf (providing
rules that govern takeovers and substantial acquisitions in Ireland).
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have adopted shareholder rights plans, the validity of these
plans has yet to be tested in Irish court.169
Break-up fees are also handled differently in the United
States than in the United Kingdom and Ireland. A break-up fee
is a fee that a target company pays to a buyer if the deal is
canceled under certain circumstances specified in the
acquisition agreement.170 For instance, if a topping bidder offers
a larger sum to the target company and causes the target to
terminate a previous agreement, the target will need to pay the
previous buyer a break-up fee. In practice, the break-up fee
increases the cost of the deal for the topping bidder, since the
topping bidder will need to cover the target’s payout of the
break-up fee—this provides a level of deal protection to the
original buyer.171 In Delaware, there is no bright-line rule about
what size break-up fee is reasonable, but generally, fees in the
3% to 4% range have passed muster.172 Both British and Irish
takeover rules are stricter about the use of break-up fees.
British takeover rules specify that a break-up fee needs to be
approved by the British Takeover Panel and can be used only
in limited circumstances.173 Under Irish takeover rules, breakup fees also require prior approval by the Irish Takeover Panel,
and are capped at not more than 1% of the value of the offer.174
The restriction on break-up fees can reduce deal certainty: for
instance, parties subject to British or Irish takeover rules
cannot agree to a relatively high break-up fee in order to
protect the deal and ensure certainty.
However, while inverting corporations face certain
transition costs, even a corporation that does not invert faces
potential changes to corporate laws and rules in its jurisdiction
of incorporation, which must be learned on an ongoing basis.
Moreover, both inverted and non-inverted corporations are able
to engage sophisticated counsel or employ relevant experts to
help them navigate and comply with local laws. The cost of
engaging those experts is likely outweighed by the enormous tax
Finnerty & McLaughlin, infra note 184, at 77.
DAVID FOX ET AL., BREAKUP FEES—PICKING YOUR NUMBER, KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP (Sep. 6, 2012), available at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/
MAUpdate_090612.pdf (describing the range of break-up fees).
171 Id.
172 Id. (referencing the decisions in In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d
487 (Del. Ch. 2010), In re Toys “R” Us S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005), and
In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 9216 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007), which held that 3%,
3.75%, and 4.3% break-up fees were reasonable).
173 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, supra note 168, at Rule 21.
174 Id.
169
170
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savings of inverting. Finally, while commentators of previous
generations of inversions worried about shareholders’ inability
to understand inversion-related changes to governance—one
commentator noted that “few American shareholders possess a
sufficient understanding” of the inverted-to jurisdiction’s
laws175—modern-day shareholders, including institutional and
activist investors, are more engaged with governance matters.176
Thus, the concern that shareholders will be blindsided in the
governance context by a move is also mitigated.
2. Reduced Local Influence
Another related concern for an inverted corporation is
that if the laws of its new jurisdiction change, an inverted
corporation may lack the necessary local influence to protect
itself. Both management and shareholders may have incomplete
pictures of how foreign corporate laws play out. For instance,
how do local courts interpret the boundaries of the laws? How
do the texts of the laws interact with the local political,
economic, or social climate?177
Tyco International recently learned that local political
and social climate can have a real and potentially negative
impact on the corporation, its shareholders, and its managers.
Tyco was a U.S. company that inverted to Bermuda in 1997,
and later inverted portions of the company from Bermuda to
Switzerland.178 In 2013, Switzerland passed a voter referendum

175 Kun, supra note 31 at 343-44. Public companies file proxy statements in
conjunction with corporate inversions, and these disclosures provide an item-by-item
comparison of corporate laws in their original jurisdictions and the foreign jurisdictions
to which they are inverting.
176 See generally Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor
Activism A Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001).
177 Of course, there is an argument to be made that U.S. shareholders have a
less-than-complete picture of U.S. corporate laws, too—after all, many shareholders
may lack the legal and technical ability to understand U.S. corporate laws and how
they interact with the United States’s political, economic, and social climate. However,
there are many reasons to believe that U.S. shareholders have a better understanding
of U.S. law than foreign law. U.S. shareholders are more likely to be invested in more
than one U.S. company, so they can at least compare one company’s corporate practices
against that of another. U.S. shareholders are also exposed regularly to U.S. news, and
therefore should have a better understanding of the United States’s political, economic,
and social climate than they would have of a foreign jurisdiction’s. And finally, U.S.
shareholders have easier access to U.S. counsel.
178 Stuart Webber, Inverted U.S. Firms Relocate Headquarters to Europe, 64
TAX NOTES INT’L 589, 590-91 (2011) (noting that Tyco inverted to Bermuda in 1997,
split into three companies, and then inverted two of them from Bermuda to
Switzerland in 2008 and 2009).
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called the Minder Initiative.179 Among other things, the Minder
Initiative requires a binding shareholder vote on executive pay
for Swiss public companies and bans signing bonuses and
golden parachutes, among other forms of compensation.180
Swiss voters also considered another executive pay proposal:
the 1:12 Initiative for Fair Pay, which, if passed, would have
capped the salaries of top-level Swiss executives at 12 times
the wages of their lowest-paid employees.181 These proposals
caused concern to management of Tyco and other Swiss
companies.182 For managers especially, executive compensation
caps are considered negative: they make it harder for
companies to hire the best managers (who, in theory, require
the highest compensation), and threaten managers’ personal
bottom lines. In May 2014, Tyco announced its intention to
invert from Switzerland to Ireland, citing “[r]ecent changes in
Swiss law impacting regulatory environment” as matters “of
great concern to [Tyco].”183
Tyco’s experience with Switzerland’s executive pay
reforms is just one example of how inverting corporations may
be affected by unfavorable changes in the corporate laws of
their new jurisdictions of incorporation. Because inverted
corporations may also have small footprints in their new
foreign jurisdictions—they may have few employees and little
in the way of operations in their new foreign home184—they also

179 Catherine Bosley, Swiss Voters Approve Limits on “Fat Cat” Executive Pay,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2013, 7:38 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-03/swissvoters-set-limits-on-ceo-paychecks-sf1-projections.html (reporting on the Swiss voters’
approval of the executive pay referendum); Neil MacLucas, Swiss Voters Reject High-Pay
Initiative, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304011304579217863967104606 (reporting on the outcome of the vote
on Switzerland’s executive pay referendum).
180 MacLucas, supra note 179.
181 John Lichfield, Swiss Voters Reject ‘1:12’ Proposal to Cap Top Executives’
Pay in Latest Referendum, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/swiss-voters-reject-112-proposal-tocap-top-executives-pay-in-latest-referendum-8960669.html.
182 MacLucas, supra note 179.
183 Tyco to Move to Ireland as Swiss Tighten Laws on CEO Pay, Immigration,
REUTERS (May 2, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/02/tycointernationalireland-idUSL3N0NO41K20140502.
184 This is especially true for corporations that, for example, invert to Ireland
by purchasing a Canadian company. Domestic corporations that invert to Ireland by
purchasing an Irish company may acquire Irish operations as a result of the
acquisition. Domestic corporations that invert to Ireland by purchasing a non-Irish
company may truly have very little Irish operation in Ireland, since both the domestic
corporation and its non-Irish target may have little previous operation in Ireland. See
Ailish Finnerty & Christopher McLaughlin, Inversions to Ireland, PRAC. L.J. (Apr.
2014), at 74-75, available at http://www.arthurcox.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
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have relatively little influence in their new foreign jurisdictions.
In contrast, when faced with unfavorable circumstances, a large
corporation with a substantial local footprint can influence laws
and regulations to change their circumstances. For instance,
Washington state has given $8.7 billion in tax breaks over sixteen
years to keep Boeing from moving away, and New York state
granted aluminum company Alcoa $5.6 billion in tax breaks
over thirty years for the same reason.185 In contrast, inverted
corporations that have little operational connection to their
new jurisdictions of incorporation have less leverage when
unfavorable legislation is on the horizon. In the context of
inversion-specific legislation or regulation, the lack of influence
becomes particularly interesting: there is no guarantee that
popular inversion destinations will not come up with antiinversion laws that make inverting out of those jurisdictions a
cumbersome and costly process.
However, social changes in the United States also occur
rapidly, and may cause concern for U.S. corporations. For
example, a few years before Tyco was concerned about the
Minder Initiative in Switzerland, many U.S. corporations were
probably likewise concerned about how 2011’s Occupy Wall
Street movement would affect the domestic corporate and
economic landscape. In addition, an argument can be made
that corporations actually increase their political influence by
inverting. For instance, a mid-market domestic company may
invert from the United States to a smaller economy. In the
smaller economy, the inverter’s taxes generate a proportionally
larger chunk of the smaller economy’s total tax revenue. As a
result, the inverter, through its footing of a larger share of its
new home country’s tax bill, has a proportionally larger share
of influence than it did in the United States, where it footed a
smaller percentage of the United States’s total tax revenue.
3. Opportunity Costs of Acquiring a Foreign Business in
Service of an Inversion
Modern inversions can be executed only through
substantial cross-border business combinations, and most
companies invert to their new jurisdictions by acquiring
April2014_SpotlightOn.pdf (providing an overview of U.S. inversions to Ireland from
an Irish law firm’s perspective).
185 Danny Westneat, Tax Breaks for Boeing: We’re No. 1, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 12,
2013), available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2022245449_westneat13xml.html.
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companies in that new jurisdiction.186 In choosing to deploy its
capital to buy a particular foreign business in a tax-friendly
jurisdiction, an inverting corporation may lose out on other
growth opportunities.
The opportunity cost of purchasing a particular foreign
business in order to invert may be substantial. If Burger King’s
acquisition of Tim Hortons had been entirely driven by a desire
to invert, for instance, Burger King would have tied up $11.0 billion
in order to invert.187 Tying up a significant amount of a company’s
capital in a substantial foreign acquisition could affect an inverting
company’s future creditworthiness, causing cash flow issues.
On the other hand, if the result of a foreign acquisition is that
cash on the assets side of a company’s balance sheet is simply
converted to a non-cash asset—a foreign company—there is
less cause for concern.
The fear that an inverting corporation may forgo other
foreign growth opportunities purely to chase an inversion is also
somewhat mitigated by recent deals. Pennsylvania company
Mylan recently announced its corporate inversion to the
Netherlands through the acquisition of a foreign division of
Illinois corporation Abbott Laboratories.188 Applied Materials’
recent inversion to the Netherlands, too, was accomplished
through the acquisition of Japanese target Tokyo Electron.189
4. Costs to Inverting Corporations, Evaluated
Corporations assert that they invert to save on their tax
bills. This single-minded focus on tax savings may change
corporate behavior, causing corporations to incur, among other
things, transition costs, the costs of being incorporated in a
foreign jurisdiction in which it has relatively little influence,
and opportunity costs when the inverting corporation deploys
its capital to acquiring a particular foreign business. In many
of these cases, inverting injects risk. However, many of these
hidden costs to corporations of inverting can be and are
mitigated—and the cost of mitigation may be but a small
portion of an inverting corporation’s huge tax savings.
186 See Professor Desai’s data on inversions, supra note 12 (showing that most
recent inversions are accomplished through a cross-border business combination transaction
with a company already domiciled in the combined company’s ultimate tax domicile).
187 See supra note 14.
188 Mylan, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jul. 14, 2014) (announcing its
proposed acquisition of Abbott and planned subsequent inversion to the Netherlands).
189 New Corporate Tax Shelter: A Merger Abroad, supra note 13.
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Moreover, while not inverting carries similar risk (for instance,
that the relevant corporate law may change), the risk of
inverting may be higher. On the whole, then, it appears that
these costs and risks may, for a corporation, take a back seat in
the face of enormous tax savings.
B.

Inversion Costs Borne by the Public

In addition to creating costs for corporations, inversions
may also create costs that are borne by the public. These
negative externalities are not accounted for by inverters.
1. Inversions Driving Industry Over-Consolidation
Modern inversions require inverting companies to engage
in substantial cross-border business combinations, so the
availability of inversions may drive over-consolidation in some
industries. For instance, in conjunction with Pfizer’s proposed
inversion through the acquisition of AstraZeneca, Professor
Victor Fleischer observed that “[w]e don’t know if Pfizer is
pursuing AstraZeneca because the combined firm will be more
efficient or because of the tax savings.”190 He notes that:
Coase argued that the boundaries of the firm depend on what is
known as the make vs. buy decision. If the costs of making a product
inside the firm are less than the costs of contracting out, the
company will make the product, not buy it . . . . The boundaries of
the firm are set at the point where the benefits of [buying from] the
market are outweighed by [the] transaction costs [associated with
buying from the market].191

However, when buying from outside—that is, buying
another company—is associated with a tax break, the make vs.
buy decision is distorted. Companies begin to think about the
make vs. buy decision based in part on whether buying will
garner a specific tax benefit. Buying is now a necessary part of
inverting. Thus, inverting companies may choose to buy more
than to make in order to take advantage of inversions’ tax
benefits. For companies, this has a potentially negative side
effect: they may grow larger than would have been efficient in
the absence of inversions’ tax benefits. On the other hand, a
190 Victor Fleischer, How Tax Laws Distort the Pfizer Deal, N. Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 29, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/how-taxlaws-distort-the-pfizer-deal/ (discussing, in the context of Pfizer’s proposed inversion
via an acquisition of AstraZeneca, the distortionary effects of current U.S. tax laws).
191 Id.
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particular inverting company’s tax savings may still outweigh
any inefficiencies that result from buying when it should have
been making, so inverters may still come out ahead as a result
of an inversion.
On a systemic level, however, multiple inverters
engaging in inversion-related business combinations may have
a negative effect for the public. Multiple business combinations
almost necessarily lead to increasing consolidation within a
particular industry. That is, a life sciences company that needs
to buy another company in order to invert is likely to choose
another life sciences company as a target, rather than, for
example, a hotel chain. When multiple life sciences companies
invert, they buy up many of the other life sciences companies in
the market. Over time, industries may over-consolidate as
many companies begin to choose to buy rather than to make in
order to take advantage of the tax benefits of inverting.
Many have commented on the detriments of overconsolidation and the resulting monopolistic markets. For
instance, scholars have noted that monopoly inhibits
innovation.192 This lack of innovation creates a negative
externality that the public must bear. Many recent inversions
have involved companies in the life sciences industry. In the
life sciences industry, over-consolidation may lead to fewer
drugs being developed. Pfizer’s former President of Global
Research and Development, John LaMattina, has called
pharmaceutical-industry consolidation “devastating.”193 In a
Forbes op-ed about Pfizer’s bid for AstraZeneca, LaMattina
noted that industry consolidation can lead to reduction in R&D
projects: “While done with the best of intentions, the fact is
that you can never be sure that you haven’t dropped what
would have been a major new advance to treat brain
cancer . . . . [T]he major outcome for R&D in mergers is that

192 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation
2 (Stanford L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 397, Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670197 (noting that “there is
substantial economic evidence suggesting that competition itself may act as a greater
spur to innovation than monopoly,” and citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS, 609, 615 (1962)).
193 John L. LaMattina, The Impact of Mergers on Pharmaceutical R&D, 10
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 559 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.nature.com/
nrd/journal/v10/n8/full/nrd3514.html?WT.ec_id=NRD-201108 (describing the negative
impact of mergers on research and development at Pfizer).
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there will ultimately be fewer scientists in R&D and fewer
ideas being pursued.”194
The only factor that mitigates industry overconsolidation may be that, as a public-relations matter, huge,
iconic companies like Stanley Works, Walgreens, and Pfizer
have more trouble inverting. If public relations can successfully
limit the number of large companies inverting, overconsolidation may be somewhat mitigated.
2. Inversions Exacerbating an Already-Regressive
Corporate Tax Rate
In addition to contributing to over-consolidation,
inversions also change the corporate tax rate structure. The
U.S. corporate tax rate is fairly flat: all but the smallest
businesses are subject to a 35% statutory rate.195 When large
corporations are able to invert, however, they are able to take
advantage of a much lower foreign tax rate, while smaller
businesses continue to be subject to the 35% rate.
Inversions are expensive transactions with high upfront
costs. For example, for its acquisition of Warner Chilcott,
Actavis paid $20.5 million to its two financial advisors, Merrill
Lynch and Greenhill.196 When Forest Labs inverted in 2014
(through a business combination with Actavis), it paid its
financial advisor, J.P. Morgan, $5 million for the delivery of its
opinion, and approximately $50.9 million when the deal

194 John LaMattina, Biopharmaceutical Industry Consolidation Diminishes
Future
Drug
Discovery,
FORBES
(Jun.
10,
2014,
8:01
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/06/10/biopharmaceutical-industryconsolidation-diminishes-future-drug-discovery/. LaMattina said the same in 2011,
when Pfizer merged with Wyeth:

From a business perspective, mergers and acquisitions are often considered
attractive as they remove duplication, reduce costs and produce
synergies . . . . [But i]n major [pharmaceutical] mergers today, not only are
R&D cuts made, but entire research sites are eliminated . . . . After a major
merger, the rate of progress of compounds in the development pipeline seems
to decrease. For example, comparing data from Pfizer’s pipeline
updates . . . before the Wyeth merger in February 2008, and in February
2011, reveals that 40% of the compounds (not including those from Wyeth)
have been in Phase II development for more than 3 years, which is below the
industry average.
See John L. LaMattina, supra note 193, at 559-60.
195 KEIGHTLEY & SHERLOCK, supra note 28, at 2.
196 Actavis Ltd., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-4),
supra note 10, at 85, 96 (disclosing that Actavis agreed to pay $10.5 million and $10
million to Merrill Lynch and Greenhill, respectively).
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closed.197 Lawyers’ fees for a public company deal—for
negotiation, drafting, diligence, and filing of public disclosure,
among other tasks—can also easily cost millions of dollars.198
For larger corporations, millions in upfront cost is doable:
recent announcers include Applied Materials (with a market cap
of $25.5 billion199) and Pfizer (with a market cap of $178.0
billion200). But this cost is harder for smaller corporations: a
smaller company, like hip New York subscription cosmetics startup Birchbox, has estimated annual revenues of about $125
million.201 A $10 million inversion cost would be 8% of its annual
revenues. Although smaller companies may hire less expensive
counsel who spend less time on the smaller companies’ less
complicated inversions, evidence from previous generations of
inversion activity supports the theory that only larger companies
invert: in Professors Desai’s and Hines’s survey of third-generation
inverters, even the smallest inverters had nine-figure market
valuations.202 Moreover, smaller companies where stock ownership
is concentrated with a few founders are more likely to be affected
by the shareholder-level taxes imposed by Section 367(a), adding
an additional reason for small companies not to invert.
Scholarship on regulatory arbitrage supports the
observation that large companies invert while small ones do
not.203 The conventional scholarly wisdom is that contracts, like
the ones used in big business combinations, are designed to
minimize transaction costs, including upfront drafting and
negotiation costs.204 But some deals that increase upfront
transaction costs, like inversions, exist. Regulatory arbitrage
theorizes that there is tension between regulatory costs and
upfront transaction costs—some transactions that are costly
197 Actavis plc, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-4) at 97
(May 2, 2014).
198 One report published in 2013 estimated that the average billing rate for bigfirm partners was over $700 an hour, and for law-firm associates generally was about $370
an hour. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Hourly Billing Rate for Partners Last Year Was
$727 in Largest Law Firms, ABA J. (Jul. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/average_hourly_billing_rate_for_partners_last_year
_was_727_in_largest_law_f/ (reporting on the billing rates of partners at large firms).
199 Applied Materials, Inc. (AMAT), Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q?s=AMAT (as of Aug. 12, 2014).
200 Pfizer, Inc. (PFE), Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=PFE (as of
Aug. 12, 2014).
201 Erin Griffith, Exclusive: Birchbox Banks $60 Million, FORTUNE (Apr. 21, 2014),
available at http://fortune.com/2014/04/21/exclusive-birchbox-banks-60-million/ (reporting on
Birchbox’s Series B round and providing an estimate of Birchbox’s annual revenues).
202 Desai & Hines, supra note 12, at tbl. 1.
203 See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
204 Id. at 230-31 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984)).
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upfront are perfectly rational if they are designed to minimize
regulatory costs and if those regulatory cost savings outweigh the
upfront transaction costs.205 In the case of a corporate inversion,
corporate inverters are engaged in the perfectly rational behavior
of taking on huge one-time upfront transaction costs in order to
save on ongoing regulatory costs. Those regulatory costs saved are
expected to more than make up for the millions in upfront fees.
It is worth noting here that although the conventional
wisdom in corporate finance is that worthwhile projects can be
financed with debt, this may not be the case in practice. Thus,
even if a corporate inversion would be rational for a small
corporation to undertake, the small corporation may not be
able to find the $10 million upfront funding needed.
The phenomenon of big businesses inverting while small
businesses do not has important implications. When big
businesses invert and small businesses do not, the corporate tax
rate starts to look regressive. To be sure, large, profitable
corporations may already pay taxes at a significantly lower rate
than the statutory rate,206 but the ability to invert abroad
exacerbates that problem.
3. Inversions Benefit Some Industries More Than
Others
Inversions also affect industries within the United States
differently. Consider, for instance, two large companies
incorporated in Delaware: Domestic Corp. is a U.S.-based service
provider with no overseas operations or sales, and International
Corp. is a U.S.-based software company with extensive overseas
operations and sales. A corporate inversion is worthwhile for
International Corp., because multinational corporations can use
corporate inversions to undo CFC classifications, access cash
trapped overseas, and inject intercompany debt. On the other
hand, corporate inversions are of less help to domestic
corporations that do not otherwise intend to expand overseas:
205 Id. at 231 (noting that “deal lawyers face a tension between reducing
regulatory costs on the one hand and increasing Coasean transaction costs on the other,”
that “[d]eal lawyers routinely depart from the optimal transaction-cost-minimizing [deal]
structure,” and that “[s]o long as the regulatory savings outweigh the increase in
transaction costs, such planning is perfectly rational”).
206 Corporate Income Tax: Effective Tax Rates Can Differ Significantly from the
Statutory Rate, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office 14 (May 2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654957.pdf (finding that for the 2010 tax year, large
profitable domestic companies “paid U.S. federal income taxes amounting to 12.6 percent
of the worldwide income that they reported in their financial statements”).
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Domestic Corp., for instance, may not have any CFCs it wants
to declassify or any cash trapped overseas that it needs to
access. Thus, the availability of corporate inversions as a taxsaving mechanism favors some industries over others:
corporations in industries that are very domestic cannot take
advantage of an inversion’s tax-saving features, while
corporations in more multinational industries can and do
invert to save on taxes. That said, Walgreens’ recent
contemplated inversion shows that even businesses with
primarily a domestic footprint may find inversions worthwhile.
However, domestic companies of a certain type—for instance,
domestic telecommunications providers—that find it harder to
find suitable foreign business combination partners may still
be disadvantaged compared to corporations in industries with
many suitable combination partners.
The distributional effect across industries is important. It
amplifies the effects already observed across different corporation
sizes: even within the subset of very big corporations, corporations
in certain industries can more readily take advantage of corporate
inversions’ benefits, while corporations in other industries cannot.
To the extent that the U.S. government cares about developing
certain industries domestically for non-tax policy reasons, it may
be of some concern that inversions essentially change the rate at
which different industries are taxed.
IV.

MOVING FORWARD

Corporate inversions have sparked debate from all
corners: from the Oval Office, on both sides of the political
aisle, and in the press.
Current policy responses fall into two broad categories.
The first is to build higher fences, thereby making it harder for
domestic corporations to avoid paying U.S. taxes by inverting.
Notice 2014-52 and recent proposals from the Obama
administration and Senator Levin are examples of this
strategy.207 Stephen Shay’s and Senator Schumer’s proposals are
also higher-fence proposals: they reduce the most enticing
benefits of inversions. The second category is centered on
comprehensive tax system reform that would motivate domestic
corporations to stay in the United States.208 These proposals call
207 Vinik, supra, note 154 (providing coverage of recent anti-inversion bills
and related political background).
208 Id.
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for lowering the corporate tax rate, moving toward a territorial
tax regime, simplifying the Code generally, or a combination of
some or all of these.
These proposals are not mutually exclusive: Senator
Levin’s proposal, for instance, contemplates making inversions
much harder to execute for two years, which is meant to give
Congress enough time to enact comprehensive tax reforms.209
And Senator Levin’s moratorium concept could be supplemented
by Shay’s or Senator Schumer’s proposals, which would make
inversions during the moratorium period even less likely.
This Article has argued that inversions create costs for
the inverting company and also generate negative externalities
that are borne by the public. This Part suggests several starting
points for thinking about future inversion policy.
A.

Outright Ban on Inversions

In theory, one policy solution is to ban inversions
outright. This can be accomplished through, for instance, a law
that requires all cross-border business combinations be
examined by a government body to ensure that they are not
inversions. This policy, combined with perfect enforcement,
could eliminate many of the costs discussed in this Article. For
instance, to the extent inversions exacerbate the problem of
large corporations paying taxes at lower rates, that problem
will be reduced. Moreover, if using a cross-border business
combination to leave the United States is not an option,
corporations’ managerial or operational behavior may be less
motivated by a desire to chase lower taxes.
An outright ban, however, comes with many line-drawing
and logistical concerns. Differentiating between tax-driven
transactions (inversions) and business-driven transactions that
happen to result in re-incorporation abroad will always be a
problem. In addition, companies highly motivated to invert have,
several times before, invented creative structures to sidestep
rules meant to thwart inversions. Section 7874 already attempts
to ban inversions and successfully banned the purely paper
transactions of earlier generations. Corporations have inverted
nonetheless by coupling an inversion with a large cross-border
transaction. Even an outright ban coupled with government preclearance of all cross-border transactions to ensure that they
are not inversions is unlikely to be unchallenged by
209

Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, supra note 44.
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transactional innovations that make inversions, in some form
or another, possible.
B.

Comprehensive Tax Code Overhaul

A complete overhaul of the Code may also reduce
inversions’ negative effects, address some tax revenue loss
concerns, and reduce many of the hidden costs identified in this
Article. While specific prescriptions for a Code overhaul are
outside the scope of this Article, this Article can consider the
theoretical impacts of a Code overhaul.
Suppose, for instance, that after a comprehensive
overhaul of the Code, the United States’s corporate tax system
becomes identical to Ireland’s. Under those circumstances, U.S.
companies have little reason to invert to Ireland for tax reasons.
In fact, an inversion under such circumstances would cost the
corporation in transaction and transition costs, but not provide
the tax benefits of moving to a lower-tax jurisdiction. A Code
overhaul would thereby ensure that when domestic corporations
leave the United States, they are not leaving for tax-savings
reasons, but for other reasons—for instance, to take advantage
of corporate laws that may improve value for shareholders.210
On the other hand, a complete overhaul of the Code, like
a complete ban with perfect enforcement, brings its own logistical
problems. A complete overhaul requires substantial political
cooperation—a feat that is difficult in the best of times, and
particularly challenging with today’s fractured Congress.
Moreover, it is hard to know ex ante whether a complete Code
overhaul can begin to address the inversion issue. Surely, a Code
overhaul cannot and will not be driven solely by the desire to
disincentivize inversion activity. A Code overhaul could solve
many issues, but it may not address inversions adequately or at all.
C.

Middle-of-the-Road Solutions

Policymakers can also consider other solutions—or
perhaps solutions that combine several proposals—to address
inversion activity.
For example, there may be merit in combining Senator
Levin’s moratorium idea with an attempt at tax reform. A
210 See, e.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J.
FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) (comparing the firm value of Delaware and non-Delaware
corporations in the 1980s and 1990s, and finding that Delaware corporations generally
have higher firm values).
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temporary moratorium puts an immediate stop on tax revenue
loss from inversions and also limits the hidden costs identified in
this Article. Moreover, a temporary moratorium may have the
benefit of setting a deadline for reform, since inversions can
return to popularity at the end of the moratorium if more
comprehensive change is not implemented. However, previous
Congressional promises to reform tax laws have borne limited
fruit, and with today’s Congress, reform seems even less likely.
Moreover, many parties do not stand to lose at the end of the
moratorium. Legislators who favor inversions, for instance, may
be motivated to wait for the moratorium to end and for today’s
status quo to return, making inversions once again possible. In
the absence of a real chance at comprehensive reform, any
temporary moratorium is only a short-term, stop-gap measure.
Other creative solutions exist. Since a desire to access
“trapped cash” overseas is one of the most oft-cited reasons for
inverting, solutions can target the trapped cash issue. A
temporary holiday that grants tax-free or low-tax repatriations
to the United States of offshore income could help curb some
inversion activity. In the alternative, ending deferred taxation
of foreign-earned income may also work. Both cases could be
better for the government’s bottom line than the status quo. A
tax holiday allows the government to collect some tax revenue
on cash trapped offshore. Eliminating deferred taxation on
foreign-earned income ends the incentive for cash to be trapped
offshore at all.
A more tailored version of the tax holiday concept is to
target only certain industries with a tax holiday. For instance,
the government could offer tax holidays to life sciences
companies, many of which have inverted, as a way to stem a
temporary inversion interest in that industry. States have
implemented similar plans. For example, Washington has given
$8.7 billion in tax breaks over sixteen years to keep Boeing from
moving away, and New York granted aluminum company Alcoa
$5.6 billion in tax breaks over thirty years for the same
reason.211 These temporary, industry-specific breaks help ease
potentially unobservable growing pains these industries are
going through and may be enough to deter inversion.
A tax holiday, however, presents many challenges.
First, it depends on the assumption that cash really is trapped

211 Westneat, supra note 185 (reporting on recent tax breaks for Boeing by
Washington state).
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offshore—a fact that is often disputed.212 If foreign-earned cash
is not trapped abroad, and the ability to access trapped cash is
not actually a significant driver of inversion activity, then a tax
holiday that allows corporations to bring trapped cash back to
the United States will have a substantially diminished effect
on slowing the rate of inversion activity. Moreover, if the tax
holiday is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, corporations that
were not otherwise considering inversions may also use the
opportunity to repatriate trapped cash. Worse, using tax breaks
as a way to stem current inversion activity could motivate
corporations to threaten to invert in order to trigger future tax
holidays. In that case, a tax holiday may actually have a
negative effect on revenue. Finally, temporary tax holidays may,
like temporary moratoriums, be useful only for a limited time.
At the state level, there is evidence to suggest that temporary
breaks given to certain companies do not have a lasting effect in
keeping a company within a certain jurisdiction. For example,
despite the fact that Washington state has given Boeing many
tax breaks, the company is constantly on the lookout for better
deals out of state.213
D.

Optimal Policy?

Anti-inversion policies enacted thus far have been
piecemeal solutions to a fractured tax system that seems out of
sync with international norms. Notice 2014-52, while tailored
to reduce some of the most enticing benefits of inversions, is
another Band-Aid. Like many solutions before it, Notice 2015-52
reduces some of inversions’ benefits—for example, it reduces the
benefits of hopscotch loans and some post-inversion restructurings.
On the other hand, more comprehensive tax reform—whether
that be a revamp of the U.S. tax system to more closely resemble
that of other developed countries or not—also seems unlikely,
given political realities.
The most sensible yet practicable solution, therefore,
may be a temporary moratorium that buys time for reform to
be considered. A relatively short moratorium on inversions may
allow enough time for legislators and policymakers to consider
more comprehensive reform, and the short timeframe may also
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Kirk Johnson, Boeing Looks Around, and a State Worries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/us/washington-state-not-ready-to-ponder
-future-without-boeing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on Boeing’s interest in
moving to other states).
212

213
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motivate policymakers to work quickly. In any case, only with
proper consideration of the whole story—including the hidden
costs noted here—can appropriate policy be crafted.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, many domestic corporations have left the
United States for tax-friendly foreign shores through crossborder business-combination inversion transactions. While
inversions have gained significant attention from policymakers
and the press, they have received little attention in the academic
literature. This Article identifies and examines the tax issues
that motivate inversion transactions and introduces to the
discourse a variety of other factors that should be considered in
companies’ inversion decisions and the government’s response to
inversions. In particular, while individual corporations’ tax
benefits dwarf some of inversions’ corporate-level, non-tax
downsides, this Article identifies how systemic corporate
exodus, especially in a few concentrated industries, may create
negative externalities for the public. The magnitude of
potential public harm, and the extent to which the current
generation of anti-inversion policy can mitigate that harm, is
an area ripe for further research.

Defining Domain
HIGHER EDUCATION’S BATTLES FOR CYBERSPACE
Jacob H. Rooksby†
INTRODUCTION
Juliet famously mused, “What’s in a name? that which
we call a rose / By any other word would smell as sweet.”1 The
same cannot be said for Internet domain names.2 One’s
inability to own a specific domain name has delayed product
launches, caused companies to change names, and led to
disputes with alleged cybersquatters.3 The utility of domain
names has led to a robust secondary market of buyers and
sellers, where domain names that encompass generic words, or
are comprised of very few letters or numbers, often change
hands for hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more.4 In short,
† Jacob H. Rooksby, M.Ed., J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law,
Duquesne University School of Law. Special thanks to Matthew Beddingfield for his
research assistance, to Jacqui Lipton for reviewing and providing helpful comments on
an earlier draft, and to my colleagues at Duquesne University School of Law for their
support of my work. Additional appreciation goes to Michael Olivas and the Institute
for Higher Education Law and Governance at the University of Houston Law Center
for including this Article in the institute’s monograph series. The author holds full
copyright to this article. For reprint permissions, please contact the author directly.
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, lines 43-44
(Houghton Mifflin Co. ed. 1911).
2 Domain names are alphanumeric character strings that substitute for the
numerical addresses actually used by Internet host computers to locate one another
and provide requested information to end users. See infra note 13 and accompanying
text. <amazon.com> is an example of a domain name.
3 See, e.g., Microsoft Files Dispute Over XboxOne.com and XboxOne.net Domain
Names, FUSIBLE (May 23, 2013), http://fusible.com/2013/05/microsoft-files-disputes-overxboxone-com-and-xboxone-net-domain-names/ (noting that Microsoft failed to register
<xboxone.com> and <xboxone.net> before unveiling new console called Xbox One,
leading to arbitration contest over those domain names).
4 Short domain names and generic word domain names consistently have
topped the list of the most expensive domain names sold on the secondary market. For
example, <sex.com> sold for $13 million in 2010, while <casino.com> and <slots.com>
each sold for $5.5 million in 2003 and 2010, respectively. For a list of the top-15 most
expensive domain names known to have changed hands on the secondary market, see
Ben Woods, 15 of the Most Expensive Domains of All Time, NEXT WEB (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://thenextweb.com/shareables/2013/08/13/15-of-the-most-expensive-domains-of-alltime/. For an example of a secondary market for domain names, visit <sedo.com>.
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domain names matter in the eyes of producers and consumers:
the difference of one letter in a URL can mean the difference
between an online visit that leads to a sale, or a distraction
that leads to annoyance, confusion, or worse.5
Higher education as an industry is not immune to these
market considerations. Prospective and current students,
faculty, administrators, alumni, and policymakers all have an
interest in ensuring they can easily identify their college or
university online. Separating the authentic from the inauthentic
perhaps is even more important in the cyberworld than the
brick-and-mortar world—after all, few are likely to set foot on
the University of New Haven, believing it to be Yale. But how
do we know for sure if a given domain name belongs to, or is
affiliated with, the institution it appears to reference?6
Fortunately for colleges and universities, the Internet’s
founding authorities gave higher education an advantage in
defining its metes and bounds in cyberspace. From the
beginning of the creation of the domain name system, colleges
and universities were not forced to compete with the open
market in registering a domain name. The generic top-level
extension .EDU was created with the understanding that only
colleges and universities could own second-level extensions in
that space. While governing authorities have changed the
requirements for registration over time, the .EDU extension
remains restricted, unlike the first-come, first-served nature of
the popular .COM, .NET, and .ORG extensions.7
5 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name
Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2005) (“Clearly,
a domain name can be a very valuable business asset, in that it can operate like a
combination trademark and shop front that both assists customers in locating a
commercial Web site and can develop goodwill in the sense of attracting customers over
a period of time.”).
6 Cf. 7 Things You Should Know About . . . DNSSEC, EDUCAUSE 2 (Jan.
2010), available at http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/est1001.pdf (“Because users
tend to trust certain domains, including the .edu domain, more than others, expectations
for the reliability of college and university websites are high.”). Take as an illustration
<gibill.com>, <gibillamerica.com>, and <armystudyguide.com>. Until these domain
names were transferred to the U.S. government’s Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as
part of a settlement with state attorneys general, web sites operated at these domain
names that made them look like official online outposts of the VA. Libby A. Nelson,
Attorneys General Announce Settlement with For-Profit College Marketer, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (June 28, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/28/attorneys-generalannounce-settlement-profit-college-marketer. But instead of providing general
information about the GI Bill and the array of educational opportunities available to
veterans, the web sites promoted enrollment in just 15 colleges, most of them for-profit
institutions. Id.
7 Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain
Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 382-85 (2003) (describing restricted
versus unrestricted domain name extensions).
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The rationale for giving colleges and universities their
own domain name space, uncluttered by competing claims of
others outside of higher education, is consonant with society’s
historic conception of higher education as a different type of
industry, detached from the market, and allegiant to its own
unique, public-serving norms and academic values.8 Higher
education once was viewed as a commercially sheltered industry
that needed to be protected from the unseemly aspects of the
market, and the creation of the restricted .EDU extension
arguably reflects such a romantic ideal.
Yet American higher education in modern times is very
familiar with the market, and using intellectual property to
create or capture value is one method institutions have pursued
in response to heightened budgetary pressures.9 Previous work
in this line of research, by myself and others, has noted an
increasing fixation with intellectual property acquisition and
protection by colleges and universities, chiefly with respect to
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.10
8 For one description of this historic conception of higher education, see
DAVID L. KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 7 (2003) (“[E]mbedded in the very idea of the university—not the
storybook idea, but the university at its truest and best—are values that the market
does not honor: the belief in a community of scholars and not a confederacy of selfseekers; in the idea of openness and not ownership; in the professor as a pursuer of
truth and not an entrepreneur; in the student as an acolyte whose preferences are to be
formed, not a consumer whose preferences are to be satisfied.”).
9 See, e.g., ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN, CREATING THE MARKET UNIVERSITY:
HOW ACADEMIC SCIENCE BECAME AN ECONOMIC ENGINE (2012) (describing how
academic science, protected by intellectual property, has fueled economic growth); Arti
K. Rai, The Increasingly Proprietary Nature of Publicly Funded Biomedical Research:
Benefits and Threats, in BUYING IN OR SELLING OUT? THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 117 (Donald G. Stein ed., 2004) (discussing how
higher education’s use of intellectual property protection is turning publicly-funded
science into proprietary science); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC
CAPITALISM AND THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2004)
(describing the rise of intellectual property in higher education as reflecting the
industry’s move to the market); Liza Vertinsky, Universities As Guardians of Their
Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1955-56 (discussing the traditional methods by
which universities use intellectual property to harness the economic power of their
faculty’s inventions).
10 See, e.g., Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between
Universities and Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312 (2013)
(tracking rise in university enforcement of patents); Jacob H. Rooksby, UniversityTM:
Trademark Rights Accretion in Higher Education, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349 (2014)
(tracking rise in college and university trademark activity); CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO
OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001)
(describing contention between universities and their faculty regarding the treatment of
copyrights and patents); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1 (2013)
(describing the growth of university patenting and a decline in judicial inclination to treat
higher education differently with respect to the patent laws); Brian J. Love, Do University
Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and
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Notwithstanding the contributions of these previous
works, the nature of higher education’s intellectual property
interests online—driven in particular by its trademark
interests—has not been fully considered until now. Historical and
empirical understanding of domain name registration behavior
and related disputes in higher education are uncharted territory
in intellectual property scholarship and higher education law
scholarship. This Article situates within and makes
contributions to those two fields.
As walls between the academy and the market erode, and
institutions place more emphasis on intellectual property
acquisition and enforcement in light of growing resource
constraints, how colleges and universities define their space
online has emerged as an unexamined question ripe for
consideration. This Article provides historically and empirically
supported data points in response to that inquiry, mining and
analyzing records concerning higher education’s use of the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)—
essentially an arbitration vehicle for resolving rights disputes
concerning domain names—and specialized federal court
litigation concerning domain names.11 These fields of exploration
are rich points of entry for understanding how colleges and
universities navigate intellectual property laws and harness
their rights in furtherance of institutional policy objectives.
The history of the .EDU domain name extension and
domain name ownership disputes in higher education may seem
an esoteric and picayune topic to many, if noticed at all. Even
within legal circles, few tend to focus on the practical and legal
issues implicated by domain name ownership and rights contests,
let alone by institutions of higher education. Perhaps the primary
explanation for the dearth of scholarly attention to this Article’s
topic is that the cyberworld—although now omnipresent in
Western democracies—still is in its infancy. With respect to
Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 285 (2014) (noting rise in university patent
emphasis in the high-tech fields of computing and telecommunications).
11 This Article, by design, does not focus directly on the equally interesting
question of how colleges and universities have chosen to use and regulate their online
spaces, although this question has received some popular and academic attention from
the .EDU’s earliest days through the present. See, e.g., Larry Lange, A Tour of
University Web Sites Is Quite An Education—What the Devil’s Going on at .edu?,
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 1 (describing the use of .EDU space
by students to post pornography and other forms of provocative speech); Kem Saichaie
& Christopher C. Morphew, What College and University Websites Reveal About the
Purposes of Higher Education, 85 J. HIGHER EDUC. 499 (2014) (analyzing textual and
visual elements on 12 college and university web sites).
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domain names in particular, the average consumer only has been
able to buy such property for roughly 15 years.12
Yet despite the lack of robust academic or practitioner
attention to this area, research into domain name ownership
disputes by colleges and universities provides a timely window
into the evolving thinking of higher education leadership over
questions of intellectual property and institutional identity,
brand formation and protection, and commercial involvement.
Intangible rights that institutions are willing to spend time
and money to fight over on some level reflect institutional
values and priorities. Research revealed in this Article provides
unique and fresh understanding of what those values and
priorities may be, as well as provides footing for analyzing
these activities from a policy standpoint.
Part I of the Article provides relevant background and
history on the workings of the domain name system and the
.EDU extension, arbitration and litigation vehicles available
for resolving domain name disputes, and college and university
activity in these realms. Part II discusses the methods and
limitations of the original study undertaken for this Article.
Part III presents findings. Part IV discusses policy concerns
related to higher education’s domain name acquisition efforts,
including the activity’s bearing on institutional reputation and
commitment to free speech, the delicate relationship between
brand protection and brand expansion, and the extent to which
the studied activity reflects mature legal strategy on the part of
12 This Article treats domain names as effectively synonymous with domain
name registrations, although this slight semantic difference is not without an
important distinction: the former conceptualizes domain names as some combination of
personal and real property, whereas the latter connotes a contractual right. Although
domain names have many characteristics that make them seem less like property and
more like contract rights (namely, one never owns a domain name in fee simple), one
cannot ignore the connection Internet users make between online space and physical
space. On some level, we expect the physical and virtual worlds to coalesce, and often
are disappointed, confused, or even humored when they do not (anyone visiting
<whitehouse.com>, intending to find information about the White House, will readily
agree). I recognize the hybrid property-contractual nature of domain names for this
reason. See also JACQUELINE LIPTON, INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES, TRADEMARKS AND
FREE SPEECH 5, 295 (2010) (noting that “domain names are arguably the first truly
global Internet analog to real property. They are an example of something that is like
real property, but that exists in the borderless realm of cyberspace,” and later arguing
that “the property model” is the best way to conceptualize domain names); Xuan-Thao
N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name
Classification, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 192, 205 (2001) (concluding that “the
bundle of rights resides in domain names and consequently, domain names should be
recognized as property . . . or more precisely, intangible property”); see also Kremen v.
Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029-36 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing domain name as property for
purposes of state-law tort of conversion).
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colleges and universities pursuing such actions. Part IV closes
by reflecting on the study’s findings and contributions to offer a
cautious view of higher education’s cyber future. Here, from a
normative perspective, I offer a provisional set of critical
questions that college and university decision makers ought to
consider before determining whether to harness the power of
one of their trademarks to capture an already registered
domain name. Finally, in the Conclusion, I summarize the
Article’s contributions and comment on how contentious efforts
to acquire domain names situates within larger contests over
rights and space in higher education.
I.

BACKGROUND ON INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES AND
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY DOMAIN NAME ACTIVITY AND
DISPUTES

This Part begins by introducing the Domain Name System
(DNS) and its workings, as well as other important lexicon
concerning domain names. It then provides a history of the .EDU
extension—including its genesis, management, and key operating
premises and rules—and explains how the extension has helped
shape higher education’s identity, reflecting the industry’s twin
goals of establishing authenticity and legitimacy online. This
section then moves to a legal discussion of the arbitration and
litigation avenues available to those wishing to challenge a thirdparty’s ownership or use of a domain name. The section concludes
with a survey of the limited literature available concerning college
and university use of the UDRP and specialized federal court
litigation to resolve domain name disputes.
A.

The Domain Name System Explained

Domain
names
are
“alpha-numeric
character
strings . . . that substitute for the numerical addresses[, or
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses,] actually used by Internet
host computers to locate one another” and provide requested
information to end users.13 The DNS essentially is a directory
or lookup system that allows users to interact with online
information in relation to alphanumeric strings, as opposed to
IP addresses whose numbers are seldom memorable.14 Like real
13 James M. Jordan, III, Domain Names: Basics, Pointers, and Current
Events, ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP., May 1997, at 12.
14 Compare the ease with which one can remember <cnn.com> versus its
corresponding IP address, 157.166.226.26.
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property, every domain name is unique, and thus their scarcity
means that their branding function is important.15 As Professor
Burk recognized in 1995, domain names are “both names and
addresses; they both locate and identify Internet sources.”16
While the technical locating function of domain names is
the reason for their existence, the identifying importance of
domain names is the feature that receives trademark and brand
interest. If your brand is Coke, owning <coak.com> but not
<coke.com> will not do. General rules of thumb dictate that “the
more memorable a domain name, the more value it enjoys.
Also, less is more; a short domain name is worth more than a
long domain name.”17
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN)—a nonprofit corporation based in Marina
del Ray, California—has technical oversight authority over most
of what we think of as the functioning Internet.18 ICANN’s
primary mission consists of keeping the Internet secure, stable,
and interoperable across countries and platforms.19 ICANN
accomplishes these goals by engaging in multi-stakeholder,
transnational,
consensus-driven
approaches
to
policy
20
promulgation. ICANN delegates key technical coordinating
functions—such as IP address space allocation, protocol
parameter assignment, and management of the DNS and root
server functions of the Internet—to the Internet Assigned

15 Wayde Brooks, Note, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: ICANN’s
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Name Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL’Y 297, 304 (2001).
16 Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging
Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 30 (1995), available at
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v1i1/burk.html. In this regard, Professor Burk noted how some
monikers in the analogue world also perform location and identification functions, such
as mnemonic 1-800 numbers (e.g., “1-800-FLOWERS”) and personalized mailing
addresses (e.g., “1 Coca-Cola Plaza”). Id. at ¶¶ 34-39, 52-56.
17 Nguyen, supra note 12, at 187-88.
18 Prior to the founding of ICANN, oversight authority was shared by a
variety of entities, including the National Science Foundation, NASA, the U.S. Army,
the University of Southern California, Stanford Research Institute, the University of
Maryland, the Internet Software Consortium, PSINet, and InterNIC. See Bill Frezza, A
Top-Level Domain By Any Other Name, NETWORK COMPUTING, Feb. 1, 1997, available
at 1997 WLNR 2822440; see generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT:
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 50-56 (2002).
19 See Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
ICANN.ORG, Art. I, Sec. 2(1) (July 30, 2014), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/
bylaws-2012-02-25-en.
20 For a comprehensive description of ICANN and its functions, see Welcome
to ICANN! How Does ICANN Work?, ICANN.ORG, https://www.icann.org/resources/
pages/welcome-2012-02-25-en (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
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Numbers Authority (IANA), a California-based subsidiary.21
Together, these two entities play important roles in promoting the
fair and manageable use and functioning of the global DNS, most
particularly as it relates to the creation and maintenance of new
Internet root zones (i.e., the space after the period furthest to
the right in a URL address). While ICANN, by necessity,
promulgates policies to effectuate its mission, technically the nongovernmental organization does not enjoy global policymaking
authority over the Internet.22 This virtual power vacuum means
that various national and state legislatures, as well as non-profit
organizations, contribute significantly to the formation of what we
might think of as global Internet policy.23
Name space on the Internet is parceled out into distinctly
manageable top-level domains (called TLDs), or root zones,
which are demarcated with the final period in the string, or
root. TLDs are further separated into generic TLDs (called
gTLDs) and TLDs distinguished by a two-letter country code
(called ccTLDs).24 Originally only seven gTLDs (i.e., .COM, .ORG,
.NET, .EDU, .INT, .GOV, and .MIL.) and 236 ccTLDs existed.25
ICANN introduced seven additional gTLDs in November of 2000
(i.e., .BIZ, .MUSEUM, .PRO, .INFO, .NAME, .AERO, and
.COOP), although none of these proved as popular as the original
seven gTLDs.26 More gTLDs were soon added, including .CAT,
.JOBS, .MOBI, .XXX, and .TRAVEL.27
Space within TLDs may be further parceled out and
registered to end users, creating what we think of as domain
names (which technically are second-level domain names), like
<nike.com>.28 Records of space allocation in a given TLD are
kept by one entity, called a registry. Registries permit entities
21 See Introducing IANA, IANA.ORG, http://www.iana.org/about (last visited
Mar. 31, 2015).
22 LIPTON, supra note 12, at 304.
23 Id. at 305.
24 Although ccTLDs primarily were intended for use by people within the country
that controls a given ccTLD, “[t]he commercial value of domain name country
codes . . . caused at least some nations with attractive two-letter initials such as Tuvalu [.tv]
to open registration beyond their country to anyone willing to pay a registration fee.” Scott
Bearby & Bruce Siegal, From the Stadium Parking Lot to the Information Superhighway:
How to Protect Your Trademarks from Infringement, 28 J.C. & U.L. 633, 654-55 (2002).
25 Id.; Brett R. Harris, Internet Update: Milestone Changes to the Domain
Name System Underway, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2008, at 62-63.
26 Nguyen, supra note 12, at 197; see also Ellen Whyte, Domain Name
Functions, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 28851839.
27 See Harris, supra note 25, at 62-63.
28 Id. After the second level, additional levels can be created within the same
second-level domain name without further registration. For example, <mail.duq.edu>
is a third-level domain name. MUELLER, supra note 18, at 50-56.
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called registrars (e.g., GoDaddy), which meet certain criteria
established by each registry, to sell rights to space in the TLD
that the registry controls. Registration in some TLDs, such as
the .COM, is open to all-comers willing to pay the yearly
registration price (often less than $10.00 per year, with multiyear registrations permitted), whereas registration in other
TLDs—particularly ccTLDs—is restricted and available only to
those who meet certain eligibility criteria (e.g., registration of a
trademark in the corresponding country, citizenship in the
corresponding country, etc.).29 Registries require registrars to
collect contact information from registrants and make that
information publicly available through what is called a WHOIS
database. These databases are accessible through registrar web
sites and allow browsers to determine the name, email, and
mailing address for the registrant of any given domain name
registered through that registrar.30
Dissatisfaction with the limited array of TLDs, and a
monopoly on the control of the root, led some companies in the
late 1990s and early 2000s to experiment with ways to bypass the
DNS system.31 Based on buy-in from some Internet service
providers and end consumers (who downloaded and installed
required software), these companies provided mechanisms by
which Internet users could visit what appeared to be domain
names not otherwise available for registration to the general
public.32 ICANN and related leaders of the nascent Internet
resisted these developments, which informally were known as the
AlterNIC movement.33 Detractors argued that a stable and
authoritative DNS, coordinated through a single root system, was
required in order to provide reliability and universal resolvability
of domain names. Ultimately, these arguments won out.
The movement for more and different Internet space,
however, did eventually gain traction within ICANN. In 2012,
after a period of lengthy consideration and discussion, the
organization began accepting applications for the creation of
See Manheim & Solum, supra note 7, at 381-84.
Rampant inaccuracies exist in these databases, however, as the information
submitted by registrants is not independently verified, nor is there any penalty for
providing incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent information. For a further description of
WHOIS databases and searching, see infra note 208 and accompanying text.
31 See MUELLER, supra note 18, at 50-56.
32 See Neil Batavia, Comment, That Which We Call a Domain by Any Other
Name Would Smell As Sweet: The Overbroad Protection of Trademark Law as It
Applies to Domain Names on the Internet, 53 S.C. L. REV. 461, 479-81 (2002)
(explaining how a URL like <dell.computer> did not actually exist in the DNS, but was
instead <dell.computer.xs2.net> in the DNS).
33 See Frezza, supra note 18 (describing AlterNIC).
29

30
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new gTLDs, including ones in non-Latin characters (Cyrillic,
Arabic, Chinese, etc.).34 These new domain name extensions
were intended to serve a variety of Internet users. ICANN
contemplated that products (such as .IPAD), companies (such
as .MICROSOFT), industries (such as .BANK), and regions
(such as .SOUTH), among others, might all be reflected in the
new root space. The application process was not designed to be
easy, however. Applicants had to pay $185,000 to ICANN and
satisfy a variety of criteria the organization established, mainly
aimed at ensuring the applicant’s financial and technical
viability to serve as registry for a domain name extension.35
After the application period ended, ICANN revealed that
it had received 1,930 applications, all of which were randomly
assigned lottery numbers to determine in which order ICANN
would review them.36 A public comment period followed. Google
applied for 101 new extensions, although the most sought by any
one company were the 307 applications filed by Donuts, Inc., a
company created to specialize in the sale of space in new generic
domain name extensions.37 New extensions were approved, and
registrars began selling registrations in these extensions to the
public, beginning in October of 2013.38 The first seven new gTLDs
made available to the public were .BIKE, .CLOTHING, .GURU,
.HOLDINGS, .PLUMBING, .SINGLES, and .VENTURES.39
34 See Press Release, ICANN, Internet Domain Name Expansion Now
Underway (Oct. 23, 2013), available at https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/
release-2013-10-23-en.
35 See Elizabeth Herbst Schierman, .Com and .Net, Make Room for
.Trademark: What You Should Know About the New Global Domain Names,
ADVOCATE, Feb. 2010, at 25, 26, available at https://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/
issues/adv10feb.pdf. Once a new top-level extension is created, the registry operator must
pay $25,000 a year to ICANN simply to maintain it. David J. Kappos, New Internet
Domain Name Options Are Coming: Is Your Organization Ready?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug.
16, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/16/new-internet-domain-name-optionsare-coming-is-you.
36 See Program Statistics, ICANN NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/statistics (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
37 See Andrew Allemann, Donuts Raises $100 Million, Applies for 307 New
TLDs, DOMAIN NAME WIRE (June 5, 2012), http://domainnamewire.com/2012/
06/05/donuts-raises-100-million-applies-for-307-new-tlds/; Michael Berkens, Google
Applies for 101 New gTLD’s; Amazon 77; Microsoft 11; Apple 1, THE DOMAINS (June 13,
2012), http://www.thedomains.com/2012/06/13/google-applies-for-101-new-gtlds-amazon77-microsoft-11-apple-1/. Some of the new extensions managed by Donuts, Inc. include
.EMAIL, .TOYS, .FINANCIAL, .FLORIST. See Welcome to the Not Com Revolution,
DONUTS, http://www.donuts.co/tlds/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
38 For a listing of the new extensions, and the dates on which they were created, see
Delegated Strings, ICANN NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS, http://newgtlds.icann.org/
en/program-status/delegated-strings (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
39 See Stuart Fuller, Why Are Brands Yet to Wake Up to the Dawn of the New
Internet?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV., (June 1, 2014), http://www.worldipreview.com/
article/why-are-brands-yet-to-wake-up-to-the-dawn-of-the-new-internet.
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One of the motivating concepts behind the gTLD
expansion is that space in the traditional gTLDs was artificially
scarce, and that the capacity for online identity formation
suffers as a result.40 With more than 90 million domain names
registered in the .COM extension alone, one’s ability to register
a descriptive, memorable, yet pithy domain name increasingly is
limited. Proponents of the new domain name extensions argue
that online space is infinite—unlike real property—and so no
compelling rationale for artificially constraining it exists. On
its web site, Donuts, Inc.—a leading supporter of the new
domain names—analogizes the movement as going from blackand-white to color:
This new taxonomy will allow domain names to be instantly
recognizable and understood. You’ll start to see—and be able to
purchase—domain names like soho.boutique or diva.boutique,
instead of divaboutiquesohonyc.com. And you’ll know exactly what
you’re going to find on smiths.plumbing and smiths.dental. These
short, specific domain names will offer improved navigation,
increased diversity, and expanded choice.41

Others are less optimistic about the utility of these new
extensions, arguing that the only people likely to benefit from
the expansion are attorneys and marketers, who stand to earn
fees based on their ability to help their clients understand and
navigate these new virtual spaces.42 For brands that have
carefully cultivated their image online, detractors argue that the
new extensions simply create more boundaries to police, patrol,
and manage. Should Coca-Cola apply to create the extension
.COKE?43 What about registering second-level domain names in
seemingly relevant new extensions, like <coke.beverage> or
<coke.drink>? ICANN’s founding chairperson, and a critic of the
expansion, voiced her concern as follows: “The problem is not the
shortage of space in the field of all possible names, but the
subdivision of space in Coca-Cola’s cultivated namespace.”44
40 See Bob Samuelson, A Level Playing Field Required, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
REV. (June 6, 2014), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/a-level-playing-field-required.
41 See DONUTS, supra note 37.
42 Esther Dyson, What’s In a Domain Name?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-s-in-a-domain-name- (arguing
that “[t]he problem is that expanding the namespace—allowing anyone to register a new
TLD such as .apple—doesn’t actually create any new value”).
43 In fact, the Coca-Cola company did not apply for .COKE, or any other
extension, as of the first round of applications. See New gLTD Current Application
Status, ICANN NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS, https://gtldresult.icann.org/
application-result/applicationstatus/viewstatus (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
44 Dyson, supra note 42.
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This concern touches on an inescapable reality regarding
domain name space: just like trademarks, domain names convey
meaning to Internet users, and thus people expect trademarks
to be predictably reflected in domain names. Mischief often
results, however, for quite simple reasons: (1) anyone willing to
pay a minimal registration fee can register his own domain
name in unrestricted TLDs, such as the .COM, .NET, or .ORG
extensions, and (2) registrars in unrestricted extensions
require no proof from applicants that applicants are within
their legal rights to register a given domain name incorporating
a trademark.45 In light of these features of the DNS, savvy
companies often defensively register a variety of domain names
that consumers might use to locate them online, and then seek
to capture any other domain names they believe they have claim
to, but that already are registered by others.46 Otherwise,
companies risk ceding domain name space that references them
or incorporates their trademarks to other entities, whose claims
to that space may only grow in strength over time.
With these realities in mind, the allure of having but one
domain name registration in a restricted, dedicated space that at
once conveys authenticity and legitimacy seems compelling.
Unlike purely commercial concerns, forced to proactively
register dozens of domain names across a variety of unrestricted
domain name extensions, registrants in restricted extensions do
not face the same compulsion to cover-the-board with proactive
domain name registrations. Only those who meet eligibility
criteria can register space in restricted extensions, and
registrations outside of a restricted extension may be
superfluous, given that the value of a restricted extension is
the sense of authenticity and legitimacy it conveys, by virtue of
its exclusivity, to those with space within the extension.
Incidentally, authenticity and legitimacy are what many in
higher education were given, in the form of the .EDU
extension, from the beginning days of the Internet, well before
others lobbied ICANN to expand the root zone to better define
their commercial domains.

45
46

See Manheim & Solum, supra note 7.
See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
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The History of the .EDU Extension: Identity Formation
and the Quest for Authenticity and Legitimacy

The generic top-level domain name extension .EDU was
born in April of 1985, when the fledgling Internet’s technical
architects delegated registrations in the space to six American
universities: Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University,
University of California-Berkeley, Purdue University, Rice
University, and University of California-Los Angeles.47 Originally,
educational institutions anywhere in the world were permitted to
register in the .EDU extension, although these requirements
would change over time. By July 1994, 1,292 .EDU domain
names existed.48 That number grew to 2,463 by February
1996.49 As of 2014, 7,457 domain names exist in the .EDU
extension—only 30 more than were registered in 2004.50 These
domain names represent less than 1% of all domain names
registered in the world, in any extension.51
The National Science Foundation (NSF) was the first
governmental entity with oversight function over the .EDU
extension.52 As it did with some of the other gTLDs then in
existence (e.g., .COM, .NET, and .ORG), the NSF contracted with a
company called Network Solutions to maintain the registry and
assign space in it.53 Colleges and universities did not even have to
pay a registration fee for registering extensions in the .EDU space,
as the NSF paid these fees on institutions’ behalf.54 This

47 Bill Toland, How Pittsburgh Avoided the Same Fate As Detroit. It Was A
Sometimes Rough Transition, But the City Has Made the Transition from Heavy
Industry to Its New Place as the Silicon Valley of the East, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct.
13, 2013, at T1, available at 2013 WLNR 25660755.
48 MUELLER, supra note 18, at 110.
49 Id.
50 See Average Counts of .EDU Domains by Status and Year, EDUCAUSE,
http://net.educause.edu/edudomain/report_graph.asp?Type=DOMAIN (last visited Feb. 8,
2015). Only approximately one-third of all .EDU domain names have been registered since
EDUCAUSE took over management of the .EDU extension in 2001. See POLICY PROPOSALS
FOR THE .EDU DOMAIN, EDUCAUSE 1 (2012), available at http://net.educause.edu/
edudomain/policy_board_2_28_2012.pdf.
51 See Fuller, supra note 39, at 64 (noting that there were 265 million domain
names registered in the world through the end of September 2013).
52 See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE
L.J. 187, 198-99 (2000).
53 Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 15, at 311.
54 See David L. Wilson, Colleges Won’t Have to Pay New $50 Fee for Internet
Addresses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 22, 1995, at A39, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Colleges-Wont-Have-to-Pay-New/96300/; see also ITU to Serve As ‘Depository’ for
Internet Domain MOU, TR DAILY, Apr. 25, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 6830785
(noting that “NSF has continued to pay the fees for the ‘.gov’ and ‘.edu’ domain names”).
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arrangement lasted through 1998, even after oversight of the DNS
had passed from the NSF to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Meanwhile, the federal government was actively looking
to hand off responsibility for the DNS to a non-profit entity,
partly in response to critics of the monopoly over registration
services held by Network Solutions and the U.S. government.55
ICANN filled that role, beginning with a memorandum of
understanding signed between it and the federal government
in November of 1998.56
Incidentally, ICANN’s ties to academe run deep.
Jonathan B. Postel, formerly a computer scientist at the
University of Southern California, was a driving force behind
the formation of ICANN, and Tamar Frankel, a law professor
at Boston University, oversaw early meetings designed to
respond to the federal government’s request that a not-forprofit entity be created to perform the technical functions the
government no longer wished to coordinate.57 As a news article
in 1998 noted, “Since the Internet’s earliest days, control of some
network functions has rested largely with a small circle of
technical experts like Mr. Postel—most of them at universities.”58
However, Mr. Postel’s untimely death required a leadership
change, and Michael M. Roberts became ICANN’s first president
and chief executive in November of 1998.59 Mr. Roberts was
himself a former academic-network leader, a founder of the
Internet Society and the Internet2 project, and a former vice
president of a predecessor to EDUCAUSE.60
The Louisville, Colorado-based EDUCAUSE was formed
in 1998 when two groups—Educom and CAUSE—merged.61
See Brooks, supra note 15, at 312.
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution
Services—An Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285, 290 (2005).
57 See
MUELLER, supra note 18, at 3; John Postel, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Postel (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
58 Jeffrey R. Young, Debate Flares Over Group That Hopes to Oversee the
Internet, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 27, 1998), http://chronicle.com/article/DebateFlares-Over-Group-That/27491/; see also MUELLER, supra note 18, at 103 (noting that
“the technical community deferred to Jon Postel when it came to names and numbers”).
59 Young, supra note 58. Professor Milton Mueller describes Roberts’s
ascendency as ICANN’s first president as preordained by Postel. See MUELLER, supra
note 18, at 179, 181. When Postel died of a heart attack in October of 1998, Mueller
writes that ICANN was “robbed . . . of its moral center, a good part of its institutional
memory, and most of what remained of its legitimacy.” Id. at 181.
60 See
Leader Named for Group Likely to Assume Internet-Address
Registrations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 6, 1998), http://chronicle.com/article/LeaderNamed-for-Group-Likely/17222/; see also MUELLER, supra note 18, at 95.
61 See Cause History, EDUCAUSE, http://www.educause.edu/about/missionand-organization/history/cause-history (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
55

56
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From its earliest days, EDUCAUSE represented a consortium of
colleges, universities, and businesses involved with academic
computing. The organization urged the federal government, as
early as December of 1997, to allow it to operate the .EDU
extension.62 But the government delayed peeling off operation of
the .EDU registry from Network Solutions until it had finalized
its deal with ICANN. This delay meant that Network Solutions
was left to enforce government regulations of the .EDU space
from 1993 that dictated that only “four-year, degree-granting
colleges and universities” could register .EDU domain names.63
Most four-year institutions had claimed .EDU domain
names by the late 1990s.64 Facing more than 1,500 requests to
register .EDU domain names in 1999, Network Solutions
permitted registration of fewer than 10% of the requests.65
However, eligibility criteria were not applied evenly, which led
to some individuals registering .EDU domain names for
organizations that did not meet the stated criteria.66 For
example, even though it did not offer four-year degrees, MiamiDade Community College was able to secure a .EDU
registration, as were about 200 other community colleges.67
However, the majority of the over 1,000 community colleges
operating at that time used other top-level extensions, like .US
or .COM, for their institution’s web site, either because they
were unable to obtain a .EDU registration or because the
eligibility criteria dissuaded them even from trying.68
Being forced to use a .COM extension for a community
college’s web site, instead of .EDU, may seem like a minor
concern, but in reality many students, faculty, and administrators
within those institutions acutely felt the distinction. As one
faculty member at a community college expressed at the time, use
62 Jeffrey R. Young, Academic-Technology Consortium Continues Push to
Take Charge of ‘.edu’ Domain, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Sept. 3, 1999, at A53, available
at http://chronicle.com/article/Academic-Technology-Consortium/1904/.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Mark Edelen, Campus Info Is Just a Tap Away for Parents,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Aug. 25, 1997, at D5, available at 1997 WLNR
2196974 (noting that “[u]niversities claimed early territory on the Web”).
65 Young, supra note 62.
66 Gwendolyn Bradley, Community Colleges to Get ‘.edu’ Domain Name,
ACADEME, June 2001, at 8 (noting that “Network Solutions was criticized, however, for
applying the rules inconsistently”).
67 Young, supra note 62; see also Kenneth J. Cooper, Community Colleges
Fight for Net Legitimacy, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 24, available at 2000
WLNR 10679074.
68 Jeffrey R. Young, Community Colleges Step Up Fight to Use ‘.edu’ Internet
Addresses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Dec. 8, 2000, at A39, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Community-Colleges-Step-Up/7411/.
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of the .COM instead of .EDU made her feel as though she worked
for a business, not a college.69 Compounding this sense of
misalignment was the fact that while most community colleges
were kept out of the .EDU space, some entities that were not even
colleges at all had been permitted to register a .EDU domain
name, due to error or oversight by Network Solutions in
reviewing applications. For example, to this day, <australia.edu>
resolves to a web page that provides information to nonAustralians about study abroad options in the Down Under.70
EDUCAUSE itself—which indubitably is not a degree-granting
institution—was permitted a domain name in the .EDU
extension, even before it assumed control of the registry.71
Whether entirely accurate or not, an official with Network
Solutions told a reporter for the Chronicle of Higher Education
in 1997 that a .EDU address “is given to anyone who asks for
it.”72 Eventually, however, EDUCAUSE purged from the root
zone some, but not all, of the domain names that had been
registered in blatant violation of the criteria, such as
<allison.edu>, <geraldine.edu>, <oracle.edu>, and <jedi.edu>.73
Flummoxed by the seemingly capricious nature of who
was permitted to register in the .EDU extension, the American
Association of Community Colleges wrote to the Department of
Commerce in October of 2000, stating that it was “extremely
frustrated by [its] inability to routinely access the .edu domain,”
which it alleged conveys extraordinary symbolic resonance.74 As
the group’s president observed to a national newspaper reporter,
“Some people have not given community colleges the kind of
status they deserve . . . . This is sending the same message.”75
The group also reiterated the call to turn operation of the .EDU
registry over to EDUCAUSE.76 However, a year later,
69 Jeffrey R. Young, Community Colleges Want a More Eminent Domain,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 2001, at A41, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Community-Colleges-Want-a-More/14025/.
70 EDUCAUSE has described <australia.edu> this way: “[its] sole functions are to
offer free .edu email addresses to anyone and to link to various public documents about
student travel to Australia.” POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE .EDU DOMAIN, supra note 50, at 2.
71 Joseph Georges, Putting the ‘Education’ Back Into ‘.edu,’ CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 4, 2002, http://chronicle.com/article/Putting-the-Education-Back/16174/.
72 Lisa Guernsey, Is the Internet Becoming a Bonanza for Diploma Mills?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 19, 1997, at A22, available at http://chronicle.com/article/
Is-the-Internet-Becoming-a/101045/.
73 Doug Mehus, EDUCAUSE Prepares Mass Purge of .EDU Domains,
CIRCLEID (Oct. 9, 2003, 10:51 AM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/educause_
prepares_mass_purge_of_edu_domains/.
74 Young, supra note 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75 Cooper, supra note 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Young, supra note 68.
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community colleges continued to be excluded from the .EDU
extension, which community college leaders continued to find
infuriating and insulting.77
Finally, on October 29, 2001, the Department of
Commerce engaged EDUCAUSE to operate the .EDU registry.78
EDUCAUSE’s current agreement with the Department of
Commerce to operate the .EDU registry extends through
September 30, 2016.79 Under the terms of the agreement,
EDUCAUSE can determine eligibility criteria for institutions of
higher education seeking to register in the extension.80 Soon
after taking over management of the extension, the group
opened up the .EDU space for registration to two-year
institutions, or community colleges.81 From the beginning of its
management of the extension, EDUCAUSE recognized the
power of the .EDU to signify authenticity and legitimacy for
those operating within higher education. As the organization’s
vice-president wrote at the time,
[T]he .edu domain name of a campus is important as a way of stating
that an institution is a recognized member of the higher education
community and that the institution meets the community’s
standards of degrees and accreditation. This sign of recognition will
be all the more critical as more and more teaching and learning is
conducted through the Internet via “e-learning.”82

EDUCAUSE also promulgated a rule that no eligible institution
could register more than one .EDU domain name, which only
underscored the scarcity and importance of each individual
domain name registration.83
77 Jeffrey R. Young, Educause Will Gain Control of the ‘.edu’ Internet Domain,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 27, 2001, at A46, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Educause-Will-Gain-Control-of/33006/.
78 Jeffrey R. Young, Commerce Department Hands Over ‘.edu’ Domain to
Educause, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 9, 2001, at A53, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Commerce-Department-Hands-Over/20208/.
79 See Policy Information, EDUCAUSE, http://net.educause.edu/edudomain/
policy.asp, (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
80 Id.
81 See Mark Luker, The .edu Domain and EDUCAUSE, EDUCAUSE REV.,
Sept./Oct. 2001, at 64, available at https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ERM015A.pdf.
82 Id.; see also Dot Who? They Say They Want to Use .edu, Too, Which Is
Reserved for Four-Year Colleges, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 28, 2001, at F4, available
at 2001 WLNR 10069248 (noting that many community college leaders felt .EDU
extension is “necessary for educational legitimacy,” and that the .EDU extension has a
kind of prestige associated with it).
83 However, EDUCAUSE’s policy board recently endorsed a proposal that
would permit eligible institutions that do not currently have more than one .EDU
domain name to register a second domain name, provided it is “associated with the
entire entity and not just a subunit” (e.g., a school or department within a university).
See Memorandum from Gregory A. Jackson, Vice President, EDUCAUSE, to Policy
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The hand off of .EDU operations from VeriSign (the
corporate successor to Network Solutions) to EDUCAUSE was
not without its glitches. In December of 2001, .EDU registrants
received errant renewal notices from VeriSign, asking registrants
to pay $70 to renew their .EDU domain name registrations.84
EDUCAUSE, which initially charged no registration or renewal
fees, had to assuage the concerns of network administrators at
institutions receiving the mistaken bills, many of whom were
alarmed by them and took them as a sign that the new registry
operator was inept.85
EDUCAUSE’s agreement with the Department of
Commerce was amended in several important ways during the
early years of the relationship. For example, in 2003, operating
policies were established that “[n]ames in the .edu top-level
domain, regardless of when issued, may not be transferred in
any way,” effectively eviscerating any secondary markets for the
buying, trading, or selling of .EDU space.86 In 2006, the
agreement again changed, this time to permit EDUCAUSE to
charge registrants a $40 annual fee to help cover its
administrative expenses in managing the extension.87
As EDUCAUSE worked to fortify the legitimacy of the
.EDU extension, questions continued to arise as to which types
of institutions should be eligible to register domain names in the
space. EDUCAUSE’s initial policy, promulgated in 2001, was
that would-be registrants had to (1) grant degrees, and (2) be
accredited by one of six major regional accrediting bodies.88
These rules, however, excluded educational institutions or
entities that do not grant degrees (such as paralegal certificate
programs, or state university systems or coordinating bodies), or
that grant degrees but are accredited by a national accrediting
group (such as for-profit, online-only institutions) or other
accrediting organizations (such as bible colleges, chiropractic
schools, and midwifery institutes).89 Advocates for opening the
doors of the .EDU extension to such institutions argued that the
Board for .edu 1 (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://net.educause.edu/edudomain/
policy_board_9_26_2012.pdf.
84 Jeffrey R. Young, Colleges Incorrectly Billed for Domains, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jan. 25, 2002, at A32, available at http://chronicle.com/article/CollegesIncorrectly-Billed/31487/.
85 Id.
86 Policy Information, supra note 79.
87 Id.
88 Dan Carnevale, Educause Considers Letting More Colleges Use ‘.edu’ Addresses,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 19, 2002, at A31, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Educause-Considers-Letting/35361/.
89 Id.
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public associates a .EDU address with legitimate institutions,
whereas .COM domain names used for educational purposes
connote diploma mills and fly-by-night operations.90
Advocates for loosening the .EDU eligibility requirements
also rightfully pointed out that many institutions not affiliated
with American higher education had been able to register .EDU
domain names when Network Solutions controlled the extension,
in contravention of then-existing registration eligibility
requirements.91 These domain names were grandfathered in to
the new eligibility requirements established by EDUCAUSE,
causing “great complexity at the borders of .edu policy
enforcement.”92 Thus, high schools, foreign universities, and
even entities with no tie to education at all were found to be
operating in the .EDU space once EDUCAUSE took over, even
though official policy stated that American institutions that
granted degrees, but were not accredited by one of six regional
accrediting agencies, were prevented from registering domain
names in the extension.93
After extensive public comment on the eligibility
requirements, EDUCAUSE and the Department of Commerce
changed them in February of 2003. The new rule for .EDU
registration, which continues to apply, permits any U.S.
institution that is accredited by an agency recognized by the U.S.
Department of Education to register a domain name in the .EDU
extension.94 This rule change effectively opened the door for
midwifery institutes, cosmetology schools, funeral service schools,
and other vocational training institutions to enter the extension.
Many considered this development an equalizing force for
postsecondary education, or in short, “a wonderful way of
leveling the playing field.”95 Additionally, since 2004,
“[u]niversity system offices, state coordinating offices or boards,
Id.
See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
92 See POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE .EDU DOMAIN, supra note 50, at 2.
93 See Georges, supra note 71 (noting that, as of 2002, <deerfield.org> was
used by a high school, <oxford.edu> was used by Oxford University, and
<orchestra.edu> was used by an Italian jazz orchestra, among other examples).
94 Dan Carnevale, Educause Will Open ‘.edu’ Domain to a Wide Range of
Specialized Institutions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 28, 2003, at A35, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Educause-Will-Open-edu/25060/. However, “institutional
accreditation is required for .edu eligibility; program accreditation is not sufficient.”
Policy Information, supra note 79.
95 Anick Jesdanun, Schools Get .edu Sites, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 12, 2003, 12:40
PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/964497/schools-get-edu-sites.html?pg=all (quoting
Michael P. Lambert, the executive director of the Distance Education and Training
Council) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
91
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community college district offices, or equivalent entities located
within the United States which have as their principal activity
the management and governance of a collection of ‘Accredited
Institutions’ that themselves meet the eligibility criteria for
.EDU” have been permitted to register a domain name in the
.EDU extension.96
The question of legitimacy of .EDU domain names
continued to plague EDUCAUSE, perhaps in part because of
the broadening of the eligibility requirements for registering in
the extension. In November of 2004, the Chronicle of Higher
Education published an article highlighting the plight of a
would-be student who almost wrote a $5,000 check to an
alleged diploma mill operating a web site in the .EDU
extension.97 She mistakenly perceived the institution’s .EDU
address as a sign of proper accreditation.98 Others perpetuated
the belief that organizations operating in the .EDU extension
are bona fide schools that do not sell fake degrees.99
EDUCAUSE rebuffed requests that it audit all existing
.EDU domain names and delete registrations if the registrant
did not meet current eligibility requirements.100 The
organization pointed out that institutions’ accreditation status
can change (i.e., an accredited college could lose accreditation,
then gain it back), as can the status of accrediting agencies
(i.e., approval by the Department of Education could exist one
day, then be lost the next).101 In light of the fluid nature of
accreditation, EDUCAUSE decided not to strip institutions of
their domain name when they might actively be trying to
regain their accredited status.
Others continued to criticize EDUCAUSE for this
position. As one critic pointed out, “There’s a widespread belief
that .edu means something.”102 The concept of the .EDU domain
meaning something was not lost on individual colleges and
universities. Many sought to fully capture that meaning,
offering their alumni access to their own personal .EDU email
Policy Information, supra note 79.
Dan Carnevale, Don’t Judge a College by Its Internet Address, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 26, 2004, at A29, available at http://chronicle.com/article/DontJudge-a-College-by-Its/8748/.
98 Id.
99 Cf. Whyte, supra note 26 (“[U]nderstanding domain names will help you
distinguish between bona fide schools and companies selling fake degrees. If the
organisation does not have a .edu domain name, be very wary!”).
100 Carnevale, supra note 97.
101 Id.
102 Id.
96

97
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address for life.103 Some institutions have found that providing
lifetime email addresses to alumni is “a powerful tool” for
keeping graduates engaged.104 Those proud of their alma
maters also consider the email addresses as a signaling device,
or “subtle resume.”105
While lifelong affiliation with one’s alma mater has its
price (namely, the cost of tuition), the associational value
between the institution and users of its domain name has a
price of its own. Indeed, some profiteers in China sell .EDU
email addresses on an eBay-like auction site for hundreds of
dollars each, thereby capitalizing on the perceived value and
authenticity that accompanies emails sent from high-prestige
universities reflected in the .EDU space.106
Regardless of these practices, as online infrastructure
has matured—and users’ comfort level with the medium has
deepened—some within the higher education community have
questioned whether “the tail end of a web address really
matter[s]” all that much.107 Web browsers now are programmed
to complete common URL addresses even before the user has
finished typing them, and colleges and universities themselves
have bought up various .COM, .ORG, and .NET domain names
to serve particular programmatic or marketing-related needs.108
The new gTLDs approved by ICANN will require institutions to
continue to evaluate how they wish their presence to be reflected
online, and to what extent the .EDU domain will remain used as
it was intended: not only as special space, but also the primary
space in which colleges and universities operate online.
C.

Adjudicating Domain Name Disputes under the UDRP
and the ACPA

Two primary legal vehicles exist for trademark holders to
resolve claims related to the allegedly improper ownership and
use of domain names by third parties: the UDRP action and
103 Universities Offer Graduates an E-Mail Place to Call Home, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 8, 2001, at 02M, available at 2001 WLNR 2942169.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 University Email Accounts for Sale in China, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 9,
2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/09/09/university-email-accountssale-china.
107 Josh Fischman, Trading In ‘.edu’ for ‘.com,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED
CAMPUS BLOG (Sept. 2, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/trading-in-edufor-com/33033.
108 Id. (noting Weber State University’s use of <getintoweber.com> for
recruitment and admissions purposes).
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federal court litigation. Both provide remedies for mark holders
aggrieved when a third party—often labeled a “cybersquatter” by
the mark holder—registers and uses a confusingly similar domain
name in bad faith.109 While federal court litigation over domain
names may include traditional claims of trademark infringement
and trademark dilution, this subsection discusses only the
statutory cause of action for cybersquatting that Congress created
in the late 1990s specifically to address the problem.110
1. The UDRP
Procedurally, a UDRP action is initiated when a
complainant mark holder submits a formal complaint to an
ICANN-approved dispute resolution provider.111 Complainants
may choose which provider to use, a critical option that some have
alleged creates “an incentive for providers to favor complainants
in their decisions.”112 The provider’s initial task is to determine if
the complaint complies with applicable administrative rules and
any supplementary rules of the provider.113 For example, the
109 See Lipton, supra note 5, at 1363-64 (arguing that “[w]hile ACPA and the
UDRP are extremely useful and effective in protecting trademark interests in the bad
faith cybersquatting context, they are very limited in their ability to deal with disputes
between two legitimate holders of similar trademarks with respect to a corresponding
Internet domain name”); see also MUELLER, supra note 18, at 67 (“[T]he application of
trademark law, which was national in scope and industry- and use-specific, to domain
names, which were global in scope and were governed primarily by a uniqueness
requirement, created as many conflicts as it resolved.”).
110 See LIPTON, supra note 12, at 24 (noting that trademark infringement,
dilution, and ACPA claims often are pleaded in the alternative). Professor Lipton also
notes that “the awkwardness of applying existing trademark doctrines to
cybersquatting” prompted Congress to enact ACPA, and for ICANN to promulgate the
UDRP. Id. at 272. The awkwardness stems from the fact that bad faith registration
and use of a domain name may not confuse consumers (the sine qua non of trademark
infringement actions), nor does such activity necessarily constitute use of a trademark
in commerce. For an example of one known instance involving a university suing a
defendant for trademark infringement and violation of the ACPA, see Ohio St. Univ. v.
Thomas, 738 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748, 757 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (granting preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order to university on trademark infringement
claim while declining to address university’s ACPA claim).
111 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 56, at 298. Currently, five ICANN-approved
providers exist. The first two authorized providers were the World Intellectual
Property Organization and the National Arbitration Forum, which both were approved
in December of 1999. Id. at 312. Two additional providers, eResolution and CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution, were approved in 2000, but each of these
subsequently lost its approval. In 2002, ICANN approved a new provider, Asian
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre. Additional providers include the Czech
Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes (approved 2009) and the
Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute Resolution (approved 2013). See List of
Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/
en/help/dndr/udrp/providers (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
112 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 56, at 299.
113 Id. at 303.
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UDRP only applies to domain names existing in 1 of 16 gTLDs
(the .EDU is not one of them).114 Assuming all basic filing
requirements are met, the provider submits the complaint to the
respondent, who then has 20 days to respond.115 If a timely
response is submitted, the provider submits the complaint and
response to the appointed panel (which consists of one arbitrator
or a three-arbitrator group, depending on the complainant’s
election).116 Even if no response is submitted, the complaint is
forwarded to the appointed panel, which need not consider UDRP
precedent in reaching its decision.117
Substantively, in order to prevail under the UDRP, a
complainant must show that (1) the domain name at issue is
identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the
complainant has rights (these rights need not be in the form of a
federal trademark registration, but often and ideally are); (2) the
respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain
name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.118 Evidence of registration and use in bad faith,
which often is the most hotly disputed of the three elements, can
take many forms, including circumstances suggesting that: the
respondent registered the domain name in order to prevent the
complainant from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain
name; the respondent registered the domain name primarily for
the purpose of disrupting the complainant’s business; in using the
domain name, the respondent intentionally attempted to attract
Internet users to a web site by creating a likelihood of confusion
with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the web site.119
ICANN created the UDRP in 1999, with an effective date
of January 3, 2000, after months of consultation with various
interest groups, including the World Intellectual Property
Organization.120 The UDRP was promulgated against the

114 See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/dndr-2012-02-25-en (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
115 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 56, at 303.
116 Id. The single-person arbitrator is selected at random by the provider, while
three-person panels are selected with input from the complainant, the respondent, and
the provider.
117 Id.; Bearby & Siegal, supra note 24, at 656.
118 See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, § 4(a),
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) [hereinafter
UDRP Policy].
119 Id. at § 4(b).
120 See WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN
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background of an existing dispute settlement policy
administered by Network Solutions that stakeholders widely
considered inadequate.121 The UDRP has been described as “a
decentralized regime for dispute resolution in which ICANN
created the general rules and authorized a series of competing
private providers to manage and resolve disputes.”122 ICANN
required gTLD registries to adopt the UDRP.123 In order to
effectuate this, the registries, in turn, were made to require
registrars selling domain name space within their extension to
incorporate the UDRP into the standard registration agreement
between registrars and end-purchasers of domain names.124
Jurisdiction is therefore contractual: by purchasing a domain
name, a registrant agrees that any dispute concerning the
registrant’s rights in the domain name is subject to UDRP
arbitration.125 Registries agree to enforce UDRP decisions by
approved providers no sooner than 10 days after issuance.126 The
10 days affords a losing respondent the opportunity to file a
lawsuit in court. If such action is taken, the registry will not act
on the panel’s decision, pending resolution of the court case.127
The UDRP, as a form of alternative dispute resolution,
fills a void created by the inadequacy of courts to predictably
handle disputes over domain name ownership. With disputing
parties often not subject to the same legal jurisdiction,

NAME PROCESS (Apr. 30, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf; UDRP Policy, supra note 118.
121 Roberta L. Horton & Seth I. Heller, What’s In a Name? Trade Name Protection
Under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 19 BLOOMBERG BNA:
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 514 (May 12, 2014), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/
public_document.cfm?u=WhatsinaNameTradeNameProtectionUndertheUniformDomain
NameDisputeResolutionPolicy&id=23637&key=12H1. Essentially, Network Solutions’s
dispute policy was “to stay out of domain name disputes except to the extent necessary
to protect [the company’s] interests.” Julia B. Strickland & Scott M. Pearson, Internet
Litigation-Domain Names-Trademarks-Cyberlaw: Resolution of Disputes Over Internet
Domain Names, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Apr. 6, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR
5130021 (describing how the policy functioned); see also MUELLER, supra note 18, at
121 (stating that “the policy routinely produced blatant injustices”).
122 Kesan & Gallo, supra note 56, at 293.
123 See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s ‘Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’—
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 612 (2002) (“[ICANN’s] power to
make and break registries allows ICANN to require registries (and also registrars) to
promise to subject all registrants to a mandatory third-party beneficiary clause in which
every registrant agrees to submit to ICANN’s UDRP upon the request of aggrieved third
parties who believe they have a superior claim to the registrant’s domain name.”).
124 See Lipton, supra note 5, at 1372 (“[A]ll domain name registrants are
contractually bound to submit to a mandatory arbitration under the UDRP . . . .”).
125 See MUELLER, supra note 18, at 192.
126 See UDRP Policy, supra note 118, § 4(k).
127 Id.
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enforcement of court verdicts poses difficulties.128 Furthermore,
the expense and slow speed of litigation makes it an
unattractive dispute resolution vehicle for many parties wishing
to resolve Internet domain name disputes cheaply and quickly.129
In contrast to litigation, UDRP proceedings do not involve
discovery or in-person hearings, and no money damages are
available for prevailing complainants.130 A decision is rendered
within 60 days of filing.131 According to a 2012 survey conducted
by the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA),
the mean cost to clients in legal fees to have a lawyer prepare a
UDRP complaint is $1,876, although the cost can be as high as
$5,000 for some firms and in some markets.132 Others choose to
proceed without the aid of an attorney, which the UDRP rules
permit.133 The UDRP’s chief selling points, therefore, are that it
is an international, non-governmental, relatively inexpensive,
fast, and essentially online-only dispute resolution vehicle.134
Providers have seen an uptick in the number of UDRP
actions filed each year.135 Critics of the UDRP, however, allege
that the process is too favorable to complainants.136 A common
critique is that arbitration panels are too lenient in finding bad
faith on the part of respondents.137 Whatever factors come into
play in a given arbitration panel’s decision, one macroscopic
Kesan & Gallo, supra note 56, at 292.
Id. For a detailed description of the general procedure providers follow in
adjudicating UDRP disputes, see id. at 303.
130 UDRP Policy, supra note 118.
131 See, e.g., WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
132 AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at I-107. Additionally, the
cost of using the arbitration provider can be $1,300 to $2,250 for a single-member panel,
depending on the number of domain names in dispute. See, e.g., DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FOR DOMAIN NAMES: THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM’S SUPPLEMENTAL RULES TO
ICANN’S UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 10 (July 1, 2010),
available at http://domains.adrforum.com/resource.aspx?id=1556.
133 See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Rules”), ICANN § 3 (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/rules-be2012-02-25-en (noting that complaints may be initiated by the complainant or the
complainant’s authorized representative).
134 See Lipton, supra note 5, at 1372. That said, one may seek remedy through
the UDRP while simultaneously pursuing federal court litigation; the two avenues are
not mutually exclusive. See Bearby & Siegal, supra note 24, at 655.
135 See, e.g., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ASS’N, TOTAL NUMBER OF WIPO DOMAIN
NAME CASES AND DOMAIN NAMES BY YEAR, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/pressroom/en/documents/pr_2014_756_a.pdf#annex3 (last visited Mar. 31,
2015) (showing the trend in cases from 1,857 filed in 2000, to 2,585 filed in 2013).
136 See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 18, at 193 (“Procedurally, the UDRP is
heavily biased in favor of complainants.”).
137 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 15, at 326 (“[P]anels have expanded the strict
language of the policy when their arbitration panelists have reached the conclusion
that a registrant is a ‘bad actor.’”).
128

129
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empirical data point merits consideration: respondents win less
than 20% of the UDRP proceedings that result in a ruling.138
2. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) provides federal court jurisdiction for a civil cause of
action aimed to punish cybersquatters. In order to succeed
under the ACPA, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant (1)
has a bad faith intent to profit from using a distinctive mark
owned by the plaintiff, and (2) has registered, trafficked in, or
used a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to
the plaintiff’s mark, or dilutive of the plaintiff’s mark if the
mark is famous.139 The ACPA identifies 10 non-exclusive
statutory bases for finding bad faith intent to profit, including
the defendant’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark in a site accessible under the domain name, the
defendant’s offer to sell the domain name for financial gain
without having used it, and the defendant’s provision of
material and misleading false contact information when
applying to register the domain name.140 To be actionable, the
registrant’s bad faith need not have been present at the time of
registration, but simply must have been present at some time
during the registrant’s ownership of the domain.141
President Bill Clinton signed the ACPA into law on
November 29, 1999.142 Congress enacted the ACPA against a
landscape of increased online activity that was hurting
established businesses in a way that traditional trademark law
was not well equipped to resolve.143 The ACPA aimed to address
the problem of “bad faith and abusive registration of distinctive
marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from
the goodwill associated with such marks.”144 The specific
problem boiled down to individuals—often located outside the
U.S., and thus beyond its courts’ jurisdiction—who would
register domain names containing the trademarks of American
Id. at 328; see also Horton & Heller, supra note 121.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2012).
140 See id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
141 Bad faith even can occur after a dispute arises, should the registrant offer
to settle the dispute by selling the domain name to the complainant for profit. See
LIPTON, supra note 12, at 115.
142 Karen Kaplan, Clinton Signs Cybersquatting Law, L.A. T IMES , Nov. 30,
1999, at 3.
143 See LIPTON, supra note 12, at 22.
144 S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
138
139
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companies, then offer to sell them the domain name in a
private transaction at a cost well above the seller’s minimal
expense in obtaining and maintaining the registration. While
brand owners contemplated legal action, or the cybersquatter’s
offer to sell, the domain name often was put to nefarious use,
such as automatically redirecting visitors to the web site of the
mark owner’s prime competitor. In some cases the actual
registrant could not be identified, as the registrant had
provided false name and contact information to the registrar at
the time of registration.145
These thorny problems of personal jurisdiction led
Congress to include an in rem provision in the legislation, in
addition to the in personam jurisdiction typical of most
enabling statutes. Under the in rem provision, courts may
adjudicate claims to a given domain name provided that the
domain name registrar or registry that registered or assigned
the domain name is physically present in the court’s judicial
district.146 Additionally, in order to proceed under the ACPA’s
in rem prong, the court must be satisfied that the mark owner
is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who
otherwise would be the named defendant, or through due
diligence was not able to find such a person by (1) sending
notice to the registrant at his address listed in WHOIS
information for the domain, and (2) publishing notice as the
court may direct.147 The ACPA’s in rem provision provides mark
holders with two key advantages. First, it provides a statutory
basis for declaring domain names property rather than merely
contractual rights.148 Second, the only relief contemplated
under this provision—i.e., cancellation, forfeiture, or transfer of
the domain name149—often matters more to mark owners than
the prospect of obtaining money damages.
On the subject of money, and in contrast to the UDRP,
pursuing an ACPA claim is more expensive because a claimant
must use the federal courts to advance such claims. While
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2012).
147 See id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
148 See id. § 1125(d)(2)(C) (“In an in rem action under this paragraph, a
domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which (i) the
domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
assigned the domain name is located; or (ii) documents sufficient to establish control
and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name
are deposited with the court.”).
149 See id. § 1125(d)(D)(i) (“The remedies in an in rem action under this
paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the
domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.”).
145
146
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statistics on the costs of ACPA litigation are not specifically
maintained, AIPLA’s 2012 survey of intellectual property law
firms does provide average lawsuit cost data for trademark
infringement lawsuits. These data provide the best basis for
insight into the costs associated with pursuing an ACPA claim
through trial. For a trademark infringement lawsuit with less
than $1,000,000 at risk (likely the case for most domain name
disputes), the average cost to pursue such a case to completion
was $375,000 in 2012.150
Although the UDRP is a significantly cheaper vehicle than
an ACPA lawsuit for potentially resolving a dispute over a domain
name, neither vehicle is easy to pursue without significant
planning and time investment in the adversarial process. With this
reality in mind, the following subsection explores those known
instances when the news media or other commentators publicized
college and university battles for cyberspace, focusing in particular
on their uses of the UDRP and the ACPA.
D.

College and University Battles for Cyberspace

Colleges and universities quickly learned that the
availability of the restricted .EDU extension did not mean that
they were immune from cyberattack by squatters in other TLDs.
As two authors writing in 2002 advised, “Institutions should be
on guard against a wide variety of domain name registrants,
including offshore gambling entities, adult entertainment
operators, ticket brokers, entrepreneurs trying to make a quick
dollar and even fans and alumni.”151 Indeed, higher education
waged battles with all variety of these types of squatters, and
news of these efforts soon made its way into the headlines of
popular and academic outlets.
In the first reported use of the ACPA by a university,
Harvard University sued the operators of the web site
<harvardyardsale.com> in December of 1999.152 The site’s
operators were using it to offer for sale 65 different domain
names incorporating the word “Harvard,” such as <harvardlawschool.com>, <harvardfaculty.com>, and <virtualharvard
.com>.153 Harvard University declined an offer from the site’s
AIPLA, supra note 132 at I-161.
Bearby & Siegal, supra note 24, at 653-54.
152 Wendy R. Leibowitz, Harvard Sues 2 Men Under New Law Aimed at
Cybersquatters, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 9, 1999), http://chronicle.com/article/
Harvard-Sues-2-Men-Under-New/113762/.
153 Id.
150

151
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operators to purchase the domain names, electing instead to
sue them in federal court. A spokesman for the university said
at the time, “‘We cannot allow the public to be misled into
believing that a site is officially linked to the university when it
is not.”154 The university’s lawyer in the case called universities
“latecomers to the world of trademark and domain-name
protection.”155
The case settled in March of 2000, with the site
operators agreeing to transfer the domain names to Harvard.156
Fresh off this success, the university soon had reason to turn to
the ACPA again, when it sued an online course provider
operating a web site at <notharvard.com> in August of 2000.157
The university alleged various Lanham Act claims, including
the ACPA violations related to the registration and use of
<notharvard.com>, <notharvarduniversity.com>, <notharvardu
.com>, and <notnotharvard.com>.158 After Harvard obtained a
preliminary injunction, the case settled on the eve of trial in
Harvard’s favor.159
Harvard was not alone among elite universities forging
paths as fierce protectors of their names and identities online.
Stanford and Duke both were cited in 2000 as aggressively
pursuing cybersquatters, and the University of North Carolina
(UNC) sued the owners of <uncgirls.com>, which featured
photographs of naked women on a web site using UNC colors.160
154 Id. For more details about the case, see Alayne E. Manas, Note, Harvard
As a Model in Trademark and Domain Name Protection, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 475, 484-86 (2003).
155 Wendy R. Leibowitz, As ‘Cybersquatters’ Multiply, Colleges Try to Protect Their
Good Names, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 21, 2000, at A39, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/As-Cybersquatters-Multiply/14231/.
156 See Andrea L. Foster, Plan for Domain Suffixes Has Colleges Girding for
Trademark Fights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 4, 2000, at A41, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Plan-for-Domain-Suffixes-Has/22238/.
157 See Andrea L. Foster, Facing Lawsuit, NotHarvard.com Changes Name,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 6, 2000, at A49, available at http://chronicle.com/article/FacingLawsuit-NotHarvardcom/2400/.
158 The case filed by Harvard in federal court in Massachusetts came after the
site operators preemptively sued Harvard in Texas, seeking a federal court there to
declare its use of <notharvard.com> permissible under trademark law. See Manas,
supra note 154, at 486-96 (discussing the case in detail).
159 Id. at 495; Foster, supra note 157.
160 Jennifer Jacobson, Sexually Explicit Web Site Sued by U. of North
Carolina, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 8, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/SexuallyExplicit-Web-Site/24618/; Leibowitz, supra note 155; see also Andrew Allemann, NC
State University Loses Domain Name Dispute for Wolfpack.com, DOMAIN NAME WIRE
BLOG (Jan. 31, 2014), http://domainnamewire.com/2014/01/31/nc-state-wolfpack-domain/
(describing UDRP defeat for North Carolina State University against owner of
<wolfpack.com>, who alleged to have registered it for use in connection with a snowshoe
project); Glenn Bacal & David Andersen, Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Proving Bad
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Despite these successful enforcement activities, at least one
elite university—and presumably many more non-elite
institutions—decided to pursue a more cautious strategy. In
2000, a spokeswoman for Cornell University stated that the
institution viewed domain name battles as a hassle, noting that
her institution often preferred to coexist rather than fight with
similarly-named commercial web sites.161
Whatever a given institution’s online strategy, what
soon became certain was that no college or university could
fully protect itself by buying up all domain names that could
potentially reference the institution. The permutations of the
English language are simply too many, the array of gTLDs and
ccTLDs are too great, and the costs of maintaining unused
domain names are too expensive, for colleges and universities
to justify defensively registering any more than a handful or
few dozen domain names. Reed College learned this lesson in
2002, when it discovered someone had registered
<reedcollege.com> and was using it to redirect visitors to an
anti-abortion web site. Reed College apparently had paid to
register <reed.com>, <reed.org>, and other domain names, but
not <reedcollege.com>. As the institution’s chief technology
officer said at the time, “it’s impossible to imagine every
variation of the name and how it could be used—although in
hindsight, [<reedcollege.com>] was an obvious one.”162
Less obvious may be domain names in obscure or
seldom-trafficked extensions, like the ccTLD for the country of
Montenegro, .ME. Brandeis University, Babson College, the
University of Vermont, and Tufts University all fell prey to the
same cybersquatter who registered four domain names in the
.ME extension, each confusingly similar to those institutions’
names, in order to solicit donations from unsuspecting donors
and sell to students purported access to personalized apps.163
Faith, BACAL L. GROUP, http://ipdepartment.net/articles/SunDevils.comUDRPDecision.pdf
(describing UDRP victory for Arizona State University against owner of <sundevils.com>,
which the owner used at one time to redirect visitors to a pornographic web site).
161 Leibowitz, supra note 155.
162 Jeffrey R. Young, Anti-Abortion Group Uses a Web Address Similar to Reed
College’s, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 1, 2002, at A31, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Anti-Abortion-Group-Uses-a-Web/115980/. Interestingly, as of June 2014,
<reedcollege.com> redirects to Reed College’s main .EDU web site, whereas the other
two domain names clearly are not affiliated with the institution.
163 Scott Jaschik, Victory for Colleges in Cybersquatting Case, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Aug. 7, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2012/08/07/
victory-colleges-cybersquatting-case; see also Babson Coll. v. Quevillon, WIPO Case No.
DME2012-0005 (July 23, 2012) (Foster, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/
search/text.jsp?case=DME2012-0005.
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The institutions claimed the activity was a scam, filed a UDRP
action, and were awarded transfer of the domain names.164
News outlets in higher education continued to highlight
the occasional squabble by colleges or universities upset with a
third-party’s use of space online.165 Louisiana State University
(LSU) even went so far as to sue a current student for his
ownership and use of a domain name, <lsulaw.com>.166 The law
student created a web site at the domain out of apparent
dissatisfaction with LSU’s own web presence and his desire to
have an email address that would be easy to remember.167
Groups affiliated with higher education also turned to
adversarial channels to resolve disputes over domain names. For
example, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
filed a UDRP complaint against the owner of 32 domain names
containing “ncaa” in them (some in conjunction with gambling
terms).168 The NCAA was awarded transfer of all of the domain
names except the ones that referenced gambling.169 The NCAA
subsequently challenged those same domain names in an ACPA
action in federal court.170 The NCAA’s success with the UDRP
continued to be spotty in future actions: an arbitrator awarded
the organization transfer of <finalfourmerchandise.com>, but
not <finalfourseats.com>.171
Also active was the Institute for the International
Education of Students, commonly known as the study abroad
group IES. IES filed a UDRP complaint against the owner of
<iesabroad.com>, which a for-profit competitor had registered and
attempted to sell to IES.172 A panel awarded the domain name to

164 Jaschik, supra note 163; see also Babson Coll. v. Quevillon, WIPO Case
No. DME2012-0005.
165 See, e.g., Brock Read, Ball State U. Threatens to Sue the Creator of a Web
Site Using a Campus Logo, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 29, 2002), http://chronicle.com/
article/Ball-State-U-Threatens-to-Sue/115853/ (noting the dispute between Ball State
University and owner of domain name <bsupolice.com>, who used the domain to
criticize the university).
166 Katherine S. Mangan, Louisiana State U. Takes Law Student to Court
Over Use of Domain Name, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 24, 2002, at A33, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Louisiana-State-U-Takes-Law/115488/.
167 Id.
168 See Andrea L. Foster, NCAA Loses Domain-Name Dispute Involving
Sports-Betting Sites, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 8, 2000), http://chronicle.com/
article/NCAA-Loses-Domain-Name-Dispute/107176/.
169 Id.
170 Bearby & Siegal, supra note 24, at 657.
171 Id. at 656-57.
172 See Andrea L. Foster, International-Study Group Is Awarded Copycat
Domain Name, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2001), http://chronicle.com/article/
International-Study-Group-Is/12895/.
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IES.173 Foreign universities, too, found the UDRP useful, with the
University of Oxford being awarded transfer of <university-ofoxford.com> by a WIPO arbitration panel in 2001.174
By the early- to mid-2000s, cybersquatting had emerged
as an established, lucrative venture, with many hijacked mark
owners—not just colleges and universities—preferring to resolve
disputes for their settlement value rather than arbitrating or
litigating. Perhaps with that goal in mind, one entity registered a
reported 23,000 domain names, each designed to call to mind a
college or university, usually by incorporating college or
university trademarks in the domain name.175 The owner of these
domain names viewed them as being useful spaces for selling
college-related merchandise, but the envisioned use of the domain
names never came to fruition, likely because the institutions that
were targeted did not condone the business model.176
The cybersquatting problem has become so widespread
that institutions now commonly receive watch notices from
consulting companies that notify them when new uses of their
trademarks appear online.177 Others turn elsewhere for help.
For example, institutions that contract with the Collegiate
Licensing Company (CLC) to handle the licensing of their
trademarks to sportswear companies and others have found an
ally in the organization. CLC’s general counsel states that each
quarter his legal department shuts down hundreds of web sites
selling counterfeit college merchandise.178 These enforcement
activities help institutions protect their brand in the often
messy world of cyberspace.
Online space continues to be a site of contest for higher
education. Of continued concern are authenticity and legitimacy,
Id.
David Cohen, U. of Oxford Wins Case Against Man Who Used Its Domain
Name; Canadian Judge Deems Student Destitute So She Can Sue Father for Support,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 14, 2001, at A49, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/Oxford-Wins-Domain-Name-Case/107733/.
175 Jean Marie Angelo, Evicting Cybersquatters: Colleges and Universities
Have to Protect Their Websites from Those Who Try to Poach Traffic, UNIV. BUS., Mar.,
2007, at 79; Andrea L. Foster, Company Buys Web Addresses Echoing College Names,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 8, 2005), http://chronicle.com/article/Company-Buys-WebAddresses/36300/.
176 Foster, supra note 175; see also Gary T. Brown, Institutions Interpret Purchase
of Domain Names As Illegal, NAT’L COLL. ATHLETIC ASS’N. (Nov. 21, 2005, 2:25 PM),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2005/Association-wide/institutions%2Binterpret
%2Bpurchase%2Bof%2Bdomain%2Bnames%2Bas%2Billegal%2B-%2B11-21-05%2Bncaa
%2Bnews.html.
177 Julia Love, Colleges’ Brands Escape Their Bounds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Brands-Escape-Their/134764/.
178 Id.
173
174
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and the fear that consumers of higher education will be confused
or misled by a domain name or web site they encounter. Those
who wish to profit off of colleges and universities have gone so
far as to establish web sites for sham institutions (they copy
content from legitimate college web sites),179 pretend to be the
official web site of a university,180 and exploit campus tragedy.181
When ICANN approved the new gTLD extension .XXX
in 2011, some colleges and universities took advantage of a prepurchase window for trademark holders, to make sure that no
one could register the institution’s name in the extension.182
Others did not pre-purchase any .XXX domain name, believing
that such defensive effort—the cost of which was $200 per
domain name purchased—would be fruitless.183 The University
of Hawaii was one institution that declined to take preemptive
action. Leaders there soon became dismayed to find that
someone had registered <universityofhawaii.xxx> and was using
it to display photos of nude couples engaged in sexual
intercourse.184 After the university sent the registrant a ceaseand-desist letter, the matter was resolved.185
What has not been resolved is just how broad a presence
colleges and universities should seek to stake out in the online
179 See, e.g., Ben Wieder, Reed College Seeks to Stop Copycat Web Site, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/
reed-college-seeks-to-stop-copycat-web-site/29999 (describing how an unaccredited college had
created a web site with material copied from Reed College’s web site).
180 See, e.g., Ben Wieder, Fake Web Site Pretends to Be Youngstown State U.’s,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/wiredcampus/fake-web-site-pretends-to-be-youngstown-state-u/31048 (describing how
someone used <ysu.com> to masquerade as Youngstown State University’s official web site).
181 See Brock Read, After the Virginia Tech Shootings, Profiteers Rush to Buy
Domain Names, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (May 9, 2007),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/after-the-virginia-tech-shootings-profiteersrush-to-buy-domain-names/3017 (describing how one man purchased more than 40
domain names intended to call to mind the 2007 campus shootings at Virginia Tech
University, including <bloodbathinblacksburg.com> and <virginiatechthemovie.com>).
182 Jennifer Howard, QuickWire: Colleges Buy Up .XXX Domain Names to
Sidestep Pornographers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/quickwire-colleges-buy-up-xxx-domain-names-tosidestep-pornographers/34334 (discussing the purchase of <missouri.xxx> and
<missouritigers.xxx> by the University of Missouri); Steve Kolowich, Universities
Preempt Pornographers by Buying Up “Dot-XXX” Domains, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 30,
2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/11/30/universities-preemptpornographers-buying-dot-xxx-domains (discussing the purchase of <texassports.xxx>,
<hookemhorns.xxx>, and <texasboxoffice.xxx> by the University of Texas, as well as
other .XXX domain names preemptively purchased by other colleges and universities).
183 Kolowich, supra note 182.
184 Steve Kolowich, ‘Dot-XXX’ Sites May Pose Real Risks to University Brands,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2012/02/22/dot-xxx-sites-may-pose-real-risks-university-brands.
185 Id.
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world. As EDUCAUSE’s vice president of policy stated in 2012,
the opening of each new domain name extension exposes
colleges and universities to risks and costs without offering
them much value in return.186 ICANN’s latest expansion of the
generic top-level domain space—which permits virtually any
eligible entity willing to pay a hefty fee and serve as registry to
operate its own generic top-level extension—seems to suggest
that there is a limit to institutions’ willingness to establish
their online identities through domain name acquisition. Only
three universities in the world, all located in Australia, opted
to apply for an extension.187 In January of 2014, Monash
University in Melbourne became the first to receive ICANN
approval to operate its extension.188 According to a press
release, the university viewed acquisition of .MONASH as
reflective of its presence as a “global institution” and a tool for
helping the university develop a new “customer-focused
University web presence.”189
Meanwhile, in 2012, EDUCAUSE’s vice president stated
that no American university he was aware of was proceeding to
obtain its own gTLD,190 which ICANN’s publicly-available
listing of first-round applicants confirms.191 However, the
extensions .COLLEGE and .UNIVERSITY both were approved
in April of 2014.192 Neither is operated by an accredited higher
education institution. The marketers behind the .COLLEGE
extension see it as innovative space capable of challenging the
traditional .EDU extension that they claim “does not allow for
the full spectrum of education-based services to establish an
Id.
Carl Straumsheim, ICAAN’s Personalized Domain Names Attracts Little
Interest from Higher Education, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/02/03/icanns-personalized-domain-namesattracts-little-interest-higher-education#sthash.pxTVcz3y.dpbs.
The
other
two
Australian universities that applied were Bond University and La Trobe University.
188 Id.
189 Press Release, Monash University, Monash First in the World to Acquire a
New Brand Top-Level Domain (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http://monash.edu/
news/releases/show/monash-first-in-the-world-to-acquire-a-new-brand-top-level-domain.
190 See Kolowich, supra note 184.
191 See New gTLD Current Application Status, ICAAN NEW GENERIC TOPLEVEL DOMAINS, https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/ (last
visited Mar. 6, 2015).
192 Konstantinos Zournas, 24 More New gTLDs Were Delegated: .college,
.engineering, .media, .university, .gop, .yokohama, ONLINEDOMAIN.COM (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://onlinedomain.com/2014/04/22/news/24-more-new-gtlds-were-delegated-collegeengineering-media-university-gop-yokohama/; see also Casey Fabris, New .College
Domain Is Opportunity for Some Colleges, Worry for Others, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Mar.
18,
2015),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/new-college-domain-isopportunity-for-some-colleges-worry-for-others/56145.
186
187
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internet presence.”193 Which institutions may seek registrations
within these two new extensions, and how domain names
registered in the extensions will be used, remains to be seen.
II.

A STUDY OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY INVOLVEMENT IN
UDRP ACTIONS AND ACPA LITIGATION INVOLVING
DOMAIN NAMES

This Part describes the methods I used to compile
original datasets consisting of information about college and
university involvement in UDRP actions and ACPA litigation
over domain names. The section concludes with a description of
the study’s limitations.
A.

Methods
1. UDRP Research

The UDRP portion of the study proceeded in two stages:
(1) data collection concerning UDRP actions, and (2) analysis of
individual domain names identified from the collection of data
concerning UDRP actions.
The objective of the first phase of the project was to
obtain data concerning all UDRP actions filed by American
colleges and universities, in order to better understand how
they conceptualize their space online. To obtain those data, a
structured search of several databases containing information
about UDRP actions was conducted. As of the time of data
collection in late 2013, ICANN had approved five arbitration
providers to conduct UDRP actions.194 Each of the five current
providers maintains a publicly searchable database containing
information about UDRP filings made with the arbitration
provider. Each of these five databases was searched to identify
all UDRP filings by an American college or university.
Databases of UDRP providers formerly approved by ICANN
were searched as well.195 Independent searches for the words
193 David Eccles, New Unrestricted Domain Extension .College Approved by
ICANN, SBWIRE BLOG, Aug. 22, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 20912378.
194 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
195 Two arbitration providers formerly enjoyed ICANN approval to conduct
UDRP proceedings, but by the time of data collection, no longer were approved by
ICANN. eResolution was a UDRP arbitration provider from 2000 through 2001, when
it quit the business due to disputes with ICANN. See Kieren McCarthy, eResolution
Quits Domain Arbitration: Blames WIPO, REGISTER (Dec. 4, 2001),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/04/eresolution_quits_domain_arbitration/. It no
longer operates. Meanwhile, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention &
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college, university, and regent in the complainant field were
used to identify potentially relevant UDRP actions.196
The first three databases searched—the Asian Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Centre, the Czech Arbitration Court
Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes, and the Arab Center
for Domain Name Dispute Resolution—yielded no results.
Searches of the databases maintained by WIPO and NAF
yielded hundreds of unfiltered results. Records reflecting UDRP
actions filed by foreign institutions or non-university business
institutions were filtered from the results, yielding 225
responsive records.
The responsive records were examined individually and
relevant information was extracted for inclusion in my dataset.
Extracted information included the name of the complainant,
the respondent, the disputed domain name(s), and the case
number; the decision date, outcome,197 and PDF copy of the
panel’s decision; and the number of domain names that were
the subject of the given UDRP action. Phase one data collection
and refinement occurred over several weeks in late 2013.
Phase two of the project entailed further analysis of the
domain names involved in the UDRP actions identified in phase
one. The domain names were placed in a separate dataset for
individual analysis.198 Each domain name was categorized as
falling into one of three researcher-generated categories, based
on analysis of its second-level alphanumeric domain name
Resolution, Inc. (CPR) was an approved UDRP arbitration service from 2000 through
2006; it continues to provide other dispute resolution services. Records of UDRP
actions resolved through CPR and eResolution are maintained online at
<www.cpradr.org/FileaCase/CPRsNeutrals/DomainNameICANNDisputes.aspx>
and
<www.disputes.org>, respectively. While the search functionality of these records is
limited, manual review of the records did return one UDRP action that met the study’s
search criteria. See Sw. Tex. State Univ. v. Flynn, CPR 0231 (Jan. 23, 2003) (Weinberg,
Arb.) (concerning <southwesttexasstateuniversity.com>).
196 For purposes of the study, both four-year and two-year, non-profit and forprofit institutions were included, provided they enroll students in degree programs in
the United States.
197 Possibilities for outcome included “transferred,” “cancelled,” “claim denied,”
and “split decision” (i.e., the arbitrator awarded transfer of some, but not all, domain
names subject to the UDRP action).
198 Five domain names—i.e, <baylorcollegemedicine.com>, <baylorjobs.com>,
<baylormedicalcenter.com>, <baylormedicalschool.com>, and <baylorhospitaljobs.com>—
were each the subject of two successful UDRP actions. These domain names only were
included once in the second database. One domain name, <wharton.com>, was the subject
of two unsuccessful UDRP actions. See Wharton Sch. of the Univ. of Penn. v.
Motherboards.com, NAF Claim No. FA0306000161274 (July 24, 2003) (Triana, Arb.),
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/161274.htm; Trs. of the Univ. of Penn. v.
Moniker Privacy Services, WIPO Case No. D2007-0757 (Oct. 5, 2007) (Towns, Arb.),
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0757.html.
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string. The mutually-exclusive categories were “name,” “nameplus,” and “other.” Domain names were coded as follows:
•

In order to be labeled “name,” the second-level alphanumeric
domain name string had to include the college or university
name, and no other lettering, although abbreviations of the
institution’s name, hyphens, branch campus names, and
inclusion of the letters “edu” into the second-level portion of the
domain name were permitted.199

•

In order to be labeled “name-plus,” the second-level
alphanumeric domain name string had to otherwise be
appropriately categorized as “name,” except for the existence of
additional words or terms in the second-level string (e.g., the
name of a department, school, or program within the institution,
or a service related to the institution).200

•

Domain names not fitting into either of the aforementioned
categories were labeled as “other.” Domain names categorized as
“other” have in common that they make no reference to the
identity of the college or university complainant.201

Additionally, the TLD extensions of the domain names were
reviewed to determine which TLDs, and how many of each
type, were represented in the dataset.
A web browser was used to visit each of the domain
names in the dataset created in phase two. The results of these
visits were coded in a separate field in the dataset entitled
“visit.” A variety of outcomes resulted from these site visits and
were categorized according to the way in which the web page
resolved upon visit. The various outcomes were identified as:
“fails to resolve,” “parked page,” “forwards with masking,”
“forwards without masking,” “functioning web site,” and
“other.” Visits were coded as follows:
•

Visits to web sites that led to no content being displayed in the
web browser, and/or an error message indicating that no server
could be found, or no page would resolve, resulted in labeling the
domain name “fails to resolve.”202

•

If upon visit a web site displayed a parked page, the domain
name was labeled “parked page.”203

E.g., <johnjaycollege.com>.
E.g., <universityofchicagopress.com>.
201 E.g., <uhealth.org>.
202 E.g., <sarahlawrencecollege.com>.
203 For example, as of this Article’s writing in the Summer of 2014,
<universityofidaho.com> was a “parked page,” though it now displays advertising (last
visited Mar. 19, 2015). A “parked page” for purposes of this study means a domain
name that resolved upon visit to a web page containing advertising listings and links.
199
200
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•

If upon visit a web site redirected to another domain name
owned by the institution, without changing the URL displayed
in the web browser, the domain name was labeled “forwards
with masking.”204

•

“Forwards without masking” was used for instances where a
visit to a given web site redirected the browser to another
domain name owned by the institution.205

•

“Functioning web site” was used to denote functioning, standalone
web sites that did not appear to forward to a different institutioncontrolled site (such as its main .EDU page).206

•

“Other” was used to denote a visit that resulted in something
other than one of the above-described situations.207

Additionally, WHOIS searches were conducted for each
domain name listed in the dataset created in phase two.
Registrars collect certain identifying information from
registrants at the time of registration. This information includes
the name and physical address of the registrant, as well as the
names of and contact information for administrative and
technical contacts for the registrant. The veracity of this
information is unverified by registrars, and many registrants
choose to enter false, misleading, or incomplete information.
However, all registrars must make this information searchable
through what is called a WHOIS database, located on each
registrar’s web site.208
The purpose of the WHOIS searches was to determine
who currently owns each domain name that was transferred to
Often these links are targeted to the predicted interests of the visitor, and the domain
name registrant (or its registrar) receives payment from the advertisers for each click
of a hyperlink that a visitor makes on a parked page.
204 Few
fit this description, but for an example of one, see
<baylormedicalhospital.com> (last visited Mar. 19, 2015), which resolves to a page
identical to <baylor.edu> (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
205 For
example, visitors to <sundevils.com> are redirected to
<thesundevils.com> (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
206 See, e.g., NEW YORK MAKES WORK PAY, http://www.nymakesworkpay.org
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015); THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL ATHLETICS
WEBSITE, http://www.arizonawildcats.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
207 For example, a visit to <tufts.biz> resulted in a page that displays ““));
dy>“ in the upper left-hand corner of the screen (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). A visit to
<bellevuecommunitycollege.com> displayed a site that led one to wonder whether it
was the official site for Bellevue College (it is not) (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
208 Some registrars’ web sites feature search engines that allow one to search
for WHOIS information for domain names registered across registrars. See, e.g.,
NETWORK SOLUTIONS, http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/index.jsp (last visited
Feb. 7, 2015). However, sometimes the most accurate information only can be obtained
by searching the WHOIS database of the registrar with whom the domain name in
question was registered.

2015]

DEFINING DOMAIN

895

a college or university by virtue of a UDRP decision. Categories
that emerged from the data include: “institution-owned,”
“institution-controlled,” “other entity owns,” “free for
registration,” and “privately registered.” Ownership of domain
names was coded as follows:
•

“Institution-owned” was used when the WHOIS data for a given
domain name indicated that the college or university that
prevailed in the UDRP concerning the domain name was the
domain name’s registrant.

•

“Institution-controlled” was used when the WHOIS data for a
given domain name referenced in some way the college or
university that prevailed in the UDRP concerning the domain
name, but the registrant was a different entity that likely
controlled the domain name on the college or university’s behalf.
For example, WHOIS data might show a law firm as the domain
name’s registrant, but list a university-affiliated email address
as the administrative contact, indicating beneficial ownership.

•

“Other entity owns” was used when an organization or
individual not affiliated with or believed to be controlled by the
college or university that prevailed in the UDRP action
concerning the domain name was identified in WHOIS data as
the domain name’s registrant.

•

“Free for registration” was used when a WHOIS search revealed that
the domain name was available to register or for sale by the registrar.

•

“Privately registered” was used when a private registration
service appeared in WHOIS data as the registrant, effectively
preventing any inference as to the identity of the actual owner of
the domain name or its affiliation vel non with the college or
university that prevailed in the UDRP action concerning the
domain name.209

2. ACPA Litigation Research
The ACPA litigation phase of the project aimed to locate
all lawsuits brought by colleges and universities under the
ACPA that resulted in a written ruling by a court. Lawsuit
209 Private registration is an additional service offered by many registrars at
the time of registering a domain name. Private registration effectively means that the
registrar lists the name of an entity affiliated with the registrar in the registrant name
field. Anyone wishing to reach the beneficial owner of the domain name has to contact
the private registration company, using its standard contact information located in the
domain name’s WHOIS record. Private registration offers beneficial domain name
owners the protection of keeping their identities and contact information out of publicly
searchable WHOIS records for a small yearly fee. Private registration also complies
with ICANN requirements that registrars collect and maintain registrant information
for domain names registered through them.

896

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

data were located by running a search and refinement in the
databases of reported federal court decisions maintained by
Westlaw and Lexis Advance.210 Returned records were reviewed
by hand to verify that they met the inclusion criteria. Results
were then reviewed in full for further discussion in Parts III
and IV below.
B.

Limitations

The study’s limitations are minimal. All databases used for
data collection are reasonably believed to be accurate, and the
search methodologies deployed were sound, although not infallible.
First, some colleges and universities—like Massachusetts Institute
of Technology—do not contain the words college, university, or
regent in their official titles. Therefore, if anything, the findings
might be slightly under-inclusive.211 Second, research into ACPA
lawsuits was limited by the fact that the researched databases
only contain information about lawsuits that resulted in at
least one written opinion; an ACPA lawsuit that a college or
university filed, but that did not result in a written opinion (for
example, because the case settled), would not be included in
the dataset.212 Additionally, disputes between colleges and
universities and others over domain names that did not involve
an ACPA claim would not be included in the dataset.213 Finally,
inadvertent errors may have been introduced in the human
review process, although reasonable steps were deployed to
faithfully execute the research design.214
A larger concern is the construct validity of the study.
Domain name ownership and use are not static, and much of the
data reported in Part III below simply reflects findings at a
210 The ALLFEDS database in Westlaw was searched in May 2014 for
“anticybersquatting consumer protection act.” Searching these results for the words
college, university, and regent returned 72 records. A similar search in Lexis Advance
returned 96 records for review.
211 The additional burden of sifting through the false positives that would
have been generated by searching, for example, for institute did not justify the
undertaking. If all colleges and universities without college, university, or regent in
their corporate name were known, they could be searched for specifically to enhance
the accuracy of the findings reported here.
212 PACER is the electronic docketing system maintained by the U.S. federal
courts. While searching PACER for all lawsuit filings that meet given criteria is
technically feasible, the system has many limitations that make use of it for an
empirical study such as this one both cumbersome and costly.
213 The case involving Ohio State, referenced in supra note 110, is the only
known case of this sort.
214 Namely, two coders reviewed all data and verified the coding decision
made by the other coder.

2015]

DEFINING DOMAIN

897

given moment in time. A domain name that failed to resolve to a
university web page on Tuesday could have been set to forward
to the university’s main web page on Wednesday. However, this
limitation will always exist, given the fluid and changeable
nature of the Internet, and provides no compelling reason for
discounting any of the reported findings.
III.

FINDINGS

This Part describes the main findings of the original
research projects undertaken for this Article.
A.

Overview of UDRP Research Findings

Research into UDRP actions conducted for this Article
found that, through the end of the year 2013, 100 different
colleges and universities had filed 233 UDRP complaints
involving 373 domain names since the UDRP was implemented
in 2000. Arbitration panels awarded transfer or cancellation of
91.7% of the disputed domain names (n = 342), denying
transfer of the remainder (n = 31).215 Quantitative findings are
further arrayed below by subheading.
1. Most Active Colleges and Universities
One question of interest concerned the identities of the
100 institutions found to have brought one or more UDRP
action: who are these colleges and universities? Table 1 below
identifies the most active institutions based on number of
UDRP actions filed.

215 Of the 342 domain names for which a panel awarded transfer or
cancellation, 337 of them were distinct. See infra Part III.A.5.
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TABLE 1
UDRP Activity by No. of UDRP Actions Filed
Institution Name
Baylor University
University of Texas System
Harvard University
American University
Bob Jones University
University of Michigan
West Coast University
Tufts University
Yale University
Grand Valley State University
Southern California University
University of Utah
Stanford University

No. of UDRP Actions
62
19
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3

As noted, only a few institutions of those that have filed
a UDRP action have filed three or more UDRP actions. Eightyseven institutions (or 87.0% of all that filed UDRPs) have filed
only one or two UDRP actions, compared to the 13 institutions
identified in Table 1.
2. UDRP Actions by Year
The dataset also allowed for analysis of the number of
UDRP actions filed by colleges and universities by year. The
year 2008 witnessed the most filings, with 35. Unsurprisingly,
the year 2000—the year the UDRP was implemented—saw the
fewest UDRP filings by colleges and universities, with only
four. Graph 1 depicts the activity, noting a general increase
over time, but a tapering off in recent years.
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GRAPH 1
UDRP Actions Filed by Colleges and Universities per
Year
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3. Domain Names by Type
As described in Part II, the 373 domain names identified
as being subject to UDRP actions brought by colleges and
universities were categorized by type (name, name-plus, and
other) as well as by TLD extension type (.COM, .ORG, etc.).
Table 2 displays the different types of domain names that were
subject to UDRP actions. As indicated, most (n = 204, or 54.7%)
of the located domain names were “name-plus” domain names.
TABLE 2
Types of Domain Names Subject to UDRP Actions
Type of Domain Name
Name
Name-plus
Other

No. of Domain Names (n = 373)
140 (37.5%)
204 (54.7%)
29 (7.8%)

Table 3 identifies the variety of TLD extensions of the
domain names that were subject to UDRP actions brought by
colleges and universities. As noted, approximately 75% of all
disputed domain names (n = 283, or 75.9%) ended in .COM.
Thirteen different types of TLDs were represented in the data.
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TABLE 3
TLD Extensions at Issue in the UDRP Actions
.COM
.ORG
.NET
.US
.INFO
.MOBI
.ME
.BIZ
.XXX
.TV
.NAME
.CO
.PA

TLD Extension

No. of Domain Names (n = 373)
283 (75.9%)
31 (8.3%)
21 (5.6%)
9 (2.4%)
8 (2.1%)
7 (1.9%)
4 (1.1%)
4 (1.1%)
2 (0.5%)
1 (0.3%)
1 (0.3%)
1 (0.3%)
1 (0.3%)

4. Baylor University Domain Names
Baylor University is in many ways an outlier with
respect to UDRP activity by colleges and universities. As noted
in Table 1, data revealed that Baylor had filed 62 UDRP
actions involving 130 domain names. Appendix A contains a
table that identifies those 130 domain names.
5. WHOIS Data
Of the 337 distinct domain names for which colleges and
universities had achieved transfer or cancellation by virtue of a
UDRP decision, I wanted to know who currently owned those
domain names.216 Accordingly, in spring of 2014, WHOIS
searches were conducted for each of these domain names. A
quarter of the domain names (n = 84, or 24.9%) were available
to register, and approximately another 7% (n = 23) were
registered to an entity clearly not affiliated with the college or
university that had prevailed in the UDRP action concerning
the domain name. Another 26 domain names (7.7%) were
privately registered, and 204 (60.5%) were owned or controlled
by the institution. Table 4 depicts these findings.

216 Five domain names were the subject of two successful UDRP actions. See
supra note 198. These five domain names only were analyzed once for purposes of the
findings reported in Part III.A.5 and Part III.A.6, infra.
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TABLE 4
Ownership of Domain Names Cancelled or Transferred
to Colleges & Universities in UDRP Actions
WHOIS Information
Available to register
Other entity owns
Privately registered
Institution-owned
Institution-controlled

No. of Domain Names (n = 337)
84 (24.9%)
23 (6.8%)
26 (7.7%)
141 (41.8%)
63 (18.7%)

6. Site Visit Data
I sought to know how the domain names transferred to
the college or university that brought the UDRP were currently
being used. Accordingly, each of the 227 domain names that
was transferred and not clearly owned by another entity or
available to register was visited and its contents surveyed
pursuant to the methodology described in Part II.217
As depicted in Table 5, the plurality of the domain
names (n = 98, or 43.2%) failed to resolve to a web page upon
visit. Combined with the 31 domain names (13.7%) that
resolved to a parked page, results show that nearly 60% of the
domain names (n = 129, or 56.8%) effectively were not being
used at all. Two domain names (0.9%) forwarded with masking,
78 (34.4%) forwarded without masking, and 7 (3.1%) displayed
their own functioning web site. Another 11 domain names
(4.8%) were labeled as “other” for reasons such as the following:
the site requested a login and password in order to resolve,218
the site displayed a blank page,219 or the site displayed
meaningless text.220

217 Six
domain names—i.e., <lobobasketball.com>, <lobofootball.com>,
<nittanylions.org>,
<pennstatebookstore.com>,
<pennstatestore.com>,
and
<wearepennstate.com>—were cancelled as opposed to transferred to the complainant.
These domain names are not represented in Table 5, nor is any domain name that was
coded as available to register or registered to another entity.
218 See <mybaylor.com> (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
219 See
<baylordental.com>
(last
visited
Feb.
8,
2015);
<harvarduniversitypress.com> (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
220 See, for example, <tufts.biz> (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
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TABLE 5
Use of Institution-Owned or -Controlled, or Privately
Registered, Domain Names Upon Visit
Use
Failed to resolve
Parked page
Forwards with masking
Forwards without masking
Functioning web site
Other

B.

No. of Domain Names (n = 227)
98 (43.2%)
31 (13.7%)
2 (0.9%)
78 (34.4%)
7 (3.1%)
11 (4.8%)

Overview of ACPA Litigation Research Findings

Research into judicial opinions where a court had been
asked to decide an ACPA claim brought by a college or
university returned very few cases. Indeed, research located
only two district court cases and no appellate decisions.221
The first case was brought by Baylor University against
a company and an individual who had registered
<baylorbears.com>.222 Shortly after registering the offending
domain name, the defendants posted a web page at the domain
that targeted Baylor University students and alumni.223 Baylor
sued the defendants for trademark infringement, dilution,
unfair competition, and for violating the ACPA. After default
was entered against the corporate defendant, the university
moved for summary judgment on all claims against the
personal defendant, who was a Baylor alumnus.224 The court
granted summary judgment to the university on all claims and
awarded it attorneys’ fees.225
221 Two additional cases were located involving medical schools with domestic
offices but with primary operations located abroad. See Ross Univ. Sch. of Med. v.
Amini, Civ. No. 13-6121, 2014 WL 29032 (D. N.J. Jan. 2, 2014) (involving ACPA claim
related to the domain names <rossu.net>, <rossmedicalschool.org>, and
<rossmedicalschool.com>, among others); Am. Univ. Ant. Coll. of Med. v. Woodward,
837 F. Supp. 2d 686 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (holding on plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment that defendant’s registration and noncommercial use of <aua-med.com> was
not actionable under the ACPA because it constituted protected cyber-griping). These
were not further analyzed as they did not involve an American college or university.
While Harvard University was involved in two ACPA cases initiated in 1999 and 2000,
see supra text accompanying notes 152-59, these cases resolved without any written
judicial opinion and thus were not located in the study described in Part II, supra.
222 See Baylor Univ. v. Int’l Star, Inc., No. W-00-CA-231, 2001 WL 1796464
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2001).
223 Id. at *1.
224 Id.
225 Id. at *3-4.
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The second located case concerned Savannah College of
Art and Design (SCAD).226 This case involved a defendant who
had registered two domain names (<scad.info> and <scad-andus.info>) incorporating the college’s trademarks. The defendant
used the domain names to display web sites airing negative
commentary—penned by himself and others—about SCAD,
which formerly employed him and his wife until she was fired
and he resigned.227 SCAD filed suit under the ACPA and other
provisions of the Lanham Act, alleging trademark infringement;
however, on the first day of trial, SCAD moved to dismiss its
ACPA claim, and the court granted the motion.228
After a trial on SCAD’s Lanham Act claims, the court ruled
in favor of the defendant, finding that he had not made a
commercial use of SCAD’s marks, and that even if he had, such use
did not pose a likelihood of confusion.229 In its analysis of SCAD’s
trademark infringement claim, the court reviewed the similarity
between SCAD’s marks and the defendant’s web site and domain
names. Of interest is the court’s following observation:
Is it conceivable that an Internet user searching for information on
Savannah College may initially type the URL scad.info in the address
box? Of course. Is it likely? No. The .edu domain is universally used by
schools of higher education while the .info domain is relatively new.
Thus, a user who is inclined to start his or her search with a URL is
more likely to input scad.edu rather than scad.info.230

The court’s language substantiates the importance of the .EDU
extension in the public’s eye, while downplaying the likelihood
that visitors to non-.EDU domain names will be confused into
regarding them as replacements for .EDU domain names.
More details about SCAD’s ACPA case are discussed in
Part IV.A below.
IV.

EXPANDING DOMAINS: POLICY CONCERNS RELATED TO
HIGHER EDUCATION’S CONTENTIOUS DOMAIN NAME
ACQUISITION EFFORTS

In light of findings from the original study conducted for
this Article, this Part discusses various policy concerns related
to contentious efforts by colleges and universities to expand
226 See Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929
(S.D. Ohio 2004).
227 Id. at 935-38.
228 Id. at 931 n.1.
229 Id. at 957.
230 Id. at 952 (footnote omitted).
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their domain name holdings through the UDRP and ACPA
litigation. In particular, this Part considers difficulties
confronting institutions as they seek to build and protect their
brands online while also being sensitive to the academic value of
open discourse and the potential reputational harms that face
institutions that engage in enforcement activity. This section
also considers what insights may be drawn from the study
concerning college and university approaches to fighting
cyberbattles. I conclude with a discussion of what the future
may hold for college and university battles for cyberspace,
offering a suggested set of questions that college and university
decision makers should consider before pursuing contentious
acquisition of domain names.
A.

Freedom of Expression and Reputational Concerns

Because Internet domain names are rivalrous,
registrations for online space raise the specter of conferring a
virtual linguistic monopoly on their holders.231 Linguistic
monopolies can be dangerous because they risk constraining
the freedom of language in the virtual commons, a restriction
that can alter public consciousness and memory in lasting
ways.232 Take for example the domain name <history.org>. One
might expect a visit to that domain name to lead to information
about world history, or provide resources to teachers and
students who wish to understand various details about world
wars or other momentous events. Instead, the domain name
resolves to a web site that provides information about a very
particular (albeit important) slice of history, the American
Revolutionary War.233 The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation’s
registration for this domain name means that anyone in the
world who wishes to use the generic word history to drive
traffic to a domain name about history must find a different
extension in which to do so, or rely entirely on search engine
optimization strategies to drive traffic to domain names other
than <history.org>. If one considers the normative question of
who should own domain names like <jesus.com>, or
<holocaust.com>, or whether they should even be available to

LIPTON, supra note 12, at 92-93.
Id.
233 See COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG: THAT THE FUTURE MAY LEARN FROM THE
PAST, http://www.history.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (domain name owned by the
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation).
231

232
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register at all, one immediately senses how Internet policy
quickly intersects with social policy.
The symbolic force and social resonance of domain names
in the .EDU extension are similar. <wm.edu> simply is a better
domain name than <williamandmary.edu> because it is shorter
and more incisive; fortunately for the College of William & Mary,
it applied for <wm.edu> before William Mitchell College of Law
sought its domain name (<wmitchell.edu>). Similar to other
registries, EDUCAUSE follows a first-come-first-served policy
with respect to registering domain names in the .EDU extension.
While not their primary purpose, domain names
undeniably serve brand functions in higher education. For
example, many at the University of Mississippi would prefer to
see their institution use a more neutral-sounding, descriptive
domain name, like <umiss.edu>, instead of <olemiss.edu>,
which to some conjures mental associations with slavery and
segregation.234 In short, a simple domain name often conveys
impressions to people as much as it identifies computers to
users, and thus college and university battles for cyberspace
also should be viewed through a critical cultural lens, as these
efforts to define online space can bear on institutional image
and reputation in important and lasting ways.
Some of the battles identified in the research conducted
for this Article raise the issue of institutional commitment to
free expression, a quintessential academic value, as well as the
consequences to an institution’s reputation that can come from
battles for cyberspace.235 Since at least the nineteenth century,
American colleges and universities have been regarded as
metaphysical marketplaces of ideas, areas where no subject is
off limits provided study or discussion of it might lead to better
understanding of the world.236 This quality, to many inherent in
the very concept of higher education itself, may lead one to
question what happens, or should happen, when an institution’s

234 See Scott Jashik, Names, Symbols and Race, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 4,
2014), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/08/04/u-mississippi-tries-new-approachits-history-race-and-faces-criticism.
235 Accord MUELLER, supra note
18, at 231 (“[M]easures to control
[cybersquatting] are expanding property rights to names at the expense of free
expression, privacy, and competition.”).
236 See generally ROBERT M. O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD:
POLITICAL EXTREMISM, CORPORATE POWER, AND THE UNIVERSITY (2008). Of course, this
commitment to free inquiry does have limitations. Some modes of speech, such as
plagiarism and other forms of cheating, are not tolerated in higher education, even
though they may not be illegal or universally deemed immoral in any popular sense.
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interest in a domain name conflicts with the speech interests of
a third party.
For purposes of my study, this hypothetical concern came to
resolution in those few instances when institutions used the UDRP
or the ACPA as a vehicle for capturing a domain name reflecting,
or capable of reflecting, speech with which the institution may take
issue or disagree, even if the university was within its trademark
rights to do so. Illustrative UDRP actions from my study meeting
this description include disputes over ownership of
<tuftsgeek.com>, <harvardgirlschool.com>, <ihatebaylor.com>,
<baylorsucks.com>, and <baylorbearssuck.com>.237 Each of these
domain names, by virtue of its alphanumeric strings standing
alone, calls to mind speech that is potentially unsavory or critical
of the institution whose trademarked name is contained in the
domain name. Several critical questions arise from these isolated
incidents. Should Baylor seek to grab <ihatebaylor.com> from
someone else, simply because the domain name’s alphanumeric
string standing alone is critical of the institution? To what
extent should the use to which a given domain name is being
put inform decision making about enforcement? If domain
names containing critical word strings are used to display
negative speech about an institution, should the affected
institution always seek transfer of them?
Examination of the facts behind each UDRP complaint
corresponding to the five domain names referenced above
reveals complicated stories, only two of which seem to present—
from a policy standpoint—compelling cases for enforcement
action. In all of these cases, however, one notes the sensitivity
and fact-specific nature of the undertaking when a college or
university seeks to claim from another a domain name reflecting
a message critical of, or unsavory to, the institution.
The UDRP action involving <tuftsgeek.com> represents
an instance of justified enforcement activity, even though the
domain name standing alone appears to be a potential vehicle
for speech critical of the university. However, when Tufts
University filed a UDRP action against the registrant of
<tuftsgeek.com>, the domain name was being used “to redirect
Internet users to Respondent’s website that commercially offers
advice services for an hourly rate.”238 That is to say, instead of
being used to criticize the institution, the domain name
See infra notes 238 and 240-42 for citations to these decisions.
Tufts Univ. v. Stevan Obradovic, NAF Claim No. FA0701000881136, at 2 (Feb.
19, 2007) (Yachnin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/881136.htm.
237

238
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displayed speech of a commercial character that had a potential
to confuse consumers. At no point did the record suggest that the
domain name was used to criticize Tufts or the study habits of
its students, although one could imagine its potential utility for
such purpose. Because the domain name’s registrant essentially
was usurping the value of the Tufts trademark for its own
purposes, the arbitration panel rightfully found bad faith and
transferred the domain name to the university.239
A similar story abides for <harvardgirlschool.com>,
which displayed “pornographic pictures and videos, causing
rotating banners to appear and generating hyperlinks to other
pornographic websites of the same caliber” when Harvard
University filed a UDRP action against its owner in 2005.240 No
doubt the use of the Harvard name in connection with such
base speech, unrelated to any comment or criticism of the
university, does nothing to further a compelling societal
interest. However, just as with <tuftsgeek.com>, one easily can
imagine a different set of facts where a hypothetical registrant
of <harvardgirlschool.com> used the domain name to engage in
speech critical of the institution. Would the institution have
sought transfer of the domain name had it been used for nonpornographic speech of a critical nature, or no speech at all?
Baylor University’s decision to pursue transfer of
<ihatebaylor.com>, <baylorsucks.com>, and <baylorbearssuck.
com> via UDRP actions provides examples of an institution
inappropriately acting in the face of such circumstances. Baylor
University filed UDRP actions against the registrants of
<ihatebaylor.com> and <baylorsucks.com> in 2008 and 2012,
respectively.241 Both sites resolved to parked pages at the time
the UDRP actions were filed, meaning that they effectively
were not being used in any fashion that might lead site visitors
to be confused as to the university’s affiliation or endorsement
of the sites (e.g., to advertise a person’s own goods or services),
or to think poorly of Baylor for reasons unrelated to any
criticism of the institution (e.g., to display pornography). They
also contained no speech actually critical of the university,
Id.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Nikolay, WIPO Case No. D20050120, at 2 (May 16, 2005) (Carey, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/
decisions/html/2005/d2005-0120.html.
241 See
Baylor University v. Andrew Makarov, NAF Claim No.
FA1204001438498 (May 16, 2012) (Meyerson, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1438498.htm; Baylor Univ. v. Sysadmin Admin., NAF Claim No.
FA0802001153718 (Apr. 11, 2008) (Stoner, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1153718.htm.
239
240
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although their alphanumeric strings alone reflect their utility
as vehicles for direct criticism. By seeking transfer of these
domain names, Baylor effectively sought to control two forums
for criticism of the institution, all within the legal trappings of
protecting its trademarks.
Not only is such a motivation misguided—no university
could ever control all possible online forums that could be used
to criticize the institution—but, in my opinion, such efforts can
prove perilous for the university’s image and reputation, as the
disposition of <baylorbearssuck.com> helps illustrate. In the UDRP
action concerning that domain name, the respondent claimed that
he acquired the domain name (along with four others:
<baylorbears.biz>, <baylorbears.name>, <baylorbears.net>, and
<baylorbears.tv>) “with the intention of creating a social
networking website akin to MySpace for Baylor University
students and alumni. However, due to lack of funds, the website
was never developed.”242
Shortly after Baylor filed the UDRP, the respondent set
the disputed family of domain names to redirect visitors to the
web site for Texas A&M University, one of Baylor’s chief rivals.
While the respondent indicated he took this action as a joke,
the panel was not amused and found the act to be further
evidence of bad faith, writing that the respondent was
“contemptuous” of the UDRP proceedings and viewed the panel
merely as “an opportunity to harass Baylor University for his
own amusement.”243
The respondent further attempted to persuade the panel
that using the <baylorbearssuck.com> domain name in a
manner critical of Baylor University should be considered
protected noncommercial speech. However, the panel reasoned
that “there is no indication that in this case the domain name is
being used or at any time was being used for such a purpose.”244
The panel overlooked the argument that causing a domain name
such as <baylorbearssuck.com> to redirect to the web site of a
competitor institution could itself be viewed as an act of
criticism, or at least parody, and that some may view such act as
speech that deserves protection. Regardless, the point remains
that institutions committed to the free exchange of ideas should

242 Baylor University v. JS, NAF Claim No. FA0801001141911 (Mar. 14, 2008)
(Grossman, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1141911.htm.
243 Id. at 3, 5.
244 Id. at 4.
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not be so quick to seek to claim ownership of a venue in which
speech critical of the institution might be displayed.
In addition to serving as a cautionary tale for
institutions considering action over other domain names
similar in expressive character to <baylorbearssuck.com>, the
UDRP dispute involving that domain name also stands as a
vivid example of the potential reputational consequences of
college and university battles for cyberspace. While Baylor
University won that particular UDRP battle, one must
question whether in doing so it provoked an unnecessary and
damaging war. The respondent in the UDRP action was an
alumnus of the university named John Stipe. Mr. Stipe felt
aggrieved when his alma mater filed the UDRP, having only
communicated with him once about the domain name, through
a lawyer’s cease-and-desist letter.245 As he put it:
It went straight to the lawyers and it was entirely legal. They didn’t
offer to help me or to buy the domain names or anything . . . Lawyers
are not cheap, so why do you pay a lawyer to present documents and
file papers on someone? . . Their response was over 100 pages.246

Thirteen days after losing the UDRP action, Mr. Stipe
purchased five additional domain names incorporating “sucks”
and “Baylor” in various extensions, stating in text displayed to
visitors of those domain names that “I purchased these domain
names to expose the tactics Baylor University used in order to
take the [other] domain names from me.”247 As he told me, “I
played by the rules. I lost the case, and they said the web sites
were not used as a free speech thing, so I said ‘Fine, I’ll show
you,’ and I made it free speech.”248
On the main web page displayed at the domain names
he purchased after losing the UDRP, Mr. Stipe went on to
allege that Baylor, in an effort to prevent criticism of the
university, owns at least seven other domain names that were
not subject to the UDRP it filed against him, each of which
contains “sucks” and “Baylor” in some configuration.249 In
addition to questioning the propriety of the university’s
ownership of the other domain names, and conjecturing about
245 See
John
Stipe,
The
Bear
Truth,
BAYLOR BEARS SUCK,
http://www.baylorbearssuck.us (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). As this Article went to press
in June of 2015, <baylorbearssuck.us> no longer resolved to a web page.
246 Telephone interview with John Stipe (June 17, 2014) (transcription on file
with author).
247 See Stipe, supra note 245.
248 Telephone interview with John Stipe, supra note 246.
249 See Stipe, supra note 245.
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the amount of legal fees Baylor University must have expended
in the UDRP action it brought against him, Mr. Stipe described
what he viewed as the unfairness of the university’s domain
name enforcement strategy:
I question why Baylor University chose to take my websites from
me, but allow others to have theirs. BaylorBears.org was registered
on Jan 29, 2001 and is owned by a person in New York.
BaylorBears.mobi was registered on Oct 7, 2006 and is owned by a
person in South Carolina. And while Baylor University was fighting
me for my names, on Feb 29, 2008, a person in Germany purchased
BaylorBears.info. Or how about SicEmBears.org that was registered
on Jul 25, 2007 to someone in California? . . .
I would also like to point out, which goes unanswered by Baylor
University officials, why is BaylorFans.com allowed to exist for the
last 9 years? Baylor owns BaylorFans.org, but does NOT own
BaylorFans.com or BaylorFans.net. Further, Baylor does not own
InsideBaylorSports.com which has existed since 2003, but Baylor
owns BaylorSports.com and BaylorSports.net.
It is interesting that the Baylor lawyers were arguing trademark
violations in order to take my names from me when it is quite obvious
they pick and choose who they want to go after. It is going to be
interesting to see what Baylor University does with the names they took
from me without compensation. We already know what Baylor University
will do with the BaylorBearsSuck.com, but the truth can be told in
BaylorBearsSuck.net,
BaylorBearsSuck.org,
BaylorBearsSuck.us,
BaylorBearsSuck.info, and BaylorBearsSuck.biz.250

What is perhaps most intriguing about this saga is that,
as of June 2014, more than six years after the UDRP awarding
Baylor University ownership of <baylorbearssuck.com>, the
university still owned the domain name, yet used it to display
the same critical commentary quoted above that otherwise
appeared on the domain names owned by Mr. Stipe.251 I asked
Mr. Stipe if he knew why this was. “I think that’s probably just
a mistake on their part,” he said.252
Mr. Stipe’s dispute with Baylor University is telling for
many reasons. From a reputational standpoint, the university
must question whether its enforcement effort against an
Id.
As of Spring 2015, of the five domain names subject to the UDRP, four (i.e.,
<baylorbearssuck.com>, <baylorbears.net>, <baylorbears.tv>, and <baylorbears.name>)
failed to resolve, and the additional one (<baylorbears.biz>) redirected to a domain
name controlled by Mr. Stipe.
252 Telephone interview with John Stipe, supra note 246, at 2. Mr. Stipe likely
was correct. In the five months from when a draft of this Article initially appeared
online until when it was published, Baylor caused <baylorbearssuck.com> to stop
displaying any content at all.
250
251
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alumnus was worth the counter-speech it incited.253 More than
six years after the UDRP was decided, Mr. Stipe’s critical
domain names still existed and still were being used to display
speech critical of Baylor, potentially raising attention
disproportionate to the concern that motivated university
action in the first instance.254 To be sure, time heals some
wounds, but not all. Mr. Stipe told me that he probably will
continue to renew the registrations for the domain names he
registered after losing the <baylorbearssuck.com> UDRP, even
though he no longer cares about the issue all that much.255
The university’s dispute with Mr. Stipe also reasonably
calls into question what institutions like Baylor hope to gain
through a Whac-a-Mole-type approach to domain name
enforcement. As displayed in Table A-1 in Appendix A, the
array of domain names that Baylor has sought through UDRP
actions is staggering, both in number and variety.256 Baylor no
longer owns many of these domain names, even though the
university prevailed in UDRP actions that awarded their
transfer to Baylor, and many effectively are not being used at
all (i.e., they do not resolve to an active page upon visit).
While defenders of Baylor’s enforcement efforts might
point to Table A-1 as evidence of the university’s strong
position with respect to protecting its intellectual property,
detractors might view these efforts as silly, wasteful, and
unnecessarily chilling of potentially legitimate third-party
speech.257 Assuming enforcement is a value prized by the
institution, one must question to what extent the intangible
loss of goodwill among alumni is worth the price. As Mr. Stipe
reflected to me,

253 This question is more rhetorical than actual. Baylor University recently
sued the Baylor Alumni Association, seeking to stop it from using the Baylor name and
trademarks after the formal relationship between the two broke down. Baylor U. Sues
to Stop Alumni Group From Using Its Marks, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 11, 2014),
http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/06/11/baylor-u-sues-stop-alumnigroup-using-its-marks. This lawsuit, and the UDRP action against Mr. Stipe, suggest
that the possibility of making headlines for suing its alumni may not be much of a
deterring factor for the university as it considers trademark enforcement options.
254 The dispute did make local headlines as it unfolded in 2008. See Travis
Measley, Revenge.com: Baylor Files Lawsuit Over Trademark Abuse in Websites Using
Name, Mascot, BATALLION ONLINE (Feb. 27, 2008).
255 Telephone interview with John Stipe, supra note 246.
256 See infra Appendix A.
257 Knowledge of these past efforts in the collective also might provide a handy
roadmap for anyone looking to cause Baylor to incur more legal fees: simply register a domain
name incorporating the university’s name, then wait for the UDRP action to be filed.

912

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

I just felt that Baylor has all this money and power and they do
whatever they want to do. That’s the way I see it. [ . . . ] The main
thing that I find that works in things like this in life is just be nice to
people and talk to them. It was really not necessary to throw around
the lawyers, get the lawyers involved in something like this. The
money you spent on the lawyers, why not pay someone a reasonable
amount for the domain name? It doesn’t have to be thousands of
dollars, it could be a couple hundred of dollars or something. Or free
tickets to the football game.258

Of course, lawyers for colleges and universities would
bristle at Mr. Stipe’s reasoning, and rightfully so. If word
spread that Baylor provided football tickets to those who
arbitration panels are likely to view as cybersquatters, there
soon would not be enough seats in Floyd Casey Stadium to
accommodate all of those looking to strike a deal. Some
institutions would rather pay thousands of dollars to their
attorneys than pay one dollar to someone they view as using
opportunistic or potentially coercive tactics.
But in Mr. Stipe’s case, should his alumni status not
have resulted in better treatment? Perhaps at least a phone
call attempting to persuade him of the legal merits of the
university’s position? Likely some attempt at reaching an
amicable settlement, before the university commenced the legal
processes, would have allowed the institution to protect its
reputation while also protecting its trademarks. At the very
least, <baylorbearssuck.com> could have been carved out of the
UDRP filing involving the other four domain names, so as to
avoid the question whether intellectual property protection was
more important to the university than not being seen as an
overzealous monitor of any market reference to the institution
that might have a critical edge.
SCAD’s ultimately unsuccessful ACPA lawsuit against
one of its former professors provides a similar cautionary tale
regarding the perils of enforcement, particularly when the
targeted domain name resoundingly implicates expressive
interests.259 The case is instructive even though the university
failed to take its ACPA claim to trial.260 The speech at issue on
the disputed domain names was directly critical of SCAD at
various levels, including its hiring practices, treatment of
Telephone interview with John Stipe, supra note 246.
Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 957
(S.D. Ohio 2004).
260 The reasons for this determination are not readily apparent from the only
written decision in the case. Id.
258
259
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students and employees, and academic policies.261 The purpose
of the defendant’s web site, according to the court’s assessment
of the defendant’s testimony in the case, was
to provide news and information to prospective students, parents
and faculty members about Savannah College that they will not get
from the College . . . to not only provide a site for [defendant’s]
“story” but to provide a site for others to report their experiences
with the school . . . [including] information to foreign students on
accreditation and other matters of concern, and to publicize little
discussed problems such as crime on campus.262

The defendant posted approximately 200 emails from
community members who had written him on the primary
disputed domain name, sharing their criticism of SCAD.263
Some of these communications were so harmful to SCAD that
prospective students and faculty members decided not to join
the institution because of them.264 However, SCAD did not
allege that any of the matter was defamatory, regardless of
how unpleasant and damaging to its image the institution
found the web site’s contents. Allegedly not intending to
confuse anyone as to the institution’s sponsorship or affiliation
with his critical web site, the defendant registered the disputed
domain names, and used SCAD on the web site, not in
reference to the institution, but as the acronym for “Share,
Communicate, Announce, Disclose.”265
The court ultimately agreed with the defendant that his
expressive activities on the disputed domain name did not violate
SCAD’s trademark interests. Even though the speech was hurtful
to SCAD, non-defamatory speech of a critical and hurtful nature
is not per se tantamount to speech that confuses consumers.
Encouraging is the fact that no ACPA lawsuits involving
universities in scenarios such as the one presented in the
SCAD case have surfaced since 2004. And while a handful of
non-representative UDRP actions located in my study raise the
prospect of how institutions deal with online criticism, the
majority of UDRP disputes identified in the study provide no
reason for concern on this point.
Those few, isolated cases described in this subsection,
however, are instructive of the potential hazards that lurk for
institutions considering contentious acquisition of domain
261
262
263
264
265

Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 936.
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names, particularly ones of a predominantly expressive
character. The quintessential academic value of free expression
risks being sidelined when a college or university’s response to
non-confusing online criticism of it—including in an
alphanumeric domain name string otherwise not being used to
display content—is to turn to trademark law and cyber-dispute
resolution mechanisms to attempt to capture the offending
domain name. Using the UDRP or the ACPA to attempt to
wrest control of a domain name from a critic—perhaps with the
thought that the costs of involvement in the dispute will drive
the defendant to settle—contradicts higher education’s
fundamental commitment to free expression, and for that
reason alone should not be pursued.
B.

Brand Protection v. Brand Expansion

Drawing on data from the study, in this subsection I
provide a few examples of online enforcement activity by colleges
and universities that makes sense from the perspective of brand
protection.266 However, the majority of the subsection focuses not
on sensible brand protection efforts, but rather, examples of
what I deem senseless brand expansion by institutions of higher
education and the related harms this activity creates. While the
line between online brand protection and brand expansion
admittedly is a thin one, data discussed in this subsection
illustrate why colleges and universities should be sensitive to
the distinction. I provide examples of how some institutions
seem lured into expanding their brand online when restraint
might better serve them.267 I conclude by conjecturing how
higher education’s accretion of trademark rights might help
explain higher education’s brand expansion activity online.
As noted in Part III above, over one-third of the UDRP
disputes located in my study involved domain names that
incorporated entirely a college or university name. Examples
from the dataset include <westernwashingtonuniversity.com>,
266 Brand
and trademark technically are distinct concepts, although
trademark law arguably recognizes and protects the interests of brands without
explicitly acknowledging that it does so. See Deven R. Desai & Spencer W. Waller, The
Competitive Significance of Brands, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2014, at 3.
267 To be clear, data from the study do not provide the ability to make
comprehensive conclusions regarding institutional brand protection versus brand
expansion. Indeed, these concepts are themselves a bit subjective and subject to debate
in any given instance. Instead, I use the data from the study as a starting point for
giving voice to this critical, yet heretofore overlooked, aspect of higher education’s
construction of space online.
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<americanu.com>, and <lomalinda.org>.268 Enforcement of
trademark rights in these cases easily is justified from the
standpoint of brand protection. All institutions naturally want
to see their names protected to some extent outside of the
.EDU, if for no other reason than the .COM and other
extensions are highly trafficked areas of the online world, and
allowing those unaffiliated with higher education to use the
name of a college or university for an unrelated commercial
purpose understandably seems unfair.269
However, some examples of college and university brand
protection in online space seem to be at the edges of the kinds of
harm institutions should be concerned about. For example, who
will navigate to the specific <baylorofdallas.com> before trying
the general <baylor.edu>?270 How many will try the lengthy
<coloradomesauniversity.com> before trying the shorter
<coloradomesa.edu>,271 or the unlikely <indiana-edu.com> before
trying the more likely <indiana.edu>?272 Regardless, the
propriety of seeking to reflect the institution’s corporate name in
online space is consistent with widely-recognized brand and
trademark protection strategies in the non-profit and for-profit
spheres. Additionally, to the extent that the original registrant
of one of these domain names used it in a misleading or
mischievous way—for example, the original registrant of
<indiana-edu.com> “submitted e-mails to third parties
misrepresenting that Complainant’s website was switching
from the <indiana.edu> domain name to the disputed
<indiana-edu.com> domain name”273—seeking to put an end to

268 See Loma Linda Univ. Adventist Sci. Ctr. et al., v. JM XTrade, Inc., Joseph
Martinez, WIPO Case No. D2009-0036 (Mar. 11, 2009) (Page, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/
amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-0036.html; Western Wash. Univ. v. aak / Azra
Ari Khan, WIPO Case No. D2004-0049 (Apr. 5, 2004) (Barker, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/
amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-0049.html; Am. Univ. v. Nente.com, NAF Claim
No. FA0409000323761 (Oct. 15, 2004) (Yachnin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/323761.htm.
269 Cf. AMY GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME: THE NEW ERA OF CAMPUS
LITIGATION 115 (2009) (“[U]niversities seek legal protection not only for marketable
inventions, but also for their marketable identity, with increasing attention paid to
‘branding’ and cyber rights.”).
270 See Baylor Univ. v. Above.com Domain Privacy, NAF Claim No.
FA1306001504429 (Aug. 1, 2013) (Wilson, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/
decisions/1504429.htm.
271 See Mesa State Coll. v. Don’t Panic Bus. Techs., NAF Claim No.
FA1106001393045 (Aug. 8, 2011) (Foster, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/
decisions/1393045.htm.
272 See Ind. Univ. v. Linh Wang, NAF Claim No. FA0902001247095 (Apr. 8,
2009) (Crary, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1247095.htm.
273 Id. at 2.
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such use by filing a UDRP action is a reasonable and
appropriate reaction.
Meriting more attention are some of the domain names
involved in located UDRP actions that were categorized as “nameplus” (e.g., <stanford-talk.com>, <texaslonghornchecks.com>,
<wvusports.com>, and <yale-explore.org>274) and “other” (e.g.,
<uhealth.com>, <kuhf.com>, <virtualhospital.info>, and
<julecollinssmithmuseum.com>275). Seeking ownership of these
and other domain names often seems to reflect institutional
attempts to expand brands and online footprints beyond the
typical or expected uses of brands by institutions in relation to
educational services, or what Samantha King and Sheila
Slaughter, writing in 2004, described as “the increasing
commodification of cyber properties and universities’ . . . growing
vigilance in protecting them.”276 For example, the University of
Texas is not in the business of manufacturing personal or
business checks, yet it deemed the registration and use of
<texaslonghornchecks.com> as a parked page with pay-perclick advertising disruptive enough to its operations to seek
transfer of the domain name via a UDRP action.277 One might
reasonably question why, even if Texas A&M licenses the use of
its logos for use and sale by others on negotiable instruments. Is
the
institution
prepared
to
pursue
registrants
of
<texaslonghorncoffeemugs.com>, <gianttexaslonghorncoffeemugs.
com>, or <dishwashersafetexaslonghorncoffeemugs.com>? What
about typo variations of the aforementioned, or domain names
274 See W. Va. Univ. Bd. of Governors v. WV Sports Rep., WIPO Case No.
D2011-2154 (Jan. 15, 2012) (Hill, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/
search/text.jsp?case=D2011-2154; Yale Univ. v. Yale Explore and movcom, WIPO Case
No. D2011-1367 (Oct. 3, 2011) (Lee, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/
text.jsp?case=D2011-1367; Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Domain Admin, NAF Claim
No. FA0806001208350 (July 31, 2008) (Condon, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1208350.htm; Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Computer
Prod. Info., NAF Claim No. FA0302000146571 (Mar. 28, 2003) (McCotter, Jr., Arb.),
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/146571.htm.
275 See Univ. of Miami v. Marchex Sales, Inc., NAF Claim No. FA1301001478911
(Mar. 5, 2013) (Triana, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1478911.htm;
Jule Collins Smith Museum of Fine Art at Auburn Univ. v. Khan, Zafar, NAF Claim No.
FA1205001445535 (June 23, 2012) (Carmody, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1445535.htm; Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Salvia Corp., NAF Claim No.
FA0602000637920 (Mar. 21, 2006) (Franklin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/637920.htm; Univ. of Iowa v. Juraj Vyletelka, WIPO Case No. D20020349 (May 31, 2002) (Brown, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2002/d2002-0349.html.
276 Samantha King & Sheila Slaughter, Sports ‘R’ Us: Contracts, Trademarks,
and Logos, in SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 272.
277 See Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Domain Admin, NAF Claim No.
FA0806001208350.
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incorporating even more obscure products licensed by the
institution, such as <texaslonghorncoffins.com>? The point is
that if the university’s brand is conceived in terms of everything
on which its logos currently are affixed, or might be affixed,
through a licensing arrangement, there is no articulable end in
sight to the enforcement of institutional trademarks
incorporated into domain names.
Similarly, what does West Virginia University’s decision
to seek transfer of <wvusports.com> via a UDRP proceeding say
about the institution’s conception of brand?278 Would the
institution have taken the same approach against the registrant
of the hypothetical <wvuphysics.com> (for the physics
department), or <wvuparking.com> (for the parking office)? As
Baylor University’s UDRP forays exemplify (see Table A-1 in
Appendix A), at some point seeking transfer of every domain
name that adds a generic word to the institution’s trademark
becomes unreasonable, even if prevailing law permits this activity
and the brand owner is likely to prevail if it pursues it. Consider,
in particular, <baylorsalsa.com>, <bayloryellowpages.com>,
<baylorstore.com>, <baylorbanks.com>, and <baylorflorist.com>,
transfer of all of which Baylor University sought and achieved via
UDRP actions.279
Auburn University’s UDRP over <julecollinssmithmuseum.
com> presents related questions. In the actual UDRP decision,
the panelist noted that the respondent had been using the domain
name to display content “designed to mimic Complainant’s official
website which featured links to the <ticketmayor.com> domain
name that is owned by Respondent. The domain name currently
resolves to Respondent’s <lawperiscope.com> site that
advertises legal services.”280 These uses to which the
respondent put the disputed domain name no doubt were
278 See W. Va. Univ. Bd. of Governors v. WV Sports Rep. WIPO Case No.
D2011-2154.
279 See Baylor Univ. v. Earth Yellow Pages, NAF Claim No. FA0907001274424
(Aug. 31. 2009) (Yachnin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1274424.htm
(concerning <bayloryellowpages.com>); Baylor Univ. v. Domains by Proxy, Inc., NAF
Claim No. FA0802001145651 (May 26, 2008) (Limbury, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1145651.htm (concerning <baylorsalsa.com> and <baylorflorist.com>,
among other domain names); Baylor Univ. v. Domain Park Ltd., NAF Claim No.
FA0802001142634 (Mar. 25, 2008) (Carmody, Arb.). http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1142634.htm (concerning <baylorbanks.com>, among other domain
names); Baylor Univ. v. Baylor Univ. c/o Bob Hartland, NAF Claim No.
FA0611000841917 (Jan. 2, 2007) (Carmody, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/
decisions/841917.htm (concerning <baylorstore.com>, among other domain names).
280 Jule Collins Smith Museum of Fine Art at Auburn Univ. v. Khan, Zafar,
NAF Claim No. FA1205001445535, at 3.
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harmful to Auburn’s art museum, but would Auburn have
pursued the UDRP if only the domain name had been used to
display a parked page with pay-per-click ads, as was the case
when the University of Utah filed a UDRP against the
registrant of <redbuttegardens.org>, or the University of
Houston filed a UDRP against the registrant of <kuhf.com>?281
What
if
no
one
else
had
registered
<julecollinssmithmuseum.com> and it were available to register;
would Auburn have sought to register it?282
The problem presented by enforcement efforts like these
is that once an institution decides that uses of domain names
like <julecollinssmithmuseum.com>, <redbuttegarden.org>,
and <kuhf.com> merit filing a UDRP complaint, articulating a
stopping point may be hard to do given the array of activities in
which colleges and universities are involved, and the multitude
of programs sponsored by or units contained within any given
institution. If the University of San Diego—whose sports teams
are known as the Toreros (Spanish for bullfighters)—is willing
to file a UDRP to obtain both <thetorerostore.com> and <mytorerostore.com>, which it did, which other domain names
involving its team name would it or should it pursue?283
More to the point is that just because colleges and
universities can seek to own ancillary domain names does not
mean they should. In the referenced arbitration action involving
the University of Houston and <kuhf.com>, the university
enjoyed only common law rights in KUHF as used in relation to
radio station services, and already owned registrations for both
<kuhf.org> and <kuhf.net>. Apparently not satisfied that the
non-profit, listener-supported radio station had two Internet
domain name registrations in extensions commonly thought of
as noncommercial, the university filed a UDRP action against
281 Red Butte Garden is the name of a botanical garden and arboretum operated by
the University of Utah. See RED BUTTE GARDEN, http://www.redbuttegarden.org (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015). KUHF are the call letters of a radio station affiliated with the University of
Houston. See HOUSTON PUBLIC MEDIA, http://www.kuhf.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
282 The most likely answer to this question seems to be “perhaps.” Auburn
University’s library purchased three top-level domain names in the early 2000s, because
it wanted “memorable and advertising-savvy URL[s]” to use for promotional purposes.
See Robert H. McDonald, Why Your Library Needs a .Org, .Com, and .Net!, COMPUTERS
IN LIBR., Sept. 1, 2001, at 36, available at 2001 WLNR 13639837. Interestingly, as of
Spring 2015, the three domain names the library purchased and once used (i.e.,
<aulibrary.org>, <aulibrary.com>, and <aulibrary.net>) are available for registration.
283 Incidentally, as of June 2014, <my-torerostore.com> was available to
register, and <thetorerostore.com> failed to resolve, not even four years after the
UDRP decision awarding the transfer of those domain names to the university. See
Univ. San Diego v. Hot Nix Webs, NAF Claim No. FA1010001355316 (Dec. 9, 2010)
(Upchurch, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1355316.htm.
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the registrant of <kuhf.com>, who happened to be located in
Riga, Latvia.284 The registrant used the disputed domain name
to display pay-per-click advertisements, or as the panelist put
it, “links to competing and non-competing commercial websites
from which Respondent presumably receives referral fees.”285
Even though (i) the University of Houston owned no federal
trademark registration for KUHF, (ii) domain names with four
or fewer numbers or letters in them commonly sell on
secondary markets for thousands of dollars, and (iii) KUHF
literally could stand for many different things, in many
different languages, the panelist found bad faith by the
respondent, concluding that there was no “other possible
explanation for Respondent choosing the letters KUHF,
meaningless except as Complainant’s call letters.”286
To be sure, the respondent in that action was in the
business of buying and selling domain names, many of which it
uses only by displaying parked pages with pay-per-click
advertising. But absent any offer to sell the domain name to
the complainant, or active use of it by the respondent in a way
that hurt the university—neither of which the panelist found to
be present—the university’s interest in filing the UDRP seems
questionable. The university appears to have pursued a legal
process to obtain the domain name simply because it could,
representing a vindication of the powerful apparatus of a public
institution of higher education over an obscure foreign
company whose business model few understand or respect.287
The motivation for brand expansion here may have been
sound if the university contemplated using the domain name in
a standalone, content-rich way. But even that explanation falls
short. As of June 2014, a visit to <kuhf.com> redirects visitors to
<houstonpublicmedia.org>, which suggests that the radio
station’s primary conception of brand no longer revolves around
its call letters.288 Regardless, the university has added to its
284 See Univ. Hous. Sys. v. Salvia Corp., NAF Claim No. FA0602000637920
(Mar. 21, 2006) (Franklin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/
637920.htm.
285 Id. at 4.
286 Id.
287 Even presuming that the Latvian registrant had the University of Houston
in mind when registering the offending domain name is questionable at best. Fourletter domain names are valuable precisely because four letters, not registered as a
trademark, can stand for nearly anything in multiple languages (not just English)
across the world.
288 Some evidence exists that the university’s branding objectives may have
changed in 2010, when it acquired another radio station formerly operated by students
at Rice University. See Karen Everhart, Adding 2nd Service in Houston, KUHF Buys

920

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

arsenal of intangible rights a lightly-trafficked domain name it
must pay to maintain, whose letters could mean anything, but
whose availability to the rest of the world now is diminished, for
as long as the university chooses to maintain the registration.
Also on the spectrum of brand expansion activity are
efforts by two universities to wrangle control of domain names
related to the field of healthcare, an increasing source of
revenue for universities. In one case the university was
successful, in the other it was not. The first dispute, brought by
the University of Miami, involved the domain name
<uhealth.com>.289 The university owned only a design mark
registration, registered in 2009, for a graphical rendering of the
words UHEALTH UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI HEALTH
SYSTEM, and enjoyed only common law rights in UHEALTH,
when it filed the UDRP in 2013.290 The disputed domain name
was first registered in 2002, then acquired by the respondent in
2004, well before the university’s claim of first use of the
UHEALTH mark, in December of 2007.291 Although the
arbitration panelist was generous to the University of Miami in
finding the institution had established rights in the mark
UHEALTH, the panelist declined to find that the respondent
had registered and used the domain name in bad faith, and
therefore ruled in favor of the respondent.292
The second dispute is from 2002 and involved the
University of Iowa’s successful attempt to obtain ownership of
<virtualhospital.info>.293 In that case, the university actually
owned a federal trademark registration for VIRTUAL
HOSPITAL, dating back to 1997, as used in relation to “providing
medical information, education, and instruction through
database accessible by remote computer.”294 The respondent,
located in Zilina, Slovakia, registered the disputed domain name

Rice U. Station, CURRENT (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.current.org/wpcontent/themes/current/archive-site/radio/radio1015houston.shtml. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the acquisition led the university to back away from touting
KUHF as a brand in favor of the umbrella term “Houston Public Media,” notable is the
university’s decision to maintain the <kuhf.com> registration for four years as
essentially unused property.
289 See Univ. of Miami v. Marchex Sales, Inc., NAF Claim No. FA1301001478911
(Mar. 5, 2013) (Triana, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1478911.htm.
290 Id.; see also U.S. Reg. No. 3,629,399 (June 2, 2009).
291 Univ. of Miami v. Marchex Sales, Inc., NAF Claim No. FA1301001478911.
292 Id.
293 See Univ. of Iowa v. Juraj Vyletelka, WIPO Case No. D2002-0349 (May 31, 2002)
(Brown, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0349.html.
294 See U.S. Reg. No. 2,058,573 (May 6, 1997).
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in 2001.295 Prior to filing the UDRP complaint, the university
wrote the respondent, asserted its trademark rights, and sought
to purchase the disputed domain name from him.296 The
respondent replied that he “didn’t intend to break intellectual
property rights of The University of Iowa. I have prepared
another activities (sic) on my domain virtualhospital.info. With
the stopping of those activities I shall lose 10,000 USD. This is
my offer to sell my domain virtualhospital.info”297 The
respondent further alleged that the disputed domain name was
the English-language equivalent of two domain names that he
had registered in the ccTLD-extensions for the Slovak Republic
and the Czech Republic (i.e., <virtualnanemocnica.sk> and
<virtualninemocnice.cz>, respectively).298
The university was unwilling to pay the respondent more
than the price of registering the domain name. The university
also alleged that it “is actively involved in trademark licensing
activities that utilize the term VIRTUAL HOSPITAL.”299
Although the nature of those activities was not specified by the
university, the panelist rather generously did his own factfinding and found that the university had licensed use of its
mark to hospitals in various countries where the mark also was
registered, including Australia, Iceland, Japan, and
Venezuela.300 Because of the registrant’s offer to sell the
domain name to the university for $10,000, the panelist found
that the bad faith element of the UDRP had been met,
notwithstanding the respondent’s plausible arguments that he
intended to use the domain name for legitimate non-commercial
purposes, and was not aware of the university’s trademark
registration in the U.S.301 In short, the panel found that the
university had a more compelling claim to the disputed domain,
although reading the panelist’s decision, one cannot help but
conclude that the respondent’s inability to fluently
communicate in English jeopardized his ability to mount what
otherwise might have been an effective defense.302
Univ. of Iowa v. Juraj Vyletelka, WIPO Case No. D2002-0349.
Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Others have noted the bias of some UDRP panels toward parties located in
Western democracies, due to the abundance of domain name registries existing and
operating in such countries. See, e.g., Julia Hörnle, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Procedure: Is Too Much of a Good Thing a Bad Thing?, 11 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 253, 275 (2008) (“For example, for the .com generic top-level domain,
295

296
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Both the University of Miami and the University of
Iowa UDRP actions are remarkable in that they show the
extent to which prominent universities are willing to go to
protect trademarks of theirs—however ancillary to their core
operations—in online space.303 In the University of Miami
action, even a poor set of facts did not dissuade the university
from seeking control of a domain name that did not even
explicitly reference the university. The university’s cause was
hurt by the fact that it waited over 10 years from the
registration of the disputed domain name before filing a UDRP
action. Additionally, the university did not enjoy federal
trademark rights in UHEALTH (and even then only in a design
mark) until seven years after the domain name was registered,
which also prejudiced its efforts.304 The University of Iowa
UDRP action shows that even far-flung international actors are
not immune from the brand expansion and enforcement efforts
of American universities.305
In another twist on brand expansion, at least one
university has used the UDRP to claim rights in a domain
name that it alleged references an alumnus of the institution.
Of course, the alumnus is no typical graduate, but rather a
professional football player who won the Heisman Trophy
while playing for the institution in question, Baylor University.
Baylor filed the UDRP in November 2013, nearly three years
after Robert Griffin III—also known by his nickname, RG3—
graduated from the university, and more than two years after
he threw his last pass as quarterback of Baylor’s football team
and entered the NFL.306 The university owns no trademark in
RG3’s legal name or nickname, yet felt aggrieved when a
most registrars are based in the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, some Asian
countries . . . Australia, and New Zealand. However, a .com domain name registrant in,
for example, Poland or Thailand would have to sign a registration agreement in a
foreign language and thus conduct the proceedings in that language, as well as bear
the cost of translation.”).
303 By ancillary, I mean trademarks that do not consist of their name or the name
of their athletic teams. My supposition is that few, even in Miami and Iowa City, are likely
to associate UHEALTH and VIRTUAL HOSPITAL with the two respective institutions.
304 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
305 Both of these cases support the contention that academic medicine
increasingly looks like commercial medicine, with more dollars being spent on branding
strategies that might be more usefully funneled toward patient care. Accord Thomas E.
Andreoli, The Undermining of Academic Medicine, ACADEME, Nov./Dec. 1999, at 32
(arguing that “academic values are losing out to mercantilism,” and that patient care
has suffered as a result).
306 Because he redshirted a season, RG3 played his final season at Baylor (in
2011) as a student pursuing a master’s degree in communications. See Robert Griffin, III,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Griffin_III (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
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fantasy football enthusiast registered the domain names
<rg3baylor.com> and <rg3bu.com> and began using them for
fantasy football purposes.307 Owning federal registrations for
both the word BAYLOR and the abbreviation BU, the
university asserted that the disputed domain names were
confusingly similar to its trademarks.308 The panelist agreed,
finding that the addition of the descriptive term ‘rg3’—“likely
meant as an allusion to Robert Griffin III, who achieved fame
while playing for Complainant’s football team”—did not vitiate
Baylor’s rights in the domains.309
One wonders whether RG3—whose nickname as a
professional athlete clearly has commercial value to him—
prompted this enforcement activity, or even is aware of it.
Visits in summer 2014 to the two domain names, whose
transfer Baylor successfully achieved in December 2013,
showed that neither resolved to a web page, which may suggest
that RG3 did not benefit from his alma mater’s enforcement of
his name. To what use these domain names will be put in the
future, if any, will be interesting to watch.310
Many of the UDRP actions described in this subsection
reflect an expanding conception of the university, one whose
metes and bounds no longer are constrained by institutional
name and athletic team names alone. As institutions’
conceptions of brand expand, so too will their perceived need to
307 See Baylor Univ. v. Justin Cox, NAF Claim No. FA1311001530937 (Dec. 20,
2013) (Pfeuffer, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1530937.htm.
308 As is typical of UDRP proceedings, a federal trademark registration provides
wide latitude to the complainant mark-holder in defining the extent of its ownership
interest. Accordingly, the panelist seemed not to consider the fact that BU could mean
anything, including Boston University, which owns the registration for <bu.edu>.
309 Baylor Univ. v. Justin Cox, NAF Claim No. FA1311001530937, at 5.
310 Beyond Baylor, the RG3 UDRP action serves as an intriguing inflection
point on the state of commercialization in higher education and intercollegiate
athletics. As has come to light in recent litigation concerning the NCAA’s profiting from
the use of student-athlete images and likenesses, institutional commercial interests in
student athletes and the interests of the students themselves do not always align. See
Brad Wolverton, Documents in O’Bannon Case Raise Questions About Athletes’ TV
Rights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 13, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Documentsin-O-Bannon-Case/147137/; see also King & Slaughter, supra note 276 (discussing deals
that collegiate athletic coaches enter into with sportswear companies that may not be
in the best interest of student-athletes). Sometimes, they even compete. Indeed, as
student-athletes graduate or leave for professional leagues, the commercial interest of
their alma maters in them grows, with universities channeling the graduates’ fame
toward the institution’s own brand expansion and enforcement efforts, often without
seeking their permission or providing them recompense. Baylor’s RG3 UDRP action
stands as another example of this activity, beyond the now-familiar realm of the use of
student-athlete images and likenesses in video games that financially benefitted the
NCAA, member institutions, and their licensing agents to the exclusion of former
student athletes.
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seek out more space online and fight those who may have
gotten there first.
Here, the interplay between trademarks and domain
names merits reiteration and discussion. One must have rights
in a mark in order to prevail in a UDRP action. Owning federal
registration of a mark—while not necessary in order to prevail
under the UDRP—enhances one’s prospects of winning a
UDRP action when one finds the mark incorporated into a
disputed domain name. Thus, a trademark-domain name
feedback loop exists: the stronger and more robust rights in
marks that institutions acquire, in the form of a federal
trademark registration or multiple registrations for different
versions of the mark (or in different classes), the more domain
name enforcement efforts present themselves as options to
pursue, and success in those efforts becomes more likely, and
thus attractive to institutional decision makers. In short, the
more trademark rights an institution accumulates, the greater
the online footprint the institution is able to claim in space
outside of the .EDU, and the more attractive those spaces may
appear to those charged with making enforcement decisions.
College and university behavior in the realm of
trademark acquisition is relevant for this reason. Data indicate
that lately, institutions have shown great zeal in accumulating
rights in descriptive terms and phrases associated with the
institution, no matter how loosely.311 Increasing numbers of
college- and university-owned trademarks refer not to the
institution as a whole (in the form of its official name, seal,
logo, nickname, or athletic team name), but rather to constituent
parts of the institution, such as schools, programs, or even
curricular initiatives.312 Higher education’s online presence may
soon reflect these trademark trends, if it does not already.
Domain names like <harvardessays.org>, <cornellrentals.com>,
<yaleparentingcenter.org>, and <stanfordevents.com>—all of
which were identified in the study conducted for this Article—
may be quite commonly registered by colleges and universities,
without their ever rising to the level of a UDRP dispute.313 We
311 See Rooksby, supra note 10, at 390 (depicting a significant rise in
trademark activity by colleges and universities in the past 15 years).
312 Id. at 395.
313 See Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Comp. Prod. Info., NAF Claim
No. FA0303000146571 (Mar. 28, 2003) (McCotter, Jr., Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/146571.htm (concerning <stanfordevents.com>, among other domain
names); Yale Univ. v. Whois Agent, Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., Inc., WIPO Claim No.
D2013-0405 (Apr. 25, 2013) (Elliot, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/
text.jsp?case=D2013-0405 (concerning <yaleparentingcenter.org>); Pres. & Fellows of
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simply do not know because institutions do not divulge this
information, and conducting a comprehensive search for all
domain names owned by colleges and universities would be
expensive and cumbersome.
To the extent colleges and universities are motivated to
seek online space to further their brands, we do know that such
efforts are far cheaper if carried out proactively as opposed to
reactively. The cost of registering and maintaining a domain
name is far less than pursuing arbitration or litigation to obtain
the domain name once the institution realizes it does not own it.
Whether we will see fewer UDRP actions filed by colleges and
universities in the years to come, due to their becoming savvier
and more proactive about domain name acquisition, will depend,
in part, to what extent institutions have learned from the past
and implemented internal procedures to help them
systematically manage their acquisition and maintenance of
domain names. As described in the following subsection, the
data collected for this Article provide some basis for examining
the cogency of institutional decision-making regarding domain
name acquisition and management strategies, although many
questions remain unresolved.
C.

Mastering Domains?

This subsection considers the extent to which higher
education’s construction and maintenance of online space,
obtained using contentious dispute resolution mechanisms,
reflects coherent strategies and sensible goals. I focus in
particular on the ownership and use of domain names acquired
by colleges and universities through contentious processes.
First though, on a general level, findings from the study
conducted for this Article provide useful preliminary insight
into administrative decision-making and conceptualization of
online space. For reasons of brand expansion and brand
protection discussed above, many institutions of higher
education place value on controlling spaces outside of the .EDU
extension.314 While the number of UDRP actions filed by
colleges and universities since the UDRP’s inception is not
Harvard Coll. v. A Happy DreamHost Customer, WIPO Case No. D2010-2184 (May 23,
2011) (Osborne, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=D20102184 (concerning <harvardessays.org>); Cornell Univ. v. Steven Wells, NAF Claim No.
FA0305000158423 (July 9, 2003) (Byrne, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/
decisions/158423.htm (concerning <cornellrentals.com>).
314 See supra Part IV.B.
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overwhelming compared to the number of such institutions,
data do seem to indicate a rather steady comfort with the use of
the dispute resolution mechanism by colleges and universities
since its inception. These findings contrast sharply with the
data concerning college and university involvement in ACPA
lawsuits, which have been de minimis from the start.315
Salient from the standpoint of institutional decisionmaking concerning intellectual property is what institutions
choose to do with domain names that they win in UDRP
proceedings. Analysis of the disputed domain names located in
my study revealed that fully one-third of them were available
to register or were not registered to the institution that had
won transfer of the domain name, suggesting that the
institution allowed the registration to lapse, whether
intentionally or unintentionally.316 This finding challenges any
assumption that higher education’s battles for cyberspace
necessarily concern domain names that have some lasting value
to the institution. In many cases, the data show that the
institution no longer owns the domain name it once deemed
important enough to fight over, not even five years after winning
a UDRP action concerning the domain name.317 While this
finding may not be unique to higher education—other
complainants, outside of higher education, often choose not to
renew domain name registrations they win through
arbitration—the finding does raise the question of whether the
institution’s involvement in the UDRP action was motivated by
what a decision maker might deem practical necessity, as
opposed to mere legal opportunity.
Also telling is what institutions choose to do with the
domain names that they have won and still own. A visit to
these domain names revealed that over 55% of them were not
being used in any effective way.318 That is to say, instead of
displaying content or redirecting visitors to another web site
affiliated with the institution, the majority of domain names
that colleges and universities have fought to win display no
meaningful information at all—either they did not resolve to a
315 This finding is not unique to higher education. ACPA lawsuits take longer to
resolve and are more expensive to pursue than UDRP actions, which likely explains in part
why rights holders of all sorts choose to bring more UDRP actions than ACPA lawsuits.
316 See supra Part III.A.5.
317 For five domains, the institution that initially won their transfer did not hold
on to them, yet deemed them important enough to go after again, in subsequent UDRP
actions, once someone else registered them. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
318 See supra Part III.A.6.
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web page, or they displayed a parked page upon visit.319 This
finding suggests that institutions sometimes pursue transfer of
domain names that they do not intend to use.
Admittedly, good reason exists as to why institutions
choose not to use some of the domain names they have won.
For example, Baylor University understandably does not want
to redirect visitors to <baylorgirls.xxx> to the university home
page, or use it to display content concerning its female
students. Nor does it want to see anyone else register the
domain name, so it continues to pay the registration fee and
does not use it.320 But why does Drexel University continue to
pay to maintain its registration of <drexel.org>, which it won in
a UDRP action in 2001, when it does not effectively use the
domain name to display any content to the public? Other
examples of non-used domain names, still owned as of July
2014 by the institutions that achieved their transfer through
UDRP actions, include <tufts.mobi>, <notre-dame.com>, and
<universityofcentralarkansas.com>.321
While one plausible explanation for the apparent nonuse of these domain names by these institutions could be that
they are using them for non-public facing purposes—namely,
as domain names through which to route email—the more
likely explanation seems to be that: (1) maintaining ownership
of the domain name, but not effectively using it, provides some
strategic value to the institution in that it blocks others from
registering it, or (2) the domain name actually is of little
importance to the institution, but the low cost of maintaining
the registration means the institution faces no pressing reason
to let go of it.
Regardless of the explanation, the result is the same:
colleges and universities are willing to spend not insignificant
sums of money to obtain and maintain domain names that they
do not actually use in any traditional or meaningful sense. To
the extent that the second explanation proffered above explains
Id.
Harvard
University
must
not
feel
the
same
way
about
<harvardgirlschool.com>; as of Spring 2014, it was available to register.
321 See Tufts Univ. v. Oneida Advisors LLC, NAF Claim No. FA0808001219154
(Sept.
29,
2008)
(Franklin,
Arb.),
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/
decisions/1219154.htm (concerning <tufts.mobi>); Univ. of Central Ark. V. John Simms
& John Barry, WIPO Case No. D2002-0316 (May 31, 2002) (Horning, Arb.),
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0316.html
(concerning
<universityofcentralarkansas.com>); Univ. of Notre Dame v. 24/7, WIPO Case No.
D2001-1288 (Dec. 19, 2001) (Maher, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/
decisions/html/2001/d2001-1288.html (concerning <notre-dame.com>).
319
320

928

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

decision making more than the first, colleges and universities
may be adrift in some of the cyber-battles they choose to wage,
lacking facility when it comes to picking the kinds of fights that
are worth fighting. The array of domain names located in my
study that are of seemingly little consequence to higher
education’s core operations at least raises this question.
The competing explanation, reflected in the first
explanation proffered above, is that colleges and universities
show a savvy ability to acquire intellectual property for its
strategic defensive value.322 For-profit corporations often amass
domain name registrations for the purpose of holding them, not
using them.323 If an attorney comes to know of a client’s
trademark that is reflected in an existing domain name the
client does not own, filing a UDRP action against the domain
name’s registrant is a common strategy if the domain name
might plausibly find its way into the search bar of any wouldbe customer or fan of the client’s. In short, preventing someone
else from owning a domain name—the use or non-use of which
potentially could hurt the brand owner, or distract its fans or
customers—often has value to the brand owner.
Relevant to this perspective is that as the Internet has
matured and its users have become savvier about the nuances
and functionalities of online space, prevailing business
thinking in some quarters has shifted. A company cannot
plausibly own every domain name that incorporates a company’s
trademarks. Variations of the English language are too many, as
are the tools of the cybersquatter (such as using hyphens or
common typos in the alphanumeric string of the domain name)
and the trademark holdings of some companies, to make the
322 Cf. Carl Straumsheim, Who Gets to Be a .Doctor?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar.
26, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/26/personalized-domain-namesbring-headaches-institutions-phd-holders (noting that “as ICANN continues to delegate
new domains, some colleges and universities are once again registering domains they
will likely never use to prevent others from misusing their trademarks.”).
323 See,
e.g., MARK S. SPARSCHU, NEW TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION ISSUES IMPACTING IP ATTORNEYS AND BRAND HOLDER CLIENTS (2012),
available at http://www.brookskushman.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Drag9DRigBc%
3d&tabid=95 (noting the struggle brand owners face in choosing which domain names
to defensively register in view of limited budgetary resources); Karol A. Kepchar, Next
Generation Domain Name Strategies: .COM, .NAME, .BIZ, .INFO . . . Dot What?,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 1, 2002, at 10, available at http://cdn.akingump.com/
images/content/9/3/v4/933/192.pdf (noting the value to brand owners of defensive
domain name registrations across TLDs); Todd Shields, Expansion of Web Upsets
Businesses, J. GAZETTE, Apr. 16, 2013, at A8, available at 2013 WLNR 9336541 (noting
that risk-averse companies defensively register domain names); Taylor Buley,
Um.whatever, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2008, 10:40 AM) http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/
1117/038.html (citing a report that estimated the cost to businesses of defensive
domain name registration in the new gTLDs to be $1.6 billion).
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mass acquisition of domain names an advisable or even feasible
defensive business strategy. As the venerable computer science
scholar Milton Mueller has noted, “it is impossible for a company
to prevent someone from incorporating its name into a domain
name in some way . . . the DNS supports too many variations to
make it possible to preempt criticism or capture all possible
references to a company or a product.”324
These realities, and the conflicting explanations for the
trends identified in my study’s data, lead one to question
whether college and university use of the UDRP reflects a
mature understanding of brand protection in cyberspace, an
outdated conception of brand protection in cyberspace, or
something else. In short, in defining their domain outside of
the .EDU space, have colleges and universities conscientiously
determined when UDRP enforcement is justified, not just
legally, but as a matter of policy?
My study’s data, which did not account for the strategic
goals of decision makers responsible for initiating the contentious
actions identified, unfortunately are inconclusive on this point.
Follow-up qualitative research into this question likely would
find that the answer to when enforcement activity makes sense
is without an objective answer across rights holders, with higher
education being no different. Tolerance for risk and expense,
and the value of perceived rewards that may come from
enforcement, undoubtedly vary by institution. Nearly 15 years
of UDRP and ACPA lawsuit data provide some illumination,
but in the history of the Internet, these limited data may tell us
little about enforcement strategies for the future. The fact that
domain name enforcement may be styled as low stakes—
compared to, say, patent infringement litigation, cases
involving torts on campus, or a discrimination or tenure denial
lawsuit—only adds weight to a hypothesis that decision
making in this realm likely is more idiosyncratic than it is
reflective of established policies.
D.

Higher Education’s Cyber Future

What does the future hold for college and university
battles for cyberspace? Informed by findings from the study,
this subsection tenders some general prognostications, as well
324 MUELLER, supra note 18, at 251 (further calling any attempt to protect
massive clouds of names “pointless unless draconian and undesirable restrictions are
placed on the use of DNS”).

930

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

as offers modest considerations that should inform college and
university decision making in this space.
1. Future Battles for Online Space
Past behaviors by colleges and universities in the realm
of cyberspace may not necessarily be predictive of tomorrow’s
challenges. The advent and sudden ubiquity of apps and cloudbased user interfaces provide plausibly attractive reasons for
thinking that fighting for ownership of domain names is a
phenomenon of the past. Today’s Internet users seeking
information about a given institution probably are just as likely
to visit a virtual store on their smartphone or tablet device to
see if “there is an app for that,” or to conduct extensive search
engine searches or visit known third-party social media
platforms, as they are to reach out into the .COM space and
enter a precisely-worded domain name. In short, students
seeking housing in Ithaca know to go to Craigslist or Facebook;
who cares about <cornellrentals.com>?325
But so long as institutions continue to listen to the
advice of counsel specializing in intellectual property, higher
education’s battles for cyberspace likely will continue, no
matter the enduring strategic importance vel non of domain
names. Institutions will battle those who register domain
names that are being used in ways that could reflect poorly on
the institution, or cause confusion as to the institution’s
endorsement, affiliation, or approval (as was the case for
<cornellrentals.com>) of content displayed at the domain name.
And rightfully so from a practical and legal perspective.
While the failure to enforce a trademark against a cybersquatter
typically does not put the institution at risk of losing rights in its
mark, the existence of a right and a technical grievance with a
third party can make low-stakes enforcement look appealing. To
the extent that institutions are too quick to take advantage of
these proceedings signals not a shortcoming in the law—the
cards are stacked generously in favor of all mark holders, not
just colleges and universities—but rather an opportunity for

325 <cornellrentals.com> was the subject of a successful UDRP action brought
by Cornell University in 2003. See Cornell Univ. v. Steven Wells, NAF Claim No.
FA0305000158423 (July 9, 2003) (Byrne, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/158423.htm. Respondent was found to have used the domain name
in connection with a web site “offering assistance to apartment seekers and landlords
in locating housing in Ithaca, New York.” Id. at 2.
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institutional decision makers to focus on the implications of
contentious domain name acquisitions.
The challenge contentious domain name acquisition
presents for higher education is, therefore, mostly one of policy:
articulating institutional interest in enforcing intellectual
property online. Will the institution take a constrained
approach, seeking to limit the domain name battles it chooses
to wage, or will it view its trademark holdings as manifest
destiny, seeking to reflect in online space all manner and
variation of its intangible rights?326
What I call a constrained approach to this subject
recognizes that trademark rights enforcement should be viewed
with reluctance when identified harms are more theoretical than
actual. This approach is more consistent with a public-facing,
public-serving conception of higher education and its treatment
of intellectual property, albeit one that policymakers
increasingly find unsustainable in view of budgetary pressures
and stiff market competition. Often in seemingly inevitable
fashion, when policymakers consider institutional intellectual
property, higher education’s might makes right and individual
institutions’ legal rights make might. And so the cycle continues.
Although protecting the brand does not require the
institution to expand the brand, the former often elides into the
latter, whether the institution intends that consequence or not.
The problem stems in part from the fact that the modern
college or university must be all things to all people. Its
constituents are many, as are its purposes.327 In higher
education’s ever-expanding quest for revenue, hardly any
activity, endorsement, or affiliation is unbelievable, meaning
more cyberbattles likely wait to be fought. Colleges and
universities no longer exist merely to provide educational
services; their boundaries with all aspects of the commercial
sphere are much more porous. In this new world order for
higher education, protecting the brand first requires defining
the brand, and the definition often seems to flow from the
efforts at protection. In short, combining a college or university
trademark in a domain name with nearly any descriptive word
326 Institutions face a similar choice when it comes to acquisition and
enforcement of other forms of intellectual property.
327 See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, The Soul of the Research University, CHRONICLE
REV., (Apr. 28, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/The-Soul-of-the-Research/146155/
(“[H]igher education is expected to do so many things—teach everything from
philosophy to prison administration, operate winning sports programs, provide inperson management of the transition from adolescence to adulthood, make local
economies prosper, be direct providers of medical care, and on and on.”).
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or phrase—be it a product, service, geographic place, or even a
famous alumnus’s nickname—may lead to legal action, no
matter the actual extent of harm to the institution.328
A potential lesson to be drawn from this Article is a
sense of when contentious acquisition of domain names is a
path a college or university ought to pursue. Recognizing that
every institution is different, as is every domain name, and
coming from the perspective that a constrained approach to
intellectual property enforcement better serves higher
education than opportunistic enforcement, I offer the following
nine questions as ones institutions should consider as they
determine whether to pursue enforcement action to obtain a
domain name:
1. Does the disputed domain name incorporate a trademark
that people outside of the institution actually associate with
the institution? If not, chances are the disputed domain name
represents merely an enforcement opportunity, not an enforcement
necessity, driven by the fact the institution owns registration of a
trademark not central to its core operations. Not every trademark
owned by the institution is of equal importance. Online enforcement
opportunities should be viewed accordingly. Disputes over domain
names not involving an institution’s trademarked name, or the use of
the institution’s trademarked name in combination with something
else, should be carefully considered and in most instances avoided.329
2. Is the disputed domain name one that the institution
envisions using in a meaningful sense (i.e., using it to display
content), years into the future? If not, chances are the disputed
domain name is not essential for the institution to own, and an
enforcement proceeding should not be brought.
3. Did the disputed domain name come to the attention of
an internal decision maker because of a reasonable
complaint of confusion by someone who encountered it? If
not, the institution should seriously question the extent of any harm
perceived. Simply because the domain name registration exists, the
domain name displays a parked page, or legal counsel brought the
domain name’s existence to the attention of someone internally does
not mean that the institution should act.

328 Examples of this activity from the dataset, not previously mentioned in the
Article, include <huskerfevercard.com>, <sufacebook.com>, and <ucfindie.com>. See
Univ. of Central Fla. v. Knight Publ’g, Inc., NAF Claim No. FA0505000485962 (July 13,
2005) (Richard, Lowry, Fink, Arbs.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/
485962.htm; Syracuse Univ. v. Red Ant Hosting, NAF Claim No. FA0409000332354 (Nov.
9, 2004) (Yachnin, Arb.), http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/332354.htm; Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. Karolke, WIPO Case No. D2003-0307 (June 18, 2003)
(Knopf, Arb.), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2003/d2003-0307.html.
329 In my study, I labeled as “other” the types of domain names involved in
disputes of this nature. See supra Part II.A.1 & Part III.A.3.
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4. Is the disputed domain name being used to criticize or
parody the institution in a way that is unlikely to confuse
consumers into thinking that the institution is affiliated with
the domain name? If so, the institution should decline to act,
recognizing that asserting trademark rights to obtain the domain
name is inconsistent with the traditional academic commitment to
free expression (and, in any event, would be futile in stopping the
critical expression).
5. Is the disputed domain name actively being used in a way
that tarnishes the institution (e.g., by associating it with
pornography, or illicit or illegal activity)? If so, seeking to
capture the domain name is reasonable, provided the tarnishment is
actual and not merely hypothetical. Domain names merely capable
of tarnishing the reputation of the institution, but not actively being
used for such purpose, do not present a compelling case for action.330
6. Is the disputed domain name being used in a commercial
manner, in such a way that consumers reasonably may be
confused into thinking that the domain name is affiliated,
sponsored, or endorsed by the institution? If so, enforcement
action may be justified. However, decision makers should be
sensitive to the nature of the trademark incorporated in the domain
name. Common abbreviations or geographic descriptors arguably
may reference things or places other than the institution.331 Just
because the institution owns a federal trademark registration for an
abbreviation or term incorporating geographically descriptive
language does not mean any unauthorized recitation of that
character string should lead to enforcement activity. The existence of
confusion regarding the sponsorship, affiliation, or approval of the
domain name by the institution should be actual, not hypothetical.
Relatedly, and notwithstanding what UDRP case law permits,
institutions should carefully consider any opportunity to enforce their
rights online when the commercial use to which the disputed domain
name is being put is merely as a parked page, displaying pay-per-click
advertising. Domain names in common extensions that are exact
replicas of the institution’s trademarked name present perhaps the
only compelling instances when taking such action is reasonable.332

330 For example, Creighton University should decline to seek transfer of the
hypothetical domain name <creightongirls.com>, unless it were actively being used to
in a tarnishing fashion.
331 To some, the letters UVA may call to mind the University of Virginia. To
Spanish-speakers, uva means grape. The University of Virginia therefore should
consider <uvaspain.com> an appropriate target for enforcement if the hypothetical
domain name were being used to promote university study programs in Spain.
Enforcement would not be appropriate if the hypothetical domain name were being
used to advertise bike tours through Spanish wine country.
332 Only first-time Internet users even conceivably could be confused into
thinking that parked pages are sponsored, endorsed, or affiliated with any non-profit
institution of higher education. However, when someone registers a college or
university’s trademarked name in a commonly trafficked extension (e.g., .COM, .ORG,
or .NET), and uses it for pay-per-click advertising, the annoyance presented by this
third-party registration and activity warrants enforcement action.
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7. Is the disputed domain name in a commonly trafficked
domain name extension, like .COM, .ORG, or .NET? If not,
institutions should have ample justification for deciding to pursue
enforcement. Few Americans turn to web sites in esoteric
extensions—such as .INFO, .BIZ, .MOBI, any of the non-.US
country-code extensions, or even the newly created gTLDs—in
search of reliable information. Even domain names entirely
reflective of an institution’s name are not worth pursuing in nonmainstream extensions such as those previously mentioned, absent
the presence of more compelling considerations. Institutions
preemptively should seek registrations of domain names reflective of
their names in those extensions commonly trafficked. Leave the
esoteric extensions alone, and resist any temptation to be drawn into
unnecessary battles over obscure spaces.
8. Is the disputed domain name a typographical
misspelling, broadly conceived, of one of the institution’s
trademarks? If so, decline to pursue enforcement absent the
presence of more compelling considerations.
9. Is the disputed domain name owned by someone known
to be affiliated with the institution (e.g., a current student or
alumnus)? If so, and enforcement otherwise is reasonable, attempt
to resolve the dispute informally without resorting to initiating a
UDRP or ACPA action. At the same time, beware of the precedent
that may come from resolving the dispute extra-judicially, and
refrain from paying or exchanging with the registrant anything of
value in excess of the cost of registering the domain name.

The above questions may help college and university
decision makers assess when seeking to capture a domain name
registered to a third party is consistent with a constrained
approach to intellectual property protection and enforcement.333
These questions, however, are not meant to be exhaustive or
contemplative of potentially all relevant considerations, nor is
any one of them dispositive of the ultimate decision whether to
act. Instead, these questions are meant to provide a checkpoint
on an activity that can seem attractive because of expansive
institutional trademark holdings, and because success in UDRP
actions is statistically probable.334 However, the leniency of most
UDRP panels in deciding each factor in favor of the mark
holder should not be an invitation to act.

333 In this regard, the original goals of the UDRP and the ACPA—to prevent
the bad faith registration and use of domain names, not to reward efforts at brand
expansion—should always drive any decision to enforce.
334 See supra notes 138, 215, 311-12 and accompanying text.

2015]

DEFINING DOMAIN

935

2. Additional Considerations
One practical consideration bearing on higher education’s
cyber future concerns the limits of online space itself. As colleges
and universities continue to grow in operation and complexity,
amassing with them terabytes of digital data, funneling all
aspects of their online identities and activities into one domain
name may become technically unwieldy, if not downright
unworkable. Simply put, the problem is one of breadth and depth:
institutions generate too much content, reflective of thousands of
people engaged in diverse activities and offerings, to effectively
channel all of it through but one domain name. As additional
online space becomes available (like the .COLLEGE and
.UNIVERSITY extensions, to name but two), the more attractive
new digital corners of the cyberworld may become to colleges and
universities looking to grow, both in terms of the audiences they
reach and the network infrastructures they create to support
their intangible webs and expanding market orientations.
One also must ponder the impact that online education
and MOOCs might have on college and university conceptions
of space online. Many students may never set foot on a
traditional campus in the twenty-first century, instead
receiving their degrees and certifications in exchange for
completing competency-based curricula online. For these
students, higher education’s online space may be viewed as
treasured space, and the legitimizing and authenticating
functions of higher education’s online domains are likely to be
as important as ever. In this regard, online space promises to
be the brick-and-mortar of the quintessential college
quadrangle, and just as graffiti artists and vandals of those
structures are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law,
cybersquatters also can expect to continue to face legal
consequences for their actions.
Central to all of these visions of higher education’s cyber
future is the continued role of the university as a public sphere,
a space that Professor Brian Pusser calls “at once physical,
symbolic, cultural, political, and semantic, not in relation to the
state or the broader political economy but as a site of complex,
autonomous contest in its own right.”335 As our understanding
of the contours of institutions increasingly becomes shaped by
our virtual interactions and what we see online, the importance
335 Brian Pusser, Reconsidering Higher Education and the Public Good: The Role
of Public Spheres, in GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 17 (William G. Tierney ed., 2006).
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of higher education’s metaphysical existence cannot be
understated. Battles for control and rights to domain names
that a college or university views as its prerogative tap into a
larger contest over competing orientations and views of higher
education as serving public goods or existing for private gains.
These battles cannot be divorced from the concept of ownership
itself. Many seek to use actual or imagined affiliations with
institutions of higher education for their own private
advantage, and third party registration of domain names
containing college and university trademarks often reflects this
motivation. How higher education chooses to respond to these
instances of outside claims of ownership or affiliation invites
renewed examination of the proper placement of higher
education in society and stands to influence our perception of
the industry as an instrument of public good. Domain names—
themselves a hybrid creature imbued with symbolic, cultural,
political, and semantic significance—do not just package the
public sphere, but themselves reflect it. For this reason alone, I
predict that contests over higher education’s cyber future may
not soon diminish in number or importance as we enter the
next chapter of the Internet’s history.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s historical examination of the .EDU extension
and its empirical investigation of higher education’s battles for
cyberspace is timely in view of the unprecedented expansion of the
DNS root zone currently underway. Unlike so many other
industries, higher education received from the Internet’s architects
its own domain name extension, the .EDU. While the entity that
has managed the extension has changed over the past 30 years, as
have the rules for who may register domain names in the
extension, the guiding premise of the extension remains the same:
higher education is distinct from other industries, and that
distinction merits recognition in virtual space.
But as data reported in this Article reveal, the
allocation to higher education of distinct online space does not
mean that institutions of higher education have not had to
fight to define their domain. One hundred institutions have
affirmatively harnessed the power of their trademark holdings
to expand or defend the online space they claim as theirs. The
purpose of this Article has been to reveal these efforts and
examine their policy implications for higher education. Much of
the activity is explainable as the necessary workings of the
academic enterprise in the twenty-first century. One
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inescapable fact is that colleges and universities have powerful
trademarks and brands, and many within and outside of those
institutions would like to use those intangible items for their
own private purposes and profits.
But not all battles for cyberspace by colleges and
universities are so easily dismissed as the work of good
lawyering for complex enterprises operating in the knowledge
economy. Some of the patterns and case-based anecdotes
described in this Article raise questions regarding the types of
battles various institutions have chosen to fight and how they
have chosen to fight them. While none of the illustrative cases
discussed in Part IV was representative of the entire dataset, in
some instances, constrained use of intellectual property rights in
light of higher education’s historical placement in the public
sphere seems to have given way to a more corporate-influenced
conception of intellectual property and its enforcement. In short,
some of higher education’s battles for cyberspace seem
inessentially fought, leaving as the wounded those who believe
that more intellectual property protection and enforcement do
not always serve the public’s interest when the ones wielding the
rights are publicly-funded and public-serving. The questions I
offered in Part IV.D.1 above for the consideration of college and
university decision makers hopefully may serve as an initial line
of defense in the face of such forces.
The insights provided in this Article form a small but
important narrative in the growing body of knowledge about
how higher education uses its intangible rights and assesses
enforcement priorities. One might conclude that in defining
their domain online, colleges and universities are making
important choices that reflect the value they attribute to
intangible rights and conceptions of space. Perhaps there is no
perfect prescription for when to engage in battles for
cyberspace; every institution’s needs and constraints are
different, as are their tolerances for risk. But one fact seems
certain: online space is important space, increasingly so as
entire degree programs move online, or even are born in the
virtual world. These spaces go to the heart of how we
conceptualize higher education in the public sphere, as a
public-facing entity increasingly pulled in private, rights-rich
directions, simultaneously influenced by concerns for
commerce, brand, and academic missions. At this intersection
of priorities and values, made all the more pronounced and
visibly contested in cyberspace, we find an industry struggling
to use private rights in service of a greater public good, an
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industry whose behaviors occasionally seem schizophrenic, as
the dual motives of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement
intermix.
As the venerable and late higher education leader Clark
Kerr described American higher education, writing in 1963,
well before the advent of the Internet, “it is not really private
and it is not really public; it is neither entirely of the world nor
entirely apart from it. It is unique.”336 And so it is with the
important but often overlooked spaces that colleges and
universities continue to forge for themselves online.

336

CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 1 (5th ed. 2001).
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APPENDIX A
This Appendix lists in Table A-1 all domain names
subject to UDRP actions filed by Baylor University, as located
in the study.
TABLE A-1
Domain Names Subject to UDRP Actions Filed by Baylor
University
baylor.com
baylor-university.com
baylorcollege.com
bayloruniversity.com
bayloredu.com
baylor.org
baylordallas.net
baylordallas.org
bayloreye.org
baylorhospital.com
bayloraids.com
baylorfan.com
baylorgrapevinehospital.com
baylorhospitaldallas.com
baylormedicalcenter.com
baylormedicalschool.com
baylormedicine.com
baylordentalschool.com
baylorhospitalindallas.com
baylorhospitaljobs.com
baylorplan.com
baylorschoolofnursing.com
baylorstore.com
baylorwaxahachie.com
baylorhospitals.com
baylor-alum.com
baylorcollegemd.com
baylorgrad.com
baylor-law.com
baylor-student.com
bayloralum.com
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baylormba.com
baylorstudent.com
baylorbears.biz
baylorbears.name
baylorbears.net
baylorbearssuck.com
baylorbears.tv
baylormedicalcenteratirving.com
baylorhealthcaregarland.com
baylormedicalcenterhospital.com
baylorregionalmedicalcenter.com
baylorcollegemedicine.com
baylorschools.org
baylorbanks.com
baylorfrisco.com
ihatebaylor.com
baylorcommunity.com
baylorpsychiatrist.com
baylorpsychiatry.com
bayoralumniliving.com
baylorcrave.com
baylorflorist.com
baylorfriscoivf.com
baylorhospital.mobi
baylorhospitals.mobi
baylorkehoe.com
baylorlocators.com
baylorsalsa.com
baylorsportstalk.com
baylorsportstalk.net
baylormedicalhospital.com
baylorjobs.com
baylorhelth.com
baylorofirving.com
baylorhospitalgarland.com
baylornursery.com
baylorrivals.com
baylorumc.com
baylormedicalcenter.com
baylorgroup.com
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baylorlambdas.com
cmebaylor.com
baylordentalcollege.com
baylordental.com
bayloryellowpages.com
baylorhomecoming.com
baylormedicalschool.com
baylorbkstr.com
baylormedicalclinic.com
baylorcme.com
fansofbaylor.com
baylorcareers.com
universityofbaylor.com
baylorhealthsystems.com
baylordowntown.com
baylorhosptial.com
mybaylor.com
baylorsing.com
baylorhealthcenter.com
baylorhealth.com
bayloruniversityu.com
searchbaylorhealth.com
baylorhostipal.com
mychartbaylorclinic.com
baylorgarland.com
baylorofgarland.com
thebaylorstore.com
baylorgirls.xxx
baylorhospitaljobs.com
baylorsucks.com
mybaylorlogin.com
baylorjobs.com
baylornation.com
baylorstadium.net
baylorheath.com
bayloralumnigaming.com
bayloralumnilottery.com
bayloralumnionline.com
baylorbearsgaming.com
baylorgaming.com
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baylorlottery.com
bigbaylorfan.com
belmontbaylor.com
belmont-lofts-baylor.com
belmontloftsbaylor.com
thebelmontbaylor.com
baylorfootballstadium.com
baylorriverfrontstadium.com
baylorsportsnet.com
bybaylor.com
baylorofdallas.com
4mybaylor.com
baylorallsaintshospital.com
baylorunversity.com
justbuit.com
gobusong.com
baylorhealth.com
rg3baylor.com
rg3bu.com
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The Ugly Truth about Legal Academia
Meera E. Deo, JD, PhD†
The Diversity in Legal Academia (DLA) project is the first formal,
comprehensive, mixed-method empirical examination of the law
faculty experience, utilizing an intersectional lens to investigate the
personal and professional lives of legal academics. This Article
reports on the first set of findings from that study, which I personally
designed and implemented. DLA data reveal that ongoing privilege
and institutional discrimination based on racism and sexism create
distinct challenges for particular law faculty. Interactions between
women of color law faculty and both their faculty colleagues and their
students indicate persisting racial and gender privilege, resulting in
ongoing bias. These findings cry out for law schools to intensify
efforts at strengthening rather than de-emphasizing diversity, as
many may be tempted to do during this period of great turmoil in
legal education. In fact, law schools should provide greater
institutional support to faculty, which will help not only those who
are underrepresented, marginalized, and vulnerable, but all law
faculty, law students, and the legal profession overall. This Article
draws from both quantitative and qualitative data gathered from this
national sample of law faculty to focus on the ways in which race,
gender, and the combination of the two affect law faculty interactions
with colleagues and students. It also proposes individual strategies
and structural solutions that can be utilized in order for legal
academia to live up to its full potential.

† Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The Author received
support for this project while a Visiting Scholar at Berkeley Law’s Center for the Study
of Law & Society in 2013. Preliminary findings from the Diversity in Legal Academia
(DLA) study received useful feedback at the following meetings: South Asian Legal
Academics (SALA) Inaugural Workshop (Aug. 2014); eCRT Workshop (June 2014);
AALS Annual Meeting, Presidential Workshop on Law Teachers of the Future (Jan.
2014); AALS Annual Meeting, “Hot Topics” session on Enhancing the Law School
Climate (Jan. 2014); Southern California Junior Faculty Workshop (May 2013);
Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice Symposium (Mar. 2013); AALS Annual
Meeting, Section on Law & the Social Sciences session (Jan. 2013). Numerous
colleagues and mentors have supported DLA, including: Carmen Gonzalez, Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Herma Hill Kay, Bryant Garth, Linda Pololi, Angela Harris, Kevin
Johnson, Lisa Ikemoto, Anupam Chander, Andrea Freeman, Jordan Woods, Bertrall
Ross, Wendy Greene, Bill Hines, and Rudy Hasl. Above all, thanks are due to the 93
law faculty members who participated in the DLA study and whose perspectives are
shared anonymously herein. The author holds full copyright to this article. For reprint
permissions, please contact the author directly.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the diversity debate in courts, public opinion,
and academic circles has centered on student diversity.1 There has
been virtual silence on the topic of diversity in academia. This may
be because there has never been a formal, comprehensive,
empirical study of law faculty to inform the debate.
“Yet, faculty diversity may be especially critical today
based on the unique challenges facing legal academia.”2 With
law school applications at record low levels and shrinking
enrollment at many schools, some law schools have adopted
aggressive cost-cutting measures, with more drastic changes
likely ahead.3 Faculty hiring has decreased or ceased altogether
at many law schools.4 A few law schools have begun firing
faculty and staff, as well as closing facilities.5 While faculty of
color and female faculty have been underrepresented in legal
academia since law schools first opened their doors, recent
changes threaten to deplete their numbers even further.6
Ironically, just as law schools are poised to decrease
their attention on faculty diversity, it may be in their best
interest to elevate its importance. Law schools are changing to
adapt to coming times, becoming more student-centered,
focusing more on skills-based learning, and creating other
incentives to attract students and keep them in school.
Prospective students may be especially drawn to law schools
1 See generally Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct.
1623 (2014); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978); Kathryn
Alfisi, Diversity in Higher Education: Is Affirmative Action Nearing its End?, WASH.
LAWYER
(Dec.
2012),
http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washingtonlawyer/articles/december-2012-affirmative-action.cfm; Adam Liptak, Justices Take Up Race
as a Factor in College Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at A1; Room for Debate: Diversity
Without Affirmative Action?, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2013/05/13/can-diversity-survive-without-affirmative-action.
2 Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia, 29
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 354 (2014).
3 A DISTURBING TREND IN LAW SCHOOL DIVERSITY, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
salt (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (describing declining law school enrollment rates for African
American and Mexican American students); see also Chelsea Phipps, More Law Schools
Haggle on Scholarships, WALL ST. J., (July 29, 2012, 9:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390444130304577557182667927226.html.
4 Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are
Cutting Faculty, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles /SB10001424127887323664204578607810292433272.
5 See
THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL STATEMENT (July 1, 2014),
http://www.cooley.edu/news/statement.html; see also Dan Filler, Retrenchment at Thomas
Cooley Law, FACULTY LOUNGE (July 03, 2014, at 9:22 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/
2014/07/retrenchment-at-thomas-cooley-law.html (discussing Cooley’s announcement
regarding “faculty and staff layoffs and other cutbacks”).
6 See Katherine Barnes & Elizabeth Mertz, Is It Fair? Law Professors’
Perceptions of Tenure, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 512 (2012).
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that have diverse faculty, and existing students may be more
likely to stay in school when they are engaged in learning,
mastering practical material, and connected with the
institution overall.7 All of these goals are more likely to be
achieved when diverse faculty stay employed at institutions of
legal education.8
Though abysmal, the lack of numeric representation of
women of color, white women, and men of color in legal academia
tells only part of the story; to grasp the full context, we must also
evaluate the faculty experience. In other words, we must “look
beyond [the numbers] to examine the quality of the academic
experience” for diverse faculty.9 Only by understanding workplace
challenges can we seek to reverse the low retention rates for
diverse faculty; doing so would likely increase retention rates for
students as well. Until now, there has not been a mechanism for
evaluating the experience of diverse faculty. No formal mixedmethod empirical study has investigated the experience of law
faculty, examining how race and gender create challenges and
opportunities for particular law faculty.
This Article presents the first set of findings from the
Diversity in Legal Academia (DLA) study, which itself
represents the first formal, empirical, mixed-method study of
the law faculty experience utilizing an intersectional lens. As
the Principal Investigator of the DLA study, as well as the
author of this Article, I am wholly responsible for the project. I
designed the mixed-method study, from conception through
dissemination. I personally conducted each of the 93 interviews
with legal academics and collected all survey data from DLA
participants.10 I also am responsible for coding and analyzing
the rich set of mixed-method empirical data that resulted from
these interviews and surveys, which are presented here and in
numerous anticipated future manuscripts drawing from DLA.11
7 See, e.g., VINCENT TINTO, LEAVING COLLEGE: RETHINKING CAUSES AND
CURES OF STUDENT ATTRITION 124 (2d ed. 1993).
8 Mentorship and other strong connections between faculty and students
have also been shown to increase student retention. See, e.g., Meera E. Deo & Kimberly
A. Griffin, The Social Capital Benefits of Peer Mentoring in Law School, 38 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 305 (2011).
9 Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of One,
20 U.S.F. L. REV. 503, 505 (1986).
10 I am indebted to Catherine Albiston, Linda Pololi, Harmony Rhoades, and
Renee Reichl for useful conversations on the DLA study design. The Principal
Investigators of the Educational Diversity Project, Walter Allen, Charles Daye, Abigail
Panter, and Linda Wightman, also deserve recognition for inspiring the mixed-method
design used in DLA. Any errors or methodological limitations are my own.
11 A book proposal drawing from DLA data has been solicited by Stanford
University Press. Immediately forthcoming DLA articles include the following: Meera
E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming Aug. 2015);
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The DLA study examines both the personal and
professional lives of law faculty members, from Assistant
Professor through Dean Emeritus, exploring whether and how
the race and gender of individual legal academics affect their
experience as law professors. Only 7% of law professors are
women of color; yet, this appalling lack of diversity has been
largely ignored in the academic literature.12 The DLA study
pioneers this exploration with a methodologically rigorous
investigation into the experiences of law faculty, specifically
examining similarities and differences based on race and gender.
DLA findings reveal that significant ongoing
discrimination haunts legal academia, with intersectional bias a
clear barrier to success for many non-traditional law teachers,
and especially for women of color law professors. Documenting
and acknowledging both the climate of white male privilege and
broader institutional bias is a first important step in eliminating
it, thereby improving the learning environment for all students
and the work environment for all law professors. This Article
proposes detailed necessary next steps: strategies to ameliorate
both overt and implicit bias through specific individual and
structural changes.
In Part I, this Article begins with a brief presentation of
literature on the law faculty experience and relevant
frameworks of intersectionality, privilege, structural and
institutional discrimination, and implicit bias. Part I also
shares statistics on current legal academics, as well as an
introduction to the DLA data and analytical approach. A more
detailed account of the relevant literature, data collection
technique, analytical approach, and initial hypotheses for the
DLA study have been laid out in a separate article.13
Parts II and III present findings from the DLA study
that indicate many ways in which racial and gender
Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3115
(2015); Meera E. Deo, Trajectory of a Law Professor, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L.
(forthcoming June 2015).
12 See 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty: Race and
Ethnicity, AALSFAR.COM (on file with author). For many years AALS maintained basic
statistical data on law faculty members by race and gender on its website, including at
the following link: http://aalsfar.com/statistics/2009dlt/race.html. By December 2014,
the relevant pages had been removed from the AALS website. In spite of numerous
requests by the author of this Article and others for explanation, retrieval, and
reinstatement of this data, AALS has not responded in any way and the data remains
missing from the AALS website. It is therefore unavailable to those who conduct
research on American law faculty. The author welcomes correspondence from anyone
with additional information regarding the data or from those who have sought the data
to no avail.
13 See Deo, supra note 2, at 375-77.
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discrimination continue to run rampant in legal academia, both
in overt and potentially actionable encounters as well as
through more subtle acts and implicit bias. Part II focuses on
challenging workplace interactions with fellow faculty. DLA
findings make clear that racial and gender privilege create
distinctly different experiences for racial minorities and women
as compared to white male law faculty—even in terms of how
they perceive their relationships with one another. Part III
presents analytical findings on faculty-student interactions,
including
student
confrontations
of
particular
underrepresented faculty in the classroom and beyond. Again,
race and gender color these interactions, with white women
and women of color sharing experiences with students that
differ significantly from how white male colleagues describe
interactions with students.
In Part IV, the Article draws from the data to distill
best practices and reasonable responses, suggesting strategies
for addressing the specific challenges of ongoing racial and
gender discrimination in legal academia. Summarizing and
synthesizing these findings, the Conclusion proposes specific
structural changes. The Article ends with a bullet-pointed list
of strategies that administrators, other institutional leaders,
and even faculty colleagues can adopt to eliminate or at least
ameliorate many of the challenges the data reveal.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
To fully grasp findings from the DLA study, this Part
outlines the relevant literature, presents the methodological
approach of the study, and shares basic demographic statistics
of current law faculty. The literature discussed includes
existing studies of law faculty as well as various frameworks
employed throughout the Article, including intersectionality,
privilege, and implicit bias.
A. Framing the Law Faculty Experience
In Spring 1989, law professors Derrick Bell and Richard
Delgado published an article entitled, “Minority Law
Professors’ Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey.”14 That article
reported on an informal investigation into the professional lives
of law faculty of color, with a focus on descriptive analysis of
14 Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors’ Lives: The BellDelgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989).

2015]

THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LEGAL ACADEMIA

949

specific topic areas.15 The authors found that law faculty of
color in the mid-1980s faced “discrimination in hiring and
promotion, alienation among their colleagues, hostility from
students, and a lack of support.”16 Though those findings were
non-generalizable and non-comparative, they provide valuable
insights into the professional challenges facing the few legal
academics of color at the time.17 The authors of the study had
dismal predictions for the future, expecting little institutional
interest in even addressing these challenges.18
Perhaps unsurprisingly given their prediction, no follow
up survey has taken place. In the intervening 15 years, only a
handful of studies have looked into legal academia from the
law faculty perspective and none have employed an
intersectional lens to specifically consider how race and gender
combine to affect the experiences of legal academics at various
stages of their careers.19 No study has fully investigated the
law faculty experience. None has looked into both the personal
and professional lives of both tenured and pre-tenured faculty.
No research has considered the ways in which race and gender
may play a unique role in the experiences of legal academics at
various stages of their careers.20 Nevertheless, two recent
academic projects have been instrumental in setting the stage
for the DLA study.
One empirical study recently published in the Journal
of Legal Education reports that there are “continued
difficulties” facing law faculty of color and female law faculty of
15 The Bell-Delgado study findings include discussion of the following areas:
Time Pressure, Academic Freedom, Relations with Colleagues, Relations with
Students, Appointments, Research Support, Committee Responsibilities, Bread-andButter Issues & Upward Mobility, Institutional Climate, Ghettoization, and Job
Satisfaction. Id. at 355.
16 Deo, supra note 2, at 369-70 (internal citations omitted); see also Delgado
& Bell, supra note 14.
17 Delgado & Bell report that their relatively low response rate cautions
against generalizability; they also did not include white faculty as participants. See
Delgado & Bell, supra note 14, at 354, n.17 & n.19.
18 Id. at 369-70.
19 On the other hand, empirical studies of the law student experience have
become slightly more common. See Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse
Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2011)
(discussing numerous studies of law student diversity and the law student experience
generally).
20 Throughout this Article the term “race” is used to signify both “race” and
“ethnicity.” While race deals more generally with the social construct of one’s
phenotypical or morphological presentation, and ethnicity refers more to individual or
ancestral national/regional-origin, the term “race” is used throughout simply for ease of
reading. For more on the differentiation between race and ethnicity, and their
interplay with the law, see Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:
Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1145
(2004).
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color specifically.21 That article focuses on tenure, reporting
that a much higher percentage of female professors of color
view the tenure process as unfair (35%) as compared to white
males (12%).22 A negative campus climate, challenging law
school culture, and implicit bias contribute to the overall
“negative themes” characterizing the experience for many
people of color in legal academia.23 While that study reports on
how tenured faculty remember their pre-tenure experience,
untenured faculty were excluded from participation.24
Another significant contribution to the literature is
Presumed Incompetent, an anthology exploring the experience
of female faculty of color in a variety of academic disciplines.25
The chapters covering the law faculty experience draw from a
rich narrative tradition26 and reveal personal challenges as well
as compelling discussions of structural impediments to
success.27 Many reflections on the law faculty experience by
women of color note challenges navigating a hostile campus
climate and suggest mechanisms for coping with ongoing
institutional bias.28
DLA joins both of these recent studies by drawing from a
framework of intersectionality, which acknowledges the
challenges facing particular individuals whose identity is bound
up with the “intersection of recognized sites of oppression.”29
Because of the multiple “opportunities” for oppression, it becomes
clear that those who are marginalized in multiple ways have
experiences that differ from not only the norm (at most law
schools, this would be the middle- to upper-class, heterosexual,
white male), but even from the norms attributed to particular

Barnes & Mertz, supra note 6, at 511-12.
Id. at 516-17.
23 Id. at 522-23.
24 Id. at 512.
25 PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR
WOMEN IN ACADEMIA (Gabriella Gutierrez y Muhs, Yolanda Flores-Niemann, Carmen
G. Gonzalez, & Angela P. Harris eds., 2012).
26 See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241,
1269 (1993) (“Narrative occupies a similar role in both feminist legal theory and critical
race theory.”).
27 See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, “No hay mal que por bien no venga”: A Journey to
Healing as a Latina, Lesbian Law Professor, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE
INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA, supra note 25, at 372
(discussing her personal challenges as a woman of color at an unsupportive
predominantly white institution).
28 For further discussion on these themes from Presumed Incompetent and on
the relevant literature generally, see Deo, supra note 2.
29 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 51-55 (2001).
21

22
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minority groups.30 For instance, women of color may suffer
oppression based on a combination of their race and gender,
which differs from individuals who are racial minorities (e.g.,
Black) but in the majority with regard to gender (e.g., male).
Similarly, gay men of color face oppression based on both their
race and their sexual orientation; their experiences tend to differ
from those of both white gay men and heterosexual men of color.
Yet, they still enjoy male privilege. In the traditionally white male
establishment of legal academia, one would therefore expect that
people of color would have unique experiences as compared to
whites, that women would have different experiences from men,
and that women of color—doubly marginalized by race and
gender—would have different experiences still.31 In fact,
contemporary research continues to rely “on the categories ‘men’
and ‘women’ and not—as we might have hoped—on the
intersections of categories of gender, race, ethnicity, age, and
sexual orientation. Sometimes a further delineation, ‘people of
color,’ has been made—oftentimes, however, without
distinguishing experiences of women and of men.”32
What social scientists call “structural racism” and legal
academics call “institutional racism” largely refer to the same33
30 For more on Critical Race Theory and intersectionality specifically, see
generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2d ed. 2000); EVELYN NAKANO
GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM: HOW RACE AND GENDER SHAPED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
AND LABOR (2002); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1990-1991).
31 While most scholarship drawing on a framework of intersectionality
focuses on the challenges or oppression facing groups that are marginalized across
multiple dimensions, there could be opportunities for benefits based on these identity
characteristics as well. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2151, 2152 (2013) (discussing instances where whites have capitalized on the racial
identity of people of color for the social and economic benefit of whites themselves). The
DLA study, on the other hand, contemplates how race and gender could create benefits
even for those from marginalized groups. See Deo, supra note 2, at 352.
32 Judith Resnick, A Continuous Body: Ongoing Conversations About Women
and Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 564, 569 (2003). This Article, too, sometimes
collapses various racial/ethnic and even gender categories to discuss experiences of
“women of color,” “women,” and even “people of color” collectively. However, when done
here, it is because the empirical data reveals similarities between women of color from
different non-white racial/ethnic groups, women as a whole (white and non-white), or
between people of color regardless of racial/ethnic background (including both men and
women). Also, the emphasis on intersectionality throughout the Article is on the
combination of race and gender specifically. Issues involving class, sexual orientation,
age, and other identity characteristics are woven throughout though not the explicit
focus of this study.
33 Though they refer to the same system, institutional discrimination refers
to bias within particular institutions embedded in society, while structural
discrimination refers to the collection of these various institutions and the broader
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“complex, dynamic system of conferring social benefits on some
groups and imposing burdens on others that results
in . . . denial of opportunity for millions of people of color.”34
Sexism, homophobia, and other social ills can fit similarly
within this broad framework, where we assume that those in
the dominant group (e.g., males) structure aspects of society
within their control to further the interests of the dominant
group at the expense of those with less power (e.g., women).35
Intersectionality is thus a natural lens through which to
consider discrimination in legal academia, and we can think of
those who exercise their power over doubly marginalized
individuals as operationalizing intersectional discrimination.36
Racism and other “-isms” refer to internally held biases
or stereotypical beliefs about individuals from particular
groups that are based on that identity characteristic, while
discrimination refers to the exercise of power over others based
on whatever “-ism” is at play.37 Thus, “racial discrimination
refers to unequal treatment of persons or groups on the basis of
their race or ethnicity.”38 In addition, a person holding racist
views can exercise power over a person of color to deny her a job
or refuse to sell her a car. This is racial discrimination. A person
holding sexist views can exercise power over a woman by
harassing her in the workplace or through sexist verbal abuse
that draws from that power. This is gender discrimination.

structure that encompasses them. See Fred L. Pincus, Discrimination Comes in Many
Forms: Individual, Institutional, and Structural, in READINGS FOR DIVERSITY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (Adams et al. eds., 2000).
34 Meera E. Deo, Two Sides of a Coin: Safe Space & Segregation in
Race/Ethnic-Specific Law Student Organizations, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 116-20
(2013) (quoting William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and The Law in America Today:
An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2011-2012)). For more on social science literature on
structural racism, see EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY & RACISM IN THE
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 11 (2001); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that “the major
institutions and social relationships of U.S. society—law, political organization,
economic relationships, religion, cultural life, residential patterns etc.—have been
structured from the beginning by the racial order”); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking
Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465, 469 (1997). Legal
scholar Ian Haney López has also argued similar sentiments using the term
“institutional racism.” See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
35 See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY
CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014).
36 Some have called this “‘complex’ bias.” See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity
and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439 (2009).
37 Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV.
SOC. 181, 182 (2008).
38 Id.
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The intersectional discrimination discussed in this
Article refers to the ways in which institutional policies and
practices, as well as institutional leaders, exercise not only
white privilege to discriminate against people of color, or male
privilege to discriminate against women, but also the
combination of white male privilege to discriminate against
women of color.39
In fact, privilege itself is another framework that must
be considered when examining bias in legal academia. Privilege
is “the systemic conferral of benefit and advantage [based on]
affiliation, conscious or not and chosen or not, to the dominant
side of a power system.”40 Privilege can be dissected into three
main points. First, privilege provides systemic—ongoing and
structural—advantages rather than simply one-time individual
benefits. Second, privilege is often “largely invisible to those
who reap its benefits.”41 Those aware of their privilege do not
necessarily choose to accept it; yet, it cannot easily be rejected.
Even individuals who are disadvantaged or lack privilege tend
not to challenge the status quo, as many believe that the
existing structure is normal, unavoidable, and based on merit.42
Third, the benefits associated with privilege are based on
external association with the power structure. In other words,
when external actors identify an individual as affiliated with a
group considered powerful within a given context, that
individual receives the associated privileges.
For various categories, one can easily determine which
groups are powerful and which are not; individuals associated
with powerful groups are privileged, while the others are not
accorded advantage. For instance, when considering socioeconomic status, wealthy people have more power than poor;
those believed to be wealthy and associated as such will
therefore have greater privilege. In the race context, whites
have more power and therefore more privilege than those
identified as Black, Latino, Asian American, Native American,
39 Much of the past scholarship on intersectionality has focused on who is
excluded, i.e., “when African American women claim race discrimination, their
experience is measured against that of sex-privileged (that is, male) African
Americans; when African American women claim gender discrimination, their
experience is measured against that of race-privileged (that is, white) women.” Kotkin,
supra note 36, at 1482 (citing Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, supra note 30, at 140).
40 STEPHANIE
M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 29 (1996).
41 Deo, supra note 34, at 114 (discussing WILDMAN, supra note 40, at 28).
42 WILDMAN, supra note 40, at 29.
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or as belonging to some other racial/ethnic group.43 Highlyeducated people have greater power than those with low levels
of education, and receive privilege based on their elite
educational status. Men, as a group, have more power, and
therefore more privilege, than women. Heterosexuals have
more power than those in the LGBTQ community, resulting in
those identified as “straight” receiving privilege based on their
sexual orientation.
To be sure, not all discrimination is conscious or
purposeful. Perhaps the most pervasive and destructive type of
discrimination is based on implicit bias. Implicit bias includes
thoughts and behaviors that “affect social judgments but
operate without conscious awareness or conscious control.”44 In
fact, “the term ‘implicit’ emphasizes our unawareness of having
a particular thought or feeling,” while, in contrast, “‘explicit’
emphasizes awareness of having a thought or feeling.”45 Because
it is based on subconscious thought, “implicit bias [often]
coexists with egalitarian beliefs and the denial of personal
prejudice.”46 Thus, these “attitudes, beliefs, or thoughts [are
ones] that people hold but may explicitly reject” were they to
think about them explicitly.47 In other words, though we may
think or feel something impulsively based on implicit bias, and
even act on that bias exercising discrimination, it is based on
subconscious feelings that “we might even reject …as inaccurate
or inappropriate upon self-reflection.”48
Implicit bias is especially dangerous because it infects
even those who believe themselves to be egalitarian. Because it
is not based on conscious thought but operates “automatically
and outside of rational awareness,”49 implicit bias “leak[s] into
everyday behaviors such as whom we befriend, whose work we
value, and whom we favor—notwithstanding our obliviousness

43 Of course, there is relative privilege too, where certain groups may not be
at the pinnacle of the hierarchical structure yet still enjoy some privilege. They may
also be privileged with regard to a particular status (e.g., class) while not privileged in
another (e.g., gender). See Kathleen J. Fitzgerald, White Privilege, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIETY 1404 (Richard T. Schaefer ed., 2008) (“[P]eople can be
oppressors within one status hierarchy, while in others they may be disadvantaged.
And more than likely, most people are both at some time or another . . . .”).
44 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467 (2010).
45 Id. at 469.
46 Victor Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure
Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187, 198 (2013).
47 Gregory S. Parks et al., Implicit Race Bias in Tort Jury Decision Making
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with the author).
48 Kang & Lane, supra note 44, at 469.
49 Parks et al., supra note 47.
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to any such influence.”50 It exists in our everyday lives, our
workplaces, our justice system, and other institutions—
including legal academia.51
Combining the framework of intersectionality, privilege,
and implicit bias, we see the ways in which those who lack
privilege along multiple axes face additional hurdles than even
those who lack privilege along just one axis. A “minority within
a minority” is doubly or even triply disadvantaged. As an
example, “Black women are sometimes excluded from feminist
theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are
predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not
accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender.”52 Though
Black women are Black, leadership within their racial
community may not fully appreciate their experience as women
and instead privilege the male experience; similarly, though
Black women are women, the feminist movement may not fully
understand their experience as Black and instead privilege the
white experience. The Black woman’s relative outsider status
with regard to each group may not be based on purposeful
discrimination from other group members, but instead result
from implicit bias. The Black woman is nevertheless excluded.
Legal institutions, including law schools, are not exempt
from racial and gender privilege and implicit bias. In fact, as
institutions of great power and privilege, law schools are an
especially interesting site for a study investigating intersectional
discrimination. In one sense, there is nothing unique about law
schools, nothing that suggests that there would be greater racist
or sexist incidents at these particular institutions over others.
Law schools have historically been elite, white, male
institutions, though this is true of many American institutions
and certainly of most American institutions of higher learning.53
Yet, since intersectional discrimination parallels institutional
racism, it is similarly “all-pervasive, infecting the very
institutions that support communities, civic bodies, and society
broadly.”54 Thus, law schools are simply one set of a number of
institutions that are reflective of society as a whole, including
Kang & Lane, supra note 44, at 467-68.
For more on implicit bias in courts, see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in
the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).
52 See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politic, supra note 30, at 3.
53 BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 34, at 97-98; OMI & WINANT, supra note 34, at
79; Meera E. Deo, Ebbs & Flows: The Courts in Racial Context, 8 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 167 (2007).
54 Deo, supra note 34, at 119.
50

51
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even subtle intersectional discrimination that many women of
color face on a daily basis in society at large.55 These
“microaggressions” can be defined as “subtle verbal and nonverbal insults directed toward non-Whites, often done
automatically or unconsciously.”56 Because microaggressions
are often “layered insults based on one’s race, gender, class,
sexuality, language, immigration status, phenotype, accent, or
surname,” they specifically anticipate intersectionality and
draw from a framework of intersectional discrimination.57
As social institutions, law schools likely suffer from many
of the same social ills of society as a whole. Still, one might
argue that law schools would have less formal discrimination
(i.e., that which is clearly illegal) than non-legal institutions,
since they are the workplace of many people well versed in the
law. Thus, to the extent that we can generalize findings
discussed in this Article to other educational institutions, or
even to corporate and other non-legal workplace settings,
conclusions of bias presented here may be underinclusive of the
intersectional discrimination occurring on campuses and in
other work environments without numerous attorneys in
positions of power.
Yet, the actual effects of ongoing intersectional bias in
legal academia may be even more significant than in other
environments, as the high-status position of “law professor”
should be one that rewards merit and rejects bias, providing for
upward mobility and meaningful social change for the families
and communities connected with individual law professors. In
a sense, if things are unfair, inequitable, or biased in legal
academia, what hope do we have for other professions,
academic institutions, workplaces, and campuses? If this
avenue does not truly provide opportunities for advancement,
there is little hope that other positions can create those
changes. Improving the environment in law schools can thus
not only enrich law teaching, legal education, and the legal
profession, but also serve as an example to other professional
and educational environments for how to contribute to social
change generally.
55 In fact, since they are “microcosms of larger society, schools ‘are often the
arenas in which the schisms and conflicting values of the larger society are played out
and become crystallized.’” Meera E. Deo, Separate, Unequal, and Seeking Support, 28
HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 9, 19 (2012) (quoting RUTH SIDEL, BATTLING BIAS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 8 (1994)).
56 Daniel Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions
and Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANO/ALATINO/A L. REV. 15, 17 (2002).
57 Id.

2015]

THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LEGAL ACADEMIA

957

B. Data Collection and Methodological Approach
The DLA study is the first comprehensive empirical
study of law faculty that investigates the personal and
professional lives of legal academics with an intersectional
(race/gender) lens.58 The author of this Article is also the
Principal Investigator of the DLA study. I am wholly
responsible for study design, from inception through final
dissemination of books and articles. I personally designed the
survey instrument that participants completed and the
interview questions that they answered. I also maintain
responsibility for all coding and analysis of the quantitative
and qualitative data, including creation of a coding schema,
maintenance of a codebook, and the actual coding and analysis
of the transcript data from DLA interviews and surveys.
Methodologically,
DLA
draws
from
empirical
sociological methods to incorporate both survey and in-depth
interview data from 93 legal academics employed in tenured or
tenure-track positions at ABA-accredited and AALS-member
schools during the 2013 calendar year.59 Data collection
followed a target sampling technique. Target sampling is a
well-established technique for data collection in statistics,
sociology, public health, and other arenas; it is especially
valuable for identifying and securing participation in empirical
58 For more discussion on the methods employed in the DLA study, see Deo,
supra note 2.
59 The decision to include participants from only ABA-accredited and AALSmember schools follows the tradition started by other established scholars who have
done so to ensure a high and uniform standard of all participants. See Deo, supra note
2, at 375 n.154 (discussing correspondence with Herma Hill Kay on the decision of
many researchers to follow this selection criterion). Similarly, including only tenured or
tenure-track faculty and excluding librarians, clinicians, adjunct professors, and legal
writing instructors (even those who are tenured/tenure-track) parallels other published
studies in this arena. See Deo, supra note 2, at 377 n.167 (citing Herma Hill Kay,
U.C.’s Women Law Faculty, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 331 (2003) and Marina Angel,
Women in Legal Education: What It’s Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the
Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 803 (1988)); Deborah Jones
Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative
Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 206 (1997); Elyce H. Zenoff &
Kathryn V. Lorio, What We Know, What We Think We Know, And What We Don’t Know
About Women Law Professors, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 869, 871-72 (1984) (counting only
tenure-track faculty, defined as “professor, associate professor, or assistant professor,
unmodified by any other term such as adjunct, clinical, visiting, or emeritus” and
noting that “[l]ibrarians, although usually tenure-track, were excluded because they
constitute a distinct career line”). In addition, historically Black institutions were not
included in the sample, as faculty from those institutions also tend to have
significantly different experiences than those at predominantly white schools. See
Douglas A. Guiffrida, Othermothering as a Framework for Understanding African
American Students’ Definitions of Student-Centered Faculty, 76 J. HIGHER EDUC. 701,
701-03 (2005).
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research from vulnerable or hard-to-reach populations.60 First,
a seed group of faculty members was selected to participate
based largely on their diversity across a number of dimensions,
including race/ethnicity, gender, institutional ranking,
geographic region of employment, tenure status, and
employment title/position.61 Every participant completed a
survey, which asked about interactions with colleagues and
students, sources of emotional and professional support, future
career aspirations, and a range of attitudinal and experiential
issues. A one-on-one interview followed, where research subjects
answered more nuanced questions regarding professional
interactions, entry to the legal academy, mentoring
relationships, work/life balance, and sources of support.
The penultimate question on the survey asked each
participant to nominate others to join the study; new
participants were then carefully selected from this pool of
nominated faculty to ensure not only that all eligibility
characteristics were satisfied, but also to maintain the robust
diversity of the original sample.62 Thus, as the potential sample
grew throughout data collection based on nominations of every
new participant, selections and corrections could be made to
ensure the generalizability of the final sample. This painstaking
nomination-plus-selection process yielded the 93 participants
in the study, who were selected to represent the full range of
diversity in legal academia. This methodological approach is
the most viable and sound process for this type of study, as
there is no central database of women of color law faculty
60 See Deo, supra note 2, at 379-80 (discussing research employing this
methodological technique by the following renowned scholars: Katherine Browne,
Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Research Non-heterosexual Women, 8
INT’L J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY 47 (2005); Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32
ANN. MATH. STAT. 148 (1961); D.D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New
Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC. PROBLEMS 174, 175 (1997); J.K.
Watters & P. Biernacki, Targeted Sampling: Options and Considerations for the Study
of Hidden Populations, 36 SOC. PROBLEMS 416, 420 (1989)).
61 The original, or “seed,” participants were purposefully selected to be
diverse with regard to these characteristics and these domains were formally tracked
while selecting additional participants from among those nominated. In addition, age,
sexual orientation, and disability status were loosely tracked to ensure representation
in the sample.
62 While one critique of snowball sampling is that the sample may not be
truly representative, target sampling seeks to avoid bias by painstakingly tracking
numerous domains in order to ensure representation in the final sample. This
methodological approach is most commonly used in hidden or vulnerable populations
that are unlikely to respond to “cold” or uninvited contact from a researcher. Though
critics may still believe the final sample is not as representative as a truly random
sample, the target snowball sampling technique was utilized in DLA because it was the
best way to ensure participation from the “vulnerable” population of women of color
legal academics. For more on the sampling technique and its use in DLA, see Deo,
supra note 2, at 379-82.
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members.63 All participants were assigned pseudonyms; these
are used in the findings section in lieu of actual names to
preserve anonymity.
The diverse participants in the DLA study thus represent
various faculty positions, from Assistant Professor to Dean
Emeritus, ranging from highly selective to “access” schools, in
every region of the country. The sample also has robust gender
and racial/ethnic representation, with participation from both
women and men who self-identify as White, African American,
Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, Middle
Eastern, and Multiracial.64 Because of the intersectional
(race/gender) focus of the study, women of color were
oversampled and represent the core sample, comprising 63 of the
93 participants. Comparative samples of white men, white
women, and men of color are included to add perspective and
place the intersectional experience in context. Detailed race
and gender statistics are provided in Table 1.

63 While there is an AALS Directory of Law Teachers that allows law faculty
of color to “opt in,” this would be problematic as an original pool of possible participants
because it is likely underinclusive (not all law faculty of color opt in) in potentially
meaningful ways (those who opt out may have significant differences from those who
opt in, which would not be reflected in a pool drawn only from the Directory). In
addition, the names listed there are not disaggregated by gender or ethnicity; thus, it is
not comprehensive or particularly useful for an intersectional study of how race/gender
affect the law faculty experience. Directory of Law Teachers, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS.,
www.aals.org/about/publications/directory-law-teachers/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
64 Racial/ethnic categorization is always challenging, in part because it is a
social construction. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(1994). DLA uses self-identification of participants in both the survey and interview.
The terms “African American” and “Black” are used interchangeably throughout the
Article to refer to those who self-identified using those terms. Participants who
identified as “API,” “Asian,” “Asian American,” or within one of the pan-ethnic AsianAmerican identities are identified as “Asian American,” while those who self-identified
as “Latino” or “Hispanic” are referred to as “Latino.” Those who identified only as
“white” are identified as such in the Article. Multiracial participants are those who
self-identified as having two or more racial/ethnic backgrounds.
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TABLE 1. DLA PARTICIPANTS, BY RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013
(N=93)
Male
Black
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Latino
Native American
Middle Eastern
Multiracial
White
TOTAL

Female

TOTAL

4
(4.3%)
3
(3.2%)
2
(2.2%)
1
(1.0%)
1
(1.0%)
1
(1.0%)
7
(7.5%)

21
(22.6%)
15
(16.1%)
13
(14.0%)
5
(5.4%)
2
(2.25)
7
(7.5%)
11
(11.8%)

25
(26.9%)
18
(19.4%)
15
(16.1%)
6
(6.5%)
3
(4.4%)
8
(8.6%)
18
(19.4%)

19

74

93

C. Demographic Details of Current Law Faculty
Current statistics on law faculty guided the DLA selection
process with regard to race and gender. Until 2009, the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) released basic
demographic data on American law faculty, including race and
gender statistics (See Table 2; also presented visually as Chart
1).65 While these are not completely up to date, no more-recent
disaggregated statistics were available to guide the DLA study at
its inception.66 It is especially unfortunate that current statistics
have not been available because legal academia is currently in a
state of flux, with severe admissions declines,67 significant
65 See 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty: Race and
Ethniticy, supra note 12.
66 While the American Bar Association (ABA) does release current statistics on
lawyers by profession (including statistics on legal academics) it did not until 2015
disaggregate data by race/ethnicity and gender. Thus, at the inception of the DLA study,
it was impossible to use ABA data to determine the number or percentages of women of
color law faculty. For recent data, see Total Female Staff & Faculty Members 2012-2013,
AM. BAR ASS’N., (2012-2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2012_
2013_faculty_by_gender_ethnicity.authcheckdam.pdf.
67 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 162 (2012); Luz E.
Herrera, Educating Main Street Lawyers, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 209 (2013); Philip G.
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curricular changes expected and employed,68 and budgetary
constrictions affecting faculty hiring and firing.69 Though faculty
diversity may actually draw more prospective students in and
keep current students in school, women of color, men of color, and
white women tend to occupy the least secure positions on most
law school campuses. Thus, the statistics on current law faculty
do not fully reflect today’s challenges. Still, with no superior data
available, selection loosely tracked the AALS statistics with an
oversampling of women of color to capture their full experience
based on their importance to the intersectional lens employed,
and additional oversampling of particular groups as necessary to
include a robust set of perspectives.70
If one simply considers the numbers, significant gender
and racial disparities remain in legal academia, with only
4,091 women legal academics (37%) and only 1,632 people of
color (15%) out of 10,965 total. When considering the
intersection of race and gender, the numeric inequalities are
even more pronounced. Almost every racial/ethnic group has
slightly more men than women, though the ratio of white men
(5,090) to white women (2,741) is almost 2:1. Consolidating all
women of color into one group, we see that there are only 772
women of color law faculty members, out of almost 11,000 total
legal academics; thus, women of color represent just 7% of all
law professors.71 Of these 772 women of color law faculty
members, African American women comprise the highest
percentage, followed by Latinas and Asian/Pacific Islander
women (APIs). Multiracial women, Native American women,
and those from other non-white racial groups are only
marginally represented in legal academia.

Schrag, Failing Law Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missle, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 387, 421 (2013).
68 California has been a front-runner in this arena, with new requirements
that law schools incorporate skills-based learning into the curriculum and that new
attorneys complete mandatory pro bono work within a year of graduation. The
California Bar Journal has been carefully following these developments. See, e.g.,
Laura Ernde, Panel Outlines Plan to Amend Rules for Attorney Training, CAL. BAR J.
(Jan. 2014), available at http://calbarjournal.com/January2014/TopHeadlines/TH4.aspx.
69 See, e.g., Jones & Smith, supra note 4.
70 For example, Native American women were especially oversampled;
otherwise, as they comprise only .5% of legal academics, this population would have
been empirically excluded from the sample.
71 The numbers are likely much smaller when we consider tenured and
tenure-track women, since we know that “as the status of a job within a law faculty
goes down, the percentage of women holding that position goes up; women
‘disproportionately fill non-tenure-track positions.’” Resnick, supra note 32, at 568
(quoting Deborah Merritt, Are Women Stuck on the Academic Ladder? An Empirical
Perspective, 10 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 249, 250 (2000)).
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TABLE 2. LAW FACULTY, BY RACE & GENDER, AALS 2009
(N=10,965)

American Indian/
Alaskan Native
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Black/ African
American
Hispanic/Latino
White
Other Race
Multiracial
Race/ Ethnicity
Not Identified
TOTAL

Male

Female

TOTAL

30
(0.4%)
158
(2.3%)
344
(5.0%)
199
(2.9%)
5090
(74.6%)
67
(1.0%)
62
(0.9%)
869
(12.7%)
6819
(100.0%)

21
(0.5%)
112
(2.7%)
409
(10.0%)
138
(3.4%)
2741
(67.0%)
34
(0.8%)
58
(1.4%)
578
(14.1%)
4091
(100.0%)

51
(0.5%)
270
(2.5%)
753
(6.9%)
337
(3.1%)
7831
(71.4%)
101
(0.9%)
120
(1.1%)
1502
(13.7%)
10965
(100.0%)

GRAPH 1. LAW FACULTY BY RACE & GENDER, AALS 2009
(N=10,965)
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Both hiring and retention invoke significant challenges
within legal academia. The 2005 AALS Committee on the
Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers reported
not only that the “hiring gap between white and non-white
faculty actually increased between 1990 and 1997,”72 but that
there is a “widening ‘tenure gap’ between white faculty members
and their colleagues of color,” with many faculty of color failing
to achieve tenure within the time expected.73 Understanding the
qualitative experiences of law faculty, particularly women of
color law faculty, is especially important since increasing
positive encounters and interactions could yield greater
retention rates for these faculty members and help diversify
legal academia overall.
The primary purpose of this Article is to present and
discuss various findings from the DLA study focused on
relationships with faculty colleagues and interactions with
students inside and outside of the classroom. Part II presents
findings focused on these concerns, with regard to fellow
faculty. Part III focuses on challenges from students in the
classroom and elsewhere on campus. Part IV presents findings
focused on solutions, with broader proposals discussed in the
Conclusion. Though some of the survey data are presented in
Tables, the DLA qualitative study findings are the principal
focus of this Article.74 Thus, the quantitative data are
presented at the outset in order to frame the qualitative data
that follows, which is the heart of the study and this Article.

72 Deo, supra note 2 (quoting AALS Committee Commentary, The Racial Gap
in the Promotion to Tenure of Law Professors: Report of the Committee on the
Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers 3 (2005)(“[b]oth the absolute
number as well as the proportion of minority law professors hired decreased in 1996-97
from 1990-91.”) (on file with author)). For almost a decade, AALS publicized this report
on their website at the following site: http://www.aals.org/documents/racialgap.pdf.
Numerous recent articles continue to cite to it there. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Complimentary Discrimination and Complementary Discrimination in Faculty Hiring, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 763, 770 n.20 (2010); Russell G. Pearce et al., Difference Blindness vs. Bias
Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse
Partnerships, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2410 n.14 (2015); Carmen G. González, Women of
Color in Legal Education: Challenging the Presumption of Incompetence, FED. LAW, July
2014, at 49, 57 n.5, available at http://www.upcolorado.com/excerpts/PresumedIncompetent_
FederalLawyer.pdf. Just as with removal of the statistical data on law faculty
members, no explanation has been provided as to why this Report was removed or
when it might be reinstated on the website. Its removal limits access to information
regarding this important and controversial topic and prevents widespread
dissemination of the valuable suggestions proposed in the Report.
73 Deo, supra note 2.
74 The samples of white men, white women, and men of color are especially
small and therefore less reliable; they should be used primarily as points of contrast to
the data on women of color law faculty.
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II. CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIPS WITH COLLEAGUES
“If we had a meeting and we needed a note taker there would be the
turning of all eyes to whichever female was in the room and she
would become the note taker.” -Abigail

When aggregating DLA data on collegiality, it becomes
clear that law faculty members report good relationships with
colleagues overall, and frequent interactions with colleagues of
different racial backgrounds. However, there is marked racial
variation with regard to how faculty report on interactions with
their colleagues and in terms of who is included in close-knit
groups. For instance, white professors have the best relationships
with other white professors, as 73% of white women and 75% of
white men report “very friendly” interactions with their fellow
white faculty (See Table 3). Although white faculty members
report high levels of contact with colleagues from all racial
backgrounds, the quality of those relationships varies depending
on whose perspective we consider (See Table 4).
If we compare interactions between women of color and
white faculty, the race and gender differences become clearer.
Only 52% of Black women and 42% of Latinas in the sample
report “very friendly” interactions with white faculty colleagues
at their institutions. A full 24% of Black women law professors
report “distant” relationships with white faculty. Interestingly,
white faculty members do not see relationships with their
female colleagues of color the same way. Instead, white faculty
believe their relationships with faculty of color are much better
than faculty of color view those same relationships. For
example, Table 5 shows that in spite of one-quarter (24%) of
Black female faculty characterizing their relationship with
white faculty as “distant,” no white male faculty and only one
white female characterize relationships with African American
colleagues similarly.75

75 Though not presented analytically, it is highly unlikely that this difference
in perception is due to Black male faculty being especially friendly with white faculty.
Of the four Black men in the DLA sample, one reports “very friendly” interactions with
white colleagues and the other three characterize them as “sociable.” This is not a
statistically reliable sample size, but is offered here as merely an example.
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TABLE 3. QUALITY OF INTERACTIONS WITH WHITE FACULTY, BY
RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013 (N=92)
Very
Friendly

Sociable

Black
Females

11
(52.4%)

5
(23.8%)

5
(23.8%)

0
(0.0%)

21

Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Females

9
(60.0%)

5
(33.3%)

1
(6.7%)

0
(0.0%)

15

Latinas

5
(41.7%)

6
(50.0%)

1
(8.3%)

0
(0.0%)

12

Native
American
Females

3
(60.0%)

1
(20.0%)

0
(0.0%)

1
(20.0%)

5

Middle
Eastern
Females

0
(0.0%)

2
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

2

Multiracial
Females

4
(57.1%)

3
(42.9%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White
Males

6
(75.0%)

2
(25.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

8

White
Females

8
(72.7%)

3
(27.3%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

11

Men of
Color

6
(54.5%)

4
(36.4%)

1
(9.1%)

0
(0.0%)

11

TOTAL

52

31

8

1

92

Distant

Hostile

TOTAL
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TABLE 4. FREQUENCY OF INTERACTIONS WITH WHITE FACULTY,
BY RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013 (N=92)
Not
Much

A Lot

Some

Black
Females

16
(76.2%)

4
(19.1%)

1
(4.7%)

21

Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Females

13
(86.7%)

2
(13.3%)

0
(0.0%)

15

Latinas

10
(83.3%)

2
(16.7%)

0
(0.0%)

12

4
(80.0%)

0
(0.0%)

1
(20.0%)

5

2
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

2

Multiracial
Females

6
(85.7%)

1
(14.3%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White Males

7
(87.5%)

1
(12.5%)

0
(0.0%)

8

11
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

11

Men of
Color

10
(90.9%)

1
(9.1%)

0
(0.0%)

11

TOTAL

79

11

2

92

Native
American
Females
Middle
Eastern
Females

White
Females

TOTAL
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TABLE 5. QUALITY OF INTERACTIONS WITH BLACK FACULTY, BY
RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013 (N=91)
Very
Friendly

Sociable

Black
Females

14
(66.7%)

6
(28.6%)

1
(4.8%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

21

Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Females

12
(80.0%)

3
(20.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

15

Latinas

7
(58.3%)

5
(41.7%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

12

Native
American
Females

2
(40.0%)

1
(20.0%)

2
(40.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

5

Middle
Eastern
Females

1
(50.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

1
(50.0%)

2

Multiracial
Females

6
(85.7%)

0
(0.0%)

1
(14.3%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White
Males

4
(57.1%)

3
(42.9%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White
Females

7
(63.6%)

3
(27.3%)

1
(9.1%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

11

Men of
Color

9
(81.8%)

2
(18.2%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

11

TOTAL

62

23

5

0

1

91

Distant

Hostile

N/A

TOTAL

While a number of faculty report positive interactions with
colleagues, the qualitative data make clear that many female
faculty of color see “cordial” relationships with white faculty as
simply a mask of civility hiding friction; women of color law faculty
are close primarily with other female faculty of color. Existing
literature indicates that women of color often lack a sense of
belonging when hired to teach at predominantly white and male-
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normative law school campuses.76 They often feel unwelcome in
elite spaces that have traditionally excluded them, especially if no
meaningful efforts are made to include them.77 While the pleasant
interactions may outnumber the hostile, the negative encounters
tend to color the environment overall. In addition, many positive
relationships are between women of color faculty, who enjoy
especially friendly relations with others who share similar
backgrounds, professional positions, or life experiences.
Unfortunately, gender discrimination is especially salient from the
data, both with regard to the invisibility and silencing of women as
well as through blatant sexual harassment.78
A. The Mask of Collegiality
“The first semester everyone was very welcoming [but] it was just kind
of like I was their guest [in their] home. I was new and exotic and
different.” -Laila

Even in the qualitative data, most faculty report
collegial interactions with colleagues. A Black female named
Corinne notes that her law school is “a very civil place” where
“we can really disagree,” one day, “but then we can go out to
lunch and hang out in someone’s office the next day.” Similarly,
a white female named Abigail makes clear that her faculty
“isn’t full of cliques,” but rather they “genuinely like each other
and get together and are happy to see each other.”
Corinne and Abigail are lucky to be so comfortable on
their campuses. Unfortunately, many law schools are highly
factionalized with different groups not getting along and often
in direct opposition to one another. Because there are often
blocs within law faculties that have very few women of color,
these underrepresented individuals are frequently lost in the
shuffle, becoming virtually invisible and silenced. For instance,
a number of faculty agree with how Aisha, an Asian American
law professor, describes her institution: “[T]he faculty at the
law school is very polarized.” Valeria, a Latina, sees something
76 Research regarding women in legal academia include the many articles
cited supra Part I.A. and Resnick, supra note 32. However, most of these studies do not
focus on race in addition to gender, and all could certainly be updated to reflect current
trends and patterns from the past decade or more.
77 See, e.g., Angel, supra note 59.
78 It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore in detail whether individual
female faculty have viable sexual harassment claims. Nevertheless, characterizations
of their work environments and descriptions of the incidents women have endured
seem to rise to the level of sexual harassment, as defined by the law and in the
literature. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 208490 (2003) (providing a primer on workplace sexual harassment jurisprudence).

2015]

THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LEGAL ACADEMIA

969

similar at her school and expects it is the norm, noting, “I think
with every law school there are different factions.” In response
to these tensions, Laura, a Native American, suggests that new
law faculty “just avoid anybody who has negative karma
[because] it’s not worth the time or effort to engage in a
pointless discussion.” In this way, Laura disengages from her
professional environment, determining that engaging is not
worth the potential costs. Interestingly, the disengagement of
underrepresented and disempowered law faculty parallels the
alienation of law students of color, who face similar challenges
during the three years of their law school careers.79
1. On Being a Guest
Most female faculty of color are reticent at best in their
interactions with colleagues. For instance, a Black woman
named Michelle says that at her law school she is “cordial with
everybody,” though she “purposely, consciously” maintains only
“very professional relationship[s],” rather than close ones.
Similarly, an Asian American named Elaine, states, “There are
a lot of people I’m friendly with, but I don’t have close friends on
the faculty.” In fact, this hesitancy at becoming close to fellow
faculty comes from a general distrust that many white female
faculty and especially female faculty of color have toward their
colleagues overall, especially their white male colleagues.
Much of this distrust and distance comes from women of
color recognizing that some of their colleagues may be focused on
their own best interests, rather than looking out for others. Some
have witnessed white male colleagues actively working against
the interests of women of color faculty. This goes against the
sense of community that many faculty seek, and which they often
find with others whom they see as allies or who share similar
backgrounds both within and outside of their institutions.80
One of these frequently witnessed occurrences involves
the negative treatment of junior women of color faculty, in
comparison to the positive affirmations given to junior white
male colleagues. For instance, an Asian American woman
named Cindy recalls that when she first made a lateral move to
her current institution, she “was treated like the dumb one,
sort of [like an] ‘affirmative action hire’ in the worst sense of
79 See, e.g., Meera E. Deo et al., Struggles & Support: Diversity in U.S. Law
Schools, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 71 (2010).
80 For more on community-building within institutions as well as with those
outside of the institution, see Meera E. Deo, Mentors, Sponsors, and Allies in Legal
Academia (work in progress) (on file with the author).
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the word,” while a white male colleague who started at the
same time was treated like he “was the ‘real’ [hire].” That open
display of favoritism affected her confidence initially; even she
“felt like he was the real deal and I’m not,” though “as it turned
out it was kind of opposite,” with Cindy earning tenure and
becoming widely respected while her white male colleague did
not achieve similar success.
Leanne, an Asian American law faculty member, notes
the significant difference in “the support given particularly to
young male professors” as compared to other junior scholars;
this leads many of the junior white women and women of color
to distrust their more senior colleagues who display this
blatant favoritism. She provides a poignant example of a white
male junior colleague “who went up early for promotion and
tenure” with the support of many senior colleagues, while the
two women who were hired the same year as he was were
discouraged from applying early even though, when compared
to “the golden guy,” they published at roughly equivalent rates.
Leanne was similarly discouraged from applying for promotion
by her Associate Dean for Faculty Development, the person
tasked with helping faculty grow and advance. He told Leanne
initially that she “needed to wait another year or two” before
applying, although she feels “it’s ridiculous how long I’ve been
waiting.” Now, that same senior administrator “keeps saying,
‘Oh you’re golden. You’re totally a cinch. Don’t worry about it.’
And I’m like, ‘Really? Because you worked really hard to tell
me not to go up. You explicitly said I should not go up.’” Thus,
in Leanne’s experience, even the senior administrator tasked
with advancing the careers of the faculty cannot be fully
trusted when it comes to the professional development of junior
female faculty of color.
In fact, the theme of receiving poor advice from senior
colleagues is another common one throughout the DLA data. A
Black senior scholar named Brianna warns her junior female
faculty colleagues against following the counsel they receive
from senior colleagues, especially when it does not seem logical
or consistent with what they say to others. She notes
specifically that she tells young female faculty of color, “Don’t
listen to any stupid advice about people telling you that you
can take it easy [your first year]. You can’t take it easy.”81
81 In fact, when asked to provide advice for junior scholars, most senior
scholars of color in the DLA study suggest that publishing prolifically from their very
first year is a requirement especially for female faculty of color, fully expecting they
may be judged with harsher standards and against higher expectations than white
junior faculty.
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Martha, a Latina, also makes clear the rationale for her
arms-length relationships with faculty, stating that she tries
“to keep things cordial and superficial,” but goes no further
because “I have a hard time really trusting other faculty.”
Martha has seen first-hand how some white faculty members
utilize a mask of collegiality to hide the true negativity they
feel toward faculty of color. In Martha’s many years of
experience, her colleagues will not “tell you to your face that
they don’t agree with what you said at the faculty meeting, or
[say,] ‘I think your perspective on this is wrong or harsh.’”
Instead of engaging in honest and face-to-face conversation
about why they disagree, Martha notes how “they go around
your back and say that to each other. And then label you as
mean [or] unkind.” This labeling, and the “gossip and bad talk
behind your back undermines your voice in a very significant
way.” Now, she cannot simply speak her mind and engage in
fruitful conversation with her colleagues about particular
issues, topics, ideas, or suggestions she may have; instead, she
has to “corral the right people at the table, get them to say the
right things, get them to agree” in advance and pledge to back
her up, or her voice will be ignored. She believes that her past
attempts at “just saying what I think is the truth or what
needs to be said” has led to her being “undercut [by] people who
talk about you behind your back.” After experiencing this
environment for years, Martha protects herself by either
disengaging or strategically ensuring that she has the requisite
support in advance.
Many women of color have similar experiences with
colleagues, leading to the current distrust that characterizes
faculty relationships. Alicia, a Latina, also says that it is
common at her institution for her white faculty colleagues to
act friendly towards the faculty of color to their faces, but
“behind closed doors” there is the “[d]enigration of the person’s
work, their scholarship or their teaching.” In fact, the existing
literature suggests that Critical Race Theory, feminist legal
scholarship, and other social justice-oriented research is often
devalued by many faculty colleagues at legal institutions,
though many women and people of color gravitate toward that
work as central to and validating of their own experiences.82
Alicia recounts recent conversations where “several people
came to my office and said, ‘Did you know that so and so goes
around speaking ill of X?’ and then they said, ‘And so and so is
82 Tara J. Yosso, Whose Culture has Capital? A Critical Race Theory
Discussion of Community Cultural Wealth, 8 RACE ETHNICITY & ED. 69 (2005).
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also speaking ill of Y and Z.’” It turns out that “X,” “Y,” and “Z”
are all people of color whom Alicia’s colleagues did not support
for promotion. Alicia notes that “there were two African
Americans and one Latina who were up [for promotion]. All three
of them were targeted.” While she did her best to protect them,
this produced great anxiety for Alicia even though she herself was
already tenured. In fact, perhaps because she was already
tenured, she felt the need to do whatever she could to protect
those being bad-mouthed by her colleagues, although she did not
know how best to proceed. She “didn’t know which one was going
to survive [the character assassination attempts] because . . . it’s
random at some level. Everybody has weaknesses. Everybody has
strengths.” She saw her colleagues as playing on particular
stereotypes about people of color to target those applying for
promotion, but agonized over how best to tailor her response and
even over whether one would be productive; she wondered, “When
is the subtle stoking of the stereotypes going to succeed and when
is it not? I can’t always predict.”
For Laila, a Middle Eastern woman, distrust of her
colleagues stems from the troubling shift in climate soon after
she started her tenure-track position. While her initial
reception as a “guest” may have been based on her “exotic”
racial background, things got worse by the second semester:
The first semester everyone was very welcoming [but] it was just
kind of like I was their guest [in their] home. I was new and exotic
and different and I was, you know, energetic and they thought,
“That’s so neat!” “This new person!” Sort of fresh blood. Then second
semester I think jealousy sort of set in and I really sensed it. I got to
the point [where] I didn’t even want anyone to know what I had
accomplished because . . . instead of being complimented it was like
you would get these very negative looks.

Laila’s initial reception as a “guest” as a woman of color faculty
member on a predominantly white campus is not unusual. In
fact, some have felt their unusual presence or interloper status
was more akin to an “intruder” than a guest. For example, one
contributor to Presumed Incompetent writes of a common
feature of most law schools today: the lobby wall with
numerous portraits of “dead white males and some living ones”
memorializing famous and respected former faculty members,
alumni, and donors to the school;83 she feared these sentries
noted her entry as a faculty member when she first began law
83 Adrien Katherine Wing, Lessons from a Portrait: Keep Calm and Carry On,
in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA, supra note 25, at 356, 359-60.
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silently

2. Birds of a Feather
In addition to the general sense of distrust and resulting
preference for distance from most faculty, it is also common for
women of color to seek out for closer relationships those
colleagues who come from similar backgrounds, share similar
professional experiences, or may otherwise have similar worldviews. Valeria, a Latina law professor, is closest to the other
junior faculty at her law school, though even those relationships
are not especially close; she notes that they “do things outside
the office every now and again, so it’s very collegial.” Vijay, an
Asian American male, says that he and his fellow junior
colleagues “talk a lot about issues: faculty governance issues,
difficult votes, how things are going in the classroom, we
socialize together, we are just a good group.” In this way, junior
faculty often stick together, perhaps recognizing their unity
through a shared lack of job security and other ways in which
their professional position bonds them together.
Vivian, an Asian American law professor, is picky about
her professional relationships, specifying, “I do have very
strong relationships with particular colleagues.” Erin, a Native
American woman, similarly notes that she has “some good
friends” and sees her law school as “a really wonderful
environment.”85 She is “particularly close to my African
American male colleague and my [white] lesbian colleague
because sometimes I just think that they get things better than
colleagues who are not necessarily from those backgrounds.”
Here, Erin alludes to her shared experience with colleagues
who come from backgrounds that have been traditionally
un(der)-represented in legal academia and marginalized in
society generally, noting that their shared perspective or world
view may help them relate to Erin’s experiences as a female
Native American law professor.
A number of female faculty of color agree with the
sentiment that Annalisa, an Asian American, expresses about
84 Id. While the challenges associated with faculty hiring are not discussed in
depth in this Article, they are worthy of further study as a barrier to entry for faculty
of color. Preliminary analyses of DLA data do show that institutional bias may thwart
diversity in legal academia. Deo, Trajectory of a Law Professor, supra note 11.
85 This is especially wonderful for Erin given the horrific experiences she
endured as a female faculty of color in her first tenure-track position at a different law
school. See infra, Part II.B.2.
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the ways in which her female faculty of color colleagues
provided her with the support necessary to sustain her through
various professional challenges; she says, “I was able to survive
because I had a core group of professors who were my friends,
and we challenged each other’s work and also provided moral
support.” Grace, a multiracial woman, provides specifics. She
recounts a time when her Dean was providing summer funding
for faculty to “develop these innovative ways of teaching, and
one of the Associate Deans said to me, ‘I told the Dean not to
give you that [money because you] would do it anyway, so we
don’t need to pay you to do it because you’ll do it anyway.’” Her
Associate Dean was correct that Grace’s strong investment in
the school meant that she would do the work even without the
monetary incentive; however, his candid interest in taking
advantage of her commitment made Grace go “crazy with that
whole assumption [that he] thought that was an appropriate
way to think about creating incentives for faculty.” She did not
take it up directly with the Associate Dean, who is white, but
called two colleagues “who are both people of color, both women,
to talk through [it,]” and they both “totally [were able to]
understand” her disappointment and disillusionment. She
makes her first calls after these sorts of incidents to colleagues
she trusts both “to make sure that the way I’m reacting is
appropriate” and also “to figure out strategies for how to respond
and what to do.” Because she ultimately got summer funding
that year, she decided to not pursue the matter further, but “it
still pisses me off.” Imani, a Black female, agrees, stating, “I
would say my closest relationships are with the female faculty,
particularly the three or four female faculty of color that we
have.” Thus, while faculty are cordial with one another, this
civility masks underlying distrust and distance. Of notable
exception are the close relationships female faculty of color
have with one another and other underrepresented and often
marginalized faculty members at their institutions whom they
draw on for support.86
B. Invisibility/Silencing and Sexual Harassment
“I’ve counted over 10 times on my faculty where I’ve said something
and [nobody has responded; then] a male faculty has repeated it and
another male colleague has said, ‘Good idea!’” -Carla

86 Meera E. Deo, Sources of Support for Legal Academics (work in progress)
(on file with author).
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The experiences of a number of female faculty participants
in DLA reveal that gender discrimination continues to be a serious
problem in legal academia. In fact, the white- and male-normative
law school environment has been studied in both the student and
faculty context. As students, “[w]hite males are the primary focus
of classroom attention,”87 often at the expense of women of color,
men of color, and white women. Women students tend to be “called
on less frequently than men,” and their comments are often met
with skepticism or sometimes ignored outright.88
The law faculty experience is quite similar, as
documented in the existing literature. White women faculty and
especially women of color professors rarely “enjoy the status,
authority, and opportunity equal to that of white men working
in the legal academy.”89 There are ongoing racial and gender
“disparities in terms of pay, tenure denials, and employment at
the most elite law schools, in addition to double standards in
assessing identical credentials.”90 Likely because of this bias,
women of color—who are viewed by others and often consider
themselves to be “outsiders” in the white male culture of legal
academia—have lower retention rates than white men.91
The DLA data confirms and elaborates on these past
studies, specifically documenting ongoing gender concerns
relating to invisibility/silencing and outright sexual harassment.92
In fact, the importance of relationships forged with those
similarly situated—especially friendships between female faculty
of color—seem to parallel the ways in which law students of color
rely on their peers and the broad supportive structures within
student organizations that provide them with social, cultural,
and emotional support to sustain them.93

87 Deo, supra note 19, at 78 (quoting Nancy E. Dowd et al., Diversity Matters:
Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 27
(2003)).
88 Resnick, supra note 32, at 570 (citing Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling,
The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1299-1300 (1988)).
89 Resnick, supra note 32, at 564.
90 Barnes & Mertz, supra note 6, at 512.
91 Id.
92 This Article neither defines the standards for a formal sexual harassment
claim nor asserts that participants in the DLA study have formal legal grounds for a
suit. The term is used broadly to refer to extreme gender-based exclusion and work
conditions that provide challenges for women to succeed.
93 For more on peer mentorship and organizational mentorship for law
students of color, see Deo & Griffin, supra note 8, at 311 (“[M]entorship is also
positively associated with the mentee’s likelihood of retention.”).
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1. Mansplaining and Whitesplaining
As an example of the male-centered workplace, a Black
woman named Imani notes the numerous “times where I felt
like some of the male colleagues look at themselves as above
others and [are] not always respectful of others’ contributions.”
Trisha, a Black female, blames these tensions for her current
“extremely marginalized” position among her colleagues. In
fact, the invisibility of women and especially women of color is
stark. As a contributor to Presumed Incompetent notes of her
first appointment as a legal academic, “I can recall being
almost invisible . . . . I seemed not to exist” to the other faculty
members.94 Many female faculty of color who participated in
the DLA study shared similar experiences. Jennifer, a Native
American, embodies this invisibility, in spite of her goodhumored response to it:
[In] the four and half years I’ve been here there’s a couple of people I
haven’t even had a conversation with. And they don’t look at me.
They don’t acknowledge me. They don’t seem to know who I am
[laughing]. [They] just treat me like a non-entity.95

Elaine, an Asian American senior member of her law school
faculty, echoes Jennifer’s remarks, noting that she has one faculty
colleague “who really has never acknowledged my presence.”
Male domination is most prominent during faculty
meetings at many institutions, where silencing is especially
pronounced. As a Native American woman named Melissa notes,
“There is that silencing that goes on in our faculty meetings.”
She describes what she considers an affirming, almost
welcoming “hazing” ritual for her junior white male colleagues
that was never offered to her and the other women, “where
junior white males . . . get coddled, get laughed at, get remarks
made, get floor time, get affirmations, and the women don’t
ever.” This is one way in which the male-dominant culture of
law school is reproduced and perpetuated.
Both inside and outside the workplace, a woman’s ideas,
suggestions, or observations may be ignored until a man
explains (or more frequently, simply repeats) her thoughts;
sometimes the man honestly believes himself to be the one full
94 Ruth Gordon, On Community in the Midst of Hierarchy (and Hierarchy in
the Midst of Community), in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE
AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA, supra note 25, at 313, 327.
95 Jennifer repeats this experience laughingly, and notes her overall
experience as positive; though there are a number of objectively problematic
encounters in her narrative, she has chosen to respond to them with humor and also
copes by seeking escape with large swaths of time spent with her tribe.
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of knowledge and ideas, virtually unaware of the woman’s
comments before voicing them as his own. This common
occurrence, outside of legal academia as well as within, falls
into the “archipelago of arrogance”96 referred to as
“mansplaining.”97 Mansplaining is an occurrence that many
women readily recognize from their own experience of “having
their expertise instantly dismissed because of the lady-shaped
package it came in.”98 Mansplaining occurs at “the intersection
between overconfidence and cluelessness,” where some men
repeat what women have already stated, claiming those
statements as their own, and others accept and applaud, giving
credit to the man who repeated the words rather than the
woman who created them.99 Rebecca Solnit, the author who
pioneered the ongoing public debate over mansplaining (if not
the term itself), shares that when men take it upon themselves
to interpret for women or explain to women, they assume that
a woman is simply “an empty vessel to be filled with their
wisdom and knowledge,” forgetting that women may even know
more than the man himself on a particular topic.100 Thus, before
women can even provide arguments to support their worthy
ideas, they must first fight “simply for the right to speak, to
have ideas, to be acknowledged to be in possession of facts and
truth, to have value, to be a human being.”101 The many
challenges associated with being heard, regardless of what is
being said, “keeps women from speaking up and from being
heard when they dare [or] crushes young women into silence by
indicating . . . that this is not their world.”102
Mansplaining is sadly alive and well in legal academia,
where many women receive the signal that they are unwelcome
or do not belong, and so should know their place and remain
silent.103 As an example, a Latina named Carla notes, “I’ve
96 Rebecca Solnit, Tomgram: Rebecca Solnit, The Archipelago of Arrogance,
TOMDISPATCH.COM (Apr. 13, 2008, 6:14 AM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174918.
97 See, e.g., Jessica Valenti, Mansplaining, Explained: ‘Just Ask an Expert.
Who is Not a Lady’, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2014, 7:18 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jun/06/mansplaining-explained-expert-women.
98 Helen Lewis, The Essay that Launched the Term “Mansplaining,” NEW
REPUBLIC (July 4, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118555/rebecca-solnitsmen-explain-things-me-scourge-mansplaining.
99 Rebecca Solnit, Why Mansplaining is Still a Problem, ALTERNET.COM
(Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/why-mansplaining-still-problem.
100 Solnit, supra note 96.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 In fact, it seems prevalent throughout academia generally, given that there
is a website dedicated to academic mansplaining, Academic Men Explain Things To
Me, Where Women Recount Their Experiences of Being Mansplained, in Academia and
Elsewhere, http://mansplained.tumblr.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
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counted over 10 times on my faculty where I’ve said something
and [nobody has responded; then] a male faculty has repeated
it and another male colleague has said, ‘Good idea!’” Again, this
provides weight, acknowledgment, and appreciation for men
while devaluing women.104 Elaine, an Asian American, has had
a very similar experience at her institution. She recalls, “I went
through the stages of saying things at a faculty meeting and no
one paid attention to it and then a man would say it and then
everyone would pay attention to it.” In this way, once a man
explained and validated Elaine’s remarks, others noted and
appreciated them—albeit mistaking them for being first
articulated by a male faculty member rather than by Elaine.
Combining the intersectional framework with the
concept of mansplaining, we can consider how “whitesplaining”
may also be relevant in legal academia. Smita, an Asian
American, gets the sense that what she says “would carry more
weight with the faculty if it were being said by white people.”
This is true whether she talks “about the importance of diversity
or whatever else. We don’t hear it enough from my white
colleagues, even those who consider themselves progressive. So
there is a sense of your voice being discounted in a lot of
respects.” Thus, white validation of Smita’s suggestions or
observations would give them more weight than when Smita
makes them on her own. For women of color the
invisibility/silencing and discrimination may be doubly and even
cumulatively
challenging—mansplaining
multiplied
by
whitesplaining—because it is based on both race and gender.105
Surprisingly, many gender disparities in legal
academia, especially the devaluing of women, are particularly
notable when compared to women’s experiences in corporate
law practice.106 Many women participants in the DLA study
specifically note that they did not experience such pronounced
gender discrimination in legal practice, even when working at
elite law firms.107 Camila, a Latina scholar, says her “biggest
See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 32, at 570-71.
For more on how intersectionality creates not only additive but cumulative
effects, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 29.
106 In terms of numeric representation, diversity in law firms at the associate
level is slightly better though similar to that of legal academia with roughly 11%
women of color, 10% men of color, and 33% white women. Yet, representation at the
partnership level leaves a lot to be desired with only 2% women of color, 5% men of
color, and 18% white women. Perspectives on Diversity, NALP BULLETIN (June 2014),
http://www.nalp.org/0614research.
107 The
corporate law firm realm has its own issues with gender
discrimination. Some DLA participants reflect on those issues as well. For instance,
Abigail notes, “I worked for the largest law firm in the city at the time and was one of
just a few females. One of the litigation partners downtown told me that ‘litigation is
104

105
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challenge” in law teaching involved the cultural transition from
being respected in legal practice to being virtually ignored by
her colleagues in legal academia; this involved, “going from a
place where I felt that my opinion was valued, work was
valued, partners listened to me with respect,” to being at an
institution where her colleagues “don’t want to hear what you
say, people talk over you in faculty meetings, . . . or make faces
while you’re talking.” She notes that “this kind of incredibly
immature behavior” is gender-based, targeted specifically at
the women by the men on her faculty.
Zahra, a Middle Eastern woman, recalls a meeting
about faculty hiring where women voiced gender concerns that
others pretended to care about, but ultimately ignored:
[S]everal of us junior colleagues were concerned about how a new
[potential] hire was going to interact with women, and specifically
we had heard complaints that he doesn’t work well with women.
There were, you know, four of us [women] that expressed things in
the appointments committee meeting, saying, “Look, we are
concerned about this,” and some of the male colleagues acted like
they cared; they said, “Well, you know, that sounds disappointing
and we wouldn’t want that,” but everyone voted for him anyway
[aside from the four of us women and two male junior colleagues].

That candidate was ultimately hired and will be starting at
Zahra’s law school shortly. While she is approaching her new
colleague with an open mind, she learned something about her
existing colleagues because of the incident, noting that “it was
just surprising that . . . we made our worries known, but [were]
ignored. No one cared.” This speaks not only to gender bias but
also the prevalence of expressing a “surface” interest in
diversifying without recognizing this goal as a “core” priority,
and thereby failing to act in a manner representing a true
commitment to diversity.108 Abigail, a senior white legal scholar,
remembers that in the early days of her career in legal
academia, adherence to traditional gender roles was expected.
Women were clearly meant to take on subservient, silent roles.
As an example, she recalls the following: “If we had a meeting
and we needed a note taker there would be the turning of all
like war, honey, and you just don’t send women into combat.’” See also Lisa van der
Pool, Big Law Firms Wrestle with Gender Discrimination Suits, BOS. BUS. J. (Feb. 15,
2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/print-edition/2013/02/15/big-lawfirms-wrestle-with-gender.html?page=all. This Article does not attempt to minimize
the concerns of women working in corporate law firms; rather, it simply points out that
some women participants in DLA recognize that gender discrimination may be even
more pronounced in legal academia.
108 Rebecca K. Lee, Core Diversity, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 477, 47980 (2010) (discussing “surface” versus “core” diversity ideals in the workplace).
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eyes to whichever female was in the room and she would
become the note taker.” Some of these expectations continue
today; as a white woman named Ava notes, “[S]ome of the
senior colleagues in the building . . . treat me as a ‘gal’ and not
as an intellectual equal.”
2. Causes of the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome
In fact, though many senior women recall the gender
challenges pervasive through the early days of their teaching
careers, even those who entered legal academia in more recent
years have faced what could readily be described as a hostile
work environment.109 Ava, a white woman who entered legal
academia about 15 years ago, recounted how her law school
Dean “hit on me.” Ava’s Dean (who had recently divorced)
invited Ava to what she thought was a professional lunch; he
then professed his feelings for her:
He asked if I was dating anybody. He made this big point of saying,
“I hope you know it wouldn’t be appropriate to date because I’m your
boss, but I find you really attractive and awesome. And if I could I
would really be interested in dating you.”

Ava’s response at the time was characteristic of young
professional women in her situation: “[I]t made me really
uncomfortable and I was shocked, because he was my boss, that
he would make it clear he was interested in me romantically.”
This incident occurred before Ava earned tenure (which
happened after this particular Dean left her institution).
Similarly, a white woman named Isabella recalls an
incident that occurred soon after she joined legal academia a
decade ago at an institution that she has since left: “One of my
first faculty meetings there I spoke out on an issue and didn’t
realize women were meant to be seen and not heard.” She
remembers that one of her white male colleagues approached
her afterward to say, “‘Wow! You’re really articulate!’ And that
stunned me because I thought all of us on the law faculty
would be articulate, but it really took this faculty member
aback” that a woman had spoken up and spoken so well.
Reflecting on the experience today, Isabella acknowledges,
“There were some real serious gender issues while I was there.”

109 Again, this Article does not seek to outline strategies for filing formal
sexual harassment claims against institutions based on a hostile workplace, though
further research should be done to determine whether these common experiences are
actionable.
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A Latina law professor named Lola recounts a
challenging time professionally for her, when she was denied
promotion at her school. Though she suffered greatly, she says
that “no one at school knew the pain and the betrayal I was
feeling and that was incredibly exhausting to come to work every
day and pretend like nothing was wrong.” She relied on family
and friends “for that relief of the stress and disappointment and
all of that.” She did not share her disillusionment with her faculty
colleagues because “[a]t work . . . I have relationships, but again I
don’t fully trust people here.”
When a Black law professor named Patrice was asked
about the tenure process she had recently gone through, she
replied, “Oh my god. [Sigh.] I have post-traumatic stress
disorder.” In part, she faced a challenge common to many
scholars of color and others who are underrepresented in the
legal academy and choose to focus on identity issues dear to
them personally as part of their scholarship. As Patrice
recounts it, “we have these white guys on the faculty who are
really not . . . they’re hostile to race work.” She knew their
perspective even before she applied for tenure and
contemplated how that might affect her work, thinking it “was
tricky because I wanted to be able to do the work I wanted to
do but I also wanted tenure, right?” One coping mechanism she
employed was not to share her work with her colleagues,
though Patrice is at an institution where it is common for
junior faculty to give regular talks to the full faculty. In
general, the frequent presentations of scholarship in a nascent
stage are beneficial to the presenter; as Patrice puts it, “[I]n
this setting the critiques are constructive to help you get to the
next point.” Yet, because her scholarship included issues of
race and ethnicity, some of her white male colleagues were not
constructive, but instead the purpose of their “critiques [was] to
shut it down and steer you in a different direction.” So she
made a calculated decision to disengage, to not present her
work to the faculty. Though Patrice lost the benefit of
potentially constructive feedback from some colleagues, she
kept her sanity throughout her junior faculty years. She notes
that as “an effort to be true to myself and just to sleep at night
I felt like I had to just do it, [avoid presenting,] stay in my head
with it which is also just very difficult and not particularly
fulfilling as a place to be as an academic.”
Patrice is one of the many DLA participants who admitted
to serious health effects resulting from pursuing a career as a law
professor. For instance, a Native American woman named
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Melissa notes, “I find myself missing more days from illness and
being a lot more stressed with no breaks.” In fact, the most
frequent comment along these lines echoes Patrice’s admission
that she felt she had PTSD.110 Existing scholarship has shown
that many marginalized women of color faculty members
enduring all manner of challenging situations believe that
remaining silent is “the key to [their] survival in academia.”111
Many make the calculated decision not to speak out or find other
coping mechanisms that allow them to function professionally.
However, this self-censorship and self-silencing, the tendency to
“bite your tongue and make no sound when you want to speak,”
can itself exert a significant emotional toll.112 In fact, some
scholars have tied the emotional challenges facing traditional
outsiders in legal academia with ill-health and even untimely
death; this has been termed “the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome” after
the early passing of the revered Harvard Law School professor, a
Black man who endured great challenges professionally that
many believe affected his health significantly.113
Carla, a Latina law professor, may currently be
enduring the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome herself. For years she
has been putting into practice a professional strategy that she
adopted after watching the relative downfall of a senior woman
of color colleague. Recently, Carla “was supposed to be on
research leave,” but found out just weeks before that it was
being rescinded. As she tells it, “[M]y Academic Dean called me
and said, ‘You can’t go on research leave. You have to chair [a
particular] committee.’” While some may have been flattered to
be asked to be Chair of high profile committee, Carla saw the
situation as a requirement that she continue institutional
housekeeping, noting, “I’ve been in this long enough to know
that’s not really a compliment; that means someone needs to
stay and clean the house [and] it’s going to be you.” In spite of
110 Bianca, a Latina, offers a useful strategy for combatting the challenges of
being a woman of color law professor: “I balance the stresses of my job by being
physically active.”
111 Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Silence of the Lambs, in PRESUMED
INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA,
supra note 25, at 142, 148.
112 Women of color in legal academia sometimes feel they are simply going
through the motions, playing a part as an academic, but remaining disinvested from
the job because they cannot be themselves. Instead, they endure “feel[ing] like a clown.
You smile when you do not feel like smiling. You bite your tongue and make no sound
when you want to speak.” Angela Mae Kupenda, Facing Down the Spooks, in
PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA, supra note 25, at 20, 23.
113 See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors
Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419 (1986).
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being a senior faculty member, Carla did not feel she had the
power to say no, to remind her Academic Dean that she had
negotiated for her leave two and a half years prior. She admits
that “it was really shocking, but I dealt with it by
saying . . . . Well I dealt with it with my ordinary strategy,
which was to say, ‘Okay.’” The fact that Carla was shocked but
immediately acquiesced sheds some light on the Clyde
Ferguson Syndrome, the negative health effects of being
stunned, disappointed, knowing you are the victim of injustice,
and yet remaining silent. Imagine the long-term consequences
of this cycle repeating itself year after year. Carla herself has
done this. She recounts the many ways in which she has
worked to accommodate whatever requirements her institution
imposes on her: “If someone said, ‘Do this,’ I did that. If
someone said, ‘Teach that,’ I taught that. If someone said,
‘You’ll teach [at] 8 a.m.,’ I taught at 8 a.m. If someone said,
‘You teach summer school,’ I taught summer school.” One
might expect that at some point Carla would resist, that she
would either directly or even somewhat passively attempt to
get out of these impositions. But she never felt she had the
option of saying no or even hesitating before saying yes. She
explains, “I didn’t feel that I had [a choice] or wanted to risk
saying no because then the gossip would start up: ‘She’s
difficult,’ ‘She’s not a team player.’” In fact, Carla had seen this
exact pattern with the only other woman of color on her faculty,
whom Carla says is “very, very well-credentialed,” yet because
she “said no early on [she] got pegged as not a team player.”
There were serious professional repercussions for Carla’s
colleague, which Carla interprets as “the price of saying no.”
After witnessing her colleague’s trajectory, Carla explains that
she “felt that I had to [say yes to] survive. I had to take in these
requests and produce quality work.” Her strategy has paid off
professionally: Carla is well respected and certainly holds the
badge of a team player. Yet, the personal emotional costs have
been high. She notes that in a recent year she made a startling
and disturbing realization: “I felt like I had PTSD.”
Erin, a Native American, recalls other more egregious
gender-based violations at her former law school workplace.
She remembers some of her senior male colleagues “coming
into the office and petting my hair, and telling me what
beautiful hair I have, telling me I have large luscious breasts.”
There was a clear power imbalance, based on race, gender, and
institutional status, among other things. Erin’s intersectional
experience of embodying so many devalued characteristics
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clearly worked against her as a young, untenured, woman of
color. Because the perpetrators were white “senior tenured
members” and she was a woman of color and a “junior faculty
member, you just don’t want to rock the boat, so you don’t say
anything—at least I didn’t say anything. And you regret it
later and you carry that guilt.” Erin admits that she has
accumulated negative health effects from these incidents. The
emotional toll of coping with that hostile workplace
environment haunts Erin even today, though she quickly left
her previous law faculty; she notes, “I actually have PTSD
syndrome because of the amount of stress. I still have
nightmares on a regular basis even though I’m very happy at
my current institution.” This overt gender discrimination,
while not at every institution, is still a recurring theme in the
experiences of women in legal academia.114
C. Comparison & Contrast
“I have good relationships with everybody. I don’t think there are
cliques here. People, like, respect and are nice to each other. I don’t
think there’s any kind of feeling that I can’t say [something] because it
wouldn’t be politically correct or [would] offend somebody.” -Joe

The experiences of white men provide a significant
contrast to the experiences of their female and faculty of color
colleagues with regard to faculty interactions. For instance,
when a white man named Matt was asked in the DLA
interview about his relationships with fellow faculty, he
responded in a way that is representative of the other white
men in the DLA sample: “I really enjoy my colleagues. There’s
a lot of collegiality among young faculty, older faculty. It’s a
nice place to be.” While Matt admits that he generally dislikes
the inefficiency of large meetings, his “overwhelming thought
when I go [into faculty meetings] is, ‘I really like these people.’”
He and the other white men in the sample do not mention
stress based on sexual harassment or experiences of silencing
from colleagues, as so many of their female colleagues do. A
white man named Christopher is “very close” especially with
people who were hired around the same time as he was,
including “five couples who socialized together and vacationed
together and sort of did everything together” for many years.
Ian, another white male law professor, recognizes that there is
114 While there are challenging incidents in legal academia that are based
primarily on race, they seem less overt and less frequent than gender-based or raceand-gender based incidents. There are, however, egregious racial violations with regard
to discrimination in law faculty hiring, explored further in Deo, supra note 80.
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a “broad diversity of views” on his faculty, but believes there is
“a feeling of mutual respect” among his colleagues. While he
has “good relationships with everyone,” he also is especially
close with “several of my colleagues,” meeting them for “dinner
parties [and other events] outside the law school.” An even
larger group meets frequently for “drinks or having picnics or
other events together.”
Most significantly, very few white male faculty members
note confrontational or complicated relationships with
colleagues. Recall again that white faculty note positive
relationships not only with other white colleagues, but with
those from all racial backgrounds; however, those feelings are
not always reciprocated since faculty of color characterize these
same relationships as less friendly.115 In other words, white
faculty and faculty of color perceive the same interactions
differently. Take, for instance, a white male named Joe who
insists that he has “good relationships with everybody.”
Though he is especially close to those who research and teach
in his field, he thinks nobody “would describe us as a clique” in
part because he believes “[t]here aren’t any factions” at his law
school. Interestingly, he insists both that all faculty members
“respect and are nice to each other,” and that he is comfortable
expressing his views, whatever they may be, since there is no
institutional norm of self-regulation even when saying
something that “wouldn’t be politically correct or [might] offend
somebody.” Note that Joe’s female faculty of color colleagues
might see his comments as politically incorrect or offensive,
though he feels comfortable speaking his mind.
Where white male faculty may see many positives,
white female faculty and especially female faculty of color
perceive the white male climate pervading the culture of the
law school, and recognize it as one that excludes them.116 A
white male named John’s experience is typical; he notes of his
relationships with faculty colleagues, “I don’t have any
particular challenges in terms of getting along.” Of course, if
we asked John’s white female and female faculty of color
colleagues to characterize their relationships with him and
others, they might not see these interactions as he does.

115 See supra Part II.A. for more on how different faculty view the same
relationships differently.
116 See, e.g., Angel, supra note 59.
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III. CONFRONTATIONAL INTERACTIONS WITH STUDENTS
“The [white] guys with their baseball caps on backwards . . . are
challenging just everything you are saying. [Y]ou try not to follow
them down that road and try and maintain control of the class and
just teach the class, and there they are, like the gnat just driving you
crazy.” -Patrice

Faculty relationships with students are both incredibly
wonderful and impossibly trying. DLA data show that
individual faculty members who very much enjoy close and
nurturing relationships with some students often have
especially fraught relationships with others. This Part
discusses the quality of student-faculty interactions, as well as
their frequency.
In addition, as would be expected, the vast majority of
faculty report “a lot” of interaction with white students (See
Table 6). In fact, female law faculty of color from various
racial/ethnic backgrounds have about equal levels of
interaction with white students as do white men, white women,
and men of color (See Table 6).
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TABLE 6. FREQUENCY OF INTERACTIONS WITH WHITE STUDENTS,
BY RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013 (N=92)
A Lot

Not
Much

Some

TOTAL

Black
Females

15
(71.4%)

6
(28.6%)

0
(0.0%)

21

Asian/Pacific
Islander
Females

14
(93.3%)

1
(6.7%)

0
(0.0%)

15

Latinas

8
(66.7%)

3
(25.0%)

1
(8.3%)

12

Native
American
Females

4
(80.0%)

0
(0.0%)

1
(20.0%)

5

Middle Eastern
Females

2
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

2

Multiracial
Females

7
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White Males

7
(87.5%)

1
(12.5%)

0
(0.0%)

8

White Females

10
(90.95)

1
(9.1%)

0
(0.0%)

11

Men of Color

10
(90.9%)

1
(9.1%)

0
(0.0%)

11

62

7

2

92

TOTAL

Still, the quality of those interactions does differ by
race/gender (See Table 7). For example, only 29% of Black
women faculty members characterize their interactions with
white students as “very friendly,” compared with 63% of white
men, 73% of white women, and even 73% of men of color who
enjoy “very friendly” relationships with white students. As a
whole, women of color characterize their interactions with
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white students significantly differently than all other faculty
do. The only individual in the sample to characterize the
quality of interactions with white students as “hostile” is a
Black woman. No whites, neither male nor female, characterize
their interactions as even “distant,” whereas small numbers of
both women of color and men of color do.
TABLE 7. QUALITY OF INTERACTIONS WITH WHITE STUDENTS, BY
RACE & GENDER, DLA 2013 (N=92)
Very
Friendly

Sociable

Black
Females

6
(28.6%)

12
(57.1%)

2
(9.5%)

1
(4.8%)

21

Asian/
Pacific
Islander
Females

11
(73.3%)

4
(26.7%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

15

Latinas

6
(50.0%)

5
(41.7%)

1
(8.35)

0
(0.0%)

12

Native
American
Females

2
(40.0%)

2
(40.0%)

1
(20.0%)

0
(0.0%)

5

Middle
Eastern
Females

0
(0.0%)

2
(100.0%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

2

Multiracial
Females

3
(42.9%)

3
(42.9%)

1
(14.3%)

0
(0.0%)

7

White
Males

5
(62.5%)

3
(37.5%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

8

White
Females

8
(72.7%)

3
(27.3%)

0
(0.0%)

0
(0.0%)

11

Men of
Color

8
(72.7%)

1
(9.09%)

1
(9.09%)

0
(0.0%)

11

TOTAL

49

35

6

1

92

Distant

Hostile

TOTAL

Positive student interactions are evident from the
qualitative data as well. In fact, many female faculty of color
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spend a great deal of time mentoring students, especially
students of color, women students, and other underrepresented
or marginalized students who seek them out. Students are
sometimes so dependent on particular faculty that it becomes
challenging for the professors to meet their other personal and
professional obligations. In spite of positive interactions with
students overall, most women of color report serious challenges
from students in both the classroom and during private
meetings elsewhere on campus.
A. “Positive” Personal Interactions
“I love my students as a general matter. I always have.” -Grace

1. Role Modeling
Faculty members from all racial/ethnic and gender
backgrounds are positively glowing about their students. For
instance, a Latina law professor named Martha says that
students are “the best part of the job really.” Laura, a Native
American, agrees, stating, “Oh well, of course, your
relationship with students is one of the best parts about the
job.” Adam, a white man, says, “I really like our students.” A
multiracial faculty member named Grace gushes, “I love my
students as a general matter. I always have.” Chloe, a white
female faculty member says, “To me the students are the best
part of any law school.”
Female faculty of color are especially grateful for and
receptive to the students of color and other marginalized students
who gravitate toward them. Aisha, an Asian American, notes that
she has “a following . . . . I have my groupies and they follow me
from class to class and I have never ever had an issue filling my
classes.” Imani, a Black female, is also “very close to the students.”
She notes that because the first institution where she taught had
an especially diverse student body, “I could earn my stripes as a
new teacher in a room full of students that generally looked like
me.”117 Perhaps because of their shared identity, Imani’s former
students accorded her a great deal of respect from the outset of her
117 Imani began her law teaching career at a historically Black institution. In
fact, the experiences for both students and faculty at historically Black institutions
differ greatly from those at predominantly white institutions, including diverse schools
that were not founded on a mission of educating traditionally underrepresented
students. See, e.g., Guiffrida, supra note 59. In part for these reasons, historically Black
law schools are not included in the DLA sample, though some experiences working
within them come through from faculty who taught at those institutions in the past
and now are employed by predominantly white law schools.
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law teaching career; she therefore “did not have to deal with a lot of
the challenges” facing faculty of color at predominantly white
institutions “in regards to white male students challenging them
and this presumption of incompetence.”
Sometimes
students
at
predominantly
white
institutions are especially grateful for the few faculty of color
employed there.118 Erin, a Native American law professor,
appreciates that her students “are very hardworking” and
“dedicated.” She recognizes that their respect and deference to
her may be because “they’re thankful” that a Native American
woman joined their faculty, since there are very few students of
color on campus and even fewer faculty of color. In fact, it is a
common occurrence for faculty diversity to lag behind student
diversity, even or especially at schools with little student
diversity.119 Hannah, a multiracial female who is very involved
with student events and competitions, says that the students at
her institution “are so kind;” she says she receives “dozens” of
thank you notes “on an annual basis” from grateful students
who appreciate the considerable time and attention she
lavishes on them.
2. Overburdened by Service
The students send these notes to reward Hannah’s hard
work and extraordinary efforts at supporting them. Female
faculty seem especially connected with their students, as well
as both nurturing and willing to take time to counsel students
through personal and professional matters. Past empirical
research using law student research subjects has shown that
students from all race and gender backgrounds are especially
drawn to female faculty and faculty of color.120 “Students of
color and white students alike report that faculty of color are
often more accessible than whites and that female faculty tend
to engage students more than male faculty.”121 This
accessibility comes through in the DLA data as well. For
instance, Hannah knows that because the students view her as
118 For more on faculty-student interactions from the student perspective, see
Meera E. Deo et al., Paint by Number? How the Race and Gender of Law School
Faculty Affect the First-Year Curriculum, 29 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 1, 17 (2010).
Students from all race/ethnic backgrounds flock to white women and especially women
of color for support with personal and professional matters. See Deo et al., supra note
79, at 87.
119 See, e.g., Anupam Chander et al., Why Don’t Law Faculties Look Like
Their Students? Some Conjectures, Paper Presentation at Law & Society Annual
Meeting (June 2012) (presentation slides on file with the author).
120 See, e.g., Deo et al., supra note 79, at 87.
121 Id.
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“pretty approachable,” they seek her out not only for help
understanding class material, but for any number of personal
and professional matters:
I have students coming into my office asking for advice in my classes
but also what to do with their lives or if they have difficulty in a
particular other class how to prepare for that or what courses I
might recommend. Or if they are unsure about their schedule and
they want to check. I’ve had students cry in my office because of
personal issues.

Similarly, a Latina named Bianca has “a number of students
who frequently stop by my office,” some of whom are not even in
her classes, but “that just simply know about me or hear about
me and want to come get advice about this or that.” A pretenured white female law professor named Madison finds it
“easy” to interact with her students, especially those who “are
not hesitant to come into the office or to send an email and ask a
question.” She does not even need to “do so much approaching
and encouraging for the students to come and talk to me”
because they seek her out on their own. Many students also
open up to female faculty and especially female faculty of color
about serious life challenges. Haley, a multiracial female,
acknowledges, “I get a lot of women coming into my office
complaining about sexual harassment, stalking, or domestic
violence they are experiencing.” She thinks that “they feel
comfortable and they seek my help” in part because she covers
all of these issues in her Criminal Law course, whereas “a couple
of the men who teach Crim Law [here] don’t cover rape, sexual
assault, or domestic violence.”122 In fact, the literature makes
clear that white women, women of color, and men of color are
more likely than white men to include relevant context in
classroom discussions of substantive law, and that students
appreciate these opportunities to engage with what is often
abstract legal material on a practical level.123 It is not surprising,
then, that when students see their own experiences within this
context, they are drawn to discuss it further with the faculty
members who are comfortable bringing it up in class.
122 While uncommon, a few male participants in the DLA study also note some
close student interactions, including a white male named Joe who says, “I had a
number of students come and break down in my office, crying,” and an Asian American
named Vijay who notes that he has “an open door policy” and lots of students “asking
for guidance” with regard to “career paths or thinking about doing things outside of the
law,” and even “personal problems [or] problems they are having with other faculty.”
123 Deo et al., supra note 118, at 29. Diversity discussions are classroom
conversations regarding sensitive and personal topics including race/ethnicity, gender,
and sexual orientation. See, e.g., id. at 2-3; see also Deo, supra note 19, at 95.
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Though rewarding, these frequent activities and
emotional meetings with students can be a burden for the
faculty they turn to: often white female faculty and female
faculty of color. In fact, other research has noted that
overwhelming service obligations are but one of “a myriad of
demands [that] are placed upon their professional lives the likes
of which their white counterparts do not . . . experience.”124
Kayla, a Black female participant in the DLA study, knows this
is true for her, noting, “I definitely feel I bear the
disproportionate impact, the brunt, of service to students of
color.” She knows that students turn to her in times of need; she
does not turn them away, but rather encourages them to seek
her out as one of the few female faculty of color on campus.
White women faculty and especially women of color faculty are
particularly welcoming of female students and students of color,
whom they realize seek them out because there are few others
they connect with on the predominantly white male faculties at
most law schools.125 For instance, a Black law professor named
Gabrielle very much appreciates “the opportunity here to mentor
African American students. I spend a lot of time. I do the
[Frederick Douglas] Moot Court and all those things with them
and all those things are personally rewarding for me.” Though
Gabrielle notes that these student service experiences are
rewarding, they also take up a significant portion of time that
she could otherwise spend on research, class preparation, other
service obligations, or even personal endeavors.
What is especially problematic about these constant
service contributions is that they are rarely formally recognized
come time for promotion or tenure, or when determining a
possible course reduction or yearly bonus. Ava, a white woman,
recalls that when she first started teaching 15 years ago, “I was
one of the few women in the building and certainly the only
young one.” She thinks that may be why she “got surrounded
by students all the time [who] wanted my attention.” Ava’s
students had few others they felt comfortable relying on. Yet,
her colleagues were likely blissfully oblivious that their
comparatively smaller investment in these contributions meant
that Ava became “weigh[ed] down . . . with university service
and mentoring responsibilities.”126 Though Ava “wanted to be
Brooks, supra note 113, at 420.
In this sense, particular students may be burdening female faculty and
faculty of color “out of necessity.” Id. at 421.
126 Mary Ann Mason, In the Ivory Tower, Men Only, SLATE (June 17, 2013, 5:30
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/06/female_academics_pay_a_
heavy_baby_penalty.html.
124
125
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the professor that [was always] available for them,” when she
gave her students full access, “they would just suck up every
ounce of time I ever had.” Unfortunately, the research in this
area has consistently shown both that faculty of color and
female faculty take on enormous service responsibilities,
especially those related to students, and that these
undertakings are rarely rewarded or even acknowledged when
the larger faculty and administration evaluate faculty for
tenure or promotion.127
Jane, a multiracial female, has learned to strike a
balance, saying that while she used to schedule “particular,
private meetings” to look over outlines or talk through class
material, she now is more insistent that students make an
effort to attend her set office hours for these questions. She was
otherwise frequently scheduling meetings with students at
times that were inconvenient for her and made both her family
life and other work obligations (i.e., research) more
challenging. Still, Jane remains accommodating and
approachable, saying that “even now if someone has a personal
issue that they need to talk about, I would always set a private
meeting for that purpose.”
B.

Classroom Challenges: Dissatisfaction Leads to
Confrontation
“‘Oh my god, we got the Black lady teaching us and they got the white
guy?!’” -Susan, recounting student attitudes on her first day teaching

In spite of their strong relationships with particular
students, women faculty members are much more likely than
men to have objectively negative experiences with students,
especially in the classroom. Scholarship has begun to document
the ways in which female faculty, particularly female faculty of
color, endure a disproportionate share of classroom challenges
from students.128 In part, this is because “both minorities and
women are presumed to be incompetent as soon as they walk in
the door.”129 The early literature on this topic revealed
instances where female faculty of color:
127 Legal scholar Roy Brooks suggests law faculty of color be given “some relief
from committee assignments” to compensate for the extra time they spend on law
students. Brooks, supra note 113, at 425.
128 Bell & Delgado at 369-70; Meera E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle, 28 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2015).
129 Sylvia Lazos, Are Student Teaching Evaluations Holding Back Women and
Minorities?: The Perils of “Doing” Gender and Race in the Classroom, in PRESUMED
INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA,
supra note 25, at 164, 177.
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were “shouted down in the classroom by white males, shunned by
colleagues, had their teaching credentials openly challenged in the
classroom, received anonymous and detailed hate notes critical of
their teaching style, syntax and appearance and discovered
colleagues had encouraged students to act disrespectfully . . . .”130

Sadly, little has changed today. The DLA data reveal how
female faculty recognize the disappointment of students who
realize they will have a woman of color as a professor. Direct
classroom confrontations often ensue, especially from white
male students.
1. Presumed Incompetent
Some classroom challenges may be attributed to
tokenism: the very small numbers of female faculty of color at
most institutions mean that each one stands out as different
from the norm.131 Coupled with outright racism or even implicit
bias,132 this difference from the norm translates as a
presumption of incompetence and doubts about the
qualifications of women of color law professors.133 Because of
this presumption, as a multiracial female named Emma notes,
“I have a harder barrier to prove myself to students [which
includes] proving that I’m qualified to teach them, that I know
my material.” Because they do not look like the traditional (i.e.,
white male) law professor that many law students expect, most
female faculty of color have a hard time convincing students
that they are legitimate law professors. Gabrielle, a Black
female, acknowledges that “being young and looking very
young” combines with her race and gender to count against her;
the “looks on their faces on the first day of class when it comes
to first year students [suggest their confusion and
disappointment], ‘You can’t possibly be my professor!’” A Black
female named Susan noted the disappointed looks on her
students’ faces on her first teaching day, attributing it to them
thinking “they had the dud professor,” and comparing their
misfortune to the lucky other section of law students: “‘Oh my
god, we got the Black lady teaching us and they got the white
guy?!’” Their sense of entitlement to have a white male law
130 Gordon, supra note 94, at 320 (quoting Linda Greene, Tokens, Role Models,
and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentations of an African American Female Law Professor,
6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 83 (1990-1991)).
131 See supra Table 2 (with AALS statistics showing that women of color
account for only seven percent of American law faculty).
132 For more on implicit bias, see supra Part I.A.
133 See PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR
WOMEN IN ACADEMIA, supra note 25.

2015]

THE UGLY TRUTH ABOUT LEGAL ACADEMIA

995

professor and the injustice they felt at finding their law
professor was a woman of color was apparent to Susan.
Aisha, an Asian American, sees the students’
disappointment at having her as their professor as coming from
her position as “a woman of color in front of students that don’t
see women of color in those positions of power oftentimes and
don’t know what to do.” Mariana, a Latina, got the sense
“[e]arly on [that] they resented me because I was a woman of
color. I didn’t look like the other guys [teaching].” Of course,
she is correct; with only 772 female faculty of color out of
almost 11,000 total, women of color look like neither the
traditional law teacher nor like most of their faculty
colleagues.134 Gabrielle, a Black female, thinks wistfully about
what it would be like if there were more diversity in legal
academia, noting that “it might make it seem more normal for
me to be at the head of the classroom if there were more people
[of color]” in law teaching. Stacey, a Black woman teaching “in
a really white place with people who are really white. I don’t
know how else to describe it!,” notes that for many of her
students, “I’m the first Black professor they ever had, maybe
even their first professor of color.” Based on that, she sees “a lot
of ignorance” in her classroom and on the campus generally,
especially regarding racial sensitivity.
2. Confronting the Unexpected Authority Figure
Sometimes that ignorance spills into hostility. Gabrielle,
a Black female, recalls that her first semester teaching “started
off very bad, very hostile” because of “some students who were
unhappy to have the young Black professor . . . . And [they]
referred to me outside of the classroom as ‘that Black
professor.’” In fact, after their very first class meeting, “a big
group” of students were so “up in arms about it” that they
complained to the Assistant Dean.135 Gabrielle recalls, “[T]he
basis of their complaint was, ‘She’s the new professor. We don’t
want her. We want the other Con Law professor’—who had
been teaching for all of two years.” Thus, while the students
built a façade of preferring the other professor because
Gabrielle was new, the white male professor’s own minimal
experience reveals that their true rationale for preferring him
was likely based on race and gender bias, implicit or otherwise.
See supra Table 2 for details on law faculty statistics by race and gender.
Many women of color in the DLA sample note that students formally
complain about them to administrators at their law schools.
134

135
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Laila, a Middle Eastern woman, also got more than
strange looks on her first day as a law professor:
I had this young white male come to me and right in my face, right
before we start, I hadn’t even started teaching yet, I’d just come to
the podium and he looked at me and he goes, “Have you ever taught
before?” And I looked at him and I said, “Yes.” And he goes, “Yeah, but
have you ever taught Torts before?” Literally in that tone and I said,
“No, but you’ll be okay.” He just scowled at me and he walked away.

Again, this harkens back to the outright confrontations
detailed in the early literature. These have not abated in spite
of some numeric increases in faculty diversity.136
Yet, numeric increases alone are not sufficient.
Structural diversity—diversity in numbers—does not
automatically
translate
into
meaningful
cross-racial
interaction, either in the classroom or on campus more
generally.137 In other words, critical mass is a necessary but
insufficient condition for ensuring the types of benefits we
expect from diversity. For actual benefits of diversity to accrue,
individuals must be in mutually respectful environments
where they have an opportunity to listen and learn from one
another.138 This environment does not seem to be the standard
in law schools today, either for faculty or for students.
A multiracial faculty member named Sofia remembers
that “the very first class that I taught was a disaster.” First,
she recalls “sort of a mutiny” because she banned laptops from
her seminar. Parsing just these details, we know already that
Sofia had three strikes against her from that first day: the first
because she is a female law professor (outside the gender
norm), the second because she is a faculty member of color
(outside the racial norm), and the third because she banned
laptops (outside the norm at her school of allowing laptops in
class). Sofia remembers the rest of the semester as “truly
dreadful,” with a variety of confrontations in every class:
“people being very obnoxious and defiant and texting, like
136 In fact, the numbers have increased significantly from the slightly over 300
faculty members in the legal academy whom Bell and Delgado attempted to include in
their study, though the qualitative experience remains troublingly similar. Delgado &
Bell, supra note 14, at n.17.
137 See Deo, supra note 19, at 84.
138 See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer’s
Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY REV. 133, 171 (1991) (“Empirical
research with other minority groups has shown that inter-group contact often reduces
prejudice in the majority group when the contact meets several conditions: When it is
encouraged by the institution in which it occurs, makes shared goals salient, and
fosters inter-group cooperation; when the contact is ongoing and intimate rather than
brief and superficial; and when members of the two groups are of equal status and
share important values.”).
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having their iPhones out and texting right in front of me.” They
also expressed their displeasure with Sofia outside of the
classroom; she recounts that “three students ran a campaign
about how I should lose my job,” seeking support from the
administration in their quest to be rid of her. Because of the
painful experience, especially the ways in which “race was
brought up in all of this hostility,” she has never taught the
seminar again. Similarly a Black woman professor named
Keisha remembers that “one student basically told me that they
had other things to do than to do my written assignments.” Of
course, failure to complete required assignments would count
against the student when it came time for grading, but the
student’s brazen disrespect made for a challenging classroom
environment for Keisha in the meanwhile.
Armida, a Latina, recognizes that the students who are
constantly challenging her “tend to sit together,” and are
usually “white, male, [and] arrogant,” especially her secondsemester students who “know they’ve done really well” in their
first semester of law school. This one semester of law school
success gives them “this confidence that they know more than I
do,” which leads to “a lot of challenging within the classroom.”
Again, this disrespect often stems from the students’ disbelief
that the woman of color in front of the room is qualified to
teach them and might know more than they do. In Armida’s
experience, it is “always white males” who are confrontational,
whereas her white female students “tend to appreciate what
I’m doing,” and students of color “relate to me and I see it.”
Madison, a white untenured law professor, recognizes that
“there is a challenge being a younger-looking female professor”
especially because there are always some “male students” who
end up “challenging your authority.” Natalie, a multiracial
female, remembers “one guy who came in 45 minutes late to a
55 minute class.” After Natalie asked him to leave, “he had me
up against the wall with his finger [in my face] like, how dare I
kick him out of the class.” This physical intimidation may be
rare but is still a threat facing female faculty of color on law
school campuses today.
Patrice, a Black female who had taught upper-level
classes for a few years before being assigned to teach a firstyear course, was similarly “unprepared for the level
of . . . racism and sexism that people have told me about forever
but [that] I’d never experienced” in upper-level classes. She
remembers most vividly “the [white] guys with their baseball
caps on backwards that are challenging just everything you are
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saying.” She tried to maintain the upper hand, to not “follow
them down that road and try and maintain control of the class
and just teach the class, [but] they are like the gnat just
driving you crazy.” Because of this, Patrice learned how much
of a “challenge” it is to make students take her seriously when
they simply “see young, Black, and female. And I’m not young
but I don’t think they know how old I am! And I feel like I just
have to work a lot harder to prove my authority and mastery.”
In fact, Patrice does have to work harder than her
colleagues since she is battling against the presumption of
incompetence that accompanies women of color into the
classroom on their first day teaching and takes great effort to
overcome.139 Hannah remembers that “especially my first year,
there were students who would ask questions [drawing from]
things that were a few pages ahead in the text beyond what the
reading assignment was for that given day,” and use a “tone of
voice that demonstrated it was a challenge rather than a
legitimate question.” She makes clear that these were not
necessarily “illegitimate question[s], but rather than simply a
question that the tone of voice was very challenging.” So she
would register the question, coupled with “the tone of voice,”
and “the look on the face;” together she took these as the
student attempting to be “very challenging, [as if his
motivation were,] ‘Let’s see if she’ll get it or if she can handle
it.’” Thus, while particular questions may have been
legitimately about the course, they were drawn from material
not assigned for the day, coupled with a confrontational tone
and a superior look on the student’s face to make clear the
question was more of a challenge than a polite and enthusiastic
inquiry from an eager learner.140
Sometimes
classroom
confrontations
spill
into
challenging private meetings. For instance, a Latina named
Bianca recalls “my very first semester a student coming in[to
my office], and I think he thought he was maybe doing me a
favor, and saying, ‘I’m just not used to someone who teaches
like you,’” and suggesting changes to her teaching style and
pedagogical approach. It was likely true that this student had
not had anyone who looked like Bianca teaching him before,
139 Individual strategies for overcoming the structural challenge of being
presumed incompetent, as well as some necessary structural solutions, are discussed
infra at Part IV.B.
140 Some white male colleagues have a hard time believing these as anything
other than legitimate questions. Yet, many women of color in the DLA sample
articulate Hannah’s experience of the context coupled with the question indicating it is
more of a challenge to authority than an innocent inquiry.
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given the paltry numbers of female faculty of color in legal
academia.141 Yet, he either failed to register as disrespectful his
request that his law professor change her style to accommodate
his preferences, or was unabashedly rude to his Latina
professor. Even more dramatically, a Black woman named
Trisha recalls, “I had one student tell me once, and he thought
he was being a friend, he said, ‘I never had a Black woman tell
me anything who wasn’t dressed in white.’” Initially confused
about what this meant, it “took me a minute [before realizing
that] the roles he was assigning me were maid, nurse, [etc.].”
As Aisha, Mariana, and others note, they are often the
students’ first woman of color authority figure; Trisha’s student
simply made explicit the roles he expected Black women would
continue to play in his life. Jennifer, a Native American, had a
private meeting with a white student who felt she deserved a
better grade than the one she earned. Jennifer recalls:
[The student] was very disrespectful. And when I explained to her
why she received the grade she had, she rolled her eyes and crossed
her arms and said bad things about my teaching. You know, “Well
you didn’t explain this right.” At one point I just stopped her and
said. “I don’t think we’re communicating in a positive way right
now,” and so I said, “Maybe we should take a break and check in
after we’ve both had some time to cool down a little bit.” And she got
up and stormed out of my office. She left and I said, “I think we
should talk again.” And she said, “No, don’t bother.”

Thus, even when female faculty of color reach out to students
and make attempts to be inclusive and understanding, these
efforts are often rebuffed by students who are unable or
unwilling to recognize that all of their faculty members are
competent, but instead take every opportunity to challenge the
authority of the female faculty of color.142
C. Comparison & Contrast
“I’ve never been a professor who students approach when they have
issues.” -Ed
141 Again, Latinas comprise just 1.3% of American law professors—including
not only tenured and tenure-track faculty, but also visitors, contract, legal writing,
library, and other faculty members. With just 138 Latinas out of 10,965 law faculty
members total, this particular student would likely never encounter a professor who
looked like Bianca again. See supra Table 2.
142 Some students leave equally egregious anonymous comments on teaching
evaluations, especially when commenting on female law faculty of color. Analyses of
the DLA data show that women of color law professors endure spiteful, unproductive
critiques from students, many of which focus on style or personal appearance instead of
teaching effectiveness. For more on these additional but related challenges, see Meera
E. Deo, A Better Tenure Battle, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming Aug. 2015).
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Male law professors from different racial/ethnic groups
offer interesting contrasts to the experiences of the women
detailed above. Some male faculty of color have similar
experiences with students outside of the classroom. Many are
inundated by student requests that they feel compelled to
accept, which leaves less time to work on research or focus on
other responsibilities. For instance, a Native American man
named Stuart recognizes the significant burden that he and
other faculty of color face because “the diversity of the students
is much better than the diversity of the faculty in terms of
mere numbers, [which means that] faculty of color are
inundated with all this extra work.” Stuart is “constantly asked
to advise on papers and for groups and to go to events,”
especially by students of color. Although he “want[s] to do as
much as [I] can,” he has “little kids at home and it makes it
difficult” for him to commit to these extra work obligations and
still meet his personal responsibilities.143 He does not think his
situation is unique, but rather thinks that “all the faculty of
color are inundated.” In fact, the literature supports this
perspective, explaining that a number of students of color
“simply feel that there is no one else on the faculty who can
understand their problems or who really cares about resolving
them.”144 In spite of his efforts at accommodating student
requests, Stuart is disappointed that all of these extra efforts
directed at students do not count for “anything when it comes
to going up for tenure.”
On the other hand, the experiences of most white men
and some men of color in the DLA study differ considerably
from the general trend among female faculty and especially
female faculty of color who go to great lengths to meet their
students’ needs. Ed, a multiracial man, and Ian, a white man,
offer interesting and representative contrasts to the
experiences of Kayla, Gabrielle, Jane, and other female faculty
of color. While Ed’s relationship with students overall is
“[p]retty good,” even the students of color “really don’t lean on
me;” he admits, “I’ve never been a professor who students
approach when they have issues.”145 Similarly, Ian notes, “I
143 For more on work/life balance among law faculty, again drawing from the
DLA data, see Meera E. Deo, Becoming Family Friendly (work in progress) (on file with
the author).
144 Brooks, supra note 113, at 421.
145 Some men of color in the DLA do make a concerted effort to connect with
students. Vijay, an Asian American, says his “relationship with students is very
positive,” perhaps in part because he “believe[s] faculty members are there to serve the
students.” A Black man named Michael “handpick[s] mentees from the 1L class,” and is
so devoted to them that he “stay[s] up at night thinking about them and how to get
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probably don’t have as deep a relationship with students where
I’m their first call for situations or issues.” Again, this is likely
because the students’ first call is to the female faculty and
especially the female faculty of color they sense as the most
receptive to addressing their needs.
While many white women and women of color struggle
to assert authority in the classroom, students give white men
and men of color alike significant deference. Joe, like almost all
faculty in the DLA sample, found his first days of teaching
“[v]ery stressful,” in part because he was new to the material
and “wasn’t as in command of the subject matter” as he would
have liked. Nevertheless, within “a month or two, I got the
hang of it and everything felt fine.” For Joe, a white male law
professor, only the material was challenging, not the students
or their interactions with him. In fact, when Joe reflects on the
large first-year classes he taught, he remembers both that he
“enjoyed that,” and that he was slightly concerned about how
the students did not interact much with him because they were
“intimidated by me.” Thus, the students were so respectful of
their white male professor that they rarely interacted with him
at all—perhaps the opposite of the near-constant
confrontations facing female faculty of color in the classroom.
Similarly, when asked to reflect on his first year
teaching, an Asian American man named Andrew recalls, “It
was overwhelming how much work it was,” even in comparison
to earlier full-time positions as a judicial law clerk and law
firm associate. Yet, Andrew had no confrontations from
students or challenges to his authority in the classroom.
Instead, he says of the students that “even my first year,
everyone was supportive.” In spite of his current
acknowledgment that “[l]ooking back, I feel that the quality of
my teaching wasn’t great,” at the time he nevertheless
“consistently got amazing reviews and feedback from the
students.”146 Again, Andrew’s male privilege in the classroom
likely afforded him a measure of respect wholly absent from the
classrooms of his female colleagues. This enabled him to focus
on mastering the material, while his students encouraged and
supported him as he learned how best to teach them.

them the next opportunity.” While Michael puts “a lot of time and a lot of investment”
in his mentees, most men in the DLA sample do not seem to follow his lead.
146 Jack, an Asian American male, is especially sensitive to how some faculty
fail to take him seriously or even mistake him for a student. Still, this has never been a
hindrance in the classroom; he even won a teaching award soon after he started
teaching law.
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IV. BEST PRACTICES: STRATEGIES TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION
“I think over-preparation is the norm. I mean you just don’t get the
benefit of the doubt.” -Brianna

A. Creating Faculty Inclusion
“‘Hey, why are we all looking at the girls? I’ll take notes [today]. Next
time, John, you can take notes.’” -Abigail, recounting a suggestion
from her white male colleague

Just as Bell and Delgado noted 25 years ago, a number
of faculty of color in legal academia today are distrustful of
their faculty colleagues.147 Women of color face intersectional
discrimination, doubly discriminated against because of their
multiple devalued identity characteristics.148 While many faculty
members from traditionally and currently underrepresented
groups characterize their relationships with peers as cordial,
most are not close, especially to white male faculty members.
Instead, the closer relationships for female faculty of color are
with other individuals from marginalized groups, including
women, people of color, and those in the LGBTQ community.
Many see through the mask of collegiality to the incivility of
their colleagues. The distrust that many female faculty of color
feel is based on challenging interactions, including numerous
instances of white faculty trivializing their experiences,
denigrating their work, and putting roadblocks in the way of
their professional success.
The DLA study reveals that there are ongoing genderrelated incidents on law school campuses, many of which
invoke both racism and sexism.149 To combat this, even small
changes can have a big impact on gender inclusion.
Participants in the DLA study identified a number of “best
practices,” tried and true strategies for combatting the
discrimination they continue to face. This Part shares findings
Delgado & Bell, supra note 14, at 357-59.
DLA includes male and female LGBTQ participants, including white and
non-white law faculty members. However, the data does not reveal patterns of overt
discrimination or harassment based on sexual orientation or ways in which sexual
orientation couples with other identity characteristics to create intersectional bias.
This may be because there were only small numbers of members of the LGBTQ
community as compared to the total sample, and because intersectionality based on
sexual orientation was not the focus of the study, and so direct questions were not
asked on the topic.
149 For more on intersectionality, see Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, supra note 30; Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
supra note 30.
147

148
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that are focused on solutions. These data from women and men
legal academics invoke strategies that have been effective in
particular instances that others could employ to attain similar
positive results.
Destiny has two suggestions from her own experience as
a Black woman in legal academia. First, she says her school has
been working on “changing our meeting times to make them in
the middle of the day” instead of at 4:00pm as they had been for
years. Why would that make a difference? She explains:
Well, guess what? Half the women disappear at 3:00! A couple of the
men did as well, but almost all the women would disappear
and . . . that is significant [because] when it came to decision-making,
[women] were just not present because we were off picking up kids
from school or taking them some place or that sort of thing.150

Thus, simply changing meeting times to accommodate the
personal realities of many faculty members is one small
structural change that could lead to much greater inclusion,
both symbolically and actually.
Destiny highlights another often-unrecognized challenge
for women: teaching on Mondays. Even in academia, women
remain the primary caregivers for children.151 During the
traditional Monday to Friday workweek, most children of
academics are in day care or school.152 Destiny notes, “If you
work Monday you have to prep probably on Sunday,” which is
challenging for most women since schools/day cares tend to be
closed. The result is that many women are often “up late on
Sunday nights trying to prep for our classes” while the kids are
asleep. An alternative structural solution that takes these
realities into account would be to give parents the option of
teaching on Tuesdays or later, so they could “have four or five
hours to work” on class preparation every Monday without “the
young people underfoot.”
While family-friendly scheduling of meetings and
classes can make a difference, additional changes are needed if
women are to have a true voice at those very meetings, as they
too often complain of silencing and invisibility on the campus
as a whole and in faculty meetings in particular. Recall
Abigail’s recollection of her early days in law teaching when
her male colleagues expected their female faculty colleagues to
150 Lest these women stand accused of working less than a full time day or somehow
shirking their professional duties, many women in the DLA sample note that their workdays
resume again for many hours around 8:00 or 9:00pm when their children are in bed.
151 See Mason et al., supra note 126.
152 Some participants in the DLA study with very young children engaged
nannies or babysitters instead of or in addition to relying on day care or school.
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take notes at faculty meetings—essentially relegating them to
the role of secretary rather than equal faculty members.
Abigail notes that the practice “has abated” at her institution
in part through the hard work and persistence of one of her
white male colleagues. She says that 20 years ago, when this
practice was rampant, “he would say, ‘Hey, why are we all
looking at the girls? I’ll take notes [today]. Next time, John, you
can take notes.’”153 True, his speaking up could be considered a
form of “mansplaining,” but it got the job done, removing
secretarial work from the realm of female faculty members to
rotate among the men in the room or at least be spread equally
between all faculty colleagues. Allies participating in educating
white male colleagues can thus be particularly effective.
It is especially necessary for law school administrators to
take note of the horrific examples of gender discrimination
plaguing law schools, from outright sexual harassment to other
means of creating a hostile or unfriendly work environment for
women. All law schools should have sexual harassment policies in
place, including zero tolerance for violations. There should also be
clear reporting requirements and guidelines to ensure that the
documented silencing of women does not work against reporting
efforts. In fact, many colleges and universities around the country
that have recently been criticized for their lack of reporting and
enforcement mechanisms to prevent sexual harassment and
sexual assault on and around campus have quickly intensified
efforts to comply with Title IX.154 Law schools should follow their
lead before the U.S. Department of Education targets them for
their lack of compliance with federal law.155
B. Combatting Discrimination in the Classroom
“I use a lot of skills of being a mother: very sweet, very nice, very
nurturing, but switching at a moment’s notice and letting them know
there is no messing around in my class and these are my expectations.
And also I take a very feminine approach to it; it’s about establishing
relationships where they don’t want to let me down.” -Eliana

153 Note that even this white male defender and educator referred to his
female colleagues as “girls”!
154 For instance, “55 colleges and universities nationwide [are] under scrutiny
by the U.S. Department of Education for [their] handling of reported sex crimes on
campus.” Jack Flynn, Amherst College, Responding to Federal Title IX Probe, Cites Major
Improvements in its Handling of Sexual Assault Complaints, MASSLIVE (May 1, 2014, 7:12
PM) http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/05/amherst_college_responding_to.html.
155 This Article does not seek to expound on the requirements of Title IX; it is
mentioned here only to emphasize the real threat that federal authorities could
intervene to ensure compliance.
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In spite of their many positive interactions with students,
female faculty of color also endure challenging classroom
confrontations, especially from white male students. Existing
literature has documented how many of these faculty members
enter the classroom with a presumption of incompetence
working against them.156 Some faculty members have devised
creative strategies to combat these classroom challenges on their
own. Yet, individual efforts are not enough; broader structural
support, following the lead of the institutions discussed below, is
also sorely needed.
1. Individual Strategies: Over-Preparation, Confidence,
and the Art of Gender Judo
Many female faculty of color respond to anticipated or
real student confrontations in the classroom by working harder
than they thought possible, mastering the material before they
even enter the classroom in order to combat the presumption
that they are not qualified to teach. Hannah, a multiracial
woman, believes she “had to do more to prove that I knew what
I was talking about than I would if I were a white male. I
firmly believe that.” Hannah recalls being “challenged” in the
classroom frequently, especially when she first started law
teaching, and the challengers “tended to be white men,
absolutely.” In order to prove her competency, Hannah took to
“infusing references to things that demonstrated the depth of
my knowledge.” For instance, she made sure to mention her
prior, prestigious, corporate law practice and specifically drew
from her practical experience when discussing particularly
difficult material in class. While many law professors mention
prior practice and share practice-related insights in class,
Hannah did so specifically in order to “demonstrate the kind of
work that I was working on and that it directly related to what
I was teaching them.” In this way, she could assert her
competence and prove to her students that she was qualified to
teach them, at least for this particular subject.
Similarly, a Latina named Armida believes that “it’s all
about credentializing yourself,” especially to gain legitimacy
with the “white males” who tend to challenge her in the
classroom. Thus, she suggests the following as “a tactic you can
employ” sometime “at the beginning” of the academic year:
“incorporating in the conversation [past] experience from a
156 See generally PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND
CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA, supra note 25.
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large law firm. That impresses them [and] gives them a value
in me. [They think,] ‘Sullivan & Cromwell, that means that
she’s smart.’”
A Black senior female named Brianna suggests that it may
not be enough to “know the stuff inside and out,” or reveal previous
prestigious work experience. Hannah’s experience makes this
clear, because in spite of her hard work and over-preparation, she
was still frequently challenged in class. Even her attempts to prove
her competency were not met with complete respect. Brianna notes
that because “people of color and women in particular don’t get the
benefit of the doubt” that they are experts and know the material
well, “over-preparation is the norm” for them. She believes that
older, white, male professors “can walk in with old crusty notes and
not have really innovated their classes in a lot of different ways and
can not be on the top of their game on any given day,” and students
will not punish them for their lack of preparation because they at
least look like what the students expect in a law professor. Of
course, women of color law professors are not “afforded that
luxury,” and therefore have to work much harder to earn and keep
their students’ respect.157 Brianna explains that while you “have to
know your material,” it is equally important to “exude a confidence
[through] a classroom persona.” She warns that female faculty of
color who do not “go into that classroom and command that
classroom” meet “students [who] sense vulnerability [and] will
devour you.” Thus, it is not sufficient to prove competency by
mastering the material; women of color must also exude confidence
to be believable as law faculty members.
Eliana is a Latina who started a tenure-track position
only recently. Yet, like Brianna, she “spent so much time”
anticipating classroom challenges and developing strategies to
avoid or combat them. Perhaps because of this, during her first
year in law teaching she “never had a student challenge me.”
Eliana provides many of the same suggestions as Brianna; for
instance, “I immediately come in with a lot of authority, with a
lot of telling [the students], ‘These are my credentials.’ ‘This is
why we are doing this.’” If any issues arise, Eliana “use[s]
humor” to neutralize tension, and also “a lot of skills [from]
being a mother: very sweet, very nice, very nurturing, but
switching at a moment’s notice and letting them know there is
no messing around in my class and these are my expectations.”
157 This Article does not suggest that most white male law professors are not
innovative or excellent teachers; the inclusion of Brianna’s quote is simply to highlight
a pattern in the data identifying the opportunity for older white male professors to rest
on their laurels (even if they are not doing so), while women of color rarely have laurels
available.
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She describes this as her “feminine approach” to teaching,
where the focus is on “establishing relationships where they
don’t want to let me down” and believes this is why “students
work really hard in my class.” In fact, researchers would
characterize Eliana’s strategy as an example of “gender judo,”
defined as the purposeful decision to “take feminine stereotypes
that can hold women back—the selfless mother and the dutiful
daughter, for example—and use those stereotypes to propel
themselves forward.”158 In spite of her success in employing
gender judo, Eliana realizes that it “takes a lot of energy” for
her to utilize this approach, “versus a white male colleague”
who she believes would not have to strategize about asserting
classroom authority and work as hard to maintain it.
2. Structural Suggestions: Mentors, Allies &
Administrative Support
In addition to individual attempts to combat bias, some
schools have found ways to offer structural support to faculty
with regard to their teaching. Most do not target these efforts
at improving the experience or the retention rates of female
faculty of color, though they tend to have that effect. For
instance, some schools offer new law teachers a “light load” in
the first year or semester, where they teach just one class
during their first semester and one or two during their second
semester (at schools where the standard may be two classes per
semester). This allows new faculty to ease into the law school
environment and especially into class preparation. When
Abigail, a senior white scholar, first started teaching, she says
her school “didn’t, as we do now, allow our first year, first
semester teachers to have a light load.” As a result, she recalls,
“I taught four courses my first year, Torts I [and] Criminal Law
in the Fall [then] Constitutional Law and Torts II in the
Spring.” She clearly had no opportunity to ease into law
teaching; in fact, during her first year on the faculty, she “had
two-thirds of the [entering] class” of students in at least one of
the “four huge classes” she was assigned to teach.
The “light load” may be especially important for women
of color, as class preparation for this group refers not only to
mastering the substantive material they plan to teach, but also
the pedagogical approach and detailed strategies they will
158 Joan C. Williams, Women, Work and the Art of Gender Judo, WASH. POST
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/women-work-and-the-art-ofgender-judo/2014/01/24/29e209b2-82b2-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html.

1008

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

employ to keep the class on track. For instance, a multiracial
faculty member named Hannah is especially appreciative of the
structural support she has received at her school. For all new law
faculty members, in their “first year and the first semester,
fortunately, we have a lighter load, so my introduction was merely
preparing one class, and then the second semester I prepare[d]
two.” This gave her the freedom and flexibility to spend
considerable time on class preparation, noting that in her early
years of law teaching, she “basically was working [the equivalent
of] large law firm hours” in order to master the material and
present a fully competent self in class, in part because she is
motivated to be “as good as I can be for my students.”
While Hannah did work hard, she also credits
mentorship and faculty support for improving her teaching.
She notes, “Fortunately, there are two other professors here
that teach [my first year course] on a regular basis, and one of
them used the same textbook [as I did]. The other one has been
teaching for probably something like 30 years.” While her
school did not have a formal mentor program in place to
connect her with these senior scholars, they had an informal
open-door policy to encourage new faculty to feel comfortable
approaching them for counsel. Hannah readily took advantage
of the welcoming atmosphere at her school and especially the
encouragement she received from those teaching in her subject
area, and “would regularly just shoot them questions about the
questions a student had, and I thought I had the right answer,
but I wanted to make sure.” Thus, rather than avoiding her
colleagues because they looked down on her, believed her to be
ill-prepared, or were jealous of her accomplishments, Hannah
was in an environment where she was made to feel comfortable
reaching out to her colleagues for reassurance that she had the
right answers and was well prepared to respond to her
students. She would also ask these mentors directly, “‘How
would you present this material?’ And I would get back
answers,” rather than snarky comments or hostility. Hannah
was actually so comfortable asking for help that “sometimes I
would just stop them in the hallway and ask them questions
too.” All of these efforts at connecting with faculty, seeking out
advice, and taking suggestions paid off. In spite of some
challenging classroom confrontations from white male
students, Hannah persevered, eventually earning two teaching
awards in less than a decade of law teaching.
Mentorship does not necessarily involve a shared race or
gender identity. Many of the women of color in the DLA sample
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noted the ways in which white men and white women with
positions of power sponsored or supported them, especially
when they first entered legal academia. For instance, an Asian
American named Vivian says the following of her mentor
relationship with a senior white female scholar:
She’s my . . . strongest ally. [T]hat relationship has been absolutely
pivotal for me here. She was the Associate Dean when I got hired. She
was my go-to person when I don’t know what to do about something.

Although “most of my colleagues are white” and Vivian
maintains “an arms-length relationship” with many, based in
part on the distrust discussed earlier,159 her relationship with
this particular mentor has flourished; it is obviously not based
on a shared racial identity, though she says specifically, “other
stuff trumps race.”
There are instances during which administrators took
an active role in protecting and safeguarding the careers of
vulnerable faculty, where they stood up for the faculty they had
hired. Sometimes this was as simple as communicating openly
with female faculty of color about student complaints or issues;
other times, administrators simply refused to accommodate the
outlandish demands of complaining white students or made
clear to students that they believed in and supported these
often marginalized faculty. In her first semester teaching, a
white woman named Madison “ended up having one student
who is notoriously difficult [which] made the day-to-day class
more challenging.” However, because Madison “had the full
support of the faculty,” it was “easier to manage” since she
never felt she was dealing with his disruptions all on her own.
In fact, at some point, “the Associate Dean did end up
intervening and having a chat” with the problem student to get
him in line. Unfortunately, even this basic level of support is
the outlier rather than the norm in legal academia.
Lack of administrative support is much more common,
leading the faculty members under attack to become further
marginalized. Laila, a Middle Eastern female, was not told
about numerous student complaints regarding her teaching in
a timely fashion, when she could have worked to address them.
When the Associate Dean finally conveyed student concerns
months later, Laila recalls him saying, “‘Yeah, I think they said
you were really mean, humiliating and degrading.’” She was
shocked, but explained the situation, detailing how one of her
159 See supra Part II.A. for more on the distrust lurking behind the mask of
civility in faculty relations.
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students consistently challenged her in class in various ways:
interrupting her lectures, announcing that the professor “was
wrong” on particular points of law, and even walking out of
class during lecture instead of at the scheduled break time.
When Laila forcefully asserted her authority over the
class, publicly telling the student that this sort of behavior was
unacceptable, her attempted solution backfired and “created a
huge chill among the class.” She did not realize then that it
would go beyond momentary tension. At the time, she was afraid
to discuss the situation with colleagues or administrators
because “I didn’t want to be perceived [as if] I didn’t have control
over the classroom.” Even years later, she believes that had her
Associate Dean told her about it earlier, “maybe I could have
had a discussion with them” to resolve what she had not
realized was an ongoing student concern. She also realized
later that the administration had not positioned her in a way to
make a smooth transition into law teaching by giving her a
light course load or small seminars to teach; instead, though it
“was my first semester teaching [they] gave me two sections of
Torts, so of course I’m not going to get professor of the year.”
Overall, she was concerned that the administration was
“looking at all the negative things” that students said, not
allowing her the opportunity to share her side of the story, and
“giving the students way more credit” than they deserved,
while also “completely ignoring the things I was
accomplishing.” Thus, the administration not only set her up to
face great challenges by giving her two large first-year classes
to teach during her first year on the faculty, but in taking the
students’ side, they also further marginalized and devalued
Laila’s competency as a legal academic.
Alicia, a Latina faculty member, had a white male
student who was “very hostile” toward her during her first
semester as a law professor. That student complained to one of
Alicia’s “white male faculty member” colleagues about her
pedagogical approach and demeanor. Rather than defend her to
the student or suggest the student talk with Alicia directly,
Alicia’s colleague promptly “assumed that of course the student
was correct in his complaints.” When Alicia’s white male
colleague later approached Alicia to discuss the situation, it
was as an advocate for the student, speaking on his behalf. For
Alicia, the “unfortunate circumstance of this faculty member
taking the student’s side is that [it] empowered the student to
act out even more” in class, which in turn led other students to
get more comfortable challenging her as well. Ultimately, she
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had “a little cabal of problematic students that I then had to
manage” throughout the semester, disrupting her teaching and
ruining the learning environment for all students. Just as with
Laila’s example, Alicia’s challenging situation could have been
nipped in the bud with the proper administrative support;
instead of taking her side outright or discussing the situation
with her in an open-minded fashion, her colleague sided with
the aggrieved student, complicating circumstances further.160
CONCLUSION
“[I]f you would like a woman of color on your faculty, then you have to
go and hire a woman of color. You can’t [simply] hope a woman of
color comes your way.” -Ryan

As a formal quantitative and qualitative national study
of law faculty, DLA reveals the current climate in legal
academia, and the unique challenges facing women of color.
The environment creates obstacles for women of color law
teachers that inhibit not only their success, but student
learning as a whole. The good news is that legal institutions
can employ strategies to combat these challenges and level the
playing field so that law faculty from all backgrounds can
succeed and students can focus on law school learning.
Many faculty members appreciate their colleagues and
their work environments, though they worry about the bias and
enmity lurking just below the mask of collegiality. Gender
discrimination, from silencing and invisibility to outright
harassment, plagues white women and women of color alike.
Interactions with students are similarly varied, and similarly
infused with both racism and sexism.161 Individual faculty
members from all racial backgrounds, including men and
women, report positive relationships with students. Yet, women
160 Alicia ultimately decided to talk with her colleague not only about how his
interference may have undermined her authority in the classroom, but also thereby
worsened her classroom situation. She used scholarship to connect with him, because
when she first approached him to discuss the situation, “I said, ‘We need to talk about
what happens in the classroom to women of color and I need you to read this article.’”
To his credit, he did and a productive discussion followed. This could be seen as
another individual strategy that others could employ, educating their peers about their
experiences in legal academia so that they understand the unique challenges, and
perhaps will sympathize and take them into consideration come time for tenure or
promotion review.
161 LGBTQ
individuals, disabled individuals, and those from various
socioeconomic backgrounds participated in the DLA study. These background
characteristics were not presented or discussed in this Article in part to protect
anonymity of participants. However, these salient characteristics likely have an effect
on interactions as well, including marginalized populations suffering “othering” among
faculty and challenges from students.
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faculty and especially women of color endure disrespectful
classroom confrontations from particular students.
Contemplating these challenges and opportunities
collectively, it seems clear that legal academia is long overdue
for broad structural change. While legal academia currently
confronts a number of external challenges, it is past time for
these institutions of higher learning to also do some internal
soul-searching.162 Many changes should be swift and dramatic.
For instance, law schools should immediately institute policies
to safeguard against ongoing gender bias and sexual
harassment. There should be zero tolerance for studentinitiated, disrespectful confrontations in the classroom, which
not only harm the law professor, but are disruptive distractions
from learning for all students. Administrative support, rather
than acquiescence or collaboration with student detractors, is
also crucial to ensuring the success of all law professors and
the students they seek to teach.
Other changes may have to be more subtle or gradual.
How can administrators offer support to women of color so that
they might improve student-faculty interactions? When faculty
members demonstrate that women of color faculty are
competent, experienced, and respected colleagues, rather than
belittle or silence them in public and private, students may
follow their lead. When the administration stands up for white
female faculty and both male and female faculty of color, rather
than siding with students, that too sends a clear message that
these nontraditional faculty are nevertheless valued, warning
students against future transgressions.
What follows is a list of specific proposals that
administrators and faculty who are seriously committed to
improving the experience of all law faculty and law students
can adopt to move in the direction of more equality-based and
equity-focused institutions:
•

Loudly and proudly advertise not only a presumption of
competence, but a presumption of excellence for all faculty

•

Create formal mentoring programs that are subject-specific for
new law faculty regarding both teaching and scholarship

162 External challenges currently facing legal academia include declining
admissions rates, shrinking faculties and faculty budgets, and forced changes to
curriculum and pedagogy. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 67, at 162-63; Herrera,
supra note 67, at 209; Ernde, supra note 68; Jones & Smith, supra note 4; Schrag,
supra note 67, at 407-08; .
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•

Cultivate an environment conducive to informal mentoring so
that new law faculty can connect with senior scholars in a safe
environment without judgment or tension

•

Support law faculty in any challenges from students; while we must
all be open to critique and willing to recognize our errors, give
faculty the benefit of the doubt instead of readily agreeing with
student complaints that confirm existing race/gender stereotypes

•

Adopt a zero-tolerance sexual harassment policy defining
violations and clarifying the appropriate reporting mechanisms
as well as harsh penalties for violations

•

Require participation from all faculty members in annual racial
and gender equality trainings/workshops

•

Discuss creative solutions for institutional housekeeping so that
note-taking and other internal administrative requirements
rotate equally among all faculty

•

Reward extraordinary service commitments, including
significant outreach to students, with decreases in other service
or teaching obligations

This list should not be seen as exhaustive, or a panacea
that will eliminate all vestiges of racism, sexism, and the
intersection of the two in the legal academy.163 In fact, when the
DLA participants were asked for their own suggestions for how
to improve diversity in legal academia, some of the most
thoughtful responses came from those making clear that there
was nothing new to suggest. For instance, an Asian American
woman named Surya notes, “I honestly don’t think the problem
is that administrators don’t know what they can do.” Her
perspective is that many do not feel it is important to diversify
the faculty in the first place, again suggesting diversity may be a
“surface” value rather than a “core” goal for many institutions.164
A Black faculty member named Ryan offers a particularly
poignant suggestion: “[I]f you would like a woman of color on
your faculty, then you have to go and hire a woman of color. You
can’t [simply] hope a woman of color comes your way.”
This Article and the DLA data overall are more hopeful
about the possibilities for and likelihood of change. Outreach,
support, and a willingness to engage with underrepresented legal
scholars would go a long way toward improving retention rates for
faculty. As Isabella, a white woman, notes, to retain diverse
163 For more strategies to combat institutional bias, see Yolanda Flores
Niemann, Lessons from the Experiences of Women of Color Working in Academia, in
PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA, supra note 25, at 446-99.
164 See Lee, supra note 108, at 479-80.
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faculty, “you have to make the work environment a friendly
enough place that someone wants to be there.” Thus, the
proposals above will only truly be effective when coupled with a
sincere desire to diversify the faculty, to recruit and retain white
women, women of color, men of color, and others from nontraditional and traditionally underrepresented backgrounds.
The DLA data reveal that marginalized faculty members
are coping as best they can, creating strategies in the hallways
to navigate difficult interactions with colleagues and in the
classroom to guard against or respond to student confrontations.
However, greater structural support is necessary to meet the
identified structural challenges. We cannot expect individuals to
fight alone against structural bias and win.
The real winners in a legal academy free of institutional
bias are not only those facing that bias now, but also other
faculty members who could learn and grow through respectful
interaction with their colleagues. Students of color would be
better served as well without the distractions of classroom
confrontations and other challenging interactions on campus.
Yet, since structural diversity (e.g., an increase in the number of
underrepresented faculty) does not lead automatically to
interactional diversity (i.e., meaningful cross-racial interaction),
we must do more than diversify our faculty.165 While ensuring
critical mass is a necessary first step, for law schools to live up to
their full potential, the environments much be such that faculty
see each other as equals and are comfortable interacting with
one another. When that happens, the legal profession as a whole
comes out ahead.

165

Deo, supra note 19, at 82-3, 85.

RESPONSES

Correcting the Record Regarding the
Restatement of Property’s Slayer Rule
in the Brooklyn Law Review’s
Symposium Issue on Restatements
Lawrence W. Waggoner†
John H. Langbein††
In 2014, the Brooklyn Law Review published a
symposium issue on Restatements of the Law.1 The organizer
of the symposium, Professor Anita Bernstein, did not afford an
opportunity for Restatement reporters to comment on the
articles.2 The organizer did invite the Director of the American
Law Institute, Lance Liebman, to contribute an essay
commenting on the symposium as a whole.3
Liebman’s essay—unintentionally no doubt—misstated
the position that we took in formulating the slayer rule for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers.4 Liebman’s misstatement—that we recommended
that the Institute adopt a rule allowing a murderer to inherit
from his or her victim—needs to be corrected.

† Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan;
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.
†† Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University; Associate
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.
1 Symposium, Restatement of . . . , 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
2 See
Anita Bernstein, Symposium Introduction, Onlookers Tell an
Extraordinary Entity What to Do, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
3 See Lance Liebman, Symposium Afterword, Law Reform Agenda as ALI
Approaches Its Centennial, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 821 (2014).
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 (2003) [hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT] (“Homicide─The Slayer Rule”).
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The passage in question observes that the Institute’s
deliberative process on occasion “resolves an inconsistency”5
among the reporters of different Restatements.
The best example during my Directorship was when Andrew Kull, from
his grounding in the law of restitution and unjust enrichment,
persuaded the membership to require Lawrence Waggoner and John
Langbein, the Reporters for wills and other donative transfer[s], to alter
their recommendation that a murderer be able to inherit from his or her
victim. Indeed, could there be a more unjust enrichment than that?6

The well-accepted general principle embodied in the
slayer rule is that a slayer is not allowed to benefit in any way
from his or her crime.7 We have never questioned that principle,
and accordingly, we did not recommend that “a murderer be able
to inherit from his or her victim.” The position that we
recommended and that the Institute approved is that the
“victim’s intestate estate passes and is administered as if the
slayer predeceased the victim.”8 A long-established corollary of
the slayer rule is that the rule does not cause the slayer to
forfeit his or her own property. If X murders Y, X cannot
inherit from Y, but Y’s estate has no right to X’s property
(although, of course, in a tort action, X may be found liable to
Y’s estate in a wrongful death action).9
The slayer rule has broad application to a number of
subsidiary situations.10 The disagreement between Reporter
Kull and us concerned the application of the slayer rule to one
of these subsidiary situations: when two persons hold property
in joint tenancy, and one slays the other. In a joint tenancy,
each tenant has the unilateral right to sever the tenancy and
take his or her own fractional interest outright. Our position,
strongly supported by the case law and statutes,11 was (and
remains) that because the right to sever was the slayer’s own
property, that right is not forfeited by the crime. As we
explained in the Reporter’s Note, that principle “can be
implemented either by imposing a constructive trust in favor of
the victim’s estate of the victim’s fractional share that would
otherwise pass to the killer by survivorship or (a remedy that
Liebman, supra note 3, at 827.
Id. (emphasis added).
7 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at cmts. a, b.
8 Id. at cmt. j; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
9 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at cmts. o and q.
10 See id. cmts. j-n, p.
11 See id. Reporter’s Note No. 8.
5
6
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yields the same result) by treating the killing as effecting a
severance of the joint tenancy.”12 Kull’s position is to the
contrary, or, more specifically, that the victim’s estate takes the
whole of the property by right of survivorship (unless there is
some further equitable justification for effecting a severance of
the joint tenancy).13
Our purpose here is not to revisit the merits of the two
positions, but to emphasize that we never recommended that
the Institute adopt a rule that “a murderer be able to inherit
from his or her victim.”14

12
13

Note No. 8.
14

Id.
The Kull motion is reproduced in the Reporter’s Note. See id. Reporter’s
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

How the ALI’s Restatement Third of
Property is Influencing the Law of
Trusts and Estates
Lawrence W. Waggoner†
Restatements, once limited to restating existing law, are
now substantially devoted to law reform. The ALI’s website
states its law-reform policy thus: “The American Law Institute
is the leading independent organization in the United States
producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law.”1
In 2014, the Brooklyn Law Review published a
symposium issue on Restatements of the Law.2 A paper in that
symposium argued against the ALI’s law-reform policy.3 The
† Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan;
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers. I
thank John Langbein for commenting on an earlier draft.
1 ALI Overview, ALI: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (emphasis added).
2 Symposium, Restatement of . . . , 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
3 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014). The authors
discussed four discrete Restatements of Property: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & TENANT (1977), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES (1997),
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (volumes released in 1999, 2003, 2011). Id. at 690-91,
693-95. The latter is the largest and most recently published of the four. It has three
volumes, eight divisions, 27 chapters, 135 sections, more than 1100 lettered comments, and
1468 pages (not counting tables and indices).
The Merrill-Smith complaints come from the perspective of property-law
teachers and some of them have nothing to do with the Donative-Transfers project. But
some of their complaints do relate to the Donative-Transfers project, and, as the Reporter
for that project, I wish to respond to their claim that that project has lost influence in the
development of the law. I would add that the Landlord-and-Tenant, Mortgages, and
Servitudes projects cover real-estate topics, are properly located under the Restatement of
Property umbrella, and are within the expertise of property-law teachers. The ALI has in
fact recently announced that it will begin work in 2015 on a Restatement (Fourth) of
Property, but that project will be limited to real-estate topics. See Press Release, American
Law Institute, The American Law Institute Announces Four New Projects, available at
http://www.ali.org/email/pr-14-11-17.html.
Donative Transfers is a trusts-and-estates topic and is within the expertise
of trusts-and-estates scholars. Donative Transfers could therefore logically be a
separate Restatement and be titled the Restatement of Wills and Other Donative
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authors specifically speculated that the reformist rather than
restatist character of the recently completed Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers4
(Property Restatement) has “very likely” caused that
Restatement to lose influence—be ignored—in the development
of the law.5
Before expressing such a harsh judgment,6 one would
expect the authors to have examined the statutory and case
law, as well as the trusts-and-estates scholarly literature, to
see if there is any evidence that supports their case. They did
not. Instead, they based their claim of irrelevancy on the ALI’s
royalties from Westlaw downloads as compared to royalties
from the Restatements of Torts and Contracts.7 Although the
authors cite no comparisons based on dollars and cents, the fact
is that royalties for downloads is a superficial measure of the
impact of a Restatement. More important is what the
downloaders do with the downloads.
The law of trusts-and-estates has long been in need of
substantial reform. This short essay serves as an interim
report on how the Property Restatement is contributing to that
effort8 and, in the process, refutes the claim that the
Transfers. Because the future Property Restatement Fourth will be limited to realestate topics, the Property Restatement Third on Wills and Other Donative Transfers
will not be affected by the Fourth and hence the Third will continue to represent the
position of the ALI for the wills-and-other-donative-transfers topic.
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (2003);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (1999)
[hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT].
5 Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 682. (“Perhaps most critically, the Second and
Third Restatements of Property have been given over to campaigns for legal reform, often
entailing the repudiation of earlier volumes of the Restatement, which has very likely
undermined the utility and the credibility of the ALI’s effort.”). For a similar point of view
regarding Restatements in general, and § 39 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) in particular, see the opinion of Justice Scalia, in Kansas v.
Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Over time, the Restatements’ authors have abandoned the mission of describing the law, and
have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to
be . . . . Restatement sections such as [§ 39] should be given no weight whatever as to the
current state of the law, and no more weight regarding what the law ought to be than the
recommendations of any respected lawyer or scholar.”). Justice Scalia’s statement about the
weight to be given to a Restatement section ignores the deliberative processes of the ALI that
every Restatement section goes through before it becomes final. See Overview: How ALI Works,
ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteworks (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
6 Not to be overlooked is the willfully hostile subtitle the authors chose for their
article: “The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property.” Merrill & Smith, supra note
3, at 681 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 681-82.
8 See generally
John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property
Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1 (2012); Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the
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Restatement’s reformist character has undermined its
importance. The Property Restatement’s influence extends to
all three pillars of law reform: uniform laws, decisional law,
and legal scholarship.
I.

INFLUENCING UNIFORM LAWS

There has been significant cross-fertilization between
the Property Restatement and uniform laws dealing with
trusts-and-estates.9
Unifying the Law of Probate and Nonprobate Transfers.
Although probate and nonprobate transfers occur at death and
thus are functionally equivalent, the law has historically
applied different rules to these categories. One of the broad
themes of reforming the law of trusts-and-estates is to unify
the law of probate and nonprobate transfers, so that the same
rules apply to both.10 The Property Restatement and the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) embrace that theme in various
manifestations. For example, the law has historically held that
divorce presumptively revokes provisions in a will in favor of
the former spouse but has not applied the same divorcerevocation rule to nonprobate transfers such as revocable
trusts or life insurance. In an important reformist move, the
Property Restatement and the UPC extend the divorcerevocation rule to nonprobate transfers.11
Class Gifts. Division V of the Property Restatement,
consisting of four chapters and 19 sections, contains a
comprehensive treatment of class gifts, especially addressing the
newly emerged question of the rights of children of assisted
reproduction to participate as class members. Class gifts are widely

Third and Final Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners
Should Know About, 38 ACTEC L.J. 23 (2012). The Langbein and Waggoner articles
are also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291160.
9 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 727, 731-36 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231637.
10 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
11 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 4.1; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2804 (amended 2010). In Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013), and Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), the Supreme Court thwarted the achievement of that
goal for federally regulated or created nonprobate transfers. See John H. Langbein,
Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary
Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-88,
1694-96 (2014); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of WealthTransfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1638-42 (2014).
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used in estate planning documents. The Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) codified Division V in the Uniform Probate Code.12
Powers of Appointment. Division VI of the Property
Restatement, consisting of seven chapters and 42 sections,
contains a comprehensive treatment of powers of appointment.
Powers of appointment are central to estate planning practice.
The ULC codified Division VI in the Uniform Powers of
Appointment Act.13
Reformation to Correct Mistakes. The law historically
has authorized courts to reform inter vivos donative documents,
but not wills, to correct mistaken terms.14 Section 12.1 of the
Property Restatement adopts a reformation doctrine for wills
as well as for other donative transfers. The ULC codified that
Restatement provision in the UPC and the Uniform Trust Code
(UTC).15 In North Dakota, a state that has enacted the UTC
reformation provision, the state supreme court in In re
Matthew Larson Trust Agreement,16 noted that the Comment to
the UTC reformation provision states that the provision was
copied from the Property Restatement’s reformation provision.
The court then proceeded to quote extensively and with
12 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115 to -122, 2-705; see also Sheldon F. Kurtz &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Addresses the Class-Gift and
Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC L.J. 30
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477961; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class
Gifts under the Restatement (Third) of Property (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper, No. 266, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006627.
In Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), the Supreme Court upheld the
Social Security Administration’s interpretation of § 416 of the Social Security Act as
requiring that state intestacy laws, despite being nonuniform, control the right of
posthumously conceived children of assisted reproduction (ART children) to Social
Security survivor benefits. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 1658-62. In Mattison v. Soc.
Sec. Comm’r, 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012), the Michigan Supreme Court held that ART
children born to the decedent’s widow are not entitled to take by intestacy under
Michigan law (and hence not entitled to Social Security survivor benefits). Id. at 570. The
Mattison decision prompted the Council of the Probate and Estate Planning Section of the
State Bar of Michigan to appoint a committee to study enactment of the UPC provisions
dealing with ART children. Full disclosure: I am a member of that committee.
13 The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act states: “A
comprehensive restatement of the law of powers of appointment was approved in 2010
and published in 2011 by the American Law Institute. See chapters 17-23 of the
Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers. This act draws
heavily on that Restatement.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT 1 (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Powers_of_Appointment/2013_UPAA_Final.pdf.
14 See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
15 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2014); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (amended
2010); see also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curing Execution Errors
and Mistaken Terms in Wills (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper,
No. 207, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653438.
16 831 N.W.2d 388, 394 (N.D. 2013).
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approval from the Property Restatement’s Comments and
Illustrations.17 In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service issued
private letter rulings accepting the validity for tax purposes of
UTC mistake-correcting reformations.18
Modification to Achieve the Donor’s Tax Objectives.
Section 12.2 of the Property Restatement adopts a taxmotivated modification doctrine for wills as well as for other
donative documents. The ULC codified that Restatement
provision in the UPC and the UTC.19 In 2014, the Internal
Revenue Service issued private letter rulings accepting the
validity for tax purposes of UTC tax-motivated modifications.20
Premarital and Marital Agreements. Section 9.4 of the
Property Restatement on premarital and marital agreements
regarding the surviving spouse’s elective-share and other
rights provides—for the first time to my knowledge—that
financial disclosure is not sufficient for the agreement to be
enforceable. Informed consent also requires disclosure of the
legal rights that the spouse or spouse-to-be is forgoing by
signing the agreement. The ULC adopted that position in the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.21
II.

INFLUENCING DECISIONAL LAW

The Property Restatement has also had considerable
influence with litigants seeking to change existing law or make
new law and ultimately with the courts in embracing the
Restatement’s proposals.22 It is important to point out that the
17 Id. at 394-95, 397, 399 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 12.1).
18 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151442-13 (June 18, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul
151441-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151440-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul 151439-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151438-13 (June 18, 2014).
19 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-806 (2014); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (amended 2010).
20 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151442-13 (June 18, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul
151441-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151440-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul 151439-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151438-13 (June 18, 2014).
21 See UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9 (2012).
22 Only two cases, to my knowledge, have rejected a Property Restatement’s
reformist initiative: one a four-two decision on the reformation of wills, Flannery v.
McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Mass. 2000), and the other on the inclusion of property
subject to a general power of appointment for purposes of the elective share of the surviving
spouse, Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 347 (Mass. 2003). For criticism of Flannery,
see Martin L. Fried, The Disappointed Heir: Going Beyond the Probate Process to Remedy
Wrongdoing or Rectify Mistake, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 400 (2004). Dissenting in
Bongaards, Chief Justice Marshall said: “I dissent from so much of the court’s opinion as
indulges in the criticism of, or forecloses in any respect our subsequent consideration of, the
recently approved § 9.1(c) of the Restatement (Third) [of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers].” Bongaards, 793 N.E.2d at 354 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Also, in In re Estate of Phillips, No. 01-0879, 2002 WL 1447482, at *1-
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following list does not include case law with routine citations to
the Restatement in support of existing law.23 Here, then, is a
list of decisions, compiled in alphabetical order by jurisdiction,
in which the court changed existing law or made new law on
the basis of the Property Restatement:
Ruotolo v. Tietjen.24 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that mere survival language does not
trump an antilapse statute, saying: “In sum, we agree with [the
Property Restatement].”25
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes
& Pagos.26 The court, in a tax reformation case, adopted the
Property Restatement’s position that a mistake of law, as well
as of fact, can be the basis for reforming a provision in a
testamentary trust, saying: “We adopt the [Property]
Restatement[’s] view on this subject.”27
University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker.28
The court abandoned the distinction between types of ambiguity
in construing instruments, saying: “We agree with [the Property
Restatement] and [other] authorities that the latent/patent
distinction . . . no longer serves any useful purpose.”29
Sieh v. Sieh.30 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that the value of property owned or
owned in substance by the decedent is subject to the forced
share of the surviving spouse, even when the forced-share

2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2002), an unpublished opinion, the court declined to adopt the
harmless-error rule of PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 3.3 on the ground that adopting such a
view was a matter for the legislature.
23 For citations of that sort, see, e.g., Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021,1024,
1026-27 (Mass. 2013), which cites PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 10.2 cmt. g and § 17.1
cmt. g with approval, BankBoston v. Marlow, 701 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Mass. 1998), which
cites PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 12.2 with approval, and Miller v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 84 A.3d 620, 624-25 (Pa. 2012), which adopts PROPERTY RESTATEMENT
§ 7.1’s definition of “will substitute.”
Two additional decisions cite and adopt PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 12.1 on
reformation on the ground of mistake: Estate of Irvine v. Oaas, 309 P.3d 986, 990 (Mont.
2013), and In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979, 331 P.3d 881, 888 (Nev. 2014).
Although these are cases of first impression in their jurisdictions, the donative documents
in question were inter vivos, not wills, so I have not listed these cases in Part II as
adopting the Property Restatement’s reformation doctrine for wills.
24 890 A.2d 166 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff ’ d per curiam, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007).
25 890 A.2d at 177 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra
note 4, § 5.5).
26 895 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. 2008).
27 Id. at 1200 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 12.1).
28 843 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2006).
29 Id. at 535 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§§ 10.2, 11.1).
30 713 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 2006).
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statute refers only to the probate estate, saying: “We adopt the
view of the American Law Institute on this issue.”31
In re Estate of Beauregard.32 The court adopted the
Property Restatement’s position that preponderance of the
evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is the proper
standard of proof for rebutting the presumption that a lost will
that is traced to the testator’s possession was revoked by act,
saying: “We follow the [Property] Restatement . . . on this
point, for the reasons [there] explained.”33
In re Griffin Revocable Grantor Trust.34 The court, on
“the basis of [the Property Restatement and other] authorities,”
concluded that “while [the Michigan statute on no-contest
clauses] does not apply to trusts, it reflects this state’s public
policy that no-contest clauses in trust agreements are
unenforceable if there is probable cause for challenging the
trust.”35 Later in the opinion, the court adopted the Property
Restatement’s definition of probable cause.36
Magnuson v. Diekmann.37 The court said: “Because
Minnesota caselaw on reformation pertains to contractual
rather than donative instruments, we turn to [the Property
Restatement for guidance].”38 The court then quoted and
applied several provisions of that Restatement dealing with
reforming a donative document to effect the donor’s intention.39
In re Martin B.40 The court, in a case of first impression,
held that the terms “issue” and “descendants” in trusts include
children conceived posthumously by means of assisted
reproduction, saying: “The rationale of the [Property]
Restatement . . . should be applied here.”41
31 Id. at 197-98 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 9.1(c) & cmt. j). The Iowa legislature subsequently rendered the forced share
ineffective by expressly limiting the nonprobate transfers subject to the spouse’s share
to one type—revocable inter vivos trusts. See IOWA CODE § 633.238 (2009); In re Estate
of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012).
32 921 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 2010).
33 Id. at 958 n.5 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note
4, § 4.1); see also id. at 957 n.4.
34 760 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
35 Id. at 322 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 8.5 cmt. i).
36 Id. at 323.
37 689 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
38 Id. at 274.
39 Id. at 275 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§§ 10.1, 10.2, and 12.1).
40 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Surr. Ct. 2007).
41 Id. at 211 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 14.8).
On November 21, 2014, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a bill designed to diminish
the possibility that a posthumously conceived child of assisted reproduction can qualify as a
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In re Estate of Herceg.42 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that a will can be reformed on the
ground of mistake, saying: “[I]t seems logical to this court to
choose the path . . . recommended by the [Property]
Restatement . . . .”43
See also In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, supra.44
III.

INFLUENCING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The Property Restatement is also influencing the third
pillar of law reform—legal scholarship. Just about every trustsand-estates law review article published lately cites the
Restatement for one or more propositions.45 The trusts-andestates casebooks are replete with full-section extracts from,
and other references to, the Restatement.46 A statutory
supplement that is widely adopted for classroom use
reproduces provisions of the Restatement alongside provisions
of the UPC and, where relevant, other uniform laws dealing
with trusts and estates.47

beneficiary of a trust. The new legislation will also necessitate significant attorney involvement
in order for such a child to benefit. The statute’s stringent requirements relate to highformality documentary evidence of the deceased genetic parent’s consent to allow posthumous
conception, post-death recordation of the decedent’s written consent, and post-death delivery
by the prospective birth mother of written notice of possible use of the decedent’s genetic
material for conception. The statute also imposes constrictive time limits for post-death
conception or birth. Finally, for wills or trusts that became effective before September 1, 2014,
as well as for decedents who died intestate before that date, the statute only allows a child to
take from the deceased genetic parent, not from an ancestor or any other relative of the
deceased genetic parent. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2014). In a
report issued after the bill passed the Assembly, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York urged the governor to sign it into law. The City Bar’s report praised the bill’s effect of
“limiting” the number of posthumously conceived children who will qualify as trust
beneficiaries. See New York City Bar, Report on Legislation by the Trusts, Estates and
Surrogate’s Courts Committee 1, 5 (July 2014), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/
20072610-PosthumouslyConceivedChildren.pdf.
42 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Surr. Ct. 2002).
43 Id. at 905 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 12.1).
44 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying
Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335 (2013); Steven J. Horowitz &
Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2014).
46 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES (9th ed. 2013); THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS (5th ed. 2011).
47 See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, UNIFORM TRUST AND ESTATE STATUTES (201415 ed. 2014).
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CONCLUSION
The Property Restatement has influenced and is
influencing the law of trusts and estates. Its influence extends
to all three pillars of law reform: uniform laws, decisional law,
and legal scholarship. Any claim to the contrary is demonstrably
false.

NOTES

An Unconstitutional Playbook
WHY THE NCAA MUST STOP MONITORING
STUDENT-ATHLETES’ PASSWORD-PROTECTED
SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
Social media use has increased exponentially in the past
few years. Twitter and Facebook have controlled much of the
social media market share and dominate this continuously
growing landscape.1 Since its launch in March 2006,2 Twitter
has amassed about 1 billion subscribers and is used by
approximately 100 million people everyday.3 The social media
site is “a real-time information network that connects you to
the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about what you find
interesting.”4 The service is used by people for business and
pleasure, and allows users to freely share their thoughts and
emotions via short updates, or “Tweets.”5 Users may shield
their Tweets from public view by making them private and
limiting visibility only to users’ approved followers.6 Similarly,
Facebook was founded on February 4, 2004, with the
“mission . . . to give people the power to share and make the
1 Most Popular Social Media Websites in the United States in September 2014,
Based on Share of Visits, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/marketshare-of-the-most-popular-social-media-websites-in-the-us/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
2 Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 13,
2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4.
3 Craig Smith, By The Numbers: 250+ Amazing Twitter Statistics, DIGITAL
MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://www.expandedramblings.com/index.php/march-2013-bythe-numbers-a-few-amazing-twitter-stats/ (last updated Jan. 3, 2015).
4 Getting
Started
on
Social
Media,
STANFORD+CONNECTS,
https://stanfordconnects.stanford.edu/get-started/social-media (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
5 New User FAQs, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/50-welcometo-twitter/topics/203-faqs/articles/13920-new-user-faqs (last visited May 1, 2015).
6 Id.
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world more open and connected.”7 The site currently has an
estimated 864 million active users each day, even surpassing
the amount on Twitter.8 Facebook allows users to find and add
their friends by sending and accepting “friend requests.”9 Users
may also alter their privacy settings to decide to whom their
posts, photos, or information is visible, or even whether the
general public can find the existence of their page.10 As a result,
it is no surprise that a prevalent group among the social media
lovers using Twitter and Facebook are American high school
students. However, this use of social media may not be allowed
if you are one of those students lucky enough to be offered a
collegiate scholarship for athletics.
In order to play football at Florida State University, prior
to the 2012 season students were forced to give up all use of
their Twitter accounts “in order to keep them from embarrassing
the program.”11 Similarly, Boise State coach Chris Petersen
demanded that his football players refrain from all use of
Twitter for the duration of the 2012 season.12 Sweeping bans are
not the only means which universities and individual teams
have resorted to when it comes to restricting the social media
access of their student-athletes. Athletes at schools including the
University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville are
subject to constant monitoring of their Facebook and Twitter
accounts conducted by third parties employed by the
universities.13 In 2012, the athletic director of University of
Oklahoma admitted that “the university required its athletes to

7 About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last
visited May 1, 2015).
8 Craig Smith, By The Numbers: 170 Amazing Facebook User & Demographic
Statistics, DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/bythe-numbers-17-amazing-facebook-stats/#.VFPm3010zc (last updated May 1, 2015).
9 Finding
Friends, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/www/
336320879782850/ (last visited May 1, 2015); Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/www/146466588759199 (last visited May 1, 2015).
10 Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/www/325807937506242/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
11 Kristian Dyer, Florida State Bans Its Players From Twitter, YAHOO!
SPORTS (July 20, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/dr-saturday/floridastate-bans-players-twitter-222622167--ncaaf.html.
12 Paul Steinbach, Schools Attempting to Control Athletes’ Use of Social
Media, ATHLETIC BUSINESS (Oct. 2012), http://www.athleticbusiness.com/schoolsattempting-to-control-athletes-use-of-social-media.html.
13 Mark Boxley, University of Kentucky, Louisville Monitor Athletes’ Tweets,
USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/college/story/2012-08-20/University-of-Kentucky-and-University-of-Louisvillestudent-athletes-monitored-on-Twitter/57165704/1.
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friend coaches on Facebook.”14 Later in the year, it was reported
that Utah State University even went as far as “forcing athletes
to allow school officials access to their private accounts.”15
Once a student is forced to register his username with
the school and the monitoring company installs the application,
their account may be considered seized for constitutional
purposes, as the student’s Fourth Amendment rights may have
been violated.16 Similarly, a mandatory Facebook friend request
can be compared to a school demanding a search of the student’s
account, and may also be a violation of the Constitution.17
Students are forced to submit their account to an ongoing
search by someone from whom they should have the right to
remain private.
Recently, many have questioned the constitutionality of
these restrictions and systems of monitoring.18 Courts have
weighed in on several issues relating to social media, and thus far
have held that First Amendment protection does extend to speech
on social media.19 It can be extremely difficult, however, to
determine when actions taken by universities cross the line and
become an invasion of the student-athletes’ constitutionally
protected rights. For example, some schools employ companies to
monitor student-athletes’ social media counts.20 Companies such
as Varsity Monitor and UDiligence have prospered as schools
across the country call on them to “keep[ ] an online eye on their
athletes.”21 These companies offer customized levels of monitoring
of the student-athletes’ social media feeds to meet the requests of
the university.22 Their services usually involve the installation of
software to the athlete’s social media accounts, which in turn
allows the company to access and monitor the accounts.23

14 Pete Thamel, Tracking Twitter, Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/sports/universities-track-athletes-online-raising-legalconcerns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
15 Kellie Woodhouse, University of Michigan Athletes Sign Social Media
Policy in Bid to Avoid Controversy As Twitter Incidents Multiply, ANN ARBOR NEWS
(Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.annarbor.com/news/as-twitter-incidents-multiply-michiganathletes-sign-social-media-contract-and-try-to-avoid-controve/.
16 Bradley Shear, Are UDiligence and Varsity Monitor Advising NCAA
Schools to Violate the Stored Communications Act?, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (May 18,
2012), http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2012/05/is-varsity-monitor-and-udiligence.html.
17 Id.
18 See Thamel, supra note 14.
19 See infra Part IV.A.
20 Thamel, supra note 14.
21 Id.
22 Boxley, supra note 13.
23 Id.
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This note argues that the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) must adopt a new social media policy
outlawing the use of monitoring systems and mandatory friend
requests, because the current system inappropriately
encourages schools to engage in conduct that may violate the
constitutional and legal rights of their students. Part I of this
note will introduce the state of social media monitoring at
universities and will discuss its impact on NCAA studentathletes. Part II details the methods that universities are using
to restrict the social media privacy of their student-athletes. It
will also explore the use of third-party social media monitoring
systems and mandatory Facebook friend requests by coaches or
other school officials, as well as the issue of universities using
unconstitutional methods to secure the consent of studentathletes to have their accounts monitored in these ways. This
note suggests that the duress suffered by students is what
ultimately compels them to oblige, which renders the consent
illegal and invalid.24 Part III looks at the constitutional
implications of this monitoring, and explains why the NCAA’s
current system allows for potential violations of both the First
and Fourth Amendments by public universities. Part IV
discusses the current legal atmosphere regarding this issue,
and shows how federal courts have already ruled to protect
constitutional rights in the social media platform. Further, it
will examine the legislative actions taken by states to protect
the privacy of students’ social media accounts. Part V will
consist of a brief discussion to show how universities risk
exposing themselves to liability issues if they continue to
engage in student monitoring. Part VI concludes that the
NCAA should create a new bylaw to its manual that builds a
social media policy for all universities and their athletes to
follow, and specifically prohibits schools from stripping athletes
of their privacy by demanding them to perform certain actions
on their social media accounts.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING IN
THE NCAA

A.

The Problem

Currently, each university is responsible for setting its
own social media policies, and choosing its own methods of
24

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
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policing and enforcing these policies.25 While “the NCAA does
not require its member schools to monitor social media
accounts of student[-]athletes[,]” it does “encourage[ ] schools to
do so.”26 Many schools, including the University of Georgia, do
not even apply their social media restrictions evenly across
student-athletes, but rather only to members of select teams.27
This lack of uniformity allows athletic directors and coaches to
take whatever measures of social media monitoring and
restricting they so choose. If the school chooses a method such
as installing monitoring software or demanding a Facebook
friend request, it may be violating several constitutional
rights,28 including freedom of speech and freedom “against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”29 Those schools that
choose to utilize a third-party monitoring company appear to be
practicing a system that may be unconstitutional and has been
likened to using “an online bug.”30 The school may obtain the
student’s consent, seemingly removing it from any
constitutional liability; however, these acts of consent may
have been acquired involuntarily, and perhaps even through
coercion.31 Because “the consent was not given voluntarily,” it
may be invalid as a violation of the student’s constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment.32 Finally, the current
system opens the door to an immense number of problems for
the universities, including potential liability for missing a
crime,33 or for leaking “student athletes’ personal information.”34
These methods can actually come back to hurt the schools
themselves and, accordingly, they would be wise to stay away
from these methods for their own protection.35
25 See Matt Dunning, Social Media Has Schools on Defense, BUSINESS
INSURANCE (July 24, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20110724/NEWS07/307249975.
26 Id.
27 Rex Santus, Social Media Monitoring Widespread Among College Athletic
Departments, Public Records Survey Shows, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. (Mar. 16, 2014, 8:00
PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2014/03/social-media-monitoring-widespread-among-collegeathletic-departments-public-records-survey-shows.
28 Shear, supra note 16.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 Boxley, supra note 13.
31 See infra Part III.C.
32 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1972).
33 Bradley Shear, New Jersey Bans NCAA Social Media Monitoring Companies,
SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/
search?updated-max=2013-08-30T00:02:00-04:00&max-results=5.
34 Boxley, supra note 13.
35 This note will not delve into these liability issues at length, but will briefly
bring them up to show how dangerous these policies are for universities.
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The Solution

Ultimately, the ideal solution for the NCAA is to recant
its encouragement of universities to engage in social media
monitoring.36 The NCAA is at the center of the issue, as it is
allowing social media monitoring through its decisions to
encourage the policy rather than penalize it. As a result, the
NCAA must implement a brand new social media policy
through the creation of a specific bylaw to deal with, and create
penalties for, social media monitoring. The NCAA can follow
the University of Michigan and create a “Social Media
Agreement” that all players must sign.37 This new policy should
apply universally to each of the NCAA’s member institutions.
Doing so will help close the door on the extreme amount of
variety in the way each NCAA school and team handles its
athletes with regards to social media. This policy would be very
straightforward and would help educate and guide studentathletes about the best ways to use social media. The NCAA
must ensure that this policy sets guidelines for the studentathletes that can help them maintain successful social media
accounts on their own, free from any university supervision. In
addition, one way for the NCAA to feel more comfortable about
its athletes’ Twitter accounts could be to ask them to include a
brief disclaimer in their account bio. This would alert the
athlete’s followers that the account represents the views of the
individual and is in no way associated with the university.
Most importantly, the policy must limit the monitoring
power of public universities and, alternatively, prevent them
from forcing athletes to accept Facebook friend requests from
coaches, or turnover their username or password. One way the
NCAA can do this is by outlawing the same practices that some
state legislatures have already banned. For example, the state
of Arkansas enacted H.B. 1902 in 2013.38 The bill “prohibit[s] an
institution of higher education from requiring or requesting a
current or prospective employee or student from disclosing his or
her username or password for a social media account.”39 In
addition, the NCAA must take heed of judicial decisions that are
giving social media users a wide range of protection, based in the
First and Fourth Amendments, and the Stored Communications
36 See, e.g., Dunning, supra note 25 (discussing possible risks for schools that
monitor the social media accounts of its athletes).
37 Woodhouse, supra note 15.
38 H.B. 1902, 89th Gen. Assemb. (Ark. 2013).
39 Id. (capitalization omitted).
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Act. The NCAA can do so by telling its member institutions that
in order to enforce any restrictions on a student’s social media
account, the student must first engage in conduct that would
lead to “substantial disruption”40 to the university. Furthermore,
since the Stored Communications Act prevents individuals from
using third-party applications or forcing students to friend a
coach to bypass privacy settings,41 the NCAA must prevent its
universities from doing the same. The NCAA should announce
clearly, via a new bylaw, that both of these monitoring methods
are strictly prohibited, and no longer can any NCAA school or
team implement these broad-sweeping requirements. The NCAA
must not wait for other states or the federal government to act,
but should instead be proactive and take action to increase its
reputation and level of accountability.
Next, the NCAA must ensure the effectiveness of the
new measures it takes, and that its member schools take them
seriously. The NCAA enforces rule violations by its studentathletes by serving them with suspensions, rendering them
ineligible to compete in a specified number of games.42 In
addition, the NCAA often penalizes the school itself for
violations committed by student-athletes, taking away wins,
championships, bowl eligibility, or scholarships.43 Two of the
major ways that the NCAA polices schools for these violations
are through schools self-reporting them,44 and the use of an 18member “infractions committee.”45 Since it would seem unlikely
that schools would expose themselves to these harsh penalties
by “self-reporting” themselves for violating the new social
40 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(discussing the standard necessary for school officials to prohibit a student’s First
Amendment right to freedom of expression or speech).
41 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2002); see also infra Part IV.B.
42 See, e.g., Half-Game Penalty for Johnny Manziel, ESPN (Aug. 29, 2013,
12:41 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9609389/johnny-manziel-texasaggies-suspended-1st-half-season-opener-rice-owls; Kansas’ Naadir Tharpe Suspended 1
Game for NCAA Violation, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2013, 11:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/ncaab/big12/2013/10/29/kansas-jayhawks-naadir-tharpe-suspended-1-game/
3311227/ [hereinafter Kansas’ Naadir Tharpe]; Andy Katz, Artis, Carter Banned 9 Games,
ESPN (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/
id/9943201/oregon-ducks-dominic-artis-ben-carter-suspended-9-games.
43 See, e.g., Gary Klein, NCAA Hands USC Two-Year Bowl Game Ban, Major
Scholarship Reduction in Football, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/jun/09/sports/la-sp-usc-20100610; Lynn Zinser, Memphis Stripped of 2008 Final
Four by N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/
sports/ncaabasketball/21memphis.html?_r=0.
44 See Kansas’ Naadir Tharpe, supra note 42; see also Katz, supra note 42.
45 New NCAA Enforcement Structure Takes Effect, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013,
3:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/08/01/ncaa-new-enforcementstructure-takes-effect/2609185/.
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media policy, the NCAA must ensure that its “infractions
committee” is prepared to handle the responsibility. The
committee has been pondering the idea of adding even more
members to its staff,46 and with the recent explosion of social
media issues, it would be a good idea for them to do so. The larger
the size of the committee, the more members the NCAA can
dedicate to enforcing its new social media policy, and thus the
more effective it will be. Finally, because of the constitutional
issues implemented, a breach of the NCAA’s new social media
policy should fall under the infraction category of a “serious
breach of conduct.”47 By being placed in this category, schools
using social media monitoring tactics will be subject to the
most severe penalties, including the ability of the “infractions
committee” to suspend coaches “up to one full season.”48 If these
recommendations are followed, the NCAA will have a strong
new policy that it can implement to solve the problem of teams
monitoring the social media accounts of their student-athletes.
In sum, these actions will help close the door on the potential
illegal monitoring and simultaneously help protect the NCAA
and its member institutions from liability.
II.

HOW UNIVERSITIES ARE MONITORING STUDENTS’ SOCIAL
MEDIA ACCOUNTS

A.

Social Media Monitoring Companies and Their Clients

Two of the companies involved in the social media
monitoring business are Varsity Monitor and UDiligence.49
Both of these companies use similarly designed software to
monitor the activity of student-athletes on various social media
sites, including Facebook and Twitter.50 The software is
installed in the athletes’ social media accounts, and sends
“email[ ] alerts to coaches whenever athletes use a word that
could embarrass the student, the university or tarnish their
images on services such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and
MySpace.”51 The software typically “gives [the monitoring]
company access to every bit of information on the account—
Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Myron Medcalf, Policing the Social Media Craze, ESPN (May 1, 2012, 3:53
PM), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/7876754/policing-social-mediacraze-college-sports-ncb.
50 Id.
51 Boxley, supra note 13.
46
47
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whether or not it is password protected/private information.”52
The extent of this information is great and it includes items such
as the student’s “[e]mail address, phone number, birth date,
posts, pictures, videos, friend lists, relationships, [and] calendar
of events.”53 Because of the way these programs work, some have
referred to the services as “cyberstalking software.”54
Each school can customize its own list of words that will
trigger these alerts being sent.55 One example of this comes
from the University of Louisville, which in late 2012 had over
400 trigger words, mostly “hav[ing] to do with drugs, sex, or
alcohol.”56 As of August 2012, the client list of UDiligence
included the University of Louisville, “LSU, Ole Miss, Texas
Tech, Utah State, Texas A&M, Texas, Baylor, University of
Florida, New Mexico and Missouri.”57 Varsity Monitor clients
have included the Universities of North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and Nebraska.58 More schools, including Auburn, Mississippi
State and South Carolina have used the services of other
monitoring companies.59 An exact client list is difficult to
confirm because these companies no longer have client lists
displayed on their websites.60 Both the University of North
Carolina and Utah State University no longer use these
services, as their states have enacted legislation that protects
the privacy of students’ social media accounts and in doing, has
effectively banned them.61 Further, Texas A&M’s Athletic
Director recently denied using any monitoring service.62
The NCAA’s current policy leaves it to each individual
school to decide what social media policy, if any, to impose and
gives complete discretion to the schools to decide which of their
athletic teams should be subjected to the provisions of the
52 Kevin DeShazo, Is Monitoring Student-Athletes on Social Media Illegal?,
http://kevindeshazo.tumblr.com/post/50661117318/is-monitoring-student-athletes-onsocial-media-illegal (last visited May 1, 2015).
53 Id.
54 Bradley Shear, Right to Privacy Will Be Protected By the Social Networking
Online Protection Act, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2013/02/right-to-privacy-will-be-protected-by.html.
55 See Boxley, supra note 13.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See Thamel, supra note 14.
59 Boxley, supra note 13.
60 Shear, supra note 16.
61 H.B. 846, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.B. 100, 2013 Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2013).
62 Jody Serrano, Universities Might Have to Limit Monitoring, Set Social
Media Policies in Stone Under Proposal, STATESMAN (Feb. 10, 2013, 5:08 PM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local-education/universities-might-have-to-limitmonitoring-set-so/nWLNg/.
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school’s policies.63 For example, at the University of Kentucky,
every student-athlete is required to use the service.64 However,
the University of Florida has chosen “to monitor only [its]
football players.”65 This further complicates the issue and creates
a wide range of disparity not only amongst each institution, but
also amongst each team at the same institution.
B.

Mandatory Facebook Friend Requests

The other procedure used to oversee an athlete’s social
media activity requires that the student accept a Facebook
friend request from a coach or other school official. This policy
has admittedly been used by large NCAA schools such as the
University of Oklahoma.66 According to an NBC News report in
2012, “[s]tudent-athletes in colleges around the country also
are finding out they can no longer maintain privacy in
Facebook communications because schools are requiring them
to ‘friend’ a coach or compliance officer, giving that person
access to their ‘friends-only’ posts.”67 The effect of this demand
is that, “if you want to play, you have to friend a coach.”68
Like the installation of monitoring software, this method
completely takes away the athlete’s choice and right to the
privacy of his password-protected content. Facebook is designed
to allow users complete control and customizability over the
privacy of their accounts.69 Users can determine who can see
their information, posts, and photos, and even limit who can find
their account.70 However, once athletic departments force
monitoring systems onto student-athlete’s accounts, or demand
students to accept the friend request of a coach or administrator,
athletic departments are no longer giving the athletes a choice
as to the privacy controls of their accounts.
63 See Thamel, supra note 14; Pete Warner, NCAA Has Limited Stance on
Student-Athletes’ Use of Social Media, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:05 PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/17/sports/ncaa-has-limited-stance-on-studentathletes-use-of-social-media/.
64 See Boxley, supra note 13.
65 See Thamel, supra note 14.
66 Id.
67 Bob Sullivan, Govt. Agencies, Colleges Demand Applicants’ Facebook
Passwords, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/govtagencies-colleges-demand-applicants-facebook-passwords328791?franchiseSlug=technolog.
68 Id.
69 See Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/325807937506242 (last visited May 1, 2015).
70 See Privacy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/445588775451827
(last visited May 1, 2015).
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III.

HOW UNIVERSITIES’ ACTIVITIES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

A.

The First Amendment

The case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District established that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”71 The Court developed the “substantial and
material disruption”72 test and found that a school may not
prevent a student from exercising these First Amendment
rights unless his or her conduct “materially and substantially
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school.”73 Tinker allows student-athletes at
public institutions to take the first step in contesting the NCAA’s
current policy, as they can make the claim that their social media
speech has First Amendment protection. Tinker, however, is
distinguishable from the present issue as none of the contesting
plaintiffs were older than the age of high school students.74
Despite the dissimilar factual context, the strong First
Amendment principles of Tinker have been expanded in recent
case law and are a solid basis from which student-athletes can
mount a legal challenge to university monitoring policies.
Three years after Tinker, the Supreme Court erased all
doubt of whether First Amendment protection of students
would extend to those in college.75 Students at Central
Connecticut State College (CCSC) “desired to form a local
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)” on
campus.76 When they attempted to register with the college and
obtain “official recognition as a campus organization,” the
school’s President denied the request.77 Although the students’
application had made a showing that their viewpoint deserved
a say at the college, “the Young Americans for Freedom, the
Young Democrats, the Young Republicans, and the Liberal
Party all enjoyed recognized status,”78 the President still denied
their request. While the group vowed that they would not be
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
The Court in Tinker does not refer to the test by this name, but later courts
have commonly used this title. See, e.g., Dina Harris & Yonit Kovnator, Courts Confirm
Discipline for Off-Campus Speech Must Meet the “Tinker” Test, MARTINDALE.COM (Sept. 21,
2011), http://www.martindale.com/education-law/article_Best-Best-Krieger-LLP_1346822.htm.
73 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
74 Id. at 504.
75 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
76 Id. at 170.
77 Id. at 170, 172, 174.
78 Id. at 174.
71

72
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controlled by the National SDS group, and did not share in
many of their goals,79 the President was concerned that the
group would not be independent.80 In analyzing the
constitutionality of the college’s decision, the Court stated, “At
the outset we note that state colleges and private universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.”81 The Court added that, “The college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming
this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”82
The case affirmed that the Tinker test for material disruption is
the correct standard to determine the constitutionality of a
school’s action, even at the college level.83 “[I]f there were an
evidentiary basis to support the conclusion that CCSC-SDS
posed a substantial threat of material disruption in violation of
that command[,] the President’s decision should be affirmed.”84
The Court ultimately remanded the case for a determination of
that matter.85
Monitoring the accounts of student-athletes in order to
prevent them from using certain words or phrases appears to
be a clear violation of the rights afforded in Tinker and
extended to college students in Healy. Bradley Shear, an
attorney who specializes in the field of social media law, says
that, “You cannot create a prior restraint on your students
because they may do something or say something that may
create embarrassment (for) your [institution.]”86 In Kentucky,
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has even begun to
take a look at the effect of social media monitoring on students’
First Amendment rights.87 Regarding the matter, the ACLU
stated that:
When students are forced, as a condition of receiving a scholarship,
to grant government officials access to all of their social networking
accounts and then are subject to punishment for engaging in lawful

Id. at 173.
Id. at 175.
81 Id. at 180.
82 Id. at 180-81 (citation omitted).
83 Id. at 189.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 194.
86 Joe Utter & Adam Lewis, WSU Coach Mike Leach’s Ban of Twitter Raises
Concerns From Legal Experts, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012, 2:15 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/take2/2019510389_taketwo24.html (first alteration in original).
87 Boxley, supra note 13.
79

80
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speech that the university simply doesn’t like, we believe public
universities cross the line.88

The current way that monitoring products are used
seems to give them the effect of a “disciplinary tool,”89 which
punishes students by restricting their rights to the freedoms of
speech and expression. According to Tinker, prohibiting these
rights is unconstitutional unless the students’ conduct meets
the “materially disruptive” standard. Embarrassment for the
institution would not seem to rise to meet this standard and
according to the Court, even “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression.”90 If a star college athlete tweeted a
racist remark, the argument could be made that the level of
embarrassment to the institution would materially disrupt the
education environment. However, even if some tweets could be
materially disruptive, a blanket policy would be over-inclusive
and unconstitutional because it would prohibit, on balance,
much more protected speech then unprotected speech. As a
result, the NCAA’s lack of a uniform social media policy allows
its member institutions to take away the First Amendment
protection that the American judiciary has explicitly extended
to students of public universities.
B.

The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications
Act

By monitoring social media, universities not only risk
violating the First Amendment, but risk violating the Fourth
Amendment as well. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution safeguards the people “against unreasonable
searches and seizures” unless the government makes a showing
of “probable cause.”91 In addition, the Stored Communications
Act “grant[s] individuals a right to privacy in their electronic
communications that supplements the protections already
contained within the Fourth Amendment.”92 The Act gives
Id.
David J. Leonard, Athletic Programs’ Twitter Jitters, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION (Feb. 25, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/02/25/
athletic-programs-twitter-jitters/.
90 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
92 Troutman Sanders LLP, The Stored Communications Act Can’t Make
Public
Tweets
Private,
INFORMATION
INTERSECTION
(Aug.
30,
2012),
http://www.informationintersection.com/2012/08/the-stored-communications-act-cantmake-public-tweets-private/.
88
89
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“individuals . . . a civil cause of action when their electronic
information is disclosed in violation of the [Act].”93 As a result,
these laws often work in tandem.94
Although the Fourth Amendment was created to
safeguard against law enforcement officials, the “Court has
never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police.”95
The Court also stated that, “It is surely anomalous to say that
the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior.”96 A later example of the Court applying
the Fourth Amendment to conduct by those other than law
enforcement officers can be found when the Supreme Court
specifically held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” does indeed
apply to those “conducted by public school officials.”97 The
Court articulated the standard to follow in determining
whether the search is constitutional, as one that “should
depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.”98 To determine whether the
nature of the search was reasonable, the Court has set forth a
two-step process, asking “whether the officer’s action was
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.”99
Social media monitoring does not seem to rise to the
necessary level to be considered a reasonable search under the
circumstances. Schools are searching student-athletes’ accounts
in an extremely broad way and it is doubtful that a court would
hold that this practice is “justified at its inception.”100 Maryland
Senator Ronald N. Young has likened social media monitoring to
the unconstitutional practices of “reading [someone’s] mail or
listening to [someone’s] phone calls.”101 Young believes that it is
a constitutional violation for schools to demand access to their
student-athlete’s accounts by having them “give up their

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id.
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985).
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 341.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
Id. at 20.
Thamel, supra note 14.
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password or user name.”102 Further, Bradley Shear, the
aforementioned social media attorney asks, “[W]ould it be
acceptable for schools to require athletes to bug their offcampus apartments? Does a school have a right to know who
all your friends are?”103 Once a student is compelled to register
his username with the school and the monitoring company
installs the application, their account is being constantly searched
under the Constitution. As a result, school administrators are
thereby violating their privacy rights. Similarly, a mandatory
Facebook friend request can be compared to demanding a search
of the student’s account. Students are forced to submit their
account to an ongoing search by someone from whom they
should have the right to remain private.
C.

Counterarguments and the Issue of Consent

Several counterarguments should be examined
regarding the unconstitutionality of the current system. The
first argument is that, when schools request only usernames
but not passwords, they are obtaining access to information
that is already available to the public at large.104 However,
“[m]embers generally publish information they want to share
to their personal profile, and the information is thereby
broadcasted to the members’ online ‘friends’ (i.e., other
members in their online network).”105 The social media
monitoring systems do away with the requirement that you
must be a user to log on and view others’ information and
posts. The information is not in the public domain, but rather
available for other users with permission to access it (in the
“online network” of the user). As a result, the monitoring
company is more like an outside bug being installed on the
account. The school would not otherwise have access to the
athletes’ account but, similar to a hacker, the monitoring
company breaks the rules and gets them in anyway. This goes
back to the question of whether it is “reasonable” for the
schools to do this and conduct a constant search of the studentathlete’s accounts. Perhaps if a specific athlete has done
something to raise suspicions, then the school could have a case
to monitor his account, but there is no basis for a school to

102
103
104
105

Id.
Sullivan, supra note 67.
See DeShazo, supra note 52.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012).
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claim that it needs sweeping access to monitor an entire team
or athletic department of students.
A second argument is that schools already monitor
student-athletes in other ways, such as drug testing. However,
social media monitoring is distinguishable from drug testing
because, while the content that the NCAA searches for through
the process of drug testing is illegal, that is not the case with
social media monitoring.106 The California Supreme Court has
ruled that “[t]he NCAA’s drug testing program does not violate
the state constitutional right to privacy.”107 However, the court
found it significant that the plaintiffs did “not contend that the
purpose or objectives of the NCAA are contrary to law or public
policy.”108 On the other hand, the issue of monitoring social
media accounts could be against both law and public policy.
While there is no inherent legal right to maintain a social
media account, many courts have already held that social
media users should be afforded a high level of constitutional
protection and have explicit First and Fourth Amendment
protection.109 Further, because the drugs that the NCAA tests
for are indeed illegal, there was no way for the plaintiffs to
argue that public policy favored their right to be protected from
a search. However, with millions around the world using social
media as a means of free expression, public policy would not
seem to favor NCAA institutions taking this right away in a
sweeping manner just to guard against the chance of one or
more students making a comment that harms the school’s
reputation. Finally, the practice of drug testing studentathletes survived legal challenge because drugs have a direct
effect on the outcome of NCAA events. “[T]he NCAA’s decision
to enforce a ban on the use of drugs by means of a drug testing
program is reasonably calculated to further its legitimate
interest in maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletic
competition.”110 The NCAA’s decision to drug test is used
directly to enforce one of its most important rules and keep
illegal substances from compromising the integrity of its
various sports. “[Athletic] competition should be decided on the
basis of who has done the best job of perfecting and utilizing
his or her natural abilities, not on the basis of who has the best

106
107
108
109
110

Thamel, supra note 14.
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 669 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 660.
See infra Part IV.
Hill, 865 P.2d at 660.
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pharmacist.”111 On the other hand, there is no correlation
between a student’s social media account use and his or her onfield performance or the integrity of the sport. Thus, the NCAA
would not be able to make any of the same arguments that it
made to defend its use of drug testing as a proper means of
enforcing a rule, and not as a reasonable search.
The final, and perhaps strongest counterargument, is
that schools are not in danger of committing any constitutional
violation here since the student-athletes themselves are
consenting to these monitoring methods. Before a school official
or coach can become Facebook friends with a student-athlete,
the student-athlete must accept the other party’s friend
request. As a result, it would seem that the student has
consented to the search of his account. If this were true, then
there would be no issue of constitutionality, as “a search
authorized by consent is wholly valid.”112 Similarly, when a
public school decides to use a third-party monitoring service to
monitor the student’s account, the school may argue that there
was consent from the student because he turned over his
username and/or password and thus gave permission for the
installation of the software. However, “[w]hen a prosecutor
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search,
he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact,
freely and voluntarily given.”113 The Supreme Court spelled out
what is required to show “that a consent was ‘voluntarily’
given,”114 determining that it “is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”115 The
Court added that the interpretation of “voluntariness” in this
sphere of the law should be the same as the conventional
“definition of ‘voluntariness.’”116 According to the MerriamWebster dictionary, “voluntary” can be defined as “done or
given because you want to and not because you are forced to” or
“having power of free choice.”117
In the context of student-athletes “consenting” to the
monitoring of their accounts, there seems to be a valid claim
111 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eric
D. Zemper, Drug Testing in Athletics, in DRUG TESTING: ISSUES & OPTIONS 120
(Coombs & West, eds. 1991)).
112 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
113 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
114 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
115 Id. at 227.
116 Id. at 229.
117 Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
voluntary (last visited May 1, 2015).
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that the consent was not “voluntarily given,” as required by the
Court.118 Using the Court’s “totality of all the circumstances”
test,119 there is a strong argument that the “traditional
definition of voluntariness” is not met when student-athletes
consent to the monitoring of their accounts.120 As Bob Sullivan
stated in a special report for NBC News, “[f]or student
athletes . . . the access isn’t voluntary. No access, no sports.”121
For student-athletes who have worked hard their entire lives to
get to where they are in their sport, and have earned a full
scholarship to college, it does not seem like they have much of a
“free choice” because their other option will take away so much
from them and could change their lives for the worse.
Exercising the “choice” not to participate in social media
monitoring would spark a long and consequential chain for the
student-athletes: they would not be allowed to play sports and
that would lead them to being kicked off the team and losing
their scholarship. Without the scholarship, many studentathletes would not have been able to attend college and have
the chance for a life-changing experience.122 After working so
hard to get to this point, and playing with a dream of the pros
and supporting your family, how else is an 18 year-old student
supposed to respond when put in this situation except to give
consent? The Court held that the “possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents” must be taken into
account as well in testing if the consent was voluntary.123 It
seems like that would be a factor here as the average studentathlete, who is young and controlled in so many ways by the
university, may be taken advantage of and thus be the type of
person who is considered vulnerable.
The NCAA must act to prevent universities from taking
advantage of their position of power over young studentathletes, and coercing student-athletes to consent to
unconstitutional acts. It does appear that the consent is
typically involuntary, and thus invalid, so the acts by the
schools are unconstitutional.124 By not creating a uniform social
media policy, the NCAA is turning a blind eye and allowing
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
Id. at 223.
120 Id. at 248.
121 Sullivan, supra note 67.
122 See Jordan Moore, USC Athletic Director Addresses Hot-Button Topics in
College Sports, USC NEWS (June 6, 2014), https://news.usc.edu/63826/usc-athleticdirector-addresses-hot-button-topics-in-college-sports/.
123 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
124 See id. at 233.
118

119
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potential constitutional violations to take place, instead of
taking accountability and doing something to protect its
students’ rights.
IV.

CHANGES IN THE LAW THAT REFLECT THE NEED FOR
CHANGE

A.

The Judiciary Gives Constitutional Protection to
Facebook Users

American courts have evolved in order to properly protect
the rights of their citizens from circumstances unforeseen by the
founders. One of the areas in which courts have made the most
adjustments relates to stretching the First Amendment to cover
appropriate electronic violations of the present-day digital age.
An example of this can be seen in R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch.
Dist., which involved the punishment of a student for posts she
made outside of school “on her Facebook wall.”125 The plaintiff
initially made a comment on Facebook that she hated another
student and she was given detention after someone notified the
principal of the post.126 Later, the plaintiff wrote another post
expressing a great amount of anger that someone told the
principal.127 This time, she was suspended for one day and
prevented from joining the rest of her class on a ski trip.128 The
court held that the school violated the student’s First
Amendment rights by punishing her for the Facebook post that
she made. As the court explained:
Such statements are protected under the First Amendment and not
punishable by school authorities unless they are true threats or are
reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are so
egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial
disruption in that environment. R.S.’s Facebook wall postings were
not true threats or threats of any kind.129

The decision recognized that courts are faced with new
obstacles due to the present-day popularity of speech being
broadcasted electronically on the Internet by students.130
Importantly, the court held that this “transition has not abrogated
125 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1133 (D. Minn. 2012).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1133-34.
128 Id. at 1134.
129 Id. at 1140 (emphasis omitted).
130 Id. at 1139.
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the clearly established general principles [of First Amendment free
speech] which have governed schools for decades.”131
This case shows that even though Facebook may be a
very different forum than in-person speech, First Amendment
protections will still apply. A student may have just as much of
a right to speak his mind on Facebook and be protected as when
speaking inside the classroom. According to the court, the
material disruption standard will apply in either event, and if
the speech or conduct does not meet the disruptive standard,
then the First Amendment prevents the school from prohibiting
it.132 Similarly, universities should not monitor the accounts of
student-athletes in a way that would restrict their freedom of
speech, unless the statement disrupts the classroom. As a result,
the NCAA should enact a social media policy that reflects this
notion and does not allow schools to get involved in the students’
accounts unless they have caused a disruption.
In addition to punishing her for First Amendment
protected speech on Facebook, the school also made the
plaintiff in R.S. turn over her account information so that they
could search it.133 “Feeling threatened” and not sure what else
to do, the plaintiff complied with the demand.134 The court held
that “R.S.’s posting on her Facebook wall was intended to be
accessible by her Facebook ‘friends,’ but not by members of the
general public.”135 As such, she “had a reasonable expectation of
privacy to her private Facebook information.”136
Similarly, when schools use social media monitoring
tactics, they are obtaining information that is not meant to be
accessible to anyone except the student-athletes’ social media
friends and followers. Student-athletes at public institutions
are similar to the plaintiff in the Minnewaska case in the sense
that they have First Amendment rights against state actors,
and have the same expectation of privacy that universities
want to transgress. Also like the plaintiff in Minnewaska,
student-athletes may feel threatened by the fear of losing their
scholarship and acquiesce to the demand because they have no
other option. All of this adds up to a Fourth Amendment
violation by a university and it is mainly due to the NCAA’s

131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1134.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1142.
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refusal to step in and set a policy to avoid the potential for
these issues.
B.

The Stored Communications Act

The Stored Communications Act (SCA or the Act) also
provides protection to social media users. The Act provides that
anyone who “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to that
facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in such system shall be” subject to a fine or
imprisonment.137 There are several cases that show how the Act
has been used to help protect social media rights. In Ehling v.
Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp, the plaintiff was
suspended from work after her managers received word of a
controversial post she made on her private Facebook wall.138
The court used the Stored Communications Act to analyze the
issue: “[T]he SCA covers: (1) electronic communications, (2)
that were transmitted via an electronic communication service,
(3) that are in electronic storage, and (4) that are not public.
Facebook wall posts that are configured to be private meet all
four criteria.”139 The court stated that:
Facebook allows users to select privacy settings for their Facebook
walls. Access can be limited to the user’s Facebook friends, to
particular groups or individuals, or to just the user. The Court finds
that, when users make their Facebook wall posts inaccessible to the
general public, the wall posts are ‘configured to be private’ for
purposes of the SCA. The Court notes that when it comes to privacy
protection, the critical inquiry is whether Facebook users took steps
to limit access to the information on their Facebook walls.140

Similarly, the critical inquiry for determining whether
social media monitoring systems and mandatory friend
requests violate the SCA must come down to the same
question. If users are making their accounts private, and the
schools would not otherwise have access to them, then the
school cannot use third-party applications or force students to
137 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002) (unlawful access to
stored communications).
138 Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662-63
(D.N.J. 2013).
139 Id. at 667.
140 Id. at 668.
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friend a coach to bypass these privacy settings. “This decision
is a huge victory for privacy because it recognizes that
employers and schools may not require employees and/or
students to turn over their digital user names, passwords, or
password protected digital content.”141
In October 2013, a federal court extended its greatest
level of protection to Facebook users yet. In Bland v. Roberts,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that even
pressing the “Like” button on Facebook is considered speech
protected by the First Amendment.142 According to Facebook’s
website, “The Like button is the quickest way for people to
share content with their friends. A single click on the Like
button will ‘like’ pieces of content on the web and share them
on Facebook.”143 In effect, the “Like” button allows a user to
share a thought or expression simply by the click of a button,
without typing a single word.144 The court held that there is no
“constitutional significance” to the difference between “a
user . . . us[ing] a single mouse click to produce that message
that he likes the page instead of typing the same message with
several individual key strokes.”145 This extension shows the
ever-growing protections being afforded to social media users
as courts continue to view the Constitution as protecting new
rights in the digital age that comport with the intent of the
Framers. Constitutional protection for social media users is
growing everyday and with this case the courts have extended
that protection even further than before.
C.

State Legislative Actions

Judicial action has not been the only type of response
relating to the issue of social media as protected speech. Many
states have resorted to legislative actions to protect students
from being subjected to social media monitoring tactics. In
2012, California,146 Delaware,147 Michigan148 and New Jersey149
141 Bradley Shear, NJ Federal Court: Password Protected Facebook Posts
Covered By Stored Communications Act, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2013/08/nj-federal-court-non-public-facebook.html.
142 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).
143 Like
Button
for
the
Web,
FACEBOOK
DEVELOPERS,
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/like-button/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
144 Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/like (last visited May 1, 2015
145 Bland, 730 F.3d at 386.
146 S.B. 1349, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2012).
147 H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012).
148 H.B. 5523, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012).
149 A.B. 2879, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
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enacted laws “that prohibit[ ] requesting or requiring
a[ ] . . . student or applicant to disclose a user name or
password for a personal social media account.”150 In 2013, five
other states (Arkansas,151 New Mexico,152 Oregon,153 Utah,154
and Vermont155) joined them, raising the total to nine states that
have effectively outlawed the practice of requiring a student to
disclose his social media username to a school for the purposes of
monitoring.156 Further, in 2014, four more states (Louisiana,157
Maine,158 Rhode Island,159 and Wisconsin160) signed bills into law.
The topic remains relevant, as other states have followed suit
and introduced legislation of their own to protect the social
media privacy rights of students.161 However, the NCAA
continues to fall behind and has taken no action to ensure that
those students playing for universities outside of these states are
also protected from social media monitoring.
California’s Act states that the Legislature intends “to
protect the privacy rights of students at California’s
postsecondary educational institutions.”162 The bill actually
points out that it was enacted because of new challenges
presented by “quickly evolving technologies and social media
services and Internet Web sites.”163 It thus appears that the bill
was created specifically to respond to the issue of social media
monitoring by educational institutions. The Arkansas bill is
specifically subtitled: “To prohibit an institution of higher
education from requiring or requesting a current or prospective
employee or student from disclosing his or her username or
password for a social media account.”164 This Arkansas bill
specifically outlaws what many NCAA teams are doing, thus
making it illegal to do so for all universities in the state of

150 Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last visited May 1, 2015).
151 H.B. 1902, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
152 S.B. 422, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013).
153 S.B. 344, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
154 H.B. 100, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013).
155 S.7, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013).
156 Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 150.
157 H.B. 340, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).
158 H.B. 838, 126th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Me. 2014).
159 H.B. 7124, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2014).
160 S.B. 223, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014).
161 Id.
162 S.B. 1349, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
163 Id.
164 H.B. 1902, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (original in capital letters).
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Arkansas.165 A school in that state cannot ask a student-athlete
to provide it with his Twitter username for the purpose of
installing monitoring software, or for any other reason.166
Altogether, these enacted state bills show that the NCAA is
exposing its member institutions to liability by failing to set a
social media policy preventing schools from engaging in this
conduct. Instead, the NCAA continues to leave the
responsibility to set school social media policies up to each
individual school, which for now means that unless a student is
in one of the minority states that has enacted a law, he or she
may be subjected to this monitoring. The fact that more and
more states have taken action over the last two years is a warning
sign to the NCAA that it should take action to promote uniform
protections for student-athletes’ social media expression. While
states have recognized that in the changing times of the digital
age it is important to extend statutory protection to social media
users, the NCAA refuses to adapt along with them.
D.

Social Networking Online Protection Act167

In addition to legislation at the state level, a bill has
been reintroduced by the House of Representatives that would
have the same protective effect, but on a national scale.168 The
Social Networking Online Protection Act (SNOPA) is “designed
to protect the digital privacy of . . . students . . . in the Social
Media Age.”169 “If SNOPA is enacted students will not have to
worry about being required to provide access to their personal
digital accounts in order to attend the school of their dreams or
keep their scholarships.”170 Specifically, the bill states that:
The institution will not—(i) require or request that a student or
potential student provide the institution with a user name,
password, or any other means for accessing a private email account
of the student or potential student or the personal account of the
student or potential student on any social networking website . . . .171

In addition, the bill prohibits institutions from enacting
any type of discipline against students who refuse to comply
See id.
See id. at § 1(a)(3)(C).
167 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
168 Kevin DeShazo, Debate Heats Up Over Social Media Privacy of Student
Athletes, FIELDHOUSE MEDIA (Apr. 10, 2013), https://fieldhousemedia.squarespace.com/
blog/debate-heats-up-over-social-media-privacy-of-student-athletes.
169 Shear, supra note 54.
170 Id.
171 H.R. 537 § 3(A)(i).
165
166
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with a request to provide coaches or school administrators
access to their social media account.172 This part of the Act
deals with the coercion factor mentioned previously in this
Note,173 and shows that it is a real issue. Unlike the NCAA’s
current system, the Act allows students to say no to social
media monitoring without any fear that they will face
consequences from the school, such as being dismissed from the
team or expelled from the university.174
However, the bill does not seem to be a pressing focus of
the government, and while it has been introduced, there has
been no official action on it since it was “referred to [a
Congressional] Committee” in February 2013.175 Although the
government has not acted on it, the bill may still be enacted at
any time, and the NCAA would be smart to be proactive.
Clearly both the federal and state governments are concerned
about social media monitoring of students and believe that in
the digital age it is time to make some adjustments. The NCAA
should not continue to fall behind while courts and legislators
attempt to take action.
V.

THE ISSUE OF LEGAL LIABILITY FOR UNIVERSITIES

Through the use of monitoring systems, universities are
actually leaving themselves vulnerable to lawsuits and
increasing their likelihood of liability. One of the ways that
schools expose themselves to liability is by failing to prevent a
crime that they have been alerted to on social media. In 2010,
University of Virginia student Yeardley Love was killed from a
beating by the hands of her ex-boyfriend George Huguely.176 At
the time of the beating, Huguely was a member of the
university’s men’s lacrosse team and Love of the women’s
team.177 In 2012, Huguely was convicted of second-degree

Id. at § 3(A)(ii) .
See supra Part III.C.
174 See H.R. 537 § 3(A)(ii).
175 H.R. 537: Social Networking Online Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr537 (last visited May 1, 2015).
176 Sarah Netter & Emily Friedman, University of Virginia Lacrosse Player
Yeardley Love Severely Beaten, Court Docs Say, ABC NEWS (May 4, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/TheLaw/yeardley-love-george-huguely-volatile-relationshipdeath/story?id=10547956.
177 See Mary Pat Flaherty, George Huguely V Sentenced to 23 Years for
Yeardley Love Murder, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-08-30/local/35491592_1_university-of-virginia-lacrosse-lexie-love-yeardley-love.
172

173
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murder for the act.178 Bradley Shear, a social media attorney,
proposes an interesting and seemingly realistic question that
monitoring schools and the NCAA ought to consider: “What if
the University of Virginia had been monitoring accounts in the
Yeardley Love case and missed signals that something was
going to happen?”179 He then asks, “[w]hat about the liability
the school might have?”180 This is just one example of a crime
involving an NCAA athlete and it certainly seems like a real
threat to NCAA schools. If the student-athlete were being
monitored and showed any warning signs, such as threats or
potential for violence, the family of the victim may file a
lawsuit for the failure to prevent a crime.
Another strong example of the potential liability posed
to universities through Internet monitoring and awareness is
the Penn State scandal. During the investigations into former
coach Jerry Sandusky’s child sex abuse, it was revealed that
the school may have been aware of what Sandusky was
doing.181 If this turns out to be true, it could leave Penn State
liable for “tens of millions of dollars” in damages.182 In the
aftermath of this news, one could fairly ask: “[W]hy would any
university want to create more opportunities for lawsuits by
monitoring and archiving the digital content of their studentathletes or employees?”183 Regardless of the complicated ethical
issues, an attorney’s concern is to limit is his or her client’s
legal liability. Similarly, if a school found out about a violation
or crime taking place because of its social media monitoring, it
would seem to follow that they have a duty to report this and a
liability that would not have been there if not for the
monitoring system. “Once you take on that kind of policing
activity, it creates an obligation[.]”184 As a result, the NCAA
must come up with a new social media policy that does not
leave its member institutions open to the potential for “tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars in legal liability.”185
178 Mary Pat Flaherty et al., George Huguely Guilty of Second-Degree Murder,
WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/georgehuguely-guilty-of-second-degree-murder/2012/02/21/gIQA1ss4TR_story.html.
179 Sullivan, supra note 67.
180 Id.
181 Susan Candiotti, Disturbing E-Mails Could Spell More Trouble for Penn State
Officials, CNN (July 2, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/justice/penn-state-emails/.
182 Bradley Shear, Penn State Sandusky Emails Prove NCAA Schools Should
Not Social Media Monitor Their Student-Athletes, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (June 30,
2012), http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2012/06/penn-state-sandusky-emails-prove.html.
183 Id.
184 Dunning, supra note 25.
185 Shear, supra note 182.
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Another way that schools could be exposing themselves
to major liability is by a potential “breach in security” that
inadvertently leaks the personal information of the studentathletes to the public.186 Further, a university could expose
itself to liability for taking action against a student-athlete “for
a post that he or she did not author or that was taken out of
context.”187 In that case, the student could have recourse for
“reputational damage or lost future financial benefits linked to
their athletic talents.”188 Finally, schools are putting
themselves at risk just by choosing to monitor their athletes or
specific teams.189 By monitoring only some of its students
(either athletes, or even only certain teams), the school risks
facing “accus[ations] of discrimination.”190 In sum, “[social
media monitoring] opens up such a huge Pandora’s box,” and
the NCAA may have created more of a problem than a solution
with its decision to encourage schools to engage in this
conduct.191 “They’re essentially assuming a duty of care that
they can’t enforce.”192
CONCLUSION
Currently, universities that participate in NCAA sports
receive encouragement from the NCAA “to monitor the social
media accounts of [their] student-athletes.”193 However, due to
recent state statutes and court decisions that extend privacy
protection to social media users, this practice appears to be
illegal. The use of third-party monitoring services, or
mandating that students “Facebook friend” a coach, forces
students to give up their right to privacy and subjects them to
an unconstitutional search. Both of these acts provide schools
with a way to break through the privacy granted to social
media users in the Stored Communications Act. In addition,
the argument that students have consented to these searches
seems likely to fail because under an analysis of case law, this
consent appears to have been illegally obtained. Further,
schools even expose themselves to liability of their own through
monitoring, because it risks facing lawsuits for creating a duty,
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Boxley, supra note 13.
Dunning, supra note 25.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Dunning, supra note 25.
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and then failing to prevent a crime of which it should have
been aware. For example, if the monitoring leads to the
discovery of a tweet that threatens imminent danger, the
school itself could become vulnerable for failing to act. Overall,
there are many problems with social media monitoring and it is
time for the NCAA to act. The best solution would be for the
NCAA to construct a social media policy outlawing any
monitoring practices by its member schools, apply it uniformly
to every team and every school, and enforce it as a “serious
breach of conduct”194 through its “infractions committee.” This
policy would follow the path of both state legislatures and the
United States judicial system in outlawing the practice of social
media monitoring. In the end, the NCAA, its member
institutions, and its student-athletes would all be best served
by putting a stop to the practice of social media monitoring.
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How Far Is Too Far?
THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL REMEDIES
AGAINST FACILITATORS OF TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no single issue in recent history has galvanized a
greater governmental response than the fight against terrorism.
Prior to 1992, that fight from a judicial standpoint was limited to
criminal claims brought by the U.S. government against
individuals and groups directly responsible for carrying out
terrorist acts against Americans.1 Since then, new events and new
understandings of the nature of terrorism have triggered several
expansions in the anti-terrorism statutes, most notably the
addition of a civil remedy and the extension of criminal liability to
include those who provide material support to terrorists.2
Since the introduction of these two provisions, courts
have struggled to determine the elements of the civil cause of
action under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 and how far such civil liability
extends.3 These issues have arisen primarily in cases in which
terrorist victims have sued financial institutions or other
organizations that allegedly provided money to the terrorists
who caused their injuries.4 While initially hesitant to extend
civil liability beyond those directly involved in the attack,5 courts
have recently allowed claims against indirect financiers through
a variety of theories and with little consistency in terms of the
elements required for a successful claim.6 In response, other
courts and scholars have pushed back against this expansion,
arguing that it violates general tort requirements and the intent

See 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2012).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2339A, 2339B, 2339C; see also Gill v. Arab Bank
PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing history of statute).
3 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (“Much of the relevant law is unsettled.”)
4 See, e.g., id.; Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002).
5 See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011.
6 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (describing different approaches courts
have taken).
1
2
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of Congress that the statute reach only those directly involved in
the commission of a terrorist attack.7
This note will argue for a middle ground between the
two extreme ends of this argument, expanding civil liability
beyond those directly involved in the attack, but limiting it to
only those facilitators whose material support proximately
caused a plaintiff’s injuries. Expanding liability beyond the
principle actors is the best, and perhaps the only, way to
effectively go after terrorist organizations. In virtually all cases,
the primary actors are exceedingly difficult to find and have
little if any attachable assets, meaning that limiting the civil
remedy to these individuals would rarely, if ever, provide an
actual remedy to a victim. On the other end, allowing suits
against individuals and groups who fund terrorist activity will
not only provide the victim with a chance to recover actual
damages, it will go a long way toward disrupting the activities
of terrorist groups.
Part I will examine the creation of the civil remedy, trace
the remedy’s expansion through a series of Seventh Circuit
decisions, and then consider corresponding push-back and
criticism to the expansion. Part II will look at approaches other
courts have taken. Part III will argue that legislative history,
the plain language of the statute, and policy considerations all
support expanding liability beyond the principal actors. Part IV
will first argue that the requirement of proximate cause will
sufficiently limit the scope of liability and, second, will propose a
framework by which to determine when material support has
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.
I.

CREATION OF REMEDY AND EXPANSION IN THE BOIM
CASES

The provisions of § 2333 were initially enacted to
provide victims of international terrorism a way to bring suit
against the foreign individuals or groups who carried out the
attack, who previously were beyond the jurisdictional reach of
American courts. Eventually, courts expanded the statute to
reach not only those who directly carried out the attack, but
those who provided assistance to these groups.

7 See, e.g., Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the
Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 580-81 (2013).
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Creation of Civil Remedy

Congress adopted the current version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 on October 29, 1992, as part of the Federal Courts
Administrative Act of 1992.8 Section 2333 reads in part:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
including attorney’s fees.9

The provision was largely a response to two terrorist
attacks that occurred in the 1980s that highlighted gaps in the
jurisdictional authority of U.S. courts. The first incident
occurred in 1985, when terrorists hijacked a cruise ship
travelling through the Mediterranean Sea and killed Leon
Klinghoffer, an American citizen.10 Klinghoffer’s widow and
other victims of the cruise ship hijacking brought suit against,
among others, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
which was allegedly responsible for the attack.11 Following a
lengthy battle over jurisdiction, the court eventually allowed
the claim against the PLO to proceed, because it determined
that it fell within certain admiralty-related provisions of
federal jurisdiction.12 When Congress introduced Section 2333,
it recognized that had the attack not occurred at sea, Ms.
Klinghoffer would likely be without a remedy, noting that “a
similar attack occurring on an airplane or in some other locale
might not have been subject to civil action in the U.S.”13
Further, as reflected in the testimony of Klinghoffer’s daughter
to Congress during hearings on Section 2333, following the
initial favorable ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, the
8 See Federal Courts Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat 4506
(Oct. 29, 1992). The statute actually has a somewhat complicated legislative history. It
was first introduced as the Civil Remedies for Victims of Terrorism Act by Senator
Charles Grassley in 1990, and incorporated into the Military Construction
Appropriations Act of 1991. See Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-519, 104 Stat 2240 (Nov. 5, 1991). The bill was repealed in 1991, then reintroduced
and re-adopted in 1992. See id.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012).
10 See H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (“The recent case of the Klinghoffer
family is an example of this gap in our efforts to develop a comprehensive legal
response to international terrorism.”).
11 See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
vacated on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
12 See id., at 858-59.
13 H.R. REP. 102-1040, at 5.
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family became embroiled in a long and costly fight to secure
personal jurisdiction over the PLO, eventually settling more
than a decade after the original incident.14
The second attack that spurred the creation of the civil
remedy occurred in 1988, when two Libyan terrorists smuggled
a bomb onto a Pan Am flight that exploded over Scotland, killing
270 people.15 The victims’ families were eventually able to secure
a judgment against Pan Am for willful misconduct in allowing
the bomb onto the plane.16 Still, the families faced numerous
hurdles in trying to bring a suit against the terrorists
responsible for the attack. Notably, even after the two smugglers
were identified and indicted by a federal grand jury, Libya
refused to turn the men over to U.S. authorities to stand trial.17
Together, these two incidents provided the impetus for
reform. Congress eventually passed Section 2333’s civil remedy
to ensure that terrorist attack victims and their families could
file suit in U.S. courts and have a remedy available to them for
injuries stemming from those acts of terrorism.18
B.

Boim I

It was not until 2002, ten years after Section 2333 first
became law, that it was first addressed by the courts in a series
of cases in the Seventh Circuit arising from the killing of David
Boim, a dual American and Israeli citizen, by members of
Hamas in Israel in 1996.19 Boim’s parents brought suit under
Section 2333 against Hamas and the two identified Hamas
members who carried out the attack.20 They also named as
defendants two American nonprofit organizations, Quiranic
Literary Institute (QLI) and Holy Land Foundation (HLF). QLI
was an Illinois organization engaged in translating sacred
Islamic texts.21 HLF was a Texas group that raised money for
14 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. On
Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 56-57 (1991)
[hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Hearing] (statement of Lisa Klinghoffer).
15 David Treadwell, Pan Am Guilty of ‘Willful Misconduct’: Verdict: Jury
Finds Airline, now Defunct, to be Negligent in the Lockerbie Bombing that Claimed 270
Lives. Victims’ Families can now Seek Further Damages, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-07-11/news/mn-1480_1_willful-misconduct.
16 Id.
17 Treadwell, supra note 15.
18 See infra Part III.A
19 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1002, 1009 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“No court has yet considered the meaning or scope of section[ ] . . . 2333,
and so we write upon a tabula rasa.”).
20 Id. at 1004.
21 Id. at 1003.
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humanitarian relief efforts.22 According to the Boims, the
groups were also fronts for Hamas, raising and funneling money
for the terrorist group in support of its terrorist activities.23 In
Boim I, QLI and HLF moved to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim, arguing that Section 2333 did not provide a cause
of action beyond those directly involved in the attack.24 In
response, the Boims put forth three theories for establishing
their claim against QLI and HLF: (1) Donating money to Hamas
satisfies § 2331’s definition of international terrorism; (2)
Section 2333 incorporates into the civil remedy the criminal
material support provisions of §§ 2339A, 2339B and 2339C,
which criminalizes the provision of material support, including
monetary support, to terrorist groups; and (3) Section 2333
provides for civil aiding and abetting liability.25 The district
court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting Boim’s first theory
but accepting their second and third theories.26
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court on
the first theory, that solely providing money to Hamas, without
more, did not constitute “international terrorism” under
§ 2333.27 Section 2333 defines international terrorism, by
reference to § 2331, as activities that “involve violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life,” appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, and occur primarily outside of the United States.28 The
Seventh Circuit in Boim I decided that merely providing money
to a terrorist group did not constitute a violent act or act
dangerous to human life, concluding that to label such activity
as terrorism would give § 2333 “an almost unlimited reach.”29
The Seventh Circuit also accepted Boim’s second theory,
that § 2333 incorporated §§ 2339A and 2339B, which
criminalize the provision of material support to terrorist groups
and terrorist activity.30 Section 2339A makes it a crime to
provide material support, including furnishing money or
financial services, with the intention that the support be used
to facilitate terrorist activity.31 Section 2339B criminalizes the
provision of support to known terrorist groups, regardless of
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1005-06.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012).
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1009.
Id. at 1012, 1015; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
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whether the donor intends that the support be used to facilitate
terrorist activity.32 The Seventh Circuit concluded that because
Congress chose to impose criminal liability for such behavior,
they must have intended to impose civil liability as well.33
Finally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that § 2333 provided for civil aiding and abetting liability.
In opposing this theory, QLI and HLF noted that the Supreme
Court in Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver held that civil aiding and abetting liability is only
available where the specific statute expressly provided for it.34
The Seventh Circuit held that Central Bank did not apply to
§ 2333 for four reasons. First, Central Bank involved an
implied civil cause of action (the SEC’s provision against
securities fraud does not contain an express civil cause of
action, but one has been implied by the courts), while § 2333
involved an express civil cause of action.35 Second, based on the
legislative history, the court concluded that Congress intended
§ 2333 to include general tort principles, including aiding and
abetting liability.36 Third, the court concluded, based on the
legislative history and the language of the statute, that
Congress intended that civil liability in § 2333 to be at least as
extensive as the criminal liability provided for under §§ 2339A
and 2339B.37 Specifically, the court pointed to the phrase
“involve . . . acts dangerous to human life” in the definition of
international terrorism in concluding that such broad language
necessarily showed Congress’s intent to impute all avenues of
traditional criminal and civil liability into the anti-terrorism
provisions.38 Aiding and abetting, the court concluded, was both
well-ingrained in traditional notions of tort law and, in the
context of facilitating terrorist activity, was clearly an activity
that “involve[d] acts dangerous to human life.”39 Finally, again
pointing to language from the legislative history, the court
concluded that in passing § 2333, Congress intended to go after
the funding of terrorist group and that disallowing aiding and
32 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; see also Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474,
504 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
33 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
34 See id. at 1005; see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 165 (1994) (holding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 does not provide a private right of action for aiding and abetting).
35 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1015.
39 Id. at 1020.
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abetting liability would thwart that effort.40 The court then
went on to explain the elements of an aiding and abetting
cause of action, pointing to Halberstam v. Welch, in which the
Supreme Court set out the elements of civil aiding and abetting
liability.41 Under this framework, one is liable where they
provide “substantial assistance” to another in accomplishing a
tortious act.42
Thus, in the first instance of a court encountering the
§ 2333 civil cause of action, the Boim I court allowed a Hamas
victim’s survivors to bring a civil claim against two alleged
Hamas donors on two separate theories: (1) primary liability,
by concluding that the civil claim incorporated the material
support activities included in the criminal provisions; and (2)
secondary liability, by concluding that the civil claim includes
aiding and abetting liability.
C.

Boim II, Boim III, and Criticism

Following the ruling in Boim I, affirming the denial of
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the case returned to the
district court. In 2004, the district court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiff against all defendants except QLI.43
The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied the elements for
aiding and abetting liability against HLF: (1) David Boim was
killed by an attack carried out by Hamas, and (2) HLF provided
material support to Hamas knowing that Hamas was engaged
in terrorist activities.44 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded in 2007 (Boim II).45 In Boim II, the Seventh Circuit
reiterated its holding that aiding and abetting was available
under § 2333.46 However, it concluded that even in such
secondary liability cases, there must be a showing of causation,
requiring the plaintiff’s injuries to be a foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s contributions to Hamas.47 In
this case, the court concluded it was not sufficiently foreseeable
Id. at 1019.
See id. at 1012 (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
42 Id.
43 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
44 Id. The second element was satisfied by collateral estoppel, as the D.C.
Circuit had previously affirmed a criminal conviction against HLF for materially
supporting Hamas. Id.
45 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.
2007) (order vacating judgment); see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.
(Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing findings of the Boim II court).
46 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
47 Id. at 692.
40
41
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that HLF’s procurement of funds and other support to Hamas
would result in plaintiff’s injuries.48
Plaintiffs petitioned for and received rehearing by the
Seventh Circuit en banc (Boim III).49 In Boim III, the Seventh
Circuit reversed course in several key respects, eliminating
aiding and abetting liability, but arguably expanding the reach
of § 2333. First, the court reversed its Boim I holding as to
aiding and abetting liability, concluding that Central Bank
controlled, and thus Congress’s silence meant there was no
aiding and abetting liability.50 Further, the court reasoned that
to allow aiding and abetting liability would expand “the federal
courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction,” a power that is reserved to
Congress.51 After rejecting aiding and abetting liability, the
court turned to the elements required for a primary liability
through incorporation claim. While the court concluded that
causation is required, it rejected the Boim II holding that
causation—both cause in fact and proximate cause—was
lacking as to HLF.52
On the issue of cause in fact, the court equated the case
with the multiple fires example from torts. The multiple fires
example involves two fires simultaneously converging to burn
down a building.53 Because the fires converged, it is impossible
to determine which fire caused the building to burn down. In
such cases, the analysis shifts from whether each individual
event caused the result to whether each event was a
substantial factor in bringing about the result.54 The court
reasoned that although it was impossible to determine whether
an individual monetary donation to a terrorist group caused
the attack, the requirement of but-for causation would be
relaxed to avoid a situation in which an injured party was
without a remedy.55
On the issue of proximate cause, the court rejected the
Boim II conclusion that the plaintiff’s injury was not a
foreseeable result of HLF’s support.56 “Giving money to Hamas,”
knowing the nature of its activities, the court reasoned, was

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 698-700.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 689-90.
Id. at 690-92.
Id. at 695-97.
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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analogous to “giving a loaded gun to a child.”57 That is, just as it
would be reasonably foreseeable that giving a gun to a child
would result in the child or someone else being shot, it is
reasonably foreseeable that giving money to Hamas would lead
to a terrorist act resulting in injury. The court remanded the
case as to HLF to determine whether there was causation in this
case, as the lower court had not even addressed the subject in its
original summary judgment decision.58
The dissent in Boim III criticized the holding in several
respects. First, it argued that the majority’s new conception of
causation in these cases—essentially that any financial
contribution to a terrorist group was a cause of a subsequent
attack by that group—effectively eliminated a causation
requirement.59 Second, the court noted that by treating the case
as one of primary rather than secondary liability, it eliminated
the need to show that the defendants intended that their
support would be used to facilitate terrorist activity.60 As in this
case, recklessness would now be sufficient; a donor who knew or
should have known the nature of the organization could be held
liable. Taken together, the dissent concluded, “[t]his sweeping
rule of liability leaves no role for the factfinder to distinguish
between those individuals and organizations who directly and
purposely finance terrorism from those who are many steps
removed from terrorist activity and whose aid has, at most, an
indirect, uncertain, and unintended effect on terrorist activity.”61
In the case of HLF, the dissent concluded, there was a genuine
issue whether it knew or intended that its donations to various
alleged Hamas front charities would in fact be used to facilitate
Hamas’s terrorist activity.62 The dissent envisioned liability for a
potentially endless array of groups and individuals, including
groups who host Hamas speakers at their conventions or publish
sympathetic editorials.63 At some point, the dissent argued, “the
harm is simply too remote from the original tortious act to
justify holding the actor responsible for it.”64 Finally, and
relatedly, the dissent argues that the majority’s holding would
expose a donor to potentially endless liability, as one who gives
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 690.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 724.
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money to Hamas in 2000 could theoretically be held
perpetually liable for any subsequent Hamas attacks.65
D.

Sant’s Criticism

Geoffrey Sant, a professor at Fordham Law School,
advances two primary criticisms of Boim III and other court
decisions that allowed claims to proceed against banks under
§ 2333, namely that (1) providing financial support does not fall
within the meaning of “international terrorism,” as defined by
§ 2331; and (2) that the legislative history supports a more
narrow reading of § 2333.
First, Sant argues that the term “international
terrorism” in § 2333 and its definition in § 2331 as an activity
that “involves acts dangerous to human life” does not include
the furnishing of money or financial services.66 He points to
Stutts v. De Dietrich Group, one of the earliest known § 2333
decision involving a bank.67 In Stutts, a group of former
military members exposed to toxic gas while deployed in Iraq
brought suit against De Dietrich Group, a bank that issued
letters of credit to alleged producers and suppliers of the sarin
gas used against the injured plaintiffs.68 The court referenced
the decision in Boim I—which held that funding by itself did
not constitute international terrorism—in concluding that
merely issuing letters of credit similarly did not constitute “an
act dangerous to human life” as required by the international
terrorism definition.69 Sant reasons that it is hard to envision
corporate bankers acting in their normal business duties as
fitting into the conception of international terrorists.70
Sant’s second argument is that Congress intended
§ 2333 to be a jurisdictional and largely symbolic provision
with limited reach, specifically targeting the terrorist actors
themselves and providing actual relief in only the very small
number of cases where these terrorist groups have attachable
assets in the United States.71 Sant first points to several
examples from the legislative history that he says
demonstrates that Congress adopted the civil remedy as a
Id.
See Sant, supra note 7, at 579.
67 Id. at 579; Stutts v. De Dietrich Grp., No. 03-CV-4058, 2006 WL 1867060,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006).
68 Stutts, 2006 WL 1867060, at *1.
69 Id. at *2-*3.
70 Sant, supra note 7, at 539.
71 Id. at 549.
65
66
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purely jurisdictional provision. Sant focuses on the Klinghoffer
and Pan Am cases, which were the impetus behind the
adoption of § 2333.72 First, he notes that the main issue in the
Klinghoffer case, was the court’s inability, but for certain
admiralty provisions, to secure personal jurisdiction over a
terrorist group with no contacts with the United States73 The
civil remedy, Sant argues, was created as a way to close this
jurisdictional loophole, which would allow terrorist victims to
sue their attacker if the attack occurred at sea but not on land
or in an airplane.74 Sant focuses on testimony given by Joseph
Morris, the president of the Lincoln Legal Foundation, during a
subcommittee hearing on the civil remedy, where he
emphasized that § 2333’s purpose was to redress jurisdictional
issues.75 Morris testified that
Victims who have attempted to sue terrorists have encountered
numerous jurisdictional hurdles and have found the courts reluctant
to intrude in the absence of clear statutory mandates showing them
what their jurisdictional boundaries are76 . . . . Whereas that
[Klinghoffer] opinion rested on the special nature of our admiralty
laws, this bill will provide general jurisdiction to our federal courts
and a cause of action for cases where an American has been injured
by an act of terrorism overseas.77

Sant also cites to testimony by Lisa Klinghoffer, the victim’s
daughter, who testified that “it’s taken our family [four and a
half] years to give us the right to sue the PLO. We are
hoping that other families in the future won’t have to go through
the years that we have gone through. They will have
that . . . right.”78
Sant then points to examples from the legislative
history that he contends shows Congress’s intent to limit the
§ 2333 civil remedy to the terrorist actors directly involved in
carrying out the attacks. For example, he points to testimony
by the chairmen of a group representing the victims of the Pan
Am attack, who did not mention third-party actors, instead
stating that the civil remedy “would permit victims of terrorism
to file civil actions against terrorists and terrorist
See id.; see also supra Part I.A.
Sant, supra note 7, at 541.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 541-42.
76 Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 78 (statement of Joseph Morris,
President, Lincoln Legal Foundation).
77 Id. at 17.
78 Id. at 75 (statement of Lisa Klinghoffer).
72

73
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organizations.”79 Sant also points out that the victims of the
Klinghoffer and Pan Am cases, the cases that triggered § 2333,
were able to secure monetary relief against third parties such
as the airline and cruise operator, and that the families sought
the civil remedy as a way to sue the actual perpetrators and
either get money (if the terrorist group could be found and had
assets in the United States), or, more likely, some sort of moral
vindication or sense of justice.80 As Sant notes, Lisa Klinghoffer
seems to suggest as much in her testimony before Congress: “If
one such as Abu Abbas [the mastermind of the attack that
killed her father] or his agents can be found within our borders,
he could be made to answer for his deeds.”81 Sant further points
to statements by Senator Grassley, the sponsor of the bill, that
“[T]his bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find
terrorists’ assets and seize them,” which suggests he was
focused on instances where a terrorist group itself may have
assets in the United States.82
Sant argues there are several factors that have led
judges to assume an activist role in these cases, ignoring
Congressional intent and contorting the definition of
international terrorism in order to include the activities of
banking defendants. These include the horrendous nature of
terrorist acts, the desire to punish terrorist groups, the
overwhelmingly sympathetic nature of the victims, and the
desire to provide victims with a financial remedy.83 These
sentiments are reflected in the decision of courts. Sant notes, for
instance, that the Boim II opinion contains references to David
Boim’s “trademark hug and smile.” He further contends that in
most murder cases, judges do not make these kind of sympathyinducing references to victims, but rather only refer to victims to
explain the circumstances of the death or in reference to other
more factual information. Sant perceives this as evidence of
judges’ particular susceptibility to sympathy in these cases.84
Sant also focuses at length on a particular sentence in
the Boim III opinion. After concluding that § 2333 does not
provide for aiding and abetting liability, the court goes on to
say that “an alternative and more promising ground for
bringing donors . . . within the grasp of section 2333” would be
79
80
81
82
83
84

Sant, supra note 7, at 544 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 546.
Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 59, 62.
Sant, supra note 7, at 545 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 535.
See id. at 536, 557.
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the primary liability through incorporation theory.85 Sant calls
this “a remarkable and seemingly revealing passage,”
suggesting that the “more promising” language shows that “the
court may have been searching for a means of reaching a
predetermined result.”86 As Sant notes, the dissent in Boim III
also quotes this language.87 The dissent begins its opinion by
noting that, “[t]he murder of David Boim was an unspeakably
brutal and senseless act, and I can only imagine the pain it has
caused his parents.” The dissent goes on to describe terrorism as a
“scourge” before qualifying that, “it is [the court’s] responsibility
to ask whether [terrorism] presents so unique a threat as to
justify the abandonment of” the causation requirement and to
justify the other deficiencies in the majority opinion.88
II.

APPROACHES FOLLOWING THE BOIM DECISIONS

Bolstered by the ruling in Boim I, § 2333 became the
basis for a number of new lawsuits, primarily aimed at financial
institutions with alleged ties to terrorist groups. While some
courts adopted, and even expanded, the Boim I approach, other
courts pushed back.
A.

Courts Embracing the Boim I Approach

In 2004, two years after Boim I, the families of several
Americans killed in a purported Hamas terrorist attack in
Israel in 2000 brought suit in New York against Arab Bank
P.L.C.89 Arab Bank is one of the largest financial institutions in
the Middle East.90 It is headquartered in Jordan and does
business all over the world.91 According to the plaintiffs in
Linde v. Arab Bank P.L.C., Arab Bank maintained accounts for
several groups and individuals it knew were fronts for Hamas,
and that Hamas utilized these accounts to fund its terrorist
activities.92 The plaintiffs further alleged that Arab Bank was
the administrator of a “universal death and dismemberment
85 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 690
(7th Cir. 2008).
86 Sant, supra note 7.
87 Id.
88 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
90 Arab
Bank, Our Profile (2013), http://www.arabbank.com/en/profile.
aspx?CSRT=2366691262021416800.
91 Id.
92 Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
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plan,” through which families of Hamas agents killed or
injured received a cash payment.93 According to the plaintiffs,
Hamas provided the bank with a list of eligible individuals,
who then provided the bank with the necessary certificates and
received payment.94 The plaintiffs alleged that the maintenance
of accounts and the handling of the payment plan facilitated
and encouraged Hamas’s terrorist activity, and they sought to
hold them secondarily liable for the victims’ injuries, relying on
Boim I.95 The district court, in denying Arab Bank’s motion to
dismiss, relied on the language and reasoning of Boim I,
concluding that § 2333 allows for aiding and abetting liability.96
The court further held that § 2333 allows for civil conspiracy
liability, which was never addressed in Boim I. The court
reasoned that the criminal portions of the act included
conspiracy liability, and that there was no reason not to extend
this to the civil remedy as well.97 The court went on to conclude
that plaintiffs’ allegations established a claim under either an
aiding and abetting theory or a conspiracy theory, and that,
were they to prove at trial that the victims were killed by
terrorists who were enrolled in the benefit plan, such proof
would be sufficient to prevail on either theory.98
Other courts similarly embraced the Boim I secondary
liability holding. In Wutz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a victim
of an attack by a Palestinian terrorist group sued the Bank of
China in the D.C. District Court, alleging that the Bank made
several wire transfers to the Palestinian group through its
leadership in Iran.99 Relying on the aiding and abetting liability
theory for the reasons set forth in Boim I, the court held that
the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to state an aiding and
abetting claim against Bank of China. The court pointed to the
allegations that the Palestinian terrorist group carried out the
attacks that injured plaintiff, and that the Bank knowingly
provided them with material assistance.100
Similarly, in 2010, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida recognized both the aiding and abetting
theory and conspiracy liability theory under § 2333. In Re
Chiquita Brands Intern, Inc., Alien Tort Statute and
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 577, 582-83.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id. at 54-57.
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Shareholder Derivative Litigation involved five missionaries
who were kidnapped in 1993 and 1994 and eventually killed by
a Columbian terrorist group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC).101 Chiquita, an Ohio-based company
engaged in the production and distribution of bananas, made
numerous secret payments and smuggled weapons to FARC
from 1989 through 1997.102 Chiquita pled guilty in 2007 to
numerous violations of the criminal terrorism provisions.103
Following this guilty plea, families of the five victims brought suit
against Chiquita under both primary and secondary liability
theories.104 The court concluded that the plaintiffs pled sufficient
facts to establish a claim under the Halberstam test for aiding
and abetting liability,105 holding that Chiquita’s alleged monetary
donations and weapons smuggling qualified as “substantial
assistance.”106 Further, the court recognized civil conspiracy
liability under § 2333, and held that the plaintiffs’ allegations
stated a conspiracy claim as there were sufficient allegations as to
a common scheme between the two organizations.107
B.

Pushing Back against Secondary Liability

In 2012, another Hamas victim brought a claim against
Arab Bank in the Eastern District of New York.108 Mati Gill, a
dual American-Israeli citizen, was injured by a bullet fired from
the Gaza Strip, in an incident for which Hamas took credit.109 He
brought suit against Arab Bank, asserting claims under a
variety of statutes, including primary and secondary liability
under § 2333.110 The court first concluded that § 2333 does not
allow for civil aiding and abetting liability, relying on the rule
set out by the Supreme Court in Central Bank.111 The court
rejected the Boim I reasoning that § 2333 was distinguishable
from the statute in Central Bank because it involved an express
cause of action and because Congress intended to expand
liability beyond primary actors in the terrorism context.112 The
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301-02 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 1302-03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310; see also supra Part I.B.
Chiquita, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.
Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 499-500.
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court concluded that Central Bank was not intended to be
limited to implied rights of action, and that the issue of
whether Congress intended to extend liability to secondary
actors is irrelevant in light of the Central Bank rule, since
Congress did not explicitly make such a distinction in the
statute.113 However, the court recognized the primary liability
through incorporation theory described in Boim I.114
Additionally, the court set out the specific elements a plaintiff
would need to prove to succeed on such a claim. According to
the court, the primary liability through an incorporation claim
had three elements: wrongful act, mental state, and
causation.115 That is, first, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated the acts and satisfied the mental state
described in the specific material support criminal provision.116
Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions
proximately caused his or her injuries.117
The Second Circuit eventually weighed in, agreeing
with the Eastern District that § 2333 did not allow aiding and
abetting liability but did allow for primary liability for material
supporters through incorporation. In Rothstein v. UBS AG, the
plaintiffs, injured in a series of rocket attacks in Israel, allegedly
carried out by Hamas and Hezbollah, sued UBS, a Swiss bank
with offices throughout the U.S.118 According to plaintiffs, UBS
provided financial services and other forms of support to Iran,
which in turn provided various forms of material support,
including large amounts of money, to Hamas and Hezbollah.119
Through this alleged chain of support, the plaintiffs sought to
hold UBS primarily and secondarily liable under § 2333 for their
injuries.120 In affirming the district court’s decision to grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit first held that
§ 2333 does not allow for aiding and abetting liability in light of
the Central Bank holding.121 The court then went on to
recognize the primary liability through incorporation theory
but affirmed the dismissal nonetheless because the plaintiffs
had failed to plead sufficient facts, specifically as to the

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 84-85, 87 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 97.
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connection between Iran and the terrorist groups, to plausibly
show that UBS proximately caused their injuries.122
As demonstrated above, courts and scholars have taken
§ 2333 to two extremes. On the one end is Geoffrey Sant, who
contends that civil actions should be limited to those directly
involved in carrying out the terrorist attack that caused a
particular plaintiff’s injuries. On the other end is Boim III,
which would conceivably attach civil liability to anyone who
knowingly or even recklessly provided money, services,
encouragement, or other support to the terrorist group
responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries. The proper approach to
these contending positions lies somewhere in between.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, PLAIN LANGUAGE, AND POLICY
SUPPORT EXTENDING LIABILITY BEYOND THOSE
DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK

A.

Legislative History

The legislative history of § 2333 indicates that Congress
intended the provision to be read broadly. The language of the
statute was left intentionally broad, and it was passed as part
of Congress’s effort to expand the scope of its fight against
terrorism and provide victims with a remedy.
A 1992 report from the House Judiciary Committee
regarding the adoption of § 2333 notes that, “The recent case of
the Klinghoffer family is an example of this gap in our efforts
to develop a comprehensive legal response to international
terrorism.”123 The Klinghoffer case involved a family left
without a legal remedy and a group of individuals that were
not held accountable for their actions due to jurisdictional
limitations. In emphasizing its desire for § 2333 to be a
comprehensive response to this gap, Congress indicates its
intent for § 2333 to be read as broadly as possible as a way to
eliminate the previous inequities.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report also highlights
the expansive nature of the legislation. It notes that,
[Section 2333] would allow the law to catch up with contemporary
reality by providing victims of terrorism with a remedy for a wrong
that, by its nature, falls outside the usual jurisdictional categories of
wrongs that national legal systems have traditionally addressed. By

122
123

Id.
H.R. REP. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (emphasis added).
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its provisions for compensatory damages, tremble [sic] damages, and
the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of
terrorism, it would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.124

This passage reflects the evolving understanding in the fight
against terrorism. Terrorist groups, unlike other bad actors,
are virtually impossible to attack directly through the courts.
Instead, these groups can be significantly deterred by securing
judgments against the entities that provide them money and
supplies. In recognizing that § 2333 was a key part of this new
fight against terrorism, Congress clearly intended the statute
would extend to these financial supporters of terrorism.
Further Congressional testimony provides additional
insight into the broad and comprehensive intent of the
legislators. In introducing the bill in 1991, Senator Charles
Grassley noted that,
[The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) civil remedy] empowers victims with
all the weapons available in civil litigation, including: Subpoenas for
financial records, banking information, and shipping receipts—this
bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find terrorists’ assets
and seize them. The ATA accords victims of terrorism the remedies of
American tort law, including treble damages and attorney’s fees.125

Later, he stated that, “[o]ur resolve to fight terrorism and equip
victims with civil remedies for terrorist acts is as strong as
ever.”126 Moreover, in a subsequent hearing on the bill in 1992,
Senator Grassley stated, “While this bill will not permit civil
actions against sovereign leaders, it will allow the victims to
pursue renegade terrorist organization and their leaders, and go
after the resource that keeps them in business—their money.”127
Moreover, at a hearing on an earlier version of the ATA
civil remedy, Joseph Morris, a former Department of Justice
attorney testified that,
I think that the bill as drafted is powerfully broad, and its intention,
as I read it, is to bring focus on the problem of terrorism and,
reaching behind the terrorist actors to those who fund and guide and
harbor them, bring all of the substantive law of the American tort
law system.128

Finally, the specific order in which the material support
provisions were adopted shows Congress’s evolving and
124
125
126
127
128

S. REP. NO.102-342, at 22 (1992).
137 CONG. REC. S4511-04, 1991 WL 56141, at *1 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991).
Id. at 2.
Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 136 (statement of Joseph A. Morris).
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expanding sense of how to pursue terrorist groups. In 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 2339A was passed, which criminalizes providing money
or other support to a terrorist group with the intention that the
support be used to further the terrorist activity.129 Section 2339B
followed in 1996 as a way to close the loophole created by 2339A;
it targeted individuals who give money to terrorist groups under
the guise of a charitable donation.130 This section criminalized
material support to terrorist groups regardless of whether the
person intended that the support would be used to facilitate
terrorist activity.131 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, passed in 2006,
extends liability beyond donating money to the mere furnishing
of financial services.132 Together, these statutes show an
evolving understanding of how best to target and dismantle
terrorist groups and a continually expanding commitment to
pursue terrorist groups at all possible levels. The civil remedy
should be read in the context of Congress’s ever-evolving and
ever-expanding position regarding terrorist organizations.
Sant argues that the legislative history shows that
Congress intended the civil remedy to be a largely symbolic
provision that would only come into play on the rare occasion
when a terrorist group had attachable assets in the United
States.133 However, as noted above, the statute is broad by
design and should be read in the context of current
understanding. The individuals Sant quotes may not have
thought it practicable or possible to identify the source of
money behind terrorist groups and may have believed that a
symbolic defeat of a terrorist group would have a significant
impact. As recent years have shown, and as Congress’s
subsequent actions have revealed, the current understanding is
that the most effective, and possibly the only, way to go after
terrorist groups is by attacking the source of their funding.
B.

Statutory Language

The plain language of the statute further supports an
expansive view that includes financial institutions.

129
130
131
132
133

18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
Id. § 2339B.
Id.
Id. § 2339C.
See Sant, supra note 7, at 540-43.
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1. “International Terrorism”
One of Sant’s principal arguments is that Congress
could not have intended to extend liability to financiers because
the term “international terrorism,” defined as activities that
“involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life,” does not
include donating money or providing financial services.134 As
argued in Boim III, giving money to a known terrorist group is
an act dangerous to human life in the same way as giving a gun
to a child.135 Notably, the definition of international terrorism
does not include a requirement that the conduct be intentional
or even knowing.136 Boim III and the courts that have followed
its course have all concluded that negligent conduct will not
satisfy the statute, as treble damages are generally not available
for mere negligence.137 However, if recklessness is sufficient, as
Boim III and others have advocated, the knowing provision of
support to a terrorist group such as Hamas clearly qualifies.
The Restatement of Torts defines recklessness as
engaging in an activity “knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only
that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”138
Further, in contrasting recklessness from negligence, the
Restatement explains:
“[N]egligence” excludes conduct which the actor does or should
realize as involving a risk to others which is not merely in excess of
its utility, but which is out of all proportion thereto and is therefore
“recklessly disregardful of the interests of others.” As the
disproportion between risk and utility increases, there enters into
the actor’s conduct a degree of culpability which approaches and
finally becomes indistinguishable from that which is shown by
conduct intended to invade similar interests. Therefore, where this
disproportion is great, there is a marked tendency to give the
conduct a legal effect closely analogous to that given conduct which
is intended to cause the resulting harm.139

This language generally tracks the language in the
international terrorism definition, and indicates a level of
culpability that is consistent with a punitive, treble damages
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 537.
See supra Part I.C.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
See Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
Id. § 282.
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civil remedy. Further, it is clear that knowingly providing
support to a terrorist group satisfies this requirement. Though
the utility of providing support to a terrorist group, assuming
the group also engages in positive, humanitarian efforts, could
conceivably be relatively high, the magnitude of risk is still
sufficiently exorbitant to qualify as reckless. Magnitude of risk
involves both probability and scope of potential harm.140 For a
group such as Hamas, which has engaged in numerous attacks
over a long period and has expressly stated a desire to
eradicate an entire group of people,141 the probability that the
group will use the support to facilitate an attack that will
injure people like David in Boim I is very high, at least as great
as the probability that a child provided with a loaded gun will
cause harm to himself or another. Further, the scope of
potential harm is astronomical, as Hamas and other terrorist
groups generally target areas with large groups of victims to
ensure maximum impact.142
That Congress viewed the provision of support to
terrorist groups as an “act dangerous to human life” is further
supported by the fact that Congress later criminalized this very
activity, alongside other activities, such as hijacking an
airplane, that are traditionally thought to be acts dangerous to
human life.143 Moreover, the fact that the statute specifically
says “involve violent acts” rather than just “violent acts,”
suggesting that Congress intended to expand liability to acts
that, while not inherently violent, contribute to the overall
violence of the terrorist attack.144
2. Other Language
Further, other language in the statute supports an
expansive view. The fact that Congress created a civil cause of
action without expressly stating the elements of such a cause of
action suggests that they intended for the claim to include the
general elements and principles of tort liability.145

Id.
See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685,
694 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing Hamas as “gunning for Israelis”).
142 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
143 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012).
144 Id.; Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (quoting from Section 2331 and
emphasizing the statute’s use of the word “involve”).
145 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. at 522.
140
141
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Further, the House report contains sections on
limitations to the civil cause of action.146 One such express
limitation is that a plaintiff may not bring suit, or may be
limited in discovery if the Attorney General determines it will
impair a corresponding criminal action.147 Another is that a
plaintiff may not sue for injuries arising out of an act of war.148
There is no mention on any limitation to the class of people to
which a plaintiff may sue.
3. Policy
There are two primary policy justifications for providing
a civil remedy to victims of terror. The first is providing the
victim with justice and relief.149 The second is punishing and
hopefully hindering or even incapacitating terrorist groups in
order to prevent future attacks.150 Both of these policy goals are
furthered by expanding liability beyond the principal terrorist
actors to those who provide the actors with support.
The first way in which these policy goals are furthered
is that given the lower standard of proof and expanded
discovery, civil trials are more likely to lead to findings of
liability than criminal trials.151 Thus, as a general matter, the
more people involved with terrorism that a victim may sue, the
greater the remedy to the victim and the stronger the penalty
to the terrorist. This is particularly true when dealing with
banks, where the expanded discovery afforded in civil cases
allows plaintiffs to get past bank secrecy laws that may pose a
greater barrier in criminal cases.152
The second way these policy goals are furthered is that,
terrorist groups are exceedingly hard to sue civilly, or even
criminally, for a number of reasons: they are intentionally
covert; they rarely have any contact in the United States; and
they often have few assets, certainly not enough to satisfy a
judgment following a large attack.153 Thus, a potential plaintiff
would face numerous obstacles, and likely an eventual dead
H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 3 (1992).
Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 4.
150 See generally Anti-Terrorism Act Hearing.
151 John F. Murphy, Civil Litigation Against Terrorists and the Sponsors of
Terrorism: Problems and Prospects, 28 REV. LITIG. 315, 315-16 (2008).
152 See Sant, supra note 7, at 562.
153 Id. at 546; see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III),
549 F.3d 685, 691(7th Cir. 2008).
146

147
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end, in trying to sue a foreign terrorist group in an American
court. Though § 2333 gives the courts subject matter
jurisdiction, it is unlikely a plaintiff would be able to establish
that a group such as a Hamas would have sufficient contacts
with the United States for personal jurisdiction.154 ?Even in the
exceedingly rare case where a terrorist group had contacts in
the U.S. and was brought to the U.S. to stand trial, it is likely
the group would have only minimal attachable assets in the
U.S., certainly not enough to satisfy a wrongful death action.155
These issues are all illustrated in cases such as Klinghoffer and
many others. The financial supporters of terrorist groups, on
the other hand, are often large businesses with substantial
assets and sufficient contacts in the United States to establish
personal jurisdiction.156
Indeed, Sant concedes that were the civil remedy
limited to the terrorist actors, suits would be rare and
monetary awards almost non-existent. Though Sant contends
that this was Congress’s intent, it seems counterintuitive that
Congress would create a remedy that actually did not provide
any real remedy. Rather, it is more likely, especially in the
context of the vigorous fight against terrorism, that Congress
would intend that the remedy reach as far as the courts were
willing to allow it, so as to most effectively achieve its twin
goals of fighting terrorists and compensating victims.
IV.

PROXIMATE CAUSE IS PROPER LIMITATION ON CIVIL
LIABILITY

Given the strong considerations supporting the expansion
of civil liability to include supporters of terrorism, it is not
surprising that most courts dealing with § 2333 have recognized
the potential for claims against at least some class of material
supporters.157 However, even among these courts there is still
wide disagreement about where to draw the line. As seen in Part
I, some courts still allow claims premised on aiding and
abetting liability, which has no proximate cause requirement
and instead focuses on intent as the cutoff in liability.158 Other
See Murphy, supra note 151, at 323-24.
Id. at 327; Sant, supra note 7, at 546.
156 See Adam N. Schupack, The Arab Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation
Against Terrorism, 60 DUKE L.J. 207, 238 (2010).
157 See Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 497-502 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(discussing different courts’ approaches).
158 See supra Part I.
154
155
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courts have focused on the claims as ones of primary liability,
and thus have used proximate cause, rather than intent, as the
cutoff. As will be discussed below, proximate cause provides the
most useful cutoff for these claims, as it not only incorporates
intent but addresses the primary concerns voiced by those who
worry about extending liability too far.
A.

Secondary Liability is Too Expansive

Aside from the issue that secondary liability might not
even be available under § 2333 due to Central Bank, its
reliance on intent as a cutoff on liability is inadequate. The
initial summary judgment ruling against HLF in Boim I is
illustrative of the problem. After ruling that aiding and
abetting liability was available and dismissing HLF’s motion to
dismiss, the district judge noted that under such a theory, the
Boims could prevail if they proved that HLF knowingly
provided material support to Hamas.159 In 2001, the Treasury
Department pursuant to an executive order seized HLF’s assets
following an investigation that revealed it had ties to Hamas.160
HLF challenged its designation as a terrorist group in federal
court, and the decision was upheld by a district court and
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in 2003.161 The D.C. Circuit recounted
the district courts summary of the administrative record, which
described HLF’s ties to Hamas in general terms, such as “HLF
has had financial connections to Hamas since its creation in
1989,” and “FBI informants reliably reported that HLF funds
Hamas.”162 The Boims then moved for summary judgment against
HLF, arguing that through collateral estoppel, there was no issue
of material fact as to one required element, namely that HLF
knowingly provided material support to Hamas.163 The district
court agreed and granted summary judgment.164
The district court never even addressed the connection
between HLF’s alleged monetary donations and the attack that
killed David Boim. David Boim was killed in 1996. The Treasury
Departments report explains only that HLF had economic ties to
Hamas as far back as 1989. It does not detail any specific
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002).
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 701
(7th Cir. 2008).
161 Id.
162 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
163 Id.
164 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705.
159

160
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donations or whether the donations were made to particular
segment of Hamas. Such general allegations of long-term
financial ties may be sufficient for a seizure of assets or a
criminal conviction, but there must be some further information
that it some way ties to HLF’s donation to the attack that killed
David Boim. This evidence may consist of specific donations
close in time to the 1996 donation, a substantially large donation
made to the terrorist arm of Hamas, or even some evidence
indicating that at the time HLF made its donations in the early
90s, the first years of Hamas’ existence, they knew or had reason
to know Hamas was engaged in carrying out attacks against
civilians. Under the aiding and abetting framework used by the
Boim district court, if HLF today severed all ties with Hamas
and never made another donation to them, they could
nonetheless conceivably be perpetually liable to any victim of a
future Hamas attack. Thus, without making some effort to tie
the defendant’s support to the plaintiff’s particular injuries,
the potential scope of § 2333 liability is too expansive.
B.

Cause in Fact is Too Limiting

On the other hand, requiring the plaintiffs to show that
their injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
support is equally problematic as this would effectively
preclude claims against any supporters. One basic problem
with requiring but for cause in these cases is the issue of proof.
With so many streams of money and supplies being funneled to
terrorist groups, it would be virtually impossible for plaintiffs
to isolate a particular donation as being involved in the
commission of the attack that caused their injuries. Another
fundamental issue with applying cause in fact to these cases is
the problem of the fungibility of money.165 A group like Hamas
conceivably has numerous sources of support and substantial
money in its reserve. Thus, were a particular group, such as
HLF, to decide to withhold its donation, Hamas could move
money that was allotted for another project in order to make up
this shortfall and fund its next attack. In this sense, HLF’s
monetary support cannot be said to be a but for cause of any
particular Hamas attack.

165

Id. at 698.
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Some courts have recognized this issue and decided to apply a
“substantial factor” test instead.166 This is the proper approach. To
do otherwise would leave most victims without a remedy and
effectively insulate terrorist groups and their financiers from
liability. While it is impossible to prove that a particular donation
caused a particular attack, it is undeniable that any significant
provision of support to a terrorist group will substantially facilitate
future attacks. The substantial factor test will encompass these
significant donations that, though they cannot be tied directly to a
particular attack, clearly played a role in bringing about the attack.
Proximate cause presents the best cutoff for liability.

Proximate cause provides the best cutoff for liability in
these cases. Two characteristics of proximate cause make it
particular useful as a cutoff for liability. First, because proximate
cause is an abstract, legal concept, rather than a logical one, it is
able to incorporate many considerations, including mental state
and timing. While, as discussed above, mental state by itself does
not provide a suitable measure of liability in these cases, it weighs
heavily in the ultimate determination, and proximate cause
allows mental state to be considered in context along with other
important factors. Relatedly, as will be discussed further below,
factors such as mental state and timing are codependent. A
donation made to Hamas intending to support its terrorist
activities may lead to liability further into the future than a
donation made recklessly. Proximate cause takes all of these
considerations into account.
Second, proximate cause’s focus on foreseeability and
intervening cause both usefully track culpability in this context
and protect against the two main concerns associated with
§ 2333 liability. Under traditional proximate cause formulations,
an actor only faces liability for actions that are reasonably
foreseeable results of the action.167 Similarly, an intervening act
cuts off liability where it is not foreseeable.168 The first concern
with § 2333 is that civil liability could be extended to a
potentially endless class of groups and individuals that provide
even the most remote support to a terrorist group. An example
discussed in the Boim III dissent is the political group that has a
member of Hamas speak at its convention. In the abstract, it
does not seem reasonably foreseeable that inviting a Hamas
member to speak will result in a Hamas attack. Thus, the
166 See e.g. id.; see also Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
167 Jim Gash, At The Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A
Contextual Analysis of the Proposed Restatement of Torts, 91 KY. L.J. 523, 586 (2003).
168 Id.
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subsequent attack would be a superseding intervening cause
cutting off liability for the political group. On the other hand, it
is reasonably foreseeable in the abstract that a knowing
donation of money or weapons to Hamas will lead to an attack,
and thus a subsequent attack would rightfully not cut off
liability for these donors, who have provided Hamas with
material assistance and thus would and should be culpable.
The second main concern with extending § 2333 liability
to supporters is that it will lead to perpetual liability for all
future attacks conducted by the terrorist group. Again, this
concern is addressed by proximate cause. As discussed further
below, the greater the time period is between donation and
attack, the less foreseeable it is that the donation would lead to
such an attack. That is, it is foreseeable that a large donation
made to Hamas in 2013 will result in an attack in 2013 but not
in 2050. Where the line is ultimately drawn will be a case by
case decision, but the threat of perpetual liability is eliminated.
C.

Proximate Cause Model

Having determined that proximate cause provides the
most useful cutoff in these cases, the final question is what the
test for proximate cause will be in these cases. Courts have
taken many different approaches. As seen above, Boim III
essentially concludes that any provision of support to a
terrorist group, if made at least recklessly, would satisfy
proximate cause.169 The dissent in Boim III criticized this
approach as too expansive, as have other courts.170 The Second
Circuit has not provided much guidance, concluding only that a
showing of proximate cause requires more than the “fairly
traceable” standard used to determine standing.171
The Eastern District of New York in Gill has come the
closest to providing a workable framework for determining
proximate cause in these cases. Unlike Boim III, which turns
proximate cause into a yes-no question, the court in Gill treats
proximate cause essentially as a sliding scale with multiple
factors, including mental state, timing, and nature of donation.
Thus, the court concludes, “[A] major recent contribution with a
malign state of mind would—and should—be enough . . . . But
a small contribution made long before the event—even if
See generally Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695-700.
Id. at 711-12 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
171 Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
169

170
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recklessly made—would not be. The concept of proximate cause
is central in imposing a balance.”172
1. Mental State
Mental state is perhaps the most important, and also
most complex, factor in this formulation. Not only must the
court determine what level of mental state to require, but it
must also determine which facts to apply the mental state to.
For example, in Gill, the court concluded that the defendant
must be at least reckless not only to the fact that the group to
which it made donations was engaged in terrorist activities but
also that it targeted Americans.173 On the other hand, a Texas
district court recently concluded that recklessness was not
sufficient, holding that defendant must know or intend both of
these elements.174
Requiring recklessness in these cases makes more
sense, as proving knowledge or intent would be exceedingly
difficult and place an undue burden on plaintiffs. Many
terrorist groups are large organizations with many branches
and fronts that carry out non-violent humanitarian activities in
addition to its terrorist activities. As such, it would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a defendant who
provided support to a front or earmarked its support for
humanitarian efforts actually knew or intended that this
support would be used to facilitate terrorist activity. This
concern was voiced by the dissent in Boim III.175 However, as
the majority in Boim III reasoned, the violent nature of Hamas
and other terrorist groups are so notorious that any donation,
even if made with innocent intent, is a dangerous activity.176 It
was exactly this thinking that led Congress to pass § 2339B in
order to supplement § 2339A in the material support criminal
provisions. Section 2339A criminalizes material support made
with the intent to further terrorist activities, thus allowing a
donor to escape liability by earmarking its donation for
humanitarian purposes.177 Section 2339B closed this loophole

Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 506.
174 Abecassis, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36.
175 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 706
(7th Cir. 2008) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 See id. at 698.
177 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
172
173
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by holding a donor liable so long for any donation made to a
designated terrorist group, regardless of the donor’s intent.178
2. Time
The second important factor is time. As discussed above,
a principal concern of the detractors is potentially perpetual,
ruinous liability. It is generally not reasonably foreseeable that
a donation will result in an attack 20 years down the line.
Rather than setting a fixed cutoff, the question of temporal
proximity will be a fact-specific and case-by-case question. It
will also be dependent on the other two factors in the analysis.
Thus, where an individual makes a large donation to a known
terrorist group, it is reasonably foreseeable that the donation
will facilitate attacks further into the future than a small
donation made to a relatively unknown group.
3. Nature of Support
The final factor in the analysis is the nature,
particularly the size, of the support. It is foreseeable that a
large monetary donation will facilitate terrorist activity,
whereas with a small donation or verbal support, it is not
reasonably foreseeable. For example, it is not necessarily
reasonably foreseeable that a five dollar donation to Hamas
will result in an imminent attack. Conversely, it is highly
foreseeable that continuously funneling large amounts of
money will facilitate an attack.
The result of these factors is a sliding scale and balancing
test. Thus, on one end of the spectrum are large monetary
donations made to a well-known terrorist group within a short
time of the attack in question. On the other end are small
donations to unknown groups far removed from the attack that
injured plaintiff. In between, the court will engage in fact-specific
analysis using the three factors discussed above. This measured
approach will best ensure that victims are compensated and
terrorist are punished, while avoiding potentially ruinous liability
for marginally involved third parties.

178

Id. § 2339B.
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CONCLUSION
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has
engaged in many, largely reactive measures designed to
prevent the next terrorist attack. The civil remedy of § 2333
provides one of the more promising proactive avenues in the
fight against terrorism. By allowing citizens to secure
judgments against those who fund and supply terrorists, the
civil remedy could potentially have a real impact in
interrupting the terrorist groups’ activities, while also
providing victims with actual relief. In pursuit of these goals,
the courts should interpret § 2333 broadly, allowing claims
against those who materially support terrorist activity, so long
as there is sufficient proximate cause between the support and
the particular attack that injured the plaintiff. Through this
approach, the civil cause of action will provide an adequate
remedy to victims and bring those responsible to justice.
Peter Budoff†

† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015. He would like to thank the
Brooklyn Law Review staff for its help in putting together this note.

Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
THE NEED TO EXPAND RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
The Immigration Nationality Act1 (INA) has a long
history of failing to provide special relief or, at a minimum,
special consideration for child immigrants.2 Criticism of the
immigration system reached new levels of concern in the last
year as the number of undocumented minors crossing the
southern border of the United States significantly increased.3
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) provides children
under the age of 21 with the opportunity to apply for status as
a Legal Permanent Resident4 (LPR).5 SIJS represents the first
and to date only “child-centered” immigration remedy
incorporating the traditional “best interest” standard applied in
proceedings related to children.6
1 The INA was the first consolidated immigration legislation enacted in
1952. Prior to the INA, immigration law was not organized into one cohesive code
section. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
2 David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in
Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 393 (2010).
3 Julia Preston, Rush to Deport Young Migrants Could Trample Asylum
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
20/us/rush-to-deport-young-migrants-could-trample-asylum-claims-.html?_r=0 (noting
that between October of 2013 and July of 2014, 57,000 undocumented minors have
crossed the border, marking a 92% increase from prior years); Kirk Semple, Youths
Facing Deportation to Be Given Legal Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), available at
http://www.nyti mes.com/2014/06/07/us/us- to- provide- lawyers- for - children- facingdeportation.html ?emc=eta1.
4 Lawful Permanent Residence provides a path to citizenship and is
colloquially referred to as a “green card.” Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011).
5 Wendi J. Adelson, Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile Statue,
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L & POL’Y 65, 76 (2008) (noting that SIJS relief is especially coveted
because it allows for instantaneous application for LPR status upon receipt of the SIJS
visa, whereas, many immigration relief options require a significant waiting period
between obtaining certification and adjusting to status as a LPR).
6 David B. Thronson, Kids will be Kids? Reconsidering Conception of
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 979, 1008 (2002)
[hereinafter Thronson, Kids]; David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here: Toward
a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 68 n.41 (2006)
[hereinafter Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here].

1087

1088

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

Obtaining SIJS relief involves multiple stages of review
by both state officials and federal immigration officers. First, a
juvenile must secure a special findings order7 from a state
juvenile court. The order must state that: 1) the child is
dependent upon the juvenile court8 or “legally committed to, or
placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a state,
or an individual or entity appointed by a state or juvenile court”;
2) reunification of the child with one or both parents “is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or similar basis
found under State law”; 3) return of the child to his or her home
country would not be in the child’s best interest; and 4) the child
is unmarried and under the age of 21 at the time of filing.9
Second, the special findings order is sent along with the
special immigrant petition (Form I-36010) to United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),11 which
determines whether to accept or reject the order and thus grant
SIJS status.12 Obtaining a special findings order is the most
important hurdle in the application process because USCIS
defers to the state court’s determination as to the four factual
findings necessary to merit SIJS relief.13
Third, once granted SJIS status, an applicant is
automatically eligible to adjust to LPR status (Form I-48514)
7 The orders issued by family courts with the findings necessary for a SIJS
application are generally referred to as “special findings orders.” N.Y. STATE, OFFICE
OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 4 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/external/OCFS_2011/ADMs/11-OCFS-ADM01%20Special%20Immigrant%20Juvenile%20Status%20%28SIJS%29.pdf.
8 A juvenile court is “a court located in the United States having jurisdiction
under State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of
juveniles.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2011).
9 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); Randi
Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment
of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 606, 606 (2012). The definition for “child” in
INA 101(b) requires the status of “unmarried.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1).
10 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB
NO. 1615-0020, I-360: PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
(Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-360.pdf.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); Eligibility Status for SIJS, Memorandum from
William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
Regional Dirs. & Dist. Dirs. 2 (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%2019982008/2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/eligibility-sij-status/eligibilitystatus-sij (last updated July 12, 2011).
12 Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here, supra note 6, at 1007-08.
13 See id. at 1006. The USCIS officer is mostly concerned that the findings
put forth in the state court special findings order fulfill the statutory requirements, but
she does not adjudicate the findings. Id.
14 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB
No. 1615-0023, FORM I-485: APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR
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which, if granted, would make a child eligible for a work
permit, driver’s license, subsidized health insurance, and
financial aid for higher education.15 Applicants are advised to
apply concurrently for SJIS and LPR status.16 Generally after
five years in LPR status, SJIS beneficiaries qualify for
naturalization.17 A SIJS beneficiary is restricted from
sponsoring a parent for immigration status.18
This note explores the problems that undocumented
children who live in homes where there is domestic violence
face when they seek SIJS relief. The increasing popularity of
SIJS among immigration advocates gives the impression that
SIJS is a comprehensive form of child-specific immigration
relief. However, in actuality, SIJS was meant to protect only
the most vulnerable undocumented children and to this day is
an inadequate statutory and regulatory scheme to recognize
which youth are the most vulnerable.
The following true stories illustrate the tension that
results from the lack of clear regulatory guidance to ensure
that children who live in homes where there is domestic
violence have a path to SIJS relief.
Jane19 has three brothers and three sisters, who all
recently moved from Albania to the United States with their
parents. Each member of Jane’s family is undocumented. Her
father planned for the whole family to gain status as derivatives
on his individual asylum application, but his application was
denied. Jane’s father has physically and emotionally abused
each of the children, as well as Jane’s mother, for the last 15
years. Jane’s mother had no recourse or option for escape in
Albania and unsuccessfully sought immigration protection in the
United States as a result of the abuse. Jane was hopeful that she
and her siblings might qualify for some type of relief. The family
was in and out of criminal and civil family courts to enforce
multiple orders of protection against the father. During a civil
ADJUST
STATUS
(June
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/files/form/i-485.pdf.
15 Kristen Jackson, Special Status Seekers, 34 L.A. LAWYER 20, 23 (2012);
Meghan Johnson & Yasmin Yavar, Uneven Access to Special Immigration Juvenile
Status: How the Nebraska Supreme Court Became an Immigration Gatekeeper, 33
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 63, 72 (2013).
16 Maura M. Ooi, Note, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean Unprotected: The
Inadequacies of Relief For Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
883, 890 (2011).
17 Memorandum from William R. Yates, to Regional Dirs. and Dist. Dirs.,
supra note 11, at 2.
18 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (2012); Thronson, Kids, supra note 6, at 1008.
19 Jane is a fictional name assigned to the actual child in this litigation.
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family court proceeding, Jane followed a legal advocate’s
suggestion and made a motion for special findings from the family
court that, if granted, would enable her to apply for SIJS.20
Susy was born in Honduras, where she lived alone with
her mother. Susy never lived with her father and grew up with
the knowledge that he was a violent alcoholic who had abused
his wife. When Susy was 10, her mother left for the United States.
Susy and her younger brother Jason were left in the care of their
Aunt Estella. Estella physically, emotionally, and verbally
abused Susy and Jason until twelve-year-old Susy arranged for
“coyotes” to smuggle Jason and her to the United States.
Upon arrival at the United States and Mexico border,
their group encountered border patrol authorities and
immediately ran back into Mexico. Susy and Jason were both
apprehended21 and spent 80 days at a detention group home
until their Uncle Francisco picked them up and took them to
live with him in New York.22
Susy explained to a state juvenile court in a
guardianship proceeding initiated by her Uncle that:
At first it was hard adjusting to a new place and a new language but
I now feel a lot more comfortable in the United States and I have
friends. It is the first time I feel safe and taken care of as a child—it
is a wonderful feeling to be provided for and be part of a loving
family . . . . I see my mother who lives close by with her boyfriend and
their baby daughter but my caretaker and head of family is
Francisco. I am happy living with him and his family.

Susy also petitioned for special findings with hope she
would benefit from SIJS relief.23
In the fall of 2013, Susy received the state juvenile
special findings order necessary to apply for SIJS, while Jane’s
only option was to appeal her denial of the same findings.24
20 Facts adapted from a Family Court Decision by Honorable Ilana Gruebel
[hereinafter Family Court Decision], rev’d, No. O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564 (N.Y.
App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015) (July 29, 2013) (on file with author).
21 Susy escaped, but when she realized that Jason was apprehended, she
traveled back to the border to ensure that Jason would not be alone.
22 Matter of Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 714-17 (App. Div. 2013).
23 Id. The procedural posture of the case is much more complicated than the
summary of facts indicates. Susy’s mother eventually petitioned for custody of Susy in
competition with the uncle’s guardianship proceeding. Ultimately, the Appellate
Division affirmed Susy’s mother’s competing custody petition for Susy and granted
Susy SIJS relief. Id. at 721.
24 Id. at 725; Family Court Decision, supra note 20. In fact, Jane’s appeal
resulted in a reversal of the Family Court’s order. See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015
WL 1447564 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015). The Second Appellate Department found
that the order of protection issued on her behalf against her father established the
necessary dependency required by SIJS. Id. at *2.
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This note focuses on the need to expand relief to children like
Jane. Specifically, that in order to provide explicit SIJS
eligibility for undocumented children who live in homes where
there is domestic violence, USCIS should issue a new federal
regulation or an official legal memorandum to explicitly include
a child who a juvenile court has intervened to protect from
domestic violence in the home as dependent upon a juvenile
court so that they qualify for a special findings order.25 Part I
explains that SIJS was initially intended as an immigration
relief only for children in long-term state foster care, a story
often untold amidst SIJS advocates today. Part II focuses on two
2008 SIJS amendments that clearly indicate Congress intended
to expand the pool of children eligible for SIJS relief. Part II also
illustrates the imperfect nature of the expansion and how
children in homes where there is domestic violence are likely to
be prejudiced by the modern SIJS statute. Part III then argues
that USCIS should promulgate a rule offering specific guidance
to state courts that would help ensure a clear path to SIJS relief
for children who live in homes where there is domestic violence.
I.

UNDERSTANDING SIJS

SIJS was introduced to protect undocumented, minor
immigrants eligible for long-term foster care in 1990.26 It has been
substantively amended twice, first in 1997 (1997 Amendments)27
and most recently in 2008 (2008 Amendments).28 The type of child
seeking SIJS relief drastically changed after the 2008
Amendments.29 Advocates enthusiastically embraced SIJS,
hoping it was a step toward more comprehensive, child-specific
See infra Part I.A.
Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a
Juvenile Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to
Marriage Fraud Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42847 (Aug.
12, 1993). Prior to the enactment of SIJS, immigration relief had been offered to
children for a limited period of time under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, however, those benefits were only extended for a particular group of children who
had been in the United States prior to 1982. Id.
27 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460 (1997).
28 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, & 22 U.S.C.).
29 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir: Domestic Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Field
Operations (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf; see infra Part II for more discussion
about this change.
25

26
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immigration relief.30 Regrettably, state case law indicates there
remains significant confusion as to who is eligible for the state
special findings order that is essential for SIJS relief.31
In many ways, SIJS was initially envisioned as a narrow
solution to a pre-existing state child welfare crisis.32 Several
advocates in the state of California noticed that vulnerable
children in the foster care system had a particularly difficult
path to citizenship.33 With the encouragement of a local
Congressman, Ken Borelli, the then-Deputy Director for Child
Welfare in Santa Clara County, California, drafted the
beginnings of SIJS legislation.34 As the bill was passing through
Congress, it gained support from child-welfare workers across
the state of California who realized that a large number of
children who aged out of the state foster care system lacked
immigration status.35 As a result, these children found it difficult
to live balanced and stable lives.36 The product of the California
based efforts was SIJS, a relief the advocates intended
exclusively to stabilize foster care children.37 SIJS provided
foster care children with the opportunity for a green card and,
as a result, federal benefits and legitimate employment.38 SIJS
relief led to an improvement on the quality of life for foster care
children because “[e]ligibility for federal benefits correlates
directly with improved socioeconomic status and health.”39 To
be sure, SIJS also benefited the state of California because
federal benefits “decrease[ ] reliance on wholly state-funded
services provided to undocumented immigrants.”40

30 Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The
Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 252-53 (2010).
31 Theo S. Liebmann, Keeping Promises to Immigrant Youth, 29 PACE L. REV.
511, 512 (2009).
32 Email from Ken Borelli, Retired Deputy Dir. for Child Welfare in Santa
Clara County, Cal., to author (Oct. 25, 2013) (on file with author).
33 Email from Ken Borelli, Retired Deputy Dir. for Child Welfare in Santa
Clara County, Cal., to author (Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with author).
34 Id.
35 Id.; Email from Ken Borelli, to author, supra note 32.
36 Id. An undocumented immigrant’s inability to access legal employment or
health insurance, higher rates of poverty, and constant threat of deportation generally
contribute to instability. Theo Liebmann, Ethical Advocacy For Immigrant Survivors of
Family Crisis, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 650, 655 (2012).
37 Id.
38 Jennifer Baum et al., Most in Need But Least Served: Legal and Practical
Barriers to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for Federally Detained Minors, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 621, 623 (2012).
39 Id.
40 Id.
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Under the original Act, eligibility depended upon
whether the child established that: 1) she was declared
dependent on a juvenile court; 2) she was eligible for long-term
foster care; and 3) it was contrary to her best interest to return
to her home country.41 A child in Jane’s or Susy’s position would
not have qualified because neither were eligible for foster care.
At the time SIJS was enacted, it was not controversial
and barely drew attention at floor debate.42 In fact, only 28
commentators weighed in to question the rather narrow
procedural issue of how SIJS beneficiaries would adjust to LPR
status.43 Unfortunately, the lackadaisical attitude toward SIJS
quickly changed seven years later.
In 1997, Congress drastically amended SIJS.44 Senator
Pete Domenici from Arizona45 alleged that undocumented, undetained immigrant children severely abused SIJS relief.46
Specifically, he complained, “this is a giant loophole . . . every
visiting student from overseas can have a petition filed in a state
court . . . declaring that they’re a ward and in need of foster
care, . . . [and] they’re granting them.”47 In an attempt to “define
41 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J) (2012); Immigration Act of 1990, 1990 Pub. L.
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 § 153 (1990); Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting
Undocumented Immigrant Children From Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How To
Ameliorate The Impact of The 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J.
237, 241 (2006); Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 607.
42 Lloyd, supra note 41, at 241.The only recorded discussion at the acceptance
of the 1990 SIJS act consisted of 28 commentators who questioned the potential
difficulty involved for children granted SIJS visas adjusting to LPR status. Special
Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court; Revocation
of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage Fraud
Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42848-49 (Aug. 12, 1993);
Adelson, supra note 5, at 76; see also Carl Hulse, Immigrant Surge Rooted in Law to
Curb
Child
Trafficking,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
8,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/us/immigrant-surge-rooted-in-law-to-curb-childtrafficking.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22
RI%3A18%22%7D&_r=0 (describing the 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 as “enacted quietly” continuing the under-theradar approach to amendments related to SIJS).
43 Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a
Juvenile Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to
Marriage Fraud Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. at 42848-49;
Adelson, supra note 5, at 76.
44 Only some of the amendments are discussed in this note, although there
were additional SIJS amendments which made it more difficult for children in federal
custody to pursue SIJS relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (2012); Lloyd, supra
note 41, at 240; see Ooi, supra note 16, at 890 (noting that the consent requirement
presented a significant procedural hurdle to many perspective SIJS applicants who
previously had unhindered access to juvenile courts).
45 Lloyd, supra note 41, at 239.
46 Id.
47 Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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more restrictively the minors to whom SIJS status was
available,” the 1997 Amendments specified that, in addition to
being dependent upon a state juvenile court as eligible for longterm foster care, those eligible for SIJS must also demonstrate
that their dependency upon the state was “due to abuse, neglect
or abandonment.”48 A Congressional Report at the time of the
1997 Amendments included a brief explanation as to the intent
of the addition of “due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment:”
The language has been modified in order to limit the beneficiaries of
this provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely
abandoned, neglected, or abused children, by requiring the Attorney
General to determine that neither the dependency order nor the
administrative or judicial determination of the alien’s best interest
was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.49

The number of SIJS applicants noticeably decreased after the
restrictive 1997 Amendments but then steadily rose for the next
11 years.50 With a remarkable change of attitude, in 2008,
Congress reversed course and drastically amended SIJS,
resulting in increased access to relief.
II.

EXPANDING RELIEF: THE WILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING
VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT

The 2008 Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)51 significantly expanded SIJS
eligibility.52 The TVPRA passed easily with little debate or
attention, even though, since that time, advocates have
demanded federal regulations to clarify the 2008 Amendments.53
Lloyd, supra note 41, at 239.
105 CONG. REC. H26615 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (emphasis added).
50 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460 (1997); see infra Table 1. The chart indicates that SIJS beneficiaries
decreased by approximately 140 between 1997 and 1998.
51 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, & 22 U.S.C.).
52 Young & McKenna, supra note 30, at 252. Many provisions of the TVPRA,
even some related to SIJS, are beyond the scope of this note but have been widely
discussed elsewhere. For detailed review of all the changes to SIJS, see DEBORAH LEE
ET AL., UPDATE ON LEGAL RELIEF OPTIONS FOR UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN
FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS
PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008, at 3-4 (Feb. 19, 2009) (on file at AILA
InfoNet, Doc. No. 09021830).
53 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978, 54979
(proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205, and 245); Hulse, supra
note 42 (“Advocates saw it as a breakthrough on sex trafficking after Congress had
48

49
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In fact, the 2008 Amendments were heralded as the “first major
steps toward developing a more effective system to address the
needs of unaccompanied children.”54 In particular, eligibility
was expanded so a child only needed to establish that
reunification was not viable with “one or both parents”55 rather
than both parents.56 Similarly, a child no longer needed to
establish that she was eligible “for long-term foster care.”57
Both of these 2008 Amendments broadened the scope of SIJS
eligibility beyond foster care children.
Despite the benefits of the 2008 Amendments, immigrant
children living in homes where domestic violence is prevalent
may face difficulties accessing SIJS relief. Children continue to
be arbitrarily precluded from special findings orders where the
family court petitioner is a child’s parent or where the child is
not in the “correct type” of family court dependency proceeding.
The 2008 Amendments and the difficulties of applying the new
language to juvenile court proceedings are explored in turn in
the remainder of this section.
A.

“One or Both Parents”

The 2008 Amendments show that Congress intended to
“expand eligibility.”58 Prior to the 2008 Amendments, before a
state court could grant a special findings order, a child needed
to show that reunification with both parents was impossible,
which required establishing that both parents “effectively
already scuttled an earlier attempt at broad immigration reform despite the strong
backing of Mr. Bush. Just two House Republicans—Representative Jeff Flake of
Arizona and Representative Paul Broun of Georgia—opposed the measure when it first
passed the House in 2007, but it went through Congress without opposition and with
little notice in the post-election session of 2008. Aides to Mr. Flake, now a senator, said
he did not foresee the current problems but was more concerned about holding the line
on federal spending at the time.”). The relationship between the regulations
accompanying SIJS remain problematic today as regulations accepted in 2011 still
await codification.
54 Young & McKenna, supra note 30, at 252-53.
55 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Leadership, supra note 29.
56 Mandelbaum & Steglich supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Operations, supra note 29.
57 Mandelbaum & Steglich supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Operations, supra note 29.
58 In its commentary to the proposed regulations, USCIS recognizes that the
“one or both parents” addition was intended to “expand eligibility” but fails to provide
any guidance in the actual regulations which would encourage uniform state
interpretation of the change. See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 54979; see also Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum
from Donald Neufeld, to Field Leadership, supra note 29.
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relinquished control of the child.”59 The traditional dual parent
reunification requirement was closely linked to the necessity of
showing that a child was eligible for long-term foster care. Prior
to a child entering long-term foster care, courts must generally
find that “family reunification is no longer a viable option” with
either parent.60 The dual parent reunification was initially
intended to operate as an indication of the threshold
vulnerability Congress thought SIJS beneficiaries should
establish to merit the immigration benefit.61 The elimination of
dual parent reunification created opportunities for immigration
relief for mostly non-foster care children, thereby lowering the
vulnerability threshold necessary to qualify for SIJS.
The Second Appellate Department of the New York
Supreme Court and state appellate courts in California and
Minnesota recognize that through the 2008 Amendments,
Congress intended to expand eligibility and thus extend SIJS
eligibility to children who may have the option of reunification
with one parent.62 Despite the clear language of the amended
statute, some jurisdictions interpret “one or both parents” to
require a showing that reunification is not possible with either
parent.63 The Supreme Court of Nebraska determined in In re
Erick M. that “one or both parents” required an immigrant child,
who was abandoned by his father in Mexico but lived with his
mother, to establish that reunification was also not possible with
his mother prior to granting his SIJS special findings order.64 In
order to reach that result, the court first found that the
Amendment’s
language
was
ambiguous
and
then
counterintuitively reasoned that while “the effect of the 2008
amendment was to expand the pool of children eligible for
SIJS . . . juveniles must still be seeking relief from parental abuse,
abandonment, or neglect” because the narrowness introduced by

59 In re Menjivar, Case No. A70117167, 29 Immig. Reptr. B2-37, at 170
(A.A.U. Tex., Dec. 27, 1994).
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 ANGIE JUNCK ET AL., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS 4-10 (3rd ed. 2010).
62 Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rpr. 3d 729, 736 (4th Dist. Cal. 2014);
In re Welfare of D.A.M, No. A12-0427, 2012 WL 6097225, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
2012); Marcelina M-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (App. Div. 2013); see also In re
Miguel C.-N., 989 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App. Div. 2014); In re Jorge A.V.G., 987 N.Y.S.2d
909 (App. Div. 2014); Sanchez v. Bonilla, 982 N.Y.S. 2d 373 (App. Div. 2014); Cecilia
M.P.S. v. Santos H.B., 983 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Div. 2014); Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d
52, 54 (App. Div. 2014); P.E.A. v. A.G.G., 975 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (App. Div. 2013).
63 See infra note 65.
64 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 641, 648 (Neb. 2012). In that case, the immigrant
child lived with his mother, and there were no allegations of abuse in that relationship.
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the 1997 Amendments illustrated that the prevailing purpose of
the legislation as a whole was to restrict eligibility.65
Some courts follow the suspicious reasoning of Erick
M.66 For example, the New Jersey Superior Court recently
reconsidered its prior broad interpretation of the “one or both
parents” language in a decision denying a special findings
order.67 The court explained that although there is no specific
legislative history as to the meaning of “one or both parents,”
“some guidance can be gained from the legislative history of the
2008 legislation as a whole.”68 The court then reviewed the
history of the 2008 Amendments, concluding that only a narrow
interpretation was consistent with the legislation’s purpose:
[T]he legislative and administrative history of Subparagraph J
shows two competing goals. Congress wanted to permit use of the
SIJS procedure when necessary to prevent the return of juveniles to
unsafe parents. Where such protection is unnecessary, however,
Congress wanted to prevent misuse of the SIJS statute for
immigration advantage . . . . The contrary interpretation does not
achieve both of Congress’s goals. It would mean that a juvenile could
apply for SIJS status, with its immigration advantages, even if that
juvenile could be viably reunified with one parent who never abused,
neglected, or abandoned the juvenile. Indeed, it would permit SIJS
status even if that safe parent had raised the juvenile from birth, in
love, comfort, and security, and even if reunification with the safe
parent would not result in any further contact with the unsafe
parent. Nothing in the legislative history of Subparagraph J
supports such a broad interpretation. 69

Even under the former New Jersey precedent that
broadly interpreted the statutory language, the court was
hesitant to recognize a rule that a child in a stable home
environment with one parent might be eligible for SIJS:70
Under normal circumstances, the court would be reluctant to take
jurisdiction in a case where, as here, the children are in a safe
65 Meghan Johnson & Kele Stewart, Unequal Access to Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status: State Court Adjudication of One-Parent Cases, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (July 14, 2014), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/childrights/content/articles/summer2014-0714-unequal-access-specialimmigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-adjudication-one-parent-cases.html.
66 See M.P.C. v. A.B.C., No. FD-13-20-10, 2012 WL 1205805 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 12, 2012) (affirming a denial of dependency for special immigrant
juvenile status because 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) did not allow SIJS for a child living
with a non-neglectful parent in the United States); see also D.C. v. A.B.C., 8 A.3d 260,
266 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010).
67 H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
68 Id. at 267.
69 Id. at 268.
70 In re Minor Children of J.E. and J.C., 74 A.3d 1013, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2013).
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placement with one of their natural parents. This case is different.
The children were placed with petitioner by immigration authorities
and that placement triggers the need for the court’s supervision of
that placement to make certain that the children are safe and well
taken care of. 71

The result of the confusion and conscious disregard for the
clear statutory language is that some children are arbitrarily
denied special findings orders even though Congress clearly
intended to expand SIJS’s scope.72
B.

Dependency

The elimination of the “long-term foster care”
requirement explicitly broadened eligibility for SIJS relief
beyond the child welfare system. As a substitute, a child “placed
under the custody of . . . an individual or entity appointed by a
State or juvenile court” was to be deemed dependent.73 As the
statute currently reads, in order to pursue a SIJS special
findings order a child must establish that she is dependent upon
the juvenile court in one of three ways:74 1) she has been
committed to a state agency or department, 2) she is dependent75
upon the juvenile court because of a particular proceeding, or 3)
she has been committed to an individual entity by a state
juvenile court.76 The first option is a vestige of the initial intent
of SIJS to include foster care children. The second option preexisted the 2008 Amendments but only recognizes dependency
on a juvenile court because of a proceeding that relates to the
71 Id. The facts of the boys’ case were particularly compelling. Their mother
fled to the United States from Honduras and was granted temporary protected status
after the father of the children shot at her three times. The boys remained with the
father in Honduras for 10 years and were abused by their stepmother and father, who
was eventually killed as a result of his involvement in drug trafficking. The boys were
abandoned and fled to the United States out of fear that witnessing their father’s death
would jeopardize their safety. Once in the United States, they surrendered to
immigration authorities and were released as undocumented minors to their mother’s
care after two months in a juvenile detention facility. Id. at 1014-16. This decision was
the law of New Jersey prior to the decision this summer that changed the course of
New Jersey juvenile jurisprudence.
72 Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 88-89.
73 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
74 The
additional amendment allowing for guardianship proceedings
expanded eligibility to non-foster care children but did not go far enough because the
dependency prong still continues to hinder some eligible children.
75 I have italicized this first use of “dependency” to highlight the distinction
between this dependency which refers to “dependency on a juvenile court” from the
Dependency prong which encompasses each of the three options for establishing
dependency. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
76 Id.
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“care and custody” of the child.77 The third option was the 2008
substitution that recognized guardianship proceedings as
fulfilling the dependency requirement. The remainder of this
sub-section explores the two dependency options most utilized by
the post-2008 non-foster care SIJS beneficiaries: the
guardianship option and the dependency option.
1. Guardianship
In many ways, the addition of guardianship merely
drew attention to the pre-existing use of guardianship as bona
fide dependency under the SIJS statute.78 Prior to the 2008
Amendments, some state courts already granted special
findings orders based on guardianship proceedings,79 and the
1994 Administrative Appeals Office In re Menjivar decision
recognized guardianship as an authorized action establishing
court dependency for a SIJS special findings order.80 The
Appeals Office found:
[t]he acceptance of jurisdiction over the custody of a child by a
juvenile court, when the child’s parents have effectively relinquished
control of the child, makes the child dependent upon the juvenile
court, whether the child is placed by the court in foster care or, as
here, in a guardianship situation.81

After Menjivar, some state courts recognized that a
guardianship petition sufficiently established the necessary
dependency to grant a child a special findings order.82 Prior to
the TVPRA, the New York Supreme Court First Appellate
Division recognized that a finding in favor of guardianship
fulfilled the necessary dependency to grant a SIJS special

77 Federal regulations define a juvenile court as a court that handles
proceedings related to a child’s “care and custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2009).
78 See generally In re Menjivar, Case No. A70117167, 29 Immig. Rptr. B2-37
(A.A.U. Tex., Dec. 27, 1994).
79 Id.; In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d 576 (App. Div. 2008). Some may
argue that guardianship was not accepted as a grounds for dependency prior to 2008 in
New York. See In re Guardianship of Vanessa D., 15 Misc. 3d 819 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007);
In re Zaim R., 13 Misc. 3d 180 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006). In each case the special findings
motions were dismissed on jurisdiction grounds because the petitioner aged out, but
included no discussion that the guardianship was an improper basis upon which to
grant special findings. In addition, New York later recognized guardianship
proceedings as sufficient to establish the necessary dependency to grant a special
findings order. In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
80 In re Menjivar, 29 Immig. Rptr. B2-37, at B2-39.
81 Id.
82 In re Alamgir A. 917 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 2011); Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan
W. 901 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2010); Liebmann, supra note 31, at 518 n.56.
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findings order.83 The explicit codification of the administrative
Menjivar rule was indicative of Congress’s intent to expand
relief beyond foster care children. For the first time, the SIJS
statute explicitly recognized an affirmative path to relief
whereby a child could petition a state court to commence
guardianship proceedings. This marked a significant change
from SIJS’s origins, which only allowed a child to seek a special
findings order after she had become completely dependent
upon the state as a ward.84 Specifically, states recognized that
the expansion was justified under the original intent of SIJS
because child welfare agencies were generally reluctant to file
cases against parents outside of the United States85 due to
difficulties gathering data and investigating.86 Thus, the
codification of guardianship as a dependency option made
sense as a means for a vulnerable child to affirmatively petition
the court when the state was hesitant to initiate protection
proceedings.87 The Amendment was not such a far stretch from
the original intent of the legislation, but in fact drastically
expanded access to a special findings order.88
2. Dependency on a Juvenile Court
While the guardianship expansion recognized and
affirmed the need for a broader awareness of how children might
come before the court, the dependency option was left untouched.
This dependency is not established by all juvenile court
proceedings, but only includes proceedings that are narrowly
considered to relate to the “care and custody” of the child.89
In spirit with the 2008 Amendments, which recognized
that potential SIJS beneficiaries might come before the court in
ways other than as a state ward, immigration advocates in
New York City attempted to litigate an expansion of the

In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
See supra Part I.
85 The problem was not likely jurisdictional since the New York Family Court
Act Section 1015 explicitly grants the family court jurisdiction over any case where a
child resides in the county where the court sits, regardless of where the maltreatment
may have occurred. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1015 (a) (McKinney 1998); Liebmann, supra
note 31, at 518 n 56.
86 Liebmann, supra note 31, at 518.
87 Id.
88 Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 64-65; see infra Table 1.
89 Federal regulations define a juvenile court as a court that handles
proceedings related to a child’s “care and custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2009).
83

84
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meaning of the narrow interpretation of dependency.90 New
York City advocates who argued that dependency should be
interpreted more broadly relied heavily upon a memo issued by
the Chief Administrative Judge of New York’s Unified Court
System, Judge Ann Pfau,91 noting:
Juveniles may be eligible to apply to federal immigration authorities
for SIJS where, in any category of court proceeding, a State court has
determined that they are abused, neglected or abandoned, that
“family reunification is not an option”[92] and that it would be
contrary to their best interests to return to their home country.93

Specifically, advocates argued that a child before the juvenile
court because of a child support order or a civil order of
protection should fulfill the “dependent on a juvenile court”
option and receive a special findings order.94
In In re Hei Ting C., the Second Department declined to
recognize dependency where a child found himself under the
jurisdiction of a family court to enforce a child support order.95
The court’s opinion specifically declined to expand dependency
because “no appellate decisions in this State have addressed
the question of whether an order issued by the Family Court
that does not award or affect the custody of a child satisfies the
dependency prong.”96 Similarly, in Jane’s case, the Kings
County Family Court declined to issue a special findings order
based upon the order of protection issued on behalf of a juvenile
against her father.97 Judge Gruebel’s order specifically noted
that because:
the children still live[d] with their mother, there has been no finding
of abuse or neglect against the father in an Article 10 proceeding,
and the court in this case has not accepted jurisdiction over the

90 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Family
Court Decision, supra note 20.
91 Interview with Lauren Burke, Clinical Professor at Brooklyn Law School
and counsel in In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div. 2013) (Nov. 29, 2013)
(notes on file with author).
92 This is the definition of “eligible for long-term foster care” in the federal
regulations, a broader definition than foster care under New York law. “Long-term
foster care” under the regulations means care until the child reaches the age of
majority and specifically includes adoption and guardianship. Memorandum from Hon.
Ann Pfau, Chief Admin. Judge of N.Y. Unified Court Sys., to Judges of the Family
Court 2 n.2 (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author) (citation omitted).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d at 151; Family Court Decision, supra note 20.
95 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
96 Id.
97 Family Court Decision, supra note 20.
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custody of the children . . . the requisites required [by] special
immigrant juvenile status are not met.98

Thus, family courts in one of the most immigrant
friendly states, New York,99 continued to require a juvenile
court action that is related to the “care and custody” of the
child,100 excluding support orders and only recently recognizing
certain orders of protection as a basis to request a SIJS special
findings order.101
The narrowness of the dependency option presents little
or no difficulty for foster care children seeking SIJS relief
because they have already been committed to a state agency
and therefore fulfill the dependency prong.102 In contrast, a
non-foster care child similar to Jane or Susy might not be
exposed to a state child welfare system and might have a
difficult time establishing dependency.103
[D]espite an ongoing obligation to protect and support vulnerable
children, especially those who have been harmed by abuse and
neglect, it cannot be assumed that a local child protection agency
will come to the aid [of children], calling into question one of the
underlying premises of the federal statute and regulations
establishing the SIJS criteria. At times . . . a youth simply does not
come to the attention of the child protection agency. At other times,
because a youth already has the support of an adult caregiver, often
a relative, the child protection agency will determine that the youth
is safe, no longer at risk of harm, and thus does not need the
agency’s assistance.104

Id. at 4.
See generally Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to
Wilberforce: Is the U.S. Government’s Approach to Child Migrants Improving?, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Feb. 2011, at tbl. 11 (ranking New York fourth among states granting SIJS
petitions); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR
2013 tbl. 4 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013lawful-permanent-residents (click “Table 4”); Ghita Schwarz, Why New York Is Still the
Capital of Immigrant America, THE NATION, (Jan. 6, 2015) http://www.thenation.com/
article/173957/why-new-york-still-capital-immigrant-america.
100 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2014).
101 See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr.
1, 2015) (finding that “under the proper circumstances, a child involved in a family
offense proceeding involving allegations of abuse or neglect may properly be the subject
of such a determination as an intended beneficiary of the SIJS provisions”).
102 Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, former immigration
practitioner at The Door’s Legal Servs. Ctr. (Nov. 6, 2013); Email from David B.
Thronson, former immigration practitioner at The Door’s Legal Servs. Ctr., to author
(Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with author).
103 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 610.
104 Id.
98
99
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Susy was lucky enough to have a guardian who could petition on
her behalf, but Jane did not have that option and was left with
only the option to fulfill the more demanding dependency prong.105
The 2008 expansion of SIJS eligibility created a new
dynamic. SIJS had been a solution to a pre-existing state child
welfare matter, rather than an immigration remedy.106 As
explained by Wendy Young, president of Kids in Need of
Defense and an immigration adviser to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy at the time of the TVPRA’s passage, “[t]here was a
recognition that these kids are incredibly vulnerable . . . .”107
Children who were not in foster care and who had been
ineligible for SIJS prior to 2008 now had new immigration
opportunities. Immigration advocates recognized that they
could initiate proceedings in family court in order to pursue
SIJS special findings for non-foster care children.108
Prior to the TVPRA, most SIJS applicants initially came
“to the attention of state child welfare authorities rather than
federal immigration authorities.”109 A review of the current
number of foster care children compared to non-foster care
children that benefit from SIJS relief since 2008 illustrates
that foster care children are not the primary beneficiaries of
SIJS relief.110 In New York City, between January 2011 and May
2013, only 340 children under the custody of Administration for
Children Services (ACS)111 or in foster care were identified as

105 Arguably, Jane’s mother could have petitioned for guardianship on her
behalf and perhaps made Jane eligible for SIJS relief in that way. However, her
mother’s autonomy to pursue the civil remedies she believes most effective for her
family should be preserved. The civil order of protection was a less invasive form of
civil relief and Jane should not be punished because her mother sought help in that
way as opposed to seeking to terminate her father’s parental rights.
106 The history of the enactment of SIJS described infra note 33 and
accompanying text also clearly illustrate that the driving force behind SIJS was the
need to clean up a state welfare problem rather than an immigration problem.
107 Hulse, supra note 42. Wendy Young’s statement refers to more than SIJS
eligible children since the TVPRA provided increased protection for children in
immigration proceedings generally, even beyond those eligible for SIJS.
108 In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a prima facie
case of dependency for a child living with her aunt, even though the child did not
request services from the Department of Children Families or the State because the
child was dependent as a matter of law, in that she was not being cared for by a
guardian or parent).
109 Susan Schmidt & Jacqueline Bhabha, Kafka’s Kids: Children in U.S.
Immigration Proceedings Part II: Beyond and Besides Asylum, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb.
2007, at 35.
110 Only a regional data comparison is possible because of the poor data
collection and availability in this area at both the state and federal level.
111 Administration for Children Services is the New York City agency
providing protection for abused and neglected children. About ACS, NYC ADMIN. FOR
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eligible for SIJS.112 Of those eligible, 231 (67.9%) were referred to
legal services for further review of their eligibility.113 Only 99
children (29%) were granted SIJS status at the time of the
report in June 2013.114 Some of those referred for further review
pursued different immigration relief or were later determined to
already hold United States citizenship or LPR status.115 No
official data has been published as to the total number of SIJS
beneficiaries from the State of New York during that time
period, but for the two years prior to that time period (20092010), a reported total of 370 petitions were granted.116 As a
rough estimate, comparing the number of SIJS beneficiaries
from New York State between 2009 and 2010 to the number of
New York State foster care children reported to have benefited
from SIJS relief, between January 2011 and March 2013,
approximately 27% of SIJS petitioners were foster-care
children.117 Despite the clear shift in intended beneficiaries,
many vulnerable non-foster care children continue to fall
through the cracks of SIJS relief.
3. Expanded SIJS Relief Does Not Include
Consideration of Domestic Violence
The spirit of the 2008 Amendments—to provide more
comprehensive relief to vulnerable children—falls short of its
goal because special findings orders are granted on arbitrary
grounds that are not indicative of a child’s vulnerability. The
problem lies in the decision by Congress to condition special
findings orders on the type of proceeding in which the child
approaches the state juvenile court. The problem is both one of
CHILD. SERVICES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about/about.shtml (last visited
May 1, 2015).
112 N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., LOCAL LAW 6 OF 2010: ANNUAL
REPORT 7-9 (June 2013).
113 Id.
114 Several of those identified submitted SIJS petitions and awaited their
interview, or were preparing a SIJS petition. Others had legal status or pursued relief
more favorable to their particular case. Id.
115 Id.
116 Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to Wilberforce: Is the
U.S. Government’s Approach to Child Migrants Improving?, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb.
2001, app. 1, tbl 2.
117 This number is obviously flawed because it compares data for foster-care
beneficiaries from a different time period than total New York State beneficiaries. In
addition, it only includes New York City foster care children while the total number of
New York beneficiaries likely includes non-NYC foster care children who might have
received SIJS status. Given the lack of data in this area, this comparison, flawed as it
may be, is likely the most useful to illustrate the low percentage of foster care SIJS
beneficiaries compared to non-foster care beneficiaries.
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misinterpretation of federal legislation by state courts as seen
by the “one or both parents” interpretation, and poor legislative
and regulatory drafting at the federal level as seen with the
rigid narrowness of dependency. Children living in homes
plagued by domestic violence are particularly affected by the
arbitrary requirements that juvenile courts use to determine
whether to grant special findings.
A child who lives in a home where there is domestic
violence is likely to have one functioning parent and is only
subject to risk because of the actions of the second parent. The
Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “one or both
parents” language, therefore, can be particularly difficult for
children in a home where there is domestic violence.118
Likewise, the dependency barrier is particularly onerous for
children in a home where there is domestic violence because it
discounts orders of protection, the very proceeding by which
these children are likely to petition the court to fulfill the
dependency requirement.
The “one or both parents” prong has been narrowly
interpreted to restrict eligibility because courts appear hesitant
to recognize that a child in a stable home environment might
be eligible for SIJS; whereas, the dependency prong clearly
restricts those eligible to a certain type of state court
dependency. Courts will likely begin to accept the intended
interpretation of the “one or both parents” language because
New York and California, influential states when it comes to
matters of immigration, have adopted the intended expansive
interpretation.119 In addition, once the approved USCIS
regulations are put in place to clarify that the addition of the
“one or both parents” language was intended to “expand
eligibility,” more uniform state application should follow.120 Not
all advocates believe the “one or both parents” clarification is
enough to ensure consistent interpretation across state lines.121
In fact, some advocates support increased regulatory guidance
regarding the “one or both parents” language because, “without
In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639 (Neb. 2012).
Marcelina M-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (App. Div. 2013); see also
Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (4th Dist. Cal. 2014); In re Miguel
C.N., 989 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 2014); In re Jorge A.V.G., 987 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App.
Div. 2014); Sanchez v. Bonilla, 982 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 2014); Cecilia M.P.S. v.
Santos H., 983 N.Y.S. 2d 840 (App. Div. 2014); Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d 52 (App.
Div. 2014); P.E.A. v. A.G.G., 975 N.Y.S.2d 85, 85 (App. Div. 2013).
120 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978, 54979
(proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205-45).
121 Johnson & Stewart, supra note 65.
118

119
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an explicit recognition of the validity of one-parent SIJS cases,
there is the risk that even more state court judges will close the
door to eligible children before their petitions can be considered
by USCIS.”122 While their concern is valid, the “one or both
parents” problem—one of incorrect state interpretation of fairly
clear federal legislation—is less concerning than the
dependency problem, which stems from poor federal legislation.
The proceeding by which a child enters the state court is
not necessarily indicative of his or her level of vulnerability,
and it is certainly not within the state juvenile court judge’s
jurisdiction to refuse relief based on concerns for immigration
fraud.123 A child like Jane may appear drastically different from
a foster care child or a child seeking SIJS as a result of an
approved guardianship petition with a non-biological parent,
but in many ways there are few legal distinctions. Consider
Jane and Susy: they have each been abused, neglected, or
abandoned by a biological parent and need to re-adjust their
legal rights with that parent.124 The limited SIJS relief
available to non-foster care children arbitrarily ignores that a
child who has secured a final order of protection against a
parent is dependent upon the court for her safety.125 Instead,
Susy was granted relief because she established dependency on
the court, while Jane’s dependency was not recognized.126 The
inconsistency is glaring and quite concerning from a child
welfare perspective. There needs to be an expansion of
Id.
For instance, Jane sorely needed the court’s protection, as indicated by the
multiple orders of protection granted on her behalf to keep her safe from her abusive
father, while Susy was in no immediate danger. Nonetheless, some state court judges
have refused to make findings of dependency on the grounds that a juvenile only seeks
the order for immigration purposes. Adelson, supra note 5, at 81. For example, in In re
Mohamed B., the family court judge denied SIJS findings because he had suspicions as
to how the child separated from his hosts while visiting the United States. In re
Mohamed B., 921 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 2011) (reversing the New York State Second
Appellate Department). The most drastic example is In re Jason K. where a student
was denied SIJS relief because he was still lawfully present on a student visa, and the
judge noted that SIJS is exclusively intended for “[a]n unaccompanied child [who] is
subject to deportation unless granted permission to stay in the United States.” In re
Jason K. 972 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Fam. Ct. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similar suspicion resulted in a denial of special findings because a child
arranged his own transport to the United States and thereby exhibited too much
agency to be determined dependent. Nirmal S. v. Rajinder K., 956 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App.
Div. 2012). The unfortunate result of this suspicion is that some very vulnerable
children are denied relief.
124 See supra INTRODUCTION.
125 Allie Meiers, Civil Orders of Protection: A Tool to Keep Children Safe, 19 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 373, 377 (2005).
126 See supra INTRODUCTION.
122
123
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dependency to include children who are in homes where there
is domestic violence.
Further complicating any efforts for reform, there is a
lack of demographic data about the children who seek SIJS
relief. There is no comprehensive, detailed reporting of the
individual characteristics of those children seeking relief either
at the state or federal level.127 New York State Family Courts
do not collect records or information about the type of
proceedings in which children petition juvenile courts for
special findings orders.128 The lack of reliable data is
problematic for meaningful reform efforts; it allows state
judges to continually stereotype applicants and provides little
guidance for how regulations should change to better
accommodate the population seeking SIJS relief. The remainder
of the note focuses on solving the dependency problem, since less
attention and fewer reform efforts have focused on eliminating
the dependency inconsistency.
III.

PROMULGATING A FEDERAL REGULATION

A.

Proposal

The most principled solution to the dependency problem
must include a federal solution, since at its root this is a
federally created problem. Just as the approved, but still
pending, September 2011 regulations129 attempt to clarify that
the “one or both parent” legislation was intended to “expand
eligibility,” USCIS should promulgate a regulation, or at least
distribute a regulatory guidance memorandum as to the
meaning of dependency, to help ensure that state courts grant
special findings orders to children like Jane. Specifically,
USCIS should pass a regulation explicitly providing that a
permanent one year civil order of protection issued by a
juvenile court is dispositive evidence that a child is dependent
upon the juvenile court for his or her “care and custody.”130
127 Email from Rosemary Hartmann, Adjudications Officer for the USCIS
Office of Policy & Strategy, to author (Nov. 20, 2013) (on file with author); Email from
Michael McLoughlin, First Deputy Chief Clerk for N.Y.C. Family Court, to author (Oct.
18, 2013) (on file with author). The author made several unsuccessful attempts to
receive data from USCIS regarding the demographics of SIJS beneficiaries as well as
unsuccessful attempts to receive data from New York City Family Courts issuing
special findings.
128 Email from Michael McLoughlin, to author, supra note 127.
129 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54979.
130 There is support for this position in the very recent Second Appellate
Department decision finding that “under the proper circumstances, a child involved in
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A civil order of protection is a court action intended to
address domestic violence safety concerns.131 It is widely
recognized that “[c]ivil protection orders are one of the most
commonly sought legal remedies available to protect domestic
violence victims.”132 Some form of this relief is available in all
50 states and the District of Columbia.133 A permanent order of
protection134 cannot be granted without a hearing in which the
accused party appears and has “an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence.”135 The duration of a permanent civil order of
protection varies from state to state, but in the majority of
states, a final order of protection is effective for one to two
years.136 Eligibility to file for a civil order of protection is
limited to a victim who can show beyond “a preponderance of
the evidence”137 that she has been subject to certain types of
threats or abuse and she has at least one of the enumerated
intimate relationships to the perpetrator.138 The conduct that is
generally required to merit an order of protection for a child
includes “overt acts of physical harm, threats of imminent
harm, harassment, sexual acts with minors, lewd fondling and
touching of a minor,” as well as “emotional abuse.”139 Most
states include the parent-child relationship as one of those
eligible for a civil order of protection.140 In some states, an order
of protection petition can be commenced in a state juvenile
a family offense proceeding involving allegations of abuse or neglect may properly be
the subject of such a determination as an intended beneficiary of the SIJS provisions.”
Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015).
131 Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love Got To Do With It: Securing Access to
Justice For Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 466 (2012). “Additionally, civil orders of
protection (CPO) may be called many different things depending on the jurisdiction.
Some states call their civil orders of protection a Permanent Protective Order (PPO), a
Permanent Restraining Order (PRO) or some may simply refer to the order as a
domestic violence injunction.” Meiers, supra note 125, at 375-76.
132 NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
TO LITIGATING FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDINGS 1, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/
images/FINAL-ThePractitioner%27sGu.pdf (last visited May 11, 2015).
133 Martin, supra note 131, at 466.
134 Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 101 (2005). The reader should
distinguish a final order of protection from an ex parte order which can be granted with
significantly fewer procedural protections for the accused and generally lasts for a
much shorter period of time. Id.
135 Meiers, supra note 125, at 379.
136 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Symposium on Domestic Violence:
Article: Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 848, 905 (1993); Meiers, supra note 125, at 375-76.
137 Smith, supra note 134, at 101.
138 Klein & Orloff, supra note 136, at 848, 869.
139 Meiers, supra note 125, at 377.
140 Martin, supra note 131, at 469-71.
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court on a child’s behalf by a parent, the state or a welfare
agency, or the child herself.141
Frivolous allegations do not merit a permanent order of
protection.142 A permanent order of protection is already
considered “convincing” evidence of battery in other
immigration contexts.143 Expanding dependency to include
proceedings in which permanent orders of protection are
granted for at least one year ensures an avenue to SIJS relief
for children in homes where there is domestic violence.
B.

Benefits of a Narrow Regulatory Amendment

Various proposals have been put forward to handle the
SIJS dependency problem. Some advocate that states should
amend their civil codes to “ensure a jurisdictional basis for
freestanding SIJS predicate order motions in juvenile or family
courts” or to provide a “self-petitioning ‘state of want’ cause of
action” enabling children to “initiate a SIJS predicate order
request outside of the context of a dependency action.”144 The
problem with a state-by-state campaign is that it does nothing
to promote uniform SIJS relief but rather contributes to
inconsistent application across state lines. Furthermore, such
an expansive broadening of state juvenile court jurisdiction to
grant special findings orders seems inconsistent with the
history of SIJS.
Others advocate for federal reform, including an
expanded definition of dependency. SIJS advocates Randi
Mandelbaum and Elissa Steglich propose clarifying or
broadening dependency by “either chang[ing] the statutory
language from ‘declared dependent’ to ‘the state court having
141 “State protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups with regard
to standing for minor petitioners: (1) statutes that expressly grant standing to some or
all minors; (2) statutes that expressly deny standing to some or all minors; and (3)
statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
142 Meiers, supra note 125, at 377.
143 Liebmann, supra note 36, at 653 (“‘Credible evidence of battery or extreme
cruelty’ can include the type of restraining orders and civil protection orders that are
frequently sought and issued in family offense and child dependence proceedings in
family court. In fact, such orders are generally considered among the most convincing
types of evidentiary proof that can be offered, and noncitizens who obtain protection
orders have established one of the most important elements of the VAWA self-petition.
Such orders can serve as critical support for the noncitizen’s claim of battery or
extreme cruelty and can confirm the credibility of the self-petitioner.”).
144 Baum, supra note 38, at 623. These authors argue that states should be
incentivized to makes changes because once a child becomes eligible for SIJS the child
is “federal[ly] eligibl[e] for health care, employment authorization, financial aid, and
other benefits denied to unlawfully present immigrants.” Id.
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assumed jurisdiction,’ or [ ] defin[ing] ‘declared dependent’ in
the federal regulations simply as ‘the state court having
assumed jurisdiction.’”145 Supporting this argument, they point
to practitioners’ and state court judges’ common understanding
that dependency simply means that a juvenile court has taken
jurisdiction over a matter related to the child.146 Mandelbaum
and Steglich are most concerned with inconsistent state
interpretations of dependency, rather than the exclusion of a
particular vulnerable child population.147 A broad expansion of
dependency like that put forth by Mandelbaum and Steglich
would likely encourage increased scrutiny by state court judges
who already arguably exceed their jurisdiction by questioning a
child’s motive for relief, rather than focusing on the domestic
petition the child brings before the court.148 Certainly,
Mandelbaum’s and Steglich’s broad proposal includes child
support orders as sufficient evidence of dependency.149 My
proposal does not go so far as to include children who appear
before a juvenile court under a child support enforcement order.150
Instead, the focus of this solution is on including a small,
vulnerable group of immigrant children, which is both consistent
with the purpose of SIJS to protect the most vulnerable children
and more politically feasible than broad reform.
Adding orders of protection to the definition of
dependency is consistent with the original purpose of SIJS—to
protect vulnerable children.
[N]ot all violence or abuse directed towards children evokes the
criminal or juvenile justice systems. When a parent or guardian
petitions the court for a civil order of protection for [a] child, it might
be the first contact the adult or child has had with the judicial system.

Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 616.
Id.
147 Id. This note does not focus on the variation between states as to the
meaning of dependency or the type of proceedings that various states include within
that meaning. It does not appear that any states currently consider a civil order of
protection to fall within that definition.
148 For state courts to engage in that type of review usurps the decisionmaking function of USCIS. State courts involve themselves in these issues that are
best left to immigration authorities, who do in fact conduct that analysis on a regular
basis. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 65.
149 Note that I do not advocate expanding SIJS relief to include a case like In
re Hei Ting C. where advocates tried to argue that a child support order should also be
sufficient to qualify a child for the dependency prong. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
150 See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr.
1, 2015), where the Second Appellate Department distinguished a proceeding involving
an order of protection from the issue in In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App.
Div. 2013), involving a child support order.
145

146
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Civil orders of protection statutes were designed to encompass the
minor children of domestic abuse victims.151

Furthermore, there is precedent for using regulatory
guidance to expand the scope of SIJS relief. When SIJS was a
relatively new form of relief and advocates of children in foster
care became aware of its potential benefit, there was a large
group of undocumented children in the foster care system on
the verge of emancipation.152 These children already had
dependency orders from a juvenile court as part of their foster
care placement.153 To handle the volume of SIJS applicants,
child welfare workers capitalized upon the statutory and
regulatory language that supported an administrative agency’s
ability to determine the “best interest” of immigrant children in
the SIJS context.154 Both the INA Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) and
the federal regulations associated with SIJS relief allowed for
“administrative or judicial proceedings” as the basis for
determining that it is not in the child’s “best interest” to return
to their home country or to reunite with one or both parents.155
A child advocate involved in early SIJS adjudication in
New York City explained the logic behind the hybrid procedure:
To avoid having to get back in court, we coupled the non-[SIJS] court
finding placing the child in care with an affidavit from a high level
child welfare official made the other factual findings based on a
review of the file and our submissions. INA 101(a)(27)(J) requires a
juvenile court for dependency, but contemplates “administrative or
judicial proceedings” for the rest. Our assertion, which back then
legacy INS accepted, was that the affidavit was the result of an
administrative process sufficient to satisfy the statute.156

The regulatory guidance paved the way for broader
interpretation of SIJS. In the same way, future regulation
could pave the way for increased recognition of the serious
vulnerability of immigrant children in homes where there is
domestic violence. This note’s proposed expansion, like the
amendment to include guardianship as a ground for dependency,
does nothing more than ensure that vulnerable youth who are
indistinguishable from current SIJS beneficiaries, apart from
Meiers, supra note 125, at 384.
Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, supra note 102; see Email
from David B. Thronson, to author, supra note 102.
153 Id.
154 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012); 8
C.F.R. § 204.11 (c)(6) (2014).
155 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(ii).
156 Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, supra note 102; Email from
David B. Thronson, to author, supra note 102.
151
152
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the proceeding by which they approach the state juvenile court,
are afforded the same relief.157
C.

Politically Feasible

In addition, regulatory rulemaking is also a practical,
politically feasible solution, which is crucially important in our
current political atmosphere. In fact, the TVPRA has recently
come under attack:
The Obama administration says the [TVPRA] is partly responsible
for tying its hands in dealing with the current influx of
children . . . . What many can agree on is that the Wilberforce law
was not enacted with the idea of dealing with the current flow of
tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors or providing an
incentive for children to reach the border. “It is classic unintended
consequences,” said Marc R. Rosenblum, deputy director of the U.S.
Immigration Policy Program at the Migration Policy Institute. “This
was certainly not what was envisioned.”158

The Obama administration’s comments are not
specifically directed toward the SIJS Amendments included in
the TVPRA, but nonetheless show a mounting concern that
immigration relief extended to vulnerable children is too
generous. “[G]iven the hostile climate toward immigrationrelated legislation in Congress, regulatory action may be more
expedient and appropriate.”159 A regulatory change would not
need to pass through Congress, and to the extent that Congress
disagrees with the change, the Congressional Regulatory
Review Act provides them with the power to reject the rule
within 60 days of its enactment.160 Of course, any amendment
of the dependency prong might face especially stringent
criticism because Congressional and federal authorities
welcome the dependency requirement as a safeguard against
fraud, allegedly legitimizing SIJS proceedings.161 The Second
Appellate Department of New York’s Supreme Court, in
denying special findings based upon a lack of sufficient
dependency, specifically noted:
The requirement that a child be dependent upon the juvenile
court . . . ensures that the process is not employed inappropriately by
See infra Part II.
Hulse, supra note 42; see also Preston, supra note 3.
159 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 616 n.82.
160 Robert Longley, Federal Regulations, ABOUT NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/fedregulations.htm.
161 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 154-55 (App. Div. 2013).
157
158
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children who have sufficient family support and stability to pursue
permanent residency in the United States through other, albeit more
protracted, procedures.162

Some juvenile court judges understand expanded SIJS
relief as a slippery slope toward immigration fraud and
scrutinize immigrant children seeking special findings orders:163
[T]he local officials are often wary of the implications of their actions
and nervous about what they perceive as making decisions about
whether a person will obtain an immigration benefit. Some may not
want to participate in what they perceive as a process that condones
or further encourages illegal immigration.164

A recent Queens Family Court decision granting SIJS relief
warned in dicta that:
Current news reports indicate that parents have been encouraged to
dispatch their young on perilous journeys to the United States in the
company of paid smugglers who are part of organized criminal
enterprises. The children arrive in the United States with the hope
that they will be not be deported and that they will be granted
sanctuary in the form of legal permission to remain permanently.
Although SIJS was enacted to protect children who have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned, it may perversely expose those
children to maltreatment. The smuggling of children across
international borders is inimical to their safety and well-being.165

There is little doubt that any proposed expansion of
dependency might encounter resistance.166 However, like the
Id.
Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 76.
164 Id.
165 In re Amandeep S., No. G-1310/14, 2014 WL 2808690, *13 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
June 19, 2014).
166 In fact, on March 4, 2015, a local NBC investigative team reported the
uncovering of rampant SIJS fraud in the Sikh community in Queens, New York. Melissa
Russo et al., I-Team: Family Court Exploited in Immigration Cases in Queens, Insiders
Charge, NBCNEWYORK.COM (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:16 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/
local/family-court-queens-immigration-cases-human-smuggling-green-card-295050931.html.
Their report noted that guardianship petitions in the Queens Family Court jumped
75% over the last year and that “hundreds of young men from the same part of India
are all telling similar stories in order to get special access to green cards.” Id.
Congressman Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee picked up on the
report and sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Johnson
specifically requesting answers to the following questions:
162
163

1) What immediate steps will you take to ensure that fraudulent SIJ
petitions are not approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) adjudicators? 2) What long term changes will you make to the
adjudications process and policies to ensure that fraudulent SIJ petitions are
not approved by USCIS adjudicators? 3) How exactly will you coordinate with
state courts to ensure that abuse, abandonment or neglect is not found by
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2008 Amendments that codified guardianship proceedings as
per se establishing dependency, the addition of orders of
protection to a regulatory definition merely extends protection
to those eligible for SIJS by authorizing a new posture by
which children can approach the court. In addition, this
proposal arguably expands eligibility to a much smaller group
than the 2008 Amendments. At least one experienced state
court judge, Judge Pfau of New York, recognizes that
dependency must have a broader meaning than the narrow
limitations currently imposed on the definition.167
Furthermore, the statute is not reaching enough
vulnerable children, as evidenced by the small number of
children actually obtaining SIJS relief. The 5,000 cap allotted
to SIJS beneficiaries168 has yet to be met in any year since the
legislation’s enactment.169 There was considerable surprise and
perhaps disappointment when, “rather than a flood anticipated
by some SIJS detractors,” the groundbreaking 2008
Amendments actually resulted in only “a trickle” of the
expected increase.170 For many years, only 500 SIJS
beneficiaries adjusted to LPR status.171 The number of
beneficiaries slowly increased after the 2008 Amendments;
however, even in 2013, at its peak, 2,735 reserved positions

these courts when there is evidence of fraudulent claims? 4) What, if any,
statutory changes do you suggest to give you additional tools to ensure that
fraudulent SIJ petitions are not approved by USCIS adjudicators?
Letter from Congressman Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Judiciary Comm., to Jeh
Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 19, 2015), available at https://goodlatte.house.gov/
system/uploads/415/original/RWG_to_Johnson_3.19.15.pdf. These developments appear
to be the most recent and also direct attack on SIJS as a form of relief since 1997.
Various immigration advocacy agencies have come together drafting a letter in
response to Congressman Goodlatte explaining the value of SIJS and correcting some
exaggerations and misunderstandings of how SIJS operates. Email from Ctr. on
Immigration & Child Welfare, to author (Mar. 29, 2015) (on file with author).
167

Juveniles may be eligible to apply to federal immigration authorities for SIJS
where, in any category of court proceeding, a State court has determined that
they are abused, neglected or abandoned, that ‘family reunification is not an
option’ and that it would be contrary to their best interests to return to their
home country.
Memorandum from Hon. Ann Pfau, to Judges of the Family Court, supra note 92.
168 Beth Morales Singh, To Rescue, Not Return: An International Human
Rights Approach To Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seeking Refuge in the United
States, 41 COLUM. J. L & SOC. PROB. 511, 526 (2008).
169 See infra note 172.
170 Jackson, supra note 15, at 22.
171 Ooi, supra note 16, at 896.
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remained unfilled.172 In 2012, a total of 2,250 immigrant
children obtained LPR status as a result of SIJS,173 leaving
2,740 reserved positions empty. Even with increased eligibility,
on average only one quarter of the 5,000 reserved SIJS LPR
positions are filled.174

172 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2013 tbl. 7
(2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawfulpermanent-residents (click “Table 7”) [hereinafter PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2013 TABLE].
173 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2012 tbl. 7
available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-legal-permanentresidents (click “Table 7”) [hereinafter PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS 2012 TABLE].
174 Singh, supra note 165, at 526; Ooi, supra note 16, at 890, 896; Adelson,
supra note 5, at 85.
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TABLE 1: TOTAL SIJS BENEFICIARIES ADJUSTING STATUS 19972013175
Fiscal year
2013
2012
2011
2010

Total
Beneficiaries
2,735
2,250
1,609
1,480

SIJS

175 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 36 (1997), available at https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1998
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 32 (1998),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1998/1998yb.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 32 (1999), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 31 (2000),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2000/Yearbook2000.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 29 (2001), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2001/yearbook2001.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED
CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 5 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
fiscal-year-2002-yearbook-immigration-statistics-0 (click “Table 5”); U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE
AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2003-0 (click “Table 5”); U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY
TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 4 (2004), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2004-0 (click “Table 4”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2005 tbl. 7 (2005), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2005-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2006 tbl. 7 (2006), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2006-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
2007 tbl. 7 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics2007-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2008 tbl. 7 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
yearbook-immigration-statistics-2008-3; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS
OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF
ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2009 tbl. 7 (2009), available at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbookimmigration-statistics-2009-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED
CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2010 tbl. 7 (2010), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2010-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2011, tbl. 7 (2011), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-legal-permanent-residents
(click “Table 7”); PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2012
TABLE, supra note 173; PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2013
TABLE, supra note 172.
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2005
2004
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2002
2001
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1,144
989
772
894
660
624
445
510
541
658
345
287
430

A less-than-fifty percent fulfillment rate is curiously
paltry when compared to the success of other immigration
programs for vulnerable, undocumented immigrants; 2014
marked the fifth consecutive year where all 10,000 U-Visas176
were utilized within the first several months of the fiscal year.177
No single, independent explanation has been offered for
why SIJS continually remains an underutilized form of relief
given the increasingly large number of vulnerable
undocumented children in the United States.178 Advocates
suggest that a lack of awareness among child advocates and
immigrant children is likely the largest contributor to the
consistently low number of beneficiaries.179 Regardless of the
reason that SIJS relief has not reached its cap, Congress
clearly left room for more children to qualify for SIJS relief.
There is no principled logic to preclude children like Jane when
they are clearly in need of protection and there is a continual
deficit in SIJS beneficiaries.180
176 The U-Visa provides relief to victims of domestic violence and is further
discussed later in this piece. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
177 The U-Visa was created in 2008 and predictably fulfills its 10,000 quota
within the first several months of the fiscal year. Daniel M. Kowalski, USCIS Approves
10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM:
IMMIGRATION LAW (Dec. 12, 2010 8:24 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
immigration/b/insidenews/archive/2013/12/12/uscis-approves-10-000-u-visas-for-5thstraight-fiscal-year.aspx?utm_source=Migration+%26+Child+Welfare+National+
Network+E-News&utm_campaign=58b32dae2c-MCWNN_E_News_061013&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_4a8508bf17-58b32dae2c-90769025.
178 Jackson, supra note 15, at 22.
179 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 612.
180 Since the recent surge of unaccompanied youth across the border in 2014,
there will arguably be a much higher number of SIJS petitioners and as a result a
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Others who object to expanding the definition of
dependency may argue that the addition of a final order of
protection is duplicative of other forms of comparable relief, in
particular the U-Visa that was designed for victims of domestic
violence and might afford protection to a child like Jane.181 The
U-Visa is a nonimmigrant visa182 available to undocumented
victims of certain enumerated crimes in the United States who
cooperate with law enforcement in the prosecution of crimes
committed against them, including crimes categorized as
domestic violence.183 An integral part of the U-Visa is the
receipt of a certification that the victim has cooperated with
law enforcement in the prosecution of the crime.184 A variety of
state-recognized officials have the authority to grant these
certificates, including police commissioners, family court
judges, head officials of state agencies, and other state
officials.185 U-Visa holders are eligible to adjust to LPR status
after three years of U-Visa status.186
The U-Visa does not offer relief that obviates the need
for additional federal regulatory guidance as to the meaning of
SIJS dependency. Children are currently eligible for U-Visa
status either as the primary beneficiaries or as derivatives of a
much higher number of SIJS beneficiaries. Hulse, supra note 42; Preston, supra note 3.
It remains to be seen whether SIJS will reach the 5,000 cap for 2014.
181 Liebmann, supra note 36, at 652. Liebmann notes that SIJS, VAWA, and U
visas are the most utilized forms of relief for immigrant survivors of family crisis. The
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) is not as applicable here because it requires that
the abusing parent be either a United States citizen or a permanent resident in order
for a child to seek relief under the statute. VAWA relief was enacted in 1994 and was
the first immigration remedy provided explicitly for victims of domestic violence. A
VAWA self-petitioner must satisfy seven requirements to establish eligibility: “(1)
relationship to the abuser; (2) that the abuser is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident; (3) that the petitioner resides in the United States (though there are
exceptions to this); (4) that the petitioner does, or at one time did, reside with the
abuser; (5) credible evidence of battery or extreme cruelty; (6) good moral character;
and (7) that the petitioner married the abuser in good faith, and not for the purpose of
evading immigration laws.” Id. at 653 (citation omitted). The most difficult criteria for
a victim to prove is the “credible evidence of battery” though orders of protection are
used and considered to be “convincing” evidence of battery. Id.
182 A nonimmigrant visa is one that is “issued to persons with a permanent
residence outside the U.S. but who wishes to be in the U.S. on a temporary basis” as
opposed to an immigrant visa which is issued to a person who plans to change his
residency to the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Immigrant Visas v.
Nonimmigrant Visas, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://help.cbp.gov/
app/answers/detail/a_id/72/~/immigrant-visas-vs.-nonimmigrant-visas (last visited May
1, 2015).
183 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U) (2012).
184 Id.
185 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION
RES GUIDE FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
2-3, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_certification_guide.pdf.
186 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U).
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parent’s petition, but the enumerated crimes do not include
child specific “civil-crimes” like neglect, abuse, or
abandonment.187 In addition, the U-Visa is a nonimmigrant
visa, and beneficiaries do not become eligible to petition for
LPR status until two years after they have held U-Visa
status.188 For SIJS beneficiaries, timely processing is important
because federal and state college financial aid often depend
upon one’s legal immigration status.189 Thus, the U-Visa is not
a viable solution for children like Jane who might have only
suffered civil rather than criminal harms and who rely on
expedient processing in order to lead stable lives.
In addition, a parent could petition for a U-Visa and
include his or her child as a derivative on the application, but
derivative status is not adequate immigration relief for a
vulnerable child. Jane’s mother may be ineligible for a U-Visa
for a variety of fairly common reasons, including “some aspect
of [a parent’s] background such as a criminal record or
immigration violation, or [ ] simply unsuccessful[ly] steering a
course through the minefield of immigration by, for example,
not using an attorney but rather trusting a ‘notario’ who files
botched papers.”190 Battered spouses are often deterred from
seeking help from the police because of the fear of deportation
or arrest.191 Seth Wessler conducted research about family
strife and found “[i]n numerous cases, police arrested victims of
domestic violence while investigating a report of abuse.”192 This
same deterrence might also prevent a parent from seeking an
order of protection on behalf of a child, but a parent’s failure to
seek an order of protection is not damning to a child’s ability to
seek a civil protection order. In many states, child protective
services may seek an order of protection on behalf of a child or
the child herself may petition the court for protection.193
8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(V).
Liebmann, supra note 36, at 655.
189 Adelson, supra note 5, at 83.
190 David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration
Law As Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453,
480 (2008). These same reasons illustrate why VAWA derivative status described
supra note 176 also provides inadequate protection to children.
191 SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, SHATTERED FAMILIES;
THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM 33 (2011), available at http://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/report/other/
shattered-families-perilous-intersection-immigration-enforcement-and-child-welfaresyst (click link for “Report File”); Liebmann, supra note 36, at 655; WESSLER, supra, at 33.
192 Id.
193 “State protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups with regard
to standing for minor petitioners: (1) statutes that expressly grant standing to some or
all minors; (2) statutes that expressly deny standing to some or all minors; and (3)
187

188
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It is extremely difficult to secure a U-Visa given the
high demand and potential hurdles.194 As a result, the U-Visa is
not a viable option for children like Jane, and regulatory action
remains the most feasible, practical solution to protect
undocumented children who live in homes where there is
domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
SIJS legislation has had a tumultuous history,
beginning as a remedy intended for foster care children and
currently utilized as a more comprehensive, child-specific
immigration remedy because of the lack of any comparable
child-specific immigration relief.195 Given the recent influx of
children across the southern border of the United States, the
need for child-specific immigration reforms has become a
politically, emotionally, and economically charged conversation
in the public sphere.196 Yet, the disturbing reality is that many
undocumented children are vulnerable, not as they cross the
border seeking a better life, but after arriving in the United
States where they live in the shadows.
If there were a principled reason to justify the distinctions
that SIJS legislation makes in determining eligibility for a state
special findings order, perhaps the conversation about the
problems with SIJS would be troubling but brief. However, there
is no reasonable explanation for the distinctions. Advocates who
continue to argue for legislative expansion of SIJS risk wasting
their efforts in the current political climate. The increased tension
at the southern border of the United States and the amplified
dialogue around illegal immigrants living in the United States
add to the already charged nature of the immigration debate.197
Rather, advocates should focus their efforts on data collection and
regulatory action, which will provide a faster and less politically
charged process.
Advocates must make efforts to increase data collection
of SIJS seekers in the state courts and those who file with
USCIS. Some have recognized this informational gap and
statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.” Martin, supra note 131, at 469-71
(citations omitted).
194 The 10,000 U-Visa quota is routinely met within the first several months of
each fiscal year. Kowalski, supra note 177.
195 See supra Part I.
196 Hulse, supra note 42; see also Preston, supra note 3.
197 See supra Part III.B.
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begun efforts to collect comprehensive data about the
landscape of children seeking SIJS. The most notable effort has
been put forth by Jacqueline Bhabha and Susan Schmidt who
collected SIJS data organized by state in an attempt to
determine where SIJS education efforts should be focused.198
More projects of this kind, or state efforts to collect and
compute data related to children who petition juvenile courts
for special findings orders, are needed to better understand the
population of children seeking SIJS relief.
Regulatory action avoids the politics of the legislative
process and remains consistent with the traditional
understanding that SIJS was meant for the most vulnerable
children. Immigration fraud would not likely increase by
extending dependency to include a child who successfully
obtained a permanent civil order of protection. In fact, it is
consistent with the purpose of SIJS to protect the most
vulnerable children. There is a striking difference in
vulnerability between a child who never knew a parent and a
child who was actively abused by a parent. Susy never knew
her father, and the court found that sufficient to determine
that he abandoned her.199 In contrast, Jane witnessed and
experienced abuse at the hands of her father but only qualified
for the special findings order on appeal.200 The proposed
regulation further aligns the reach of SIJS with its purpose so
that SIJS will protect rather than exclude vulnerable children
who are just as deserving, if not more, than those currently
benefiting from SIJS relief.
Shannon Aimée Daugherty†

See generally Bhabha & Schmidt, supra note 99, at tbl 2.
In re Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 714-17 (App. Div. 2013).
200 Family Court Decision, supra note 20.
† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A. Houghton College, 2011. I
would like to thank all my friends and colleagues on the Brooklyn Law Review as well as
Brooklyn Law School professors and various practitioners who provided invaluable help and
advice. I would also like to thank my family for their constant support and encouragement.
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Exempt No More
HOW NEW YORK’S UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT THREATENS EXEMPTIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are living in western New York. You have a
house that you own free and clear.1 However, in the past, you
had some money troubles and one of your creditors has filed a
lawsuit against you seeking payment of the debt. In the
meantime, you get married and transfer a one-half interest in
the house to your spouse. A few years later, you lose your job,
and there is no way you are going to be able to pay off your
debts. In the face of mounting bills and no regular income, you
decide the best course is to file for bankruptcy. You meet with a
lawyer and go over your finances. The house is only worth
around $70,000 so it is exempt under New York law—that is, it
cannot be taken by creditors to satisfy a judgment or sold
during bankruptcy.2 The lawyer tells you that you will be able
to keep the house and get a fresh start. After all, that is what
bankruptcy is designed to do.
But there is a problem. After you file, the trustee alleges
that the transfer of the one-half interest to your spouse was
fraudulent under New York law.3 As a result, the trustee can
avoid the transfer and pull that one-half interest into the
estate.4 Even worse, once the interest has been pulled back into
the estate, the house is no longer exempt.5 Now the house can
be sold by the trustee, leaving you and your spouse homeless.

That is, not subject to any mortgages or liens.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012).
3 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273-a (McKinney 2012).
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 551 (2013).
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(g), 550, 551. Sections 550 and 551 provide that property
recovered by the trustee in an avoidance action is preserved for the benefit of the
estate. Section 522(g) makes it clear that such property is no longer subject to
exemption by providing that certain types of property may still be exempted under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Hitt v. Glass, (In re Glass), 164 B.R. 759, 764-65
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) aff ’ d, 60 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1995).
1

2
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The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York recently came to this conclusion in In re Panepinto.6 In facts
largely similar to the hypothetical case outlined above, the court
held that a transfer of exempt property could be constructively
fraudulent under New York law and, after the trustee avoided the
transfer, the property was no longer exempt.7
In most states, this would not happen. The result in
Panepinto is due to the fact that New York continues to use the
outdated Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).8 The
vast majority of states have adopted the more modern Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).9 The UFTA defines “transfer”
to exclude exempt property.10 However, the UFCA, and New
York’s version of it, do not.11 According to the Panepinto court,
under New York law, a transfer of property can be fraudulent as
to the transferor’s creditors regardless of the property’s exempt
status.12 In the past, this particular quirk of the law may not
have received much attention because New York only allowed a
modest homestead exemption.13 However, because the
homestead exemption was subsequently increased, the amount
of money at stake is now much greater making this an issue
worth litigating.14
Fraudulent transfer law is designed to protect creditors
by preventing debtors from hiding property that can and should
be used to satisfy debts.15 At the most basic level, it allows
creditors to recover property and undo transfers that debtors
make in an attempt to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors.
However, when a debtor transfers exempt property, no creditor is
harmed. Regardless of the transfer, creditors had no right to the
property in the first place. Allowing the fraudulent transfer laws
In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
See id. at 374-75.
8 See
Uniform
Fraudulent
Conveyance
Act,
PRACTICAL
LAW,
http://us.practicallaw.com/9-382-3892 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
9 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (1984),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/fraudulent%20transfer/UFTA_
Final_1984.pdf. Forty-three states as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands have adopted the UFTA. Id.
10 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1.
11 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
12 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371.
13 Until 2005, New York only allowed debtors to exempt $10,000 worth of real
property used as a primary residence. The current amount ranges from $75,000 to
$150,000 depending on county of residence. See id. The exemptions are found in New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 5206 and are made applicable to bankruptcy
by New York Debtor & Creditor Law sections 282-284. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney
2012); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 282-284.
14 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 374.
15 See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
6

7
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to reach exempt property does not rectify a wrong; it commits one.
Extending fraudulent transfer law to such transfers allows
creditors to reach property they have no right to simply because
the debtor was not aware of the implications of the transfer.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws’ (the Conference) recently released version of the
UFTA provides an excellent framework to guide New York in
updating its fraudulent transfer law.16 In addition to protecting
transfers of exempt assets, the new version modernizes and
updates fraudulent transfer law. The revisions seek to do away
with the confusing labels of “constructive fraud” and “actual
fraud.”17 This is an important modernization of the law given
that much of what is currently covered by fraudulent transfer
law does not require any fraudulent intent at all. The new Act
would replace “fraudulent” with “voidable” and help eliminate
confusion around interpretation of the law.18
This Note will examine the decision in Panepinto and
argue that it is time for New York to adopt the UFTA. In Part
I, the Note will briefly explain the history and purposes behind
both the homestead exemption and fraudulent transfer law.
This part will also discuss the interaction between state
fraudulent transfer law and the federal Bankruptcy Code. Part
II will examine Panepinto in depth and compare it to a similar
case in a jurisdiction that has adopted the UFTA. Part III will
establish that there is no basis in current law for reversing the
decision in Panepinto and will advocate that the New York
legislature adopt the newest version of the UFTA.

16 NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (formerly THE UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (as amended in
2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/
2014AM_AUVTA_Draft_As%20approved.pdf.
17 Actual fraud is based on intentional deception. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and
Deceit § 8 (2014). Constructive fraud is based on specific, legally defined actions which
are presumed fraudulent regardless of the actor’s intent. Id. at § 9. This means that a
person can technically be guilty of “fraud” without having any real intent to deceive
whatsoever. In light of the common understanding of the word “fraud,” applying that
label to transfers where there is no intent to deceive can be confusing.
18 NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT reporter’s introductory note (2013), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2013AM_AUFTA_Draft.pdf.
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I.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

A.

History and Purpose of Homestead Exemptions

American homestead exemption laws originated in
Texas in the 1830s.19 The laws generally exempt a portion or all
of the value of a debtor’s home from being used to satisfy
judgments against the debtor. Currently, most states as well as
the Bankruptcy Code have some form of homestead
exemption.20 The purpose “of homestead exemption laws is to
protect home equity, preserve home ownership, avoid the
eviction of families, and minimize the need for public welfare
and housing assistance.”21
These exemptions represent a balancing act between
enforcing credit agreements and ensuring that debtors do not end
up as wards of the state.22 Enforcing the right of lenders and other
creditors to paid is important to ensure an adequate supply of
credit, but “the social cost of leaving a debtor and his family
without resources may outweigh the economic disadvantages of
immunizing property from the claims of creditors.”23
State-level homestead exemptions generally work to
prevent a judgment creditor from forcing a sale of the debtor’s
home to satisfy the judgment.24 Almost all states exempt at
least a portion of the debtor’s homestead from being used to
satisfy money judgments against the owner.25 These
exemptions apply in bankruptcy through 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).26
That provision generally exempts from the estate “any property
that is exempt under . . . State or local law.”27 This mechanism
19 George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289
(1950); see also State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023 (1937).
20 See Haskins, supra note 19; 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2013).
21 Timothy R. Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma:
Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 144 (2011).
22 Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1459
(1959) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Exemptions].
23 Id.
24 When a party recovers a money judgment in a lawsuit, it becomes a
judgment creditor of the debtor. If the debtor does not have sufficient cash to pay the
judgment (or refuses to), the judgment creditor can then levy the assets of the debtor
and force a sale. The judgment creditor is then paid from the proceeds of the sale.
Exemption law, including the homestead exemption, protects certain assets of the
debtor from this process. See generally 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions § 223 (2014); 46 AM.
JUR. 2D Judgments (2014).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.001 (2001).
26 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2013).
27 Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). There are some limitations and exceptions both in the
Bankruptcy Code and in state law, but the basic starting point is that a debtor in
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allows a debtor in bankruptcy to use state exemption laws to
protect her property from being liquidated to pay creditors.28
One of the central features of bankruptcy law is the
ability to provide the “honest but unfortunate debtor” a “fresh
start.”29 Saving the debtor’s home is often central to the debtor’s
potential to rebuild his finances. In addition to the potential loss
of equity, individuals without homes often struggle to find jobs.30
Increasing the number of homeless and jobless people puts
stress on the social system and drains resources from the state.
Allowing debtors to retain their homes promotes the goal of
giving honest but unfortunate debtors a fresh start. While there
are costs associated with exempting what is typically a debtor’s
largest asset from execution, the costs of evicting everyone who
cannot pay their debts and leaving them out on the street can
more than outweigh the costs to the credit system.31 Absent
exemptions, debtors may be forced to rely on public assistance,
which means the state will have to raise additional taxes or
divert revenue from other sources.
Homestead exemptions also represent a policy choice by
lawmakers to protect “the security of the family” which
“prevents pauperism and provides the members of the family
with some measure of stability and independence.”32 As one
court put it, “preservation of the home is deemed of paramount
importance.”33 In addition to providing economic advantages to
the debtor, home ownership is of public value as it is thought to
connect people to their communities and “cultivate the interest,
pride, and affection of the individual, so essential to the stability
and prosperity of government.”34 Since the legislature has
bankruptcy can exempt whatever property that state law exempts from being used to
satisfy judgments.
28 Id. § 522(b). Federal law also contains a homestead exemption for bankruptcy.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), a debtor can currently exempt up to $22,975 of his or her
aggregate interest in property that the debtor uses as a residence. Generally speaking, a debtor
can elect to use either the federal or state exemption scheme. Note that exemption values (and
many other dollar amounts) in the Bankruptcy Code are periodically adjusted for inflation
under 11 U.S.C. § 104. This note uses the dollar values in effect as of the year 2014.
29 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991).
30 See Christine Schanes, Homelessness Myth #1: “Get a Job!”, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 13, 2010, 11:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christine-schanes/
homelessness-myth-1-get-a_b_339500.html.
31 Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 22, at 1459.
32 Haskins, supra note 19, at 1289.
33 In re Estate of Dodge, 685 P.2d 260, 263 (Colo. App. 1984).
34 Id.; see also Ferguson v. Kumler, 6 N.W. 618, 619 (Minn. 1880) (“The
[homestead exemption] originated in the wise and humane policy of securing to the
citizen against all the misfortunes and uncertainties of life the benefits of a home not
in the interest of [the homeowner] alone, but likewise in the interest of the state, whose
welfare and prosperity so largely depend upon the growth and cultivation among its
citizens of feelings of personal independence, together with love of country and
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chosen to enact a policy of protecting the home through the
exemption laws, these laws “should be liberally construed so as
to carry out the legislative intent.”35
B.

History and Purpose of Fraudulent Transfer Laws

Fraudulent transfer law, in its most basic form, allows a
creditor to avoid transfers made by a debtor that were intended
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.36 In short, a debtor
should not be able to avoid paying his or her debts by
transferring property to a friend only to reclaim it after the
creditors have settled with the debtor or given up. These laws can
be traced back to sixteenth century English common law and the
1571 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances.37 England at the time
“had certain sanctuaries into which the King’s writ could not
enter.”38 Creditors could not go after a debtor taking refuge in a
sanctuary.39 If the debtor no longer held any property, the
creditors were left without recourse and would often settle
their claims for a relatively small amount.40
The Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances made “illegal
and void any transfer made for the purpose of hindering,
delaying, or defrauding creditors.”41 The basic structure, to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, survives in almost all
modern fraudulent transfer law.42 However, the subjective
intent of the debtor is difficult to prove.43 To decide which
transfers are intended to hinder, delay, or defraud, courts
generally have to rely on circumstantial evidence to infer the
debtor’s motives.
To address these difficulties, courts have developed a
series of factors that can be used as circumstantial evidence of

kindred-sentiments that find their deepest root and best nourishment where the home
life is spent and enjoyed.”).
35 Ferguson, 6 N.W. at 619.
36 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 829.
37 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 58 (1940).
38 Id. at § 61.
39 Id.
40 Id. While the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances is often cited as being
designed to prevent this practice, that is not the whole story. There existed at the time
common law that allowed creditors to go after the assets of debtors who had taken
sanctuary. For more on this, see id. at §§ 58-61e.
41 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 829.
42 Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
531, 537 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, Involuntary].
43 Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 UCC L.J.
195, 196 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy, UFTA].
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fraudulent intent, often referred to as the badges of fraud.44
Applying these badges, the court can presume fraudulent intent
if certain conditions are met without regard to the actual intent
of the transferor.45 One of the historic badges is a transfer of
property by an insolvent debtor without fair compensation.46
This particular badge was codified in the UFCA and made a part
of the laws of the states that adopted it.47 No showing of intent is
required.48 If the conditions are met, the transfer may be
avoided.49 This is typically referred to as constructive fraud.50 It
is suggested that the drafters of the UFCA specifically intended
the law to capture transfers made by insolvent debtors for less
than fair value even if there was no intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors.51 The law treats the transfer as fraudulent to
the debtor’s creditors regardless of the debtor’s actual motive.
New York adopted the UFCA in 1925.52 The Act is
currently codified in New York Debtor & Creditor Law (NYDCL)
sections 270, et seq.53 The relevant provisions are the constructive
fraud provisions in sections 273 to 275. These provisions apply
“without regard to [the] actual intent” of the transferor.54 Any
44 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 830 (citations omitted); Philco Fin.
Corp. v. Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41 (N.D. Miss. 1971). Badges of fraud include:

(1) the lack or inadequacy of consideration;
(2) the family, friendship or close associate relationship between the parties;
(3) the retention of possession, benefit or use of the property in question;
(4) the financial condition of the party sought to be charged both before and
after the transaction in question;
(5) the existence or cumulative effect of a pattern or series of transactions or
course of conduct after the incurring of debt, onset of financial difficulties, or
pendency or threat of suits by creditors; and
(6) the general chronology of the events and transactions under inquiry
Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582-83 (2d Cir. 1983).
45 Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 537-38.
46 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 830.
47 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2013); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney
2012); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a) (1984), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/fraudulent%20transfer/UFTA_Final_1984.pdf;
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918).
48 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (“Every conveyance made and every
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is
fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made
or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.”) (emphasis added).
49 See Sklaroff v. Rosenberg, 125 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff ’ d, 18
F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2001). .
50 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2014).
51 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 831-32.
52 GLENN, supra note 37, at § 62 n.73.
53 See HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1995).
54 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-274 (McKinney 2012).
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conveyance made that meets the requirements of sections 273 to
275 can be deemed fraudulent without any showing that the
debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his or her creditors.55
Once such a conveyance is deemed fraudulent, the creditors can
have the conveyance annulled, set aside, or directly levy on the
property as if the conveyance never happened.56
To understand the issues raised in Panepinto, it is
important to look in detail at some sections of New York’s
UFCA, particularly sections 270 to 273-a.57 Section 273 makes
fraudulent any conveyance made without fair consideration by
a person who is insolvent or is made insolvent by the
conveyance.58 Section 271 defines a person as insolvent “when
the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the
amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his
existing debts as they become absolute and matured.”59 Section
273-a makes fraudulent any conveyance made without fair
consideration by a person who is a defendant in an action for
money damages if the final judgment is not paid.60
To avoid a transfer under sections 273 and 273-a, the
party seeking to avoid the transfer must show that the
transferor did not receive fair consideration.61 Section 272
defines fair consideration as receiving property that is a fair
equivalent to the property transferred or the satisfaction of an
antecedent debt.62 It can also include an exchange that is not
equivalent so long as it is not “disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained.”63 Section 270 also contains some important
definitions. First, a “‘[c]onveyance’ includes every payment of
money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge
of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any

55 See Paradigm BioDevices, Inc. v. Viscogliosi Bros., LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d
661, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. Lefrak, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901,
905 (App. Div. 1979), aff ’ d, 401 N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1979).
56 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278.
57 In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 372 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013). The court only
discusses constructive fraud in relation to section 273-a, but the creditors raised both
sections 273 and 273-a in their motion. Further, the analysis the court uses could apply
equally to any of the constructive fraud provisions found in sections 273-275. For
purposes of this note, I will focus only on sections 273 and 273-a. Sections 270-272
supply important definitions that are referenced in §§ 273 and 273-a.
58 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273.
59 Id. § 271.
60 Id. § 273-a.
61 Id. §§ 273 & 273-a.
62 Id. § 272(a).
63 Id. § 272(b).
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lien or incumbrance.”64 Second, “‘assets’ of a debtor means
property not exempt from liability for his debts.”65
In summary, the essential rules are: (1) a transfer made
for no consideration while a person is insolvent or a defendant
in a lawsuit can be deemed fraudulent without any intent on the
part of the debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud her creditors and;
(2) the word “conveyance” as used in these statutes covers any
type of property including property that would normally be
exempt from execution by creditors. Taken together, these points
mean that a creditor could technically seek the avoidance of a
conveyance of property even though the property cannot be used
to satisfy the debtor’s obligation. However, there is little
incentive to seek avoidance in such a case because even if the
conveyance is set aside or annulled, the creditor still cannot
levy on the property.66 In this situation, returning the property
to the debtor does not help the creditor’s position at all. This all
changes once we add the Bankruptcy Code into the mix.
C.

How State Fraudulent Conveyance Law Interacts with
the Bankruptcy Code

The Bankruptcy Code has its own fraudulent
conveyance provisions, namely 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548.
Section 547 covers preferential payments67 and § 548 mirrors
the core provisions of the UFCA but vests the power to avoid
fraudulent transfers in the trustee rather than the creditors.68

Id. § 270.
Id.
66 See Corbin v. Litke, 431 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding
that homestead exemption would still apply after avoidance of transfer).
67 In general, a preference is a payment made by a debtor, while insolvent, on
account of an antecedent debt, to a creditor within 90 days of the debtor filing for
bankruptcy. For more information, see generally Robert Weisberg, Commercial
Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 3 (1986) and Vern Countryman, The Concept of A Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985).
68 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2013) provides that:
64

65

The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the
benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the
benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor,
that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of
the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
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In addition to these specific avoidance statutes, the trustee can
also take advantage of the relevant state-level fraudulent
transfer law through § 544. That section generally gives the
trustee the power to avoid any transfer that a creditor of the
debtor could avoid under applicable law.69 In New York, this
would include NYDCL sections 273 and 273-a.
Assuming the trustee avoids the transfer of exempt
property under one of these provisions, what happens next? As
noted above, the likely result under state law outside of
bankruptcy would be that the creditor is still prevented from
going after the exempt property.70 However, that is not the
result under the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 551 and
522(g), the exempt property will not only return to the estate
but will also lose its exempt status.71 Section 551 simply states
that any property recovered through an avoidance action in
bankruptcy becomes property of the estate.72 Once the property
is back in the estate, § 522(g) ensures that the exemption no
longer applies.73 So long as the transfer was voluntary, the

(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such
obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract
and not in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
69 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.”).
70 See Corbin, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 802. In this case the creditors successfully
avoided a conveyance of real estate between husband and wife as fraudulent, but the
court stated that the defendants would be entitled to the full statutory homestead
exemption if the property was properly designated as a homestead. Id.
71 Hitt v. Glass (In re Glass), 164 B.R. 759, 764 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), aff ’ d,
60 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The purpose of § 522(g) is to prevent a debtor from
claiming an exemption in recovered property which was transferred in a manner giving
rise to the trustee’s avoiding powers, where the transfer was voluntary or where the
transfer or property interest was concealed.”).
72 11 U.S.C. § 551 (“Any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547,
548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, or any lien void under section 506(d) of this title, is
preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate.”).
73 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).
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estate gets the benefit of the recovered property regardless of
its exemption status.
Thus, under a state law action, even if a creditor can
avoid a transfer as fraudulent, the debtor is still entitled to the
statutory exemptions. However, because of §§ 551 and 522(g) of
the Bankruptcy Code, when a trustee does the same thing in
bankruptcy, the debtor is no longer entitled to claim
exemptions in the property. To illustrate this problem, we now
turn to Panepinto.
II

THE UFCA AND THE UFTA IN ACTION

A.

UFCA: Panepinto

Panepinto was originally filed as a chapter 7 liquidation
case on April 23, 2012.74 It was later converted to a chapter 13
case on July 17, 2012, and the debtor filed a plan under 11
U.S.C. § 1322.75 The debtor listed her residence, a home she
owned jointly with her husband, as an exempt homestead under
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (NYCPLR) section 5206.
However, the debtor originally owned the home by herself, free
and clear of any liens. In 2008, she transferred an ownership
interest to her husband, and since that time, they held the house
jointly as tenants in the entirety. At the time the transfer was

(g) Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor may exempt
under subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee recovers under
section 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the
debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section
if such property had not been transferred, if—
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the
debtor; and
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or
(2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(1)(B) of
this section.
Id.

74 See Docket, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1211230) [hereinafter Panepinto Docket].
75 See id. In a Chapter 13 case, the debtor is required to file a plan that meets
the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 & 1325. Unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation case
where a debtor surrenders all non-exempt property but keeps his or her future income,
a Chapter 13 case generally allows a debtor to keep all of his or her assets while
pledging to pay creditors from future income. The plan details the terms of those future
payments and, in general, must provide for payments to creditors that at least equal
what the creditors would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See generally 9 AM.
JUR. 2D §§ 68, 72 Bankruptcy.
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made, the debtor was the defendant in an action seeking a
money judgment filed by Target National Bank.76
After the debtor filed her chapter 13 plan, two of the
creditors objected to the plan arguing, inter alia, that the
transfer of the ownership interest to the debtor’s husband was
fraudulent under both NYDCL sections 273 and 273-a.77 The
transfer could be held fraudulent under section 273 because
New York law presumes the debtor is insolvent when the
transfer is voluntary and the debtor does not receive fair
consideration.78 The transfer could also be fraudulent under
section 273-a because, at the time of the transfer, the debtor
was a defendant in an action for monetary damages and had
not paid the final judgment.79
The debtor filed a motion to dismiss the objections
arguing, inter alia, that the transfer was not fraudulent
because the interest transferred was subject to state exemption
law.80 The creditors argued that New York’s version of the
UFCA defines “conveyance” as any “payment of money,
assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of
tangible or intangible property,” and the term “property”
includes exempt property.81 The court agreed with the creditors.
It noted that, despite the many cases from other states that held
differently, under New York law the transfer could be avoided.82
The court attributed the inconsistency to the fact that New York
still uses the UFCA while nearly every other state has adopted
the UFTA. Both the UFTA and the UFCA define “asset” to
exclude exempt property of the debtor.83 However, the UFTA
defines “transfer” as disposing or parting with an “asset” and
76 Objections Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1325 and Bankruptcy Rules 3020[,] 11
U.S.C. 522(l) and Bankruptcy Rules 4003, Opposition to Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. 522(f) at ¶ 1.e, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1211230-MJK) [hereinafter: Creditor’s Objections].
77 Id. at ¶ 1.
78 Hassett v. Far West Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.,
Inc.), 40 B.R. 380, 393 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff ’ d, 44 B.R. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
debtor in Panepinto raised the issue of consideration in her motion to dismiss the
objections. Debtor’s Response to Creditors’ Objections Together with Motion to Dismiss
Objections at ¶ 17, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter
Debtor’s Response]. However, the judge did not address this issue when ruling on the
motion and the objections and focused instead on section 273-a. Panpeinto, 487 B.R. at
372. It is undisputed that the debtor was involved in a lawsuit at the time of the
transfer and had not paid the judgment so this issue was easier to address. Creditor’s
Objections, supra note 76, at ¶ 1(e).
79 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273-a (McKinney 2012).
80 Debtor’s Response, supra note 78.
81 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270.
82 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 374.
83 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1 (1984); see also N.Y. DEBT. &
CRED. LAW § 270.
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not “property.”84 Therefore, a transfer of exempt property, by
definition, cannot be fraudulent under the UFTA but can be
fraudulent under the UFCA. The court also stated that the
provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 551 and 522(g) would work to
eliminate the exemptions the property might be protected by
once the transfer was avoided.85
It should be noted that the ruling in Panepinto did not
conclusively decide the case.86 At this point, no party had filed
an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the transfer.87 The
issue was raised in the context of an objection to the debtor’s
chapter 13 plan and the debtor’s motion to dismiss those
objections.88 In ruling on these motions, the court simply denied
the debtor’s motion to dismiss the objections, sustained the
objections of the creditors, and declined to confirm the plan
without prejudice.89 The court did rule that, as a matter of law,
the transfer in this case could be avoided, and that if it was, the
debtor would not be entitled to an exemption.90 However,
because there was no adversary proceeding before the court
seeking to avoid the transfer, the court did not rule that the
transfer would be avoided at that time.91
In making this ruling, the court explicitly drew a
distinction between states that adopted the UFTA and ones
that still use the UFCA.92 The court noted that many courts in
different states had held that a transfer of exempt property
was not fraudulent.93 However, the court stated that the
language of the UFCA compelled a different result.94 The court
went on to make it clear that the sole basis for its ruling was
the difference in language.95 In a state that has adopted the
UFTA, this would not happen.
B.

UFTA: In re Blanch

As the Panepinto court noted, there is a significant
difference between the terminology in the UFCA and UFTA. In
1979, the Conference decided it was time to update the UFCA
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1(12) (emphasis added).
Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371.
Id. at 375.
See id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
See id. at 374-75.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
See id.
See id.
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and developed the revised UFTA in 1984.96 The goal was to
update the UFCA to accommodate the various changes in other
commercial laws since its promulgation in 1918.97 Currently, 43
states as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
have adopted the UFTA.98 One of the most obvious changes
made to the law was the change in terminology from conveyance
to transfer. The drafters stated that this change was made
because the word “conveyance” is closely associated with real
estate transfers, and they wanted to make clear the intent of the
UFTA to cover all transfers of property.99 This change was more
profound than the drafters realized at the time.
The case of In re Blanch, from the Bankruptcy Court for
the Central District of Illinois, is illustrative of this point.100
The facts of Blanch are quite similar to Panepinto. The debtor
had conveyed his otherwise exempt homestead to his parents
approximately two years prior to filing for bankruptcy.101 After
the transfer, he continued to reside there.102 The trustee
brought an action against the debtor’s parents to avoid the
transfer as fraudulent under Chapter 740 of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes sections 160/5 and 160/6.103 The defendants
countered that the transfer was not fraudulent because the
property would have been exempt anyway.104 They pointed out
that under Illinois’ version of the UFTA, “transfer” as defined
in 160/2 is the “disposing of or parting with an asset.”105 As the
court noted, “asset” does not include “property to the extent it
is generally exempt under laws of this State.”106 As a result, the
court held that “[p]roperty which is encumbered by a lien or

Kennedy, UFTA, supra note 43, at 198.
Id. at 198-99.
98 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (1984).
Legislation is also pending in several states to adopt the most recent version of the act.
Legislation, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislation.aspx
(last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
99 Kennedy, UFTA, supra note 43, at 199.
100 See Covey v. Blanch (In re Blanch), Nos. 97-82652, 98-8011, 1998 WL
34065289 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998).
101 Id., at *1.
102 Id.
103 Id. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 contains the main fraudulent transfer
language that covers actual fraud (intent to hinder, delay, or defraud) and fraud
related to incurring subsequent debts. 106/6 is the constructive fraud provision that
allows avoidance of transfers while the debtor was insolvent. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
160/5, 160/6 (2014) (similar to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney 2012)).
104 Blanch, 1998 WL 34065289, at *1.
105 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 160/2(l) (emphasis added); see also Blanch, 1998 WL
34065289, at *2.
106 Blanch, 1998 WL 34065289, at *2 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/2(b)(2)).
96

97
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subject to a homestead exemption is not an asset which is
subject to recovery as a fraudulent transfer.”107
Comparing the results of Panepinto and Blanch, as well
as the court’s discussion in Panepinto, shows that the root of
the problem is the difference between the UFCA and the
UFTA, at least to the Panepinto and Blanch courts. The next
section will consider whether there are any grounds under
existing law to overturn the decision in Panepinto and argue
that the easiest and best solution to avoid this inconsistency is
for New York to adopt the UFTA.
III

NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT THE 2014 UFTA

A.

There Are No Grounds Under Existing Law to Overturn
This Ruling.

There are two potential, but ultimately unsuccessful,
grounds for overturning the decision in Panepinto. First, the
reviewing court could decide that these types of transfers are
subject to the “no harm, no foul” rule. Second, since this case is
interpreting state law, there could be precedent from New York
courts holding that transfers of exempt property are not
fraudulent under state law. However, there is no precedent
directly on point from New York courts to guide the federal
courts in interpreting this state law issue.
1. The “No harm, No Foul” Rule
As noted in Part I, both fraudulent transfer and
exemption law have been part of the American legal system for
many years. Some jurisdictions adopted a “no harm, no foul”
rule when determining whether to avoid transfers of exempt
property.108 The basic idea behind this rule is that if the property
would not have been available to creditors prior to the transfer
then the transfer cannot be fraudulent as to the creditors.109
107 Id., at *2. It is interesting to note that the defendants also cited precedent
in Illinois law, some of which predates even the UFCA, that held that transfers of
exempt property could not be fraudulent. Id. It appears that Illinois was an early
adopter of the “no harm, no foul” rule for fraudulent transfers. See infra Part III.A.1.
However, the court did squarely address the language of the UFTA and held that this
language completely protects exempt property from fraudulent transfer law. Blanch,
1998 WL 34065289, at *2.
108 Dana Yankowitz, Comment, “I Could Have Exempted It Anyway”: Can A
Trustee Avoid A Debtor’s Prepetition Transfer of Exemptible Property?, 23 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 217, 227 (2006); see also Jarboe v. Treiber (In re Treiber), 92 B.R. 930,
932 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988).
109 Treiber, 92 B.R. at 932.
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Illinois is a good example, and the Blanch case discussed above
provides a good summary of the case law on the issue. As far
back as 1880, well before the adoption of the UFCA, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that “[n]o conveyance of property exempt
from execution can be considered fraudulent as against a
creditor.”110 However, for both legal and policy reasons, full
embrace of the “no harm, no foul” rule is not a viable option.
For the most part, federal courts have rejected the “no
harm, no foul” approach when applying the fraudulent transfer
provisions found in the Bankruptcy Code itself. Key examples
are the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Tavenner v. Smoot111 and
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in In
re Trujillo.112 Both cases directly held that a transfer of exempt
property under 11 U.S.C. § 548 could be avoided as fraudulent
and that § 522(g) prevented the debtors from claiming the
property as exempt once the transfer was avoided.113 Although
some bankruptcy courts have explicitly endorsed the “no harm,
no foul” rule,114 the positions taken in Tavenner and Trujillo
represent the current majority position.115
Despite this, there is some authority for continuing or
even expanding the “no harm, no foul” rule. In 1990, the
Supreme Court in Begier v. I.R.S. seemed to endorse at least a
limited version of the “no harm, no foul” rule as to preferences
under 11 U.S.C. § 547.116 The Court found that “an interest of
the debtor in property” for purposes of § 547 only includes “that
property that would have been part of the estate had it not
been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings.”117 The Court relied primarily on the policy behind
fraudulent transfer law.118 It stated that the purpose of § 547
was to help insure “[e]quality of distribution among

Leupold v. Krause, 95 Ill. 440, 444 (1880).
Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001).
112 Trujillo v. Grimmet (In re Trujillo), 215 B.R. 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997),
aff ’ d, 166 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
113 Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 406-07; Trujillo, 215 B.R. at 204-05 & n.5.
114 See, e.g., Treiber, 92 B.R. at 932 (“No creditor is injured when the entire
subject matter of a preference consists of exempt property. If the property had not been
conveyed, the creditors would not have shared in it. In short,—no harm, no foul.”);
Noland v. Turner (In re Turner), 45 B.R. 649, 651 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Thus, it
serves no purpose for the Trustee to seek the avoidance of a transfer which removed no
non-exempt property from the estate or which does not deplete the estate in some way.
Such transfer does not hinder, delay or defraud any creditor, since creditors would not
have benefited from the property if there had been no transfer.”).
115 See Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 219.
116 Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
117 Id. at 58.
118 See id.
110

111
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creditors.”119 It further stated that “if the debtor transfers
property that would not have been available for distribution to
his creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, the policy behind the
avoidance power is not implicated.”120
While Begier only covered preferences under § 547, the
Southern District of New York in Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v.
Gredd used the language of Begier to extend the rule to
§ 548.121 That court stated that:
While Begier and its progeny were concerned with § 547 rather than
§ 548, the “normal rule of statutory construction that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning,” counsels us to construe this language to have the same
meaning when it is used in § 548(a)(1)(A).122

The court ultimately concluded that a transfer could only be
avoided when the property would have been available to
creditors.123
Whether this fully protects transfers of exempt property
from avoidance under § 548 is not clear. Technically, the
property in Begier and Bear Stearns was never property of the
estate to begin with. Exempt property is considered property of
the estate until the debtor elects the exemption.124 The logic of
many courts in allowing § 548 to reach transfers of exempt
property focuses on this distinction.125 Prior to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which created the modern Bankruptcy
Code, property subject to exemption never became property of
the estate.126 Further, the text of § 522(g) seems to endorse the
avoidance of transfers of exempt property since it prevents
debtors from asserting an exemption on property that has been
recovered by the trustee.127
The court in Panepinto considered whether the holdings
in Begier and Bear Stearns should guide its decision, but
Id.
Id.
121 Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Gredd), 275 B.R. 190, 193-94
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
122 Id. at 194 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)).
123 Id. at 196 (“We thus conclude that § 548(a)(1)(A) only permits a trustee to
avoid a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property when, but for the transfer, such
property interest would have been available to at least one of the debtor’s creditors.”).
124 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 541(a)(1) (2013). All interests of the debtor become
property of the estate per § 541 and the debtor is then allowed to exempt certain
property out of the estate per 522(b).
125 See, e.g., Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2001).
126 Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 347 n.10 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g); see also Trujillo v. Grimmet (In re Trujillo), 215 B.R.
200, 205 & n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
119
120
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ultimately decided that the precedents did not apply because the
provision at stake was § 544, not §§ 547 or 548.128 However, the
crux of the determinations in Begier and its progeny and Bear
Stearns was the definition of “an interest of the debtor in
property.”129 Those courts held that “an interest of the debtor in
property” did not encompass property that would not otherwise be
available for creditors.130 Section 544 uses the same phrase, “an
interest of the debtor in property.”131 The court in Bear Stearns
based its extension of Begier to § 548 in part on the concept that
“the ‘normal rule of statutory construction that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning.’”132 Since § 544 uses identical words, the same
principles that apply to “an interest of the debtor in property” in
§§ 547 and 548 should also apply to § 544.
To justify its decision not to extend Begier and Bear
Stearns, the Panepinto court stated that the maximum two
year “look back” period of §§ 547 and 548 indicates that the
focus is on the “slide into bankruptcy” and courts are thus more
concerned with the “impact of pre-petition transfers [on]
the . . . bankruptcy estate.”133 The court stated that “§ 544 is
different[,]” but did not elaborate.134 But, even if the court
decided that § 544 should be treated the same as §§ 547 and
548, Begier and Bear Stearns are still not applicable because
they dealt with an entirely different type of property. In both
cases the property in question was property that would not
have been part of the estate in the first place.135 While both
opinions have language that seems to endorse a general “no
harm, no foul” rule,136 the interest in property at stake in
In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 371 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53,58 & n.1 (1990); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v.
Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
130 See Begier, 496 U.S. at 58; see also Bear, Stearns, 275 B.R. at 196.
131 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
132 Bear, Stearns, 275 B.R. at 194 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
484 (1990)).
133 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371 n.2.
134 Id.
135 Begier, 496 U.S. at 59 (“Because the debtor does not own an equitable
interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the
estate.’”); Bear Stearns, 275 B.R. at 198 (“[W]e conclude that the transfers sought to be
avoided were not transfers of ‘an interest of [the Fund] in property’ because the federal
securities laws do not permit non-brokerage house creditors to recover the transferred
assets.”) (second alteration in original).
136 Begier, 496 U.S. at 58 (“Of course, if the debtor transfers property that
would not have been available for distribution to his creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the policy behind the avoidance power is not implicated.”); Bear Stearns,
275 B.R. at 195 (“A transfer of property, even if made with fraudulent intent, that does
not leave any creditor in a worse position than he would have been had the transfer
never occurred, obviously does not offend the policy behind § 548(a)(1)(A).”).
128
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Panepinto is fundamentally different than the interest in
property at stake in either Begier or Bear Stearns.
Consequently, these cases do not provide a firm ground
for holding that a transfer of exempt property cannot be
fraudulent as to the debtor’s creditors. The court would also
have to address both the fact that a majority of courts reject
the “no harm, no foul” rule when it comes to exempt property,
and that the clear language of the Code indicates a
congressional intent to capture such transfers.137 Further, there
are also policy reasons for not extending the “no harm, no foul”
rule to bankruptcy.
2. Problems With the “No Harm, No Foul Rule” in the
Bankruptcy Context
Excluding transfers of exempt property from the Code’s
fraudulent transfer provisions would likely create more
problems than it would solve. In Lasich v. Wickstrom, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan
addressed some of the policy reasons for not adopting the “no
harm, no foul” rule.138 It presented several hypothetical
situations concerning application of the “no harm, no foul” rule,
one of which does an excellent job highlighting a potentially
serious problem and is worth exploring.
In the hypothetical, the court imagined a couple who
decide to transfer their home to a third party on the eve of
bankruptcy and then elect to take the federal exemptions
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and (5).139 The court then asked
whether preventing the trustee from avoiding this transfer
under the “no harm, no foul” rule really would result in no
harm to the debtors’ creditors.140 The answer, of course, is no.
Preventing fraudulent transfer law from reaching this transfer
could result in serious harm to creditors. Before seeing exactly
why this is the case, it is important to briefly discuss the
difference between state and federal bankruptcy exemptions.
Many states, including New York, allow debtors filing
for bankruptcy to elect either the federal exemptions or the
exemptions available under state law.141 This option matters for
Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 229-33.
See generally Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
139 Id. at 348.
140 Id.
141 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 284-285 (McKinney 2012). New York used
to limit debtors to only the exemptions available under state law. DEBT. & CRED § 284.
When this was changed with the passage of § 285, the legislature left § 284 as it was. A
137

138
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New York residents because the New York homestead
exemption is much more generous than the federal homestead
exemption.142 A person who has any significant amount of
equity in her home will typically elect the state exemptions in
order to protect what is usually her largest asset.143
However, when it comes to personal property, the
federal exemptions can be much more generous than New
York’s. Many exemption schemes (including both federal and
New York) exempt property based on category and dollar
limit.144 For example, under New York law, a debtor is allowed
to exempt a car worth up to $4,000, professional tools up to
$3,000, jewelry up to $1,000, etc.145 Federal law is similar.146
However, federal law has a provision found in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(5) that is often referred to as the “wild card”
exemption.147 This provision allows a debtor to exempt any type
of personal property up to a limit of $1,225.148 This subsection
also allows the debtor up to an additional $11,500 from any
unused portion of the federal homestead exemption.149
Therefore, a debtor who is not claiming a homestead exemption
can exempt a total of $12,725 worth of any property the debtor
chooses under the federal exemptions. The wild card exemption
is in addition to the other categorical exemptions allowed under
§ 522(d). If a debtor is eligible for all the personal property
exemptions under federal law, the total value of exempt
property can reach above $30,000.150 New York state law has no
wild card exemption and also caps personal property
exemptions at $10,000.151 Thus, if a debtor has both a home and

person only reading § 284 might conclude that New York law only allows state
exemptions, but § 285 states that an individual debtor may choose the federal
exemptions instead “[n]otwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law.” DEBT. &
CRED. § 285.
142 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012) (allowing $150,000,
$125,000, or $75,000, depending on county of residence), with 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)
(2013) (allowing $22,975).
143 See Brian Powers, Note, Can You Trust Your Trustee? Expanding
Homestead Exemptions to Include Rent-Controlled Leasehold Interests, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 741, 748 (2012).
144 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205; MASS. GEN. LAWS 235
§ 34 (2014).
145 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205.
146 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (allowing up to $12,250 worth of household goods,
$1,550 worth of jewelry, etc.).
147 See, e.g., Martin v. Cox (In re Martin), 140 F.3d 806, 807 (8th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the wild card exemption).
148 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).
149 Id. This is approximately half of the total $22,975 allowed under § 522(d)(1).
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
151 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 283 (McKinney 2012).
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a significant amount of personal property, the question of
which exemption scheme to choose poses a serious dilemma.
Let us return to the hypothetical raised by the
Wickstrom court and add some more facts. Assume the
husband and wife own the home jointly and the husband also
owns an expensive automobile currently worth around $10,000.
The home is located in Manhattan, and their equity in the
property is under the $150,000 cap for New York’s homestead
exemption.152 If the husband were to file for bankruptcy and
elect state exemptions, they could keep the house but would
lose the car.153 However, if the husband transfers the house
solely to his wife before he files, he would not have to worry
about taking an exemption for the house and could choose the
federal exemption scheme. Under the federal exemptions, and
without having to worry about a homestead exemption, he
could use the wild card provision to fully exempt the car.154
Such a transfer on the eve of bankruptcy is a classic
fraudulent transfer, but if the “no harm, no foul” rule were in
play, the trustee would be unable to do anything about it. The
debtor has now benefitted from both the federal and state
exemptions at the expense of his creditors. This is a clear case
of a transfer designed to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and
fraudulent transfer law should be able to reach it. Extending
the “no harm, no foul” rule to this case allows the debtor to
protect assets (in this case, an expensive car) that should
otherwise be available to his creditors.
Thus, extending the “no harm, no foul” rule to generally
cover all transfers of exempt property in bankruptcy is not a
viable solution. Not only could it result in serious harm to
creditors, such as in the hypothetical above, but a majority of
bankruptcy courts have already rejected it.155 However, the law
being used to avoid the transfer in Panepinto is based on state
152 One hundred fifty thousand dollars is the current maximum exemption for
real property used as a primary residence in the county of New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 5206 (McKinney 2012).
153 New York law caps the exemption value of automobiles at $4,000. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5205(8) (McKinney 2012). The husband would still be able to take advantage
of this exemption, but since the car is worth more than the exemption, the trustee
would be able to sell the car as part of the estate. See, e.g., In re Mannone, 512 B.R.
148, 153-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the trustee may only sell exempt
property when the sale will realize value above the exemption limit and that any such
value in exempt property sold by the trustee inures to the benefit of the estate). After
the sale, the husband would receive $4,000 (the exemption amount) from the sale
proceeds with the remainder going to the estate.
154 Federal law caps the exemption value of automobiles at $3,675, but the
wild card exemption (assuming no homestead) could easily cover the remaining value.
11 U.S.C. § 522.
155 See Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 219.
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law, not federal law. Thus, state law precedent could provide
grounds for overturning the Panepinto decision.
3. State Law Precedents
The transfers in Begier, Bear Stearns, and the Wickstrom
hypothetical are both subject to either §§ 547 or 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, the transfer in Panepinto concerned
application of § 544 and New York’s UFCA. Under § 544, the
trustee can avoid any transfer that a valid creditor of the debtor
could otherwise avoid under applicable law.156 In this case, the
applicable law is New York’s version of the UFCA.
The court in Panepinto concluded that New York’s
version of the UFCA allowed the avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances of exempt property. However, there are no New
York cases directly on point, and there are some New York
cases that even seem to support the “no harm, no foul” rule.
There is also a long history of similar holdings from other
states. The “no harm, no foul” rule was originally applied in the
context of state-level fraudulent transfer law and numerous
state courts have held that a transfer of property that is not
reachable by creditors due to statutory exemption cannot be
fraudulent.157 While this impressive list of decisions is not
11. U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2013).
See, e.g., Flirt v. Kirkpatrick, 175 So. 2d 755, 758 (Ala. 1965) (“A sale or
other disposition of property which is by law exempt from payment of debts cannot be
impeached by creditors as fraudulent, since creditors cannot be deemed concerned with
property not subject to their demands.”); Montgomery v. Bullock, 77 P.2d 846, 849 (Cal.
1938) (“[A] creditor is not entitled to complain of the transfer by the debtor of an asset
which he could not have reached, had the debtor retained it.”); Sneed v. Davis, 184 So.
865, 870 (Fla. 1938) (“[T]he corporate stock at the time of the alleged fraudulent
conveyance was exempt from sale under execution and, therefore, was property which
could not be subjected to the claim of the creditor against the consent of the owner and
as to which there could be no conveyance in legal fraud of creditors.”); St. Marie v.
Chester B. Brown Co., 370 P.2d 195, 197 (Idaho 1962) (“If the property, before transfer,
was exempt from execution then a creditor could not reach it and a subsequent transfer
would deprive the creditor of no rights.”); Rossow v. Peters, 115 N.E. 524, 525 (Ill.
1917) (“[A] conveyance of property exempt from the payment of debts is not fraudulent
as to creditors.”); Isgrigg v. Pauley, 47 N.E. 821, 821 (Ind. 1897) (“The whole doctrine of
annulling fraudulent conveyances rests upon the ground that the creditor has the right
to resort to the property, and where he has no such right it is impossible that a
conveyance can be deemed fraudulent.”); Hall Roberts’ Son, Inc. v. Plaht, 114 N.W.2d
548, 549 (Iowa 1962) (“As sometimes said, so far as exempt property is concerned, there
are no creditors.”); Saunders v. Graff, 173 P. 413, 413 (Kan. 1918) (“[T]here is no fraud
in withholding exempt property from satisfaction of a debtor’s obligations. Creditors
are not concerned with any disposition which the owner may make of it.”); Tewmey v.
Tewmey’s Assignee, 65 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1933) (“[C]reditors cannot be defrauded,
hindered, or delayed by the transfer of property which neither at law nor in equity can
be made to contribute to the satisfaction of their debts, and hence it is almost
universally conceded that property which is by statute exempt from execution cannot
be reached by creditors on the ground that it has been fraudulently transferred.”);
156

157
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binding on New York, there is also no precedent to the
contrary. Further, at least two older New York cases and one
modern case suggest that New York law also excludes exempt
property from fraudulent transfer law.
The first of the two older cases is Zoeller v. Riley,
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1885.158 In a note
following the opinion that appears unrelated to the case at
hand, the court stated that “the conveyance of property exempt
from execution cannot, under any circumstances, be made out
to be a fraudulent conveyance.”159 However, as this is not part
of the official opinion and does not relate to the facts of the
case, it is dicta at best. Further, this case and the one that
follows were decided prior to New York’s adoption of the UFCA
and its definition of “conveyance.”
The second older case is McDonald v. McDonald,160
where a defendant against whom a judgment had been
obtained transferred all of her property away before the
judgment could be satisfied.161 The plaintiff brought an action
to avoid the transfers.162 The New York Supreme Court held
the transfers fraudulent and affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff.163 However, at the end of the opinion, the court
Legro v. Lord, 10 Me. 161, 165 (1833) (“No creditor can be, in legal contemplation,
defrauded by a mere conveyance made by his debtor of any of his property, which such
creditor has no right by law to appropriate or even to touch by any civil process.”);
Mannan v. Merritt, 93 Mass. 582, 583 (1866) (“A creditor cannot by an attachment
impeach the validity of the sale by his debtor of articles which are exempt by law from
attachment, upon the ground that such sale was fraudulent as to creditors.”); Bresnahan
v. Nugent, 52 N.W. 735, 736 (Mich. 1892) (“It has been frequently held that a creditor
cannot complain of any disposition which a debtor sees fit to make of exempt property.”);
Sisco v. Paulson, 45 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. 1950) (“Exempt property is not susceptible of
fraudulent alienation, and creditors ordinarily have no right to complain of the
disposition made of it, since they cannot be prejudiced thereby or claim that it is a fraud
upon them.”); Chandler v. Welborn, 294 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1956) (“It is well settled
that a conveyance of exempt property may not be attacked on the ground that it was
made in fraud of creditors.”); Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietjen, 225 P. 598, 600 (Utah
1924) (“A homestead cannot be made the subject of attack by a creditor upon the ground
that it was sold or conveyed in fraud of such creditor.”); Darling v. Ricker, 35 A. 376, 377
(Vt. 1896) (“There can be no fraud as against creditors in the conveyance of property
exempt from attachment.”); Boynton v. McNeal, 72 Va. 456, 460 (1879) (“[A] creditor
cannot be said to be hindered, or delayed, or prejudiced by a fraudulent conveyance
embracing property subject to the homestead, because the debtor is entitled to hold it
exempt from the payment of his debts.”); First Wis. Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling,
272 N.W. 664, 664 (Wis. 1937) (“It has always been the rule in this state that a
conveyance of property which is exempt cannot be deemed fraudulent as against
creditors.”); see also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraudulent Conveyances & Transfers § 74 (“A debtor’s
transfer of an interest in property that is exempt cannot be fraudulent as to creditors.”).
158 Zoller v. Riley, 2 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1885).
159 Id. at 399.
160 McDonald v. McDonald, 11 N.Y.S. 248 (Gen. Term 1890).
161 Id. at 248.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 249.
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discussed a point “suggested by the appellant which should
have some further consideration.”164 The court noted that these
transfers included some furniture and other household goods
that were exempt property beyond the reach of creditors.165 The
court flatly stated that the creditors of the defendant were not
defrauded by the transfer of the exempt property.166 While the
court affirmed the judgment, it modified it to exclude any
property subject to exemption from execution.167
The more recent case is Prestige Caterers, Inc. v.
Siegel.168 In this Appellate Division case from 2011, the
defendants hired a catering company but never paid the bill.169
The catering company sued and obtained a judgment.170 In the
course of enforcing the judgment, the catering company sought
to set aside several transfers as fraudulent.171 The defendants
sought to dismiss the complaint arguing that the transfers in
question could not be fraudulent because they consisted of
social security benefits that were exempt from execution by
creditors.172 The court ultimately denied the motion because the
complaint also alleged transfers of funds that were not social
security benefits.173 While the court did not directly address the
issue, the implication from the court’s language was that it
would have dismissed the complaint had it only alleged
transfer of exempt funds.174
Looking at these three New York cases, the lack of any
New York precedent going the other direction, and the
numerous decisions from other jurisdictions, the Bankruptcy
Court could potentially rule that, as a matter of state law, a
Id.
Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Prestige Caterers, Inc. v. Siegel, 930 N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
169 Id. at 273.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. (“Although social security benefits are protected from execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, and, therefore, do not constitute
assets as defined in Debtor and Creditor Law § 270, the complaint adequately alleges
the fraudulent conveyance of other assets and funds which are not exempt from
liability for [the alleged] debts.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted)). Note that when discussing the social security benefits, the
court states they “do not constitute ‘assets’ as defined in Debtor and Creditor Law
§ 270.” Id. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
property transferred was exempt and therefore could not be fraudulent. Id. However,
as discussed above, a fraudulent conveyance under New York law is not concerned with
the transfer of ‘assets’ as defined by § 270; it is concerned with property. See supra note
65 and accompanying text. One wonders whether any of the lawyers involved in this
case brought this distinction to the attention of the court.
164
165
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transfer of exempt property cannot be fraudulent. As the
Panepinto court pointed out, “11 U.S.C. § 544 is different.”175 It
would not be inconsistent with federal court precedent to hold
that §§ 547 and 548 can reach a transfer of exempt property
and that § 544(b) cannot. Section 544(b) turns on state law and
not federal law, so a court would be justified in holding that a
transfer of exempt property, while subject to fraudulent
transfer law under the provision found in the Code itself, was
not subject to state fraudulent transfer law.
The court in Blanch endorsed a very similar
conclusion.176 In that case, the court compared §§ 544 and 548,
stating that “[t]he trustee’s powers to avoid transfers under
each provision are wholly separate and independent of one
another.”177 Specifically, the court noted that “cases decided
under the Bankruptcy Code . . . rejected the ‘no harm, no foul’”
rule, but that this did not affect the analysis under state law.178
Because avoidance under § 548 is based on the Bankruptcy
Code and avoidance under § 544(b) is based on state law, there
is no inconsistency in holding that they operate differently.
What mattered in this case was how Illinois state law would
treat the transfers in question.
There are also policy reasons to treat avoidance under
§ 548 differently from avoidance under § 544(b). Section 548, as
the court in Panepinto noted, is concerned with the “slide into
bankruptcy.”179 It can only reach transfers that were made
within two years of the bankruptcy filing.180 Most state
fraudulent transfer laws reach back further than two years.
New York provides for a six-year statute of limitations on
fraudulent conveyance actions181 and most UFTA jurisdictions
apply a four-year statute of limitations.182 A transfer,
regardless of actual intent, made immediately before filing for
bankruptcy is inherently more suspicious than one made
several years before filing. Presumably, a debtor is much more
aware of financial distress closer to filing and should be more
careful in the disposition of his assets.
In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 371 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
In re Blanch, Nos. 97-82652, 98-8011, 1998 WL 34065289 at *2 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371 n.2.
180 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2013).
181 Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that constructive
fraud actions under New York law are subject to six-year statute of limitations).
182 See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/10 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A
§ 10 (2014); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (1984).
175

176
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One justification for constructive fraud provisions is to
do away with ambiguous questions of intent. As previously
noted, actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is
rarely susceptible to direct proof. In devising the objective
markers that make a transfer fraudulent without regard to the
intent of the transferor, the drafters of the UFCA knew that
they would likely sweep up some transfers that were made
without any intent to defraud creditors.183 This was considered
acceptable when balancing out the policy goals of the statute.184
In the same spirit, applying such provisions with more
force immediately before the bankruptcy makes sense. It is
much more likely that a transfer right before filing for
bankruptcy will harm creditors. Zealously going after
potentially fraudulent transfers made in a short time period
before bankruptcy fits with the goals of the system. However, it
also makes sense to be a bit more forgiving when it comes to
transfers made as long ago as six years prior to a bankruptcy
filing, particularly when the result could be the debtor losing a
home that her creditors never had any legal right to in the first
place. If a debtor tries to engage in the sort of subterfuge that
hinders, delays, or defrauds creditors she should not be
rewarded. But that does not mean that a creditor should enjoy
advantages it was never entitled to. The result would be to
force a family out of their home because a completely innocent
transfer ran afoul of an archaic law.
Despite both the case history and the sound policy
reasons for holding that a transfer of exempt assets is not
subject to state fraudulent transfer law, the fact remains that
the plain language of the UFCA in New York, combined with
the Bankruptcy Code, seem to compel this result. New York
law defines “conveyance” as any transfer of property without
respect to exemption.185 It is unclear whether a New York court
would rule that the transfer in Panepinto was fraudulent. The
best solution is for New York to join the rest of the country and
adopt the UFTA.
B.

Solving the Exemption Problem with the UFTA

The Conference is currently considering amendments to
the UFTA (now known as the Uniform Voidable Transactions
Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 831-32.
See Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 534-35 (discussing how the
drafters of the UFCA wanted to eliminate questions of intent in order to improve
creditors’ remedies).
185 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
183

184
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Act (UVTA)).186 The release of the UVTA is an excellent
opportunity for New York to join the other 43 states that have
already adopted some version of the UFTA.187
The failure of New York to adopt a version of the UFTA to
date threatens the state exemption system. The exemptions are
there for a reason. The property set aside as exempt from
creditors is the property the state has decided is essential to
everyday life. Stripping debtors of this property creates social
costs that far outweigh the costs of leaving some debt uncollected.
The goal should be to strike a balance between ensuring creditors
are paid, which is essential to a healthy credit system, and
preventing debtors from becoming wards of the state. Bankruptcy
goes hand-in-hand with this system to prevent debtors from
falling into a cycle of debt they can never escape.
Society and the economy as a whole are better off when
people can live normal lives and make positive contributions to
the economy. It is also important for the economy to maintain a
healthy credit system, and, to do that, we must have
procedures in place to ensure creditors are paid.188 But this can
also go too far. Allowing creditors to take everything debtors
own risks putting debtors in a position where they have no
alternative but to live on public assistance.189 This in turn
raises costs for the rest of society.
Both goals are important. Proper recovery mechanisms
for creditors in the case of default encourage lenders to make
more loans.190 Access to credit is not only essential to the
modern economy,191 it can also be a key factor in reducing
poverty and promoting economic development.192 However, it is
well-settled “that exemptions in bankruptcy are to be liberally
construed in order to afford the honest debtor a fresh start.”193
The debtor’s fresh start is important because not only does it
help the debtor and her family, it also provides “benefits [to]
186 NAT’L CONF. OF COMMR’S ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (FORMERLY UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (formerly THE
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (as amended in 2014), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2014AM_AUVTA_Dr
aft_As%20approved.pdf.
187 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (2006)
(outlining the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, adopted in 43 jurisdictions.).
188 See Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 534.
189 Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 22, at 1459.
190 Luke Shimek & Rajdeep Sengupta, Access to Credit, ECONOMIC SYNOPSES
no. 4, 2007, available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/07/ES0704.pdf.
191 Jacques Sapir, Credit, Indebtedness and Economic Growth, RUSSEUROPE,
(Sept. 1, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://russeurope.hypotheses.org/1500.
192 Shimek & Sengupta, supra note 190.
193 In re Abbott, 408 B.R. 903, 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
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the rest of society by reviving the debtor’s incentive to work
and participate productively in the economy.”194
Thus, it is important to strike a balance between ensuring
creditors are paid and preventing debtors from becoming wards of
the state. We need a system that allows creditors a sufficient
recovery to keep credit flowing at reasonable rates while at the
same time ensuring that debtors have enough protections to
recover if they find themselves unable to pay their debts. The
system of exemptions is a key part of that balance. If we then
allow the law to undermine and frustrate those exemptions
unnecessarily, we risk upsetting the balance and causing harm
to the economy.
There is also a moral dimension to limiting how much
creditors should be allowed to take. As a society, we do not want
to see debtors stripped of everything they own and forced onto
the street. Creditors should not be allowed to literally strip a
debtor naked and take everything, from the family house to the
debtor’s books and even pets. The exemption laws in this
country protect the things that are essential for a person to live
with dignity in modern society. We should not allow this system
to be undermined by a technical definition of the word
“conveyance.”
There is also no policy reason to hold exempt property
subject to state fraudulent transfer law. The purpose of the law is
to recover property that can be used to pay creditors. The
exemption scheme is specifically designed to put certain property
beyond the reach of creditors. Allowing fraudulent transfer law to
alter the balance clearly intended by the legislature undermines
the policy goals of the exemption statutes. Simply put, not
updating the law is against the policy of the state.
That is not to say no potential issues exist if New York
were to adopt the UFTA or otherwise protect transfers of
exempt property from fraudulent transfer law. If fraudulent
transfer law could never reach exempt assets, it would be
possible for someone who owns a house to transfer that house
to a third party for no consideration, then use all his remaining
assets to purchase a new, exempt house. When he files for
bankruptcy, he will have no non-exempt assets, and the trustee
will be unable to avoid the transfers. Here, we see a debtor
exploiting the rules to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. However,
there are several solutions to this problem. First, in order to take
194 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car?
Some Thoughts on Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 471, 473 (2002).

2015]

EXEMPT NO MORE

1151

advantage of the UFTA, he would have to have transferred the
house more than two years before filing for bankruptcy. Otherwise,
the transfer could simply be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 548 which
reaches transfers of exempt property.195
Second, the bankruptcy courts have always retained the
ability to dismiss cases when they find the debtor has abused
the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A), the
bankruptcy court can dismiss the case if it finds the petition
was not filed in good faith.196 It is not hard to imagine a
bankruptcy court finding that the actions of our hypothetical
debtor in exploiting the exemption system to prevent
substantial assets from becoming available to his creditors
constitutes bad faith and abuse of the system.
Third, if these protections are not enough for the
legislature, it can always add additional protections as part of
the adoption of the UVTA. An easy example would be to
generally exclude transfers of exempt property from the
constructive fraud provisions while specifically including exempt
property in cases where there is evidence of actual fraud. All the
legislature would need to do is set out a separate section
making it clear that transfers made with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors are voidable regardless of
any exemptions that may apply to the property transferred.
Even if the New York legislature chooses not to adopt
the UVTA, there is still a simple fix available: they can
redefine “conveyance” to exclude exempt property. This would
require simply changing the word “property” to “asset” in the
definition of “conveyance” found in NYDCL section 270. The
current law already defines “asset” to exclude exempt
property.197 This change will promote the policy objectives of
the exemption statutes, but will not undermine any current
policy objectives of fraudulent transfer law.
CONCLUSION
For the debtor in Panepinto, this particular saga is over
as the court confirmed the debtor’s plan.198 But the underlying
issue—whether transfers of exempt assets are subject to
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (2013).
197 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
198 The court in Panepinto confirmed the Debtor’s plan on Dec. 30, 2013.
Panepinto Docket, supra note 74. A further review of the docket indicates that the
specific controversy with the main creditor has been settled. Id. The specific details are
not currently available, but no fraudulent transfer adversary proceeding was filed. Id.
195
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fraudulent transfer law in New York—remains unresolved.
Now that a bankruptcy court has opened the door to
challenging this type of transfer, trustees in future cases could
potentially sell an entirely exempt homestead out from under
an innocent debtor. Trustees are not in the business of kicking
debtors out of their homes, but they have a fiduciary duty,
imposed by law, to get the best return on a debtor’s assets for
the benefit of the estate. The only way to ensure that this
tragic scenario does not occur at some point in the future is to
change the law.
Adopting the UVTA would not be inconsistent with the
current fraudulent conveyance law in New York. There is no
indication the legislature intended to expose exempt property to
fraudulent transfer law. If the dispute in Panepinto were outside
bankruptcy, then, even if the transfer was avoided, the house
would still be exempt because it would return to the debtor
under the homestead exemption. If New York had intended for
exempt property that was fraudulently transferred to be
available to creditors, there would be some mechanism in state
law to strip the exemption after avoidance. The lack of such a
provision creates the inference that the legislature did not
intend for exempt property to lose its exempt status because it
was part of a constructively fraudulent transfer.
To remedy this situation and ensure that the exemption
system functions as it is supposed to, New York should take the
upcoming amendments to the UFTA as an opportunity to
update its fraudulent transfer law and join almost every other
state in upholding the integrity of exempt property. If the state
declines to do this, it should, at a minimum, change the
definition of “conveyance” in the fraudulent transfer statutes to
ensure that the exemption laws work as they should: to protect
property essential to everyday life.
Philip Michael Guffy†
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“I Know My Client Would Never Hurt
His Daughter, But How Can I Prove
It?”
A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING AGAINST
CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME EVIDENCE
Mr. Smith1 settles into work on a Monday morning,
completely content after sharing a wonderful weekend with his
daughter Jane.2 Although his divorce might be frustrating, he
could not be happier that he has custody of his eight-year-old
daughter on the weekend. Just then, his phone rings; his
divorce attorney is on the line. Apparently, his soon-to-be exwife has called child protective services and has accused him of
sexually abusing his daughter during their last weekend visit.
Shocked, he does not respond. The attorney continues, saying,
“Your daughter told a caseworker, ‘[Daddy] hurt my private
place with his private place.’”3 Defeated, Mr. Smith hangs up
the phone and his mind begins to race with all sorts of
1 This note will refer to the accuser as female and the accused as male, as
these gender choices represent the more common way these issues arise—when a
mother accuses her soon-to-be-ex-husband of sexually abusing their child. See RICHARD
A. GARDNER, M.D., TRUE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEX ABUSE 183 (1992)
(“Because mothers, much more commonly than fathers, are likely to initiate such
accusations, I will refer to the accuser as the mother.”). Please note that the issues
presented in this note could apply in situations involving both heterosexual and
homosexual couples, and the parents could be of either gender. Allegations of sexual
abuse of a child in custody and visitation cases can also be made against step-parents
and other cohabitants of the biological parents.
2 This note will refer to the child victim as female because Dr. Summit, in
his paper, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, refers to the child as
female. See Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 180 (1983) (internal citations omitted) (“In the current
state of the art most of the victims available for study are young females molested by
adult males entrusted with their care.”). This is not to ignore the fact that both young
girls and boys are victims of sexual abuse. Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, NAT’L CTR. OF
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexualabuse/child-sexual-abuse-statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“1 in 5 girls and 1 in 20
boys is a victim of child sexual abuse.”).
3 TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE DEVASTATING EFFECT
OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 31 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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questions. How could he possibly defend himself? Will he ever
be able to spend time with his daughter again? Two days later
Mr. Smith receives another phone call from his attorney—Jane
has recanted her allegations, but her mother intends to use the
allegations as a basis for sole custody. Now what?
INTRODUCTION
Allegations of child sexual abuse4 are often made by one
parent against another during divorce proceedings, especially
during custody disputes.5 In fact, these allegations are
“widespread”6 and parents make these allegations in about 2%
of cases.7 Although there is much debate over the veracity of
sexual abuse allegations made during custody disputes, studies
show that allegations made during divorce disputes are often
unfounded.8 Most of these allegations are “reported following a
4 There is no one definition of child sexual abuse. “Definitions vary
considerably and legal definitions found in state laws vary from state to
state . . . However, most experts agree on certain elements of the definition:
exploitation of the child; use of coercion, gentle though it may be; and some level of
gratification gained by the adult.” KAREN KINNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2 (1995). The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act first
passed in 1974 defines “sexual abuse” as:

(A) the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of
any child to engage in, or assist any other person to engage in, any sexually
explicit conduct or simulation of such conduct for the purpose of producing a
visual depiction of such conduct; or (B) the rape, and in cases of caretaker or
inter-familial relationships, statutory rape, molestation, prostitution, or other
form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4)(A)-(B) (2012).
5 MODERN FAMILY LAW 854 (Weisberg & Appleton eds., 4th ed. 2010).
6 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 300 (“Because a sex-abuse accusation is an
extremely powerful vengeance and exclusionary maneuver, such accusations have
become increasingly widespread in recent years.”); MELVIN G. GOLDZBAND, CUSTODY
CASES AND EXPERT WITNESSES: A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS 33 (2d ed. 1988) (“There is a
widespread, currently flagrant, nationwide epidemic of allegations of sexual abuse
committed against a child by one contesting parent in custody or visitation battles.”).
7 MODERN FAMILY LAW, supra note 5, at 854 (citing Kathleen Coulborn
Faller, Child Maltreatment and Endangerment in the Context of Divorce, 22 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 429, 430 (2000)); see Catherine Paquette, Note, Handling Sexual
Abuse Allegations in Child Custody Cases, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1415, 1415 n.2 (1991)
(citing Thoennes & Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations
Project, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN DIVORCE CASES 135, 135 (1988)) (“In most
states, two to ten percent of all family court cases involving custody or visitation
include an allegation of sexual abuse.”).
8 See State v. Herrera, 307 P.3d 103, 117-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“Wendy
Button, a forensic interviewer, testified for the state as an expert on the behavior and
characteristics of child sexual abuse victims. On direct examination, Button stated that
false allegations occur most commonly when the purported victims are either ‘younger
children whose parents are involved in a high-conflict divorce or custody dispute’ or
‘adolescent females.’”); see also GARDNER, supra note 1, at xxv (“There is no question
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visit with the non-custodial parent.”9 These false allegations
are often “invented by mothers to stop fathers from seeing their
children.”10 Many of these women know that an allegation of
sexual abuse is one method of “completely shutting [their]
husbands out of the child’s life.”11
Children may also be responsible for false allegations of
sexual abuse.12 They may purposefully make false allegations
to “take control over the custody determination by alleging
sexual abuse by the parent with whom the child does not want
to live.”13 Other times, children eager to please an adult
“unintentionally”14 accuse a parent of sexual abuse in response
to suggestive questioning by the other parent.15
Once an allegation is made to the family court, the
judge must consider it, which may result in the accused’s
complete loss of custody or even a loss of visitation time with
his child.16 In many of these cases that involve such allegations,
expert testimony of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS) is introduced against the accused parent.17
CSAAS is a nondiagnostic tool used “to explain how children who
that many accusations of child sex abuse are true . . . [h]owever, there is no question,
as well, that many of the accusations are false, especially in child custody disputes
(where the vengeance element and the opportunity for exclusion of a hated spouse is
operative”.); GOLDZBAND, supra note 6, at 33 (“[M]any allegations are patently false
and based upon manipulative attempts to prevent custody by the other parent, or upon
anxiety-provoked misconceptions by battling parents.”); O’Donohue, W. et al.,
Analyzing Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 13 FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 296, 301
(2004); Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citation omitted) (“[F]alse
allegations . . . occur, most typically in divorce or custody cases.”); but see 10 Custody
Myths and How to Counter Them, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
(Quarterly E-Newsletter, Vol. 4), July 2006, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/cdv_enewsletter/custodymythsandcounter.authcheckdam.pdf
(internal citation omitted) (“[T]he majority of allegations are substantiated . . .”).
9 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citation omitted).
10 Harriet Alexander, False Abuse Claims are the New Court Weapon, Retiring
Judge Says, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 6, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/national/
false-abuse-claims-are-the-new-court-weapon-retiring-judge-says-20130705-2phao.html;
see Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citations omitted) (“In some of these
instances, the parents may have created the sexual abuse occurrence in order to
terminate custody rights or prevent visitation.”); but see 10 Custody Myths and How to
Counter Them, supra note 8, at 2 (“Among false allegations, fathers are far more likely
than mothers to make intentionally false accusations . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
11 Alexander, supra note 10.
12 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1421 (internal citation omitted).
13 Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
14 Id. (internal citation omitted).
15 O’Donohue, W., et al., supra note 8, at 302 (internal citation omitted).
16 Alexander, supra note 10.
17 State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989) (warning that the term
“syndrome” may mislead the fact-finder: “[T]he term ‘syndrome’ is a misnomer since
symptoms or traits cannot by themselves be used as a test for sexual abuse, for the
simple reason that CSAAS is not probative of sexual abuse”).
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are abused react to their maltreatment.”18 Particularly, CSAAS
is used to explain why children may delay disclosing their abuse
and why they may recant their allegations of abuse.19 CSAAS
evidence however, has many flaws. This note seeks to enlighten
attorneys who represent parents accused of abusing their
children to the weaknesses of CSAAS evidence, and propose
meaningful steps to take when representing their clients in
custody hearings in family court.20 Part I of this note discusses
the history of CSAAS, the reasons for the syndrome, and
examines each of the elements of the syndrome. Part II explains
how, and for what purpose, CSAAS evidence is admitted into
court. Part III presents a survey of the nation’s major cases
involving CSAAS evidence. Part IV highlights the weaknesses of
CSAAS testimony and recommends sample objections attorneys
can make when arguing in favor of their motion to exclude the
expert testimony. Finally, Part V recommends sample questions
and answers attorneys for the clients accused of sexually
abusing their child can use when examining expert witnesses to
highlight the weaknesses of CSAAS testimony, even if the judge
permits the testimony into evidence.
I.

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME

Based on child victim’s reports and complaints from
“sexual abuse treatment centers,”21 CSAAS was first identified
in 1983 by Dr. Roland Summit in his article, The Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.22 Not only does CSAAS
18 John E. B. Myers, Special Evidentiary Issues, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 305, 309 (Ventrell & Duquette eds., 2005).
19 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993) (internal citations omitted).
20 This note relies on the term “accused” to describe the parent against whom
allegations of child sexual abuse are made. The term “defendant” is only appropriate
when the state decides to bring criminal charges (and hold a jury trial) against the
accused. If the state does not bring criminal charges against the accused, the Family
Court judge will make all determinations about the allegations. See generally Jennifer L.
Thompson, Allegations of Criminal Child Abuse in Divorce Cases, 28 A.B.A. SEC. PUB.
GPSOLO 6 (2011) (explaining the difference between criminal trials that occur after
allegations have been made in Family Court and the custody hearings taking place).
21 Susan Romer, Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Disputes:
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 647, 658 (1990); see
Kenneth J. Weiss & Julia Curcio Alexander, Sex, Lies, and Statistics: Inferences from
the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 412,
414 (2013) (“Summit’s [work was based on] statistically supported assumptions
emerging from clinical work; four years of testing in the author’s practice; strong
endorsements from victims, offenders, and family members; and consensus derived
from hundreds of training symposia.”).
22 Summit, supra note 2, at 177.
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“describe how children react (accommodate) to ongoing sexual
abuse,”23 but it also helps to identify children who may be
suffering from the effects of sexual abuse in order to provide
them with the treatment they need.24 Essentially, Dr. “Summit’s
goal was to enhance our understanding of victims, to give them
a voice, and to provide a context for understanding their coping
behavior within the family and systems of child protection and
criminal justice.”25
CSAAS is a nondiagnostic tool used solely “to explain how
children who are abused react to their maltreatment;” but CSAAS
is not used “to prove that abuse occurred.”26 To accomplish its
goal, CSAAS identifies common characteristics and their presence
in abused children.27 The presence of these common
characteristics in a child, however, is not evidence of whether a
child has been sexually abused.28 In fact, because “[t]he
accommodation syndrome is neither an illness nor a diagnosis,” it
cannot “measure whether or not a child has been sexually
abused.”29 Therefore, because CSAAS “does not detect sexual
abuse,”30 it “is not probative of sexual abuse.”31 Instead “the
syndrome assumes that abuse has occurred and helps explain the
child’s reaction to it.”32 For example, a child may tell a social
worker one day that her father sexually abused her, but may tell
her social worker the next day that her father has never touched
her inappropriately. CSAAS assumes that the child was in fact
sexually assaulted and explains why she may have recanted her
Myers, supra note 18, at 308 (internal citation omitted).
See Romer, supra note 21 (internal citation omitted) (discussing the field of
child sexual assault and the role it plays in custody and visitation disputes).
25 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
26 Myers, supra note 18; see State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989)
(“In effect, CSAAS does not diagnose or detect sexual abuse, but instead, assumes the
presence of such abuse and seeks to explain the child’s reaction to it.”).
27 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (internal citation omitted); Summit, supra note 3
(explaining that CSAAS evidence was intended to present “a common denominator of
the most frequently observed victim behaviors”).
28 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (internal citation omitted).
29 Myers, supra note 18 (quoting Mary B. Meinig, Profile of Roland Summit, 1
VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991)); Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1992) (“[CSAAS]
was not meant to be used as a diagnostic device to show that abuse had, in fact, occurred.”).
30 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995) (citing John E.B. Myers et al.,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 67 (1989)););
Myers, supra note 18, at 318.
31 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609.
32 Myers, supra note 18, at 318; see Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 490 (“[T]he
syndrome was designed for purposes of treating child victims and offering them more
effective assistance within the family and within the systems of child protection and
criminal justice . . . and helps to explain reactions—such as recanting or delayed
reporting—of children assumed to have experienced abuse.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
23
24
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story.33 CSAAS evidence, however, does not confirm that she has
been assaulted because she has recanted her story.34 Thus, a
suggestion that a child was abused because children who have
been sexually abused often recant their stories “is an improper
usage of Dr. Summit’s theory.”35
Dr. Summit “classified the typical reactions of sexually
abused children into five categories” known as the five elements
of CSAAS: “(1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and
accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing
disclosure, and (5) retraction” or recantation.36 It is imperative for
attorneys defending those accused of sexual abuse of a child to
understand the elements of CSAAS in preparing a defense
against it. For example, questions about the child’s inconsistent
statements are generally asked by the accused’s attorney on
cross examination of the accusing parent, social worker, or the
independent child psychologist appointed by the court in a
sexual abuse case.37 The accusing parent’s attorney, however,
will most likely utilize an expert witness to testify about
CSAAS and explain why the child has made inconsistent
statements.38 Consequently, attorneys defending alleged
abusers must understand the elements of CSAAS in order to
prepare the best defense for their clients.
A.

Secrecy

The first element of CSAAS, secrecy, is a “basic
childhood vulnerability” and a “precondition to the occurrence
of sexual abuse” of a child.39 “Preconditions are understood to
set the stage for the initiation and continuation of sexual
See Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609; Summit, supra note 2, at 190.
See Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (“In effect, CSAAS does not diagnose or
detect sexual abuse, but instead, assumes the presence of such abuse and seeks to
explain the child’s reaction to it.”).
35 Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1992).
36 Elaine R. Cacciola, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Infrafamily
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 184 (1986).
37 See JEAN GRAM HALL & DOUGLAS F. MARTIN, CHILD ABUSE: PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE 186 (1993) (“Under cross-examination, a witness may be asked about
statements he made prior to his appearance in the court, which are inconsistent with
his president evidence. If he admits that he made a previous statement which is
inconsistent with the evidence he is now giving, that statement is admissible to
discredit the truth of his evidence.”).
38 Myers, supra note 18, at 318 (“Expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible to
rehabilitate a child’s credibility following impeachment focused on delayed reporting,
inconsistency, or recantation. Such rehabilitation is appropriate because jurors may
not understand that delayed reporting, recantation, and inconsistency are relatively
common among sexually abused children.”).
39 Summit, supra note 2 at 181.
33

34
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abuse.”40 The secrecy aspect “is an intrinsic characteristic”
because child sexual abuse generally occurs when the offender
is secluded with the child.41
For obvious reasons, the abuser must ensure that the
illicit encounters with the child are kept completely secret from
society, especially from other adults and the police. In order to
ensure secrecy, the abuser uses intimidation tactics to scare
the child into silence.42 For example, the abuser may say, “If you
tell anyone our secret, I will hurt you.”43 These threats “make[ ] it
clear to the child that this is something bad and dangerous” so
the secrecy acts as “both the source of fear and the promise of
safety” for the child.44 Because the child is lead to believe that
she is doing something bad, the child believes her abuser when
he says, “‘Everything will be all right if you just don’t tell.’”45
The secrecy element of child sexual abuse stories is
extremely common; the “majority of the victims in [Summit’s]
surveys had never told anyone” about their childhood abuse.46
This plays out in practice as many abused children keep their
abuse a secret because they are afraid of the repercussions.47
Many fear that they would face blame for their actions, that
their parents would not believe them, or that their parents
would be upset with them for not immediately disclosing the
abuse to them.48
B.

Helplessness

Helplessness is the second “childhood vulnerability”
that serves as a “precondition to the occurrence of sexual
abuse” of a child, especially when the abuse comes from a
familiar (non-stranger) adult.49 “Helplessness . . . refers to the
power imbalance between children and adult perpetrators and
is a factor in both the initiation of sexual assault and
maintenance of secrecy.”50 Children do not share equal power
with adults, both physically and socially.51 Because the abuser
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
Id.
Summit, supra note 2 at 181.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Summit, supra note 2 at 182.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 177.
Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
Summit, supra note 2, at 182.
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is often someone the child loves and trusts, the power imbalance
increases and the child’s helplessness is further underscored.52
The imbalance of power intensifies when the abuser is a parent
because the parent is “in control of material resources,” can
influence other people important to the child, and has decisionmaking power over the child.53 Because of this imbalance of
power, the majority of victims are forced to endure their
abuse.54 Unlike adult victims who can fight back, scream for
help, or try to escape, children feel helpless against this adult
figure against whom they are physically powerless.55
C.

Entrapment and Accommodation

Entrapment and accommodation is the first of three
characteristics that are contingent upon the abuse having
taken place.56 Summit argues that until these helpless children
break the secret and seek assistance from another adult or the
police, the child is forced “to learn to accept the situation and to
survive.”57 This means a “healthy, normal, emotionally resilient
child will learn to accommodate to the reality of continuing
sexual abuse.”58
Because children have a hard time differentiating
between a trusted adult who is caring and a trusted adult who
is callous, child victims think they have “provoked the painful
encounters” and believe that by accommodating the sexual
demands of their abusers and keeping the secret, they “can
earn love and acceptance” from their abusers whom they are
already wired to trust.59 Because child victims feel they must
protect their abusive parents—from getting caught, going to
jail, and sending them and their siblings to foster care—they
Id.
Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
54 Summit, supra note 2, at 183.
55 Id. at 182. Summit points out the common reasons why children do not
speak out against trusted adults who are sexually abusing them. He specifically
condemns the work of judges and attorneys who question children who did not report
their abuse. He writes, “It is sad to hear children attacked by attorneys and discredited
by juries because they claimed to be molested yet admitted they had made no protest or
outcry.” Id. at 183. While it is essential for the attorney of an accused parent to crossexamine a child to discover why the child did not report the abuse, this author
acknowledges that the child is further attacked both by these questions in the court
room, and later on. It is for this reason that this note provides ways to use CSAAS
evidence to produce an acquittal, without the need for further harm to the child.
56 Id. at 177.
57 Id. at 184.
58 Id.
59 Id.
52
53
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must find a way to escape reality and deal with the abuse.60
Some children may develop an imaginary friend, create
multiple personalities, or disassociate themselves from the
body being abused.61
If child victims cannot accommodate the abuse as
described, they will express their helplessness and rage in
other ways.62 For example, these emotions “often lead[ ] to selfdestruction and reinforcement of self-hate[,] self-mutilation,
suicidal behavior, promiscuous sexual activity and repeated
runaways . . . .”63 Daughters being sexually abused by their
fathers will seek gifts and privileges for being exploited.64
Abused children will also express their emotions by fighting
with their parents (especially the mother whom the child
blames for being abused and allowing the abuse to continue).65
“The failure of the mother-daughter bond reinforces the young
woman’s distrust of herself as a female and makes her all the
more dependent on the pathetic hope of gaining acceptance and
protection with an abusive male.”66 Many victims also turn to
substance abuse to help them escape the realities of their abuse
or to experience the emotions that they are suppressing.67
D.

Delayed, Conflicted, and Unconvincing Disclosure

The majority of children who are sexually abused never
disclose their painful experiences.68 As the child grows up, an
abusive father may become jealous of his child’s relationships,
and may try to control the child’s involvement with others.69
Particularly with young girls, to cope, the children often rebel
against their fathers, as described above.70 As a result, they
may face punishment by their parents.71 In a typical case, an
abused girl may become enraged after a particularly
“punishing family fight and a belittling showdown of authority
by the father” and may tell her secret to the police.72 Police
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185-86 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 186 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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authorities, however, may assume her claims are fictional,
especially in cases where she may have waited years to disclose
her story.73 The police may also “assume she has invented the
story in retaliation against the father’s attempts to achieve
reasonable control and discipline;” the more intense the
punishment is, the more likely they are to assume she is trying
to “falsely incriminat[e] her father.”74
Because all abused children accommodate their abuse
differently, they may face diverse disclosure difficulties.75 For
example, some children are able to completely hide their abuse
by excelling in school or achieving popularity; they are “eager
to please both teachers and peers.”76 These children often face
skeptical adults who are unable to believe their disclosures of
abuse because the children have excelled at school and their
extra-curricular activities and appear to be unaffected.77
Summit explains that children generally, regardless of
how they deal with their abuse, “face[ ] an unbelieving
audience when [they] complain of ongoing sexual abuse” and
risk “not only disbelief, but scapegoating, humiliation and
punishment as well.”78 As a result, abused children often see no
reason to voice the complaint.79 “Whether the child is
delinquent, hypersexual, countersexual, suicidal, hysterical,
psychotic, or perfectly well-adjusted, and whether the child is
angry, evasive or serene” the parents will ignore “the
immediate affect and the adjustment pattern of the child” and
will try to explain away the child’s allegations.80
E.

Retraction

Unfortunately, when children disclose their abuse,
generally the threats made by their abusers become true: the
child is called a liar, the child’s family is broken apart, and/or
the child is taken away from the family home.81 Often the
mother guilts the child into retracting the statements about the
abuse as a result of the disruption caused to the family.82 “Once
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
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again, the child bears the responsibility of either preserving or
destroying the family.”83 Telling the truth no longer seems the
best choice, but instead the child must lie and recant, in order
to preserve the family.84 “Unless there is special support for the
child and immediate intervention to force responsibility on the
[abuser], the [child] will follow the ‘normal’ course and retract
[the] complaint.”85 The child will pretend the story was initially
fabricated and give an excuse for initially fibbing; the adults
will then believe this false version of events.86
II.

ADMITTANCE OF CSAAS EVIDENCE IN COURTS

Summit did not intend for CSAAS testimony “to prove
that abuse occurred.”87 Instead, he intended for it “to explain how
children who are abused react to their maltreatment.”88 By
identifying prototypical behaviors, he aimed to provide therapists
with a nondiagnostic tool, and not “a device for establishing the
truth of a child’s statement.”89 This intention, however, was not
clear from his initial article, and both prosecutors and defense
attorneys alike were exploiting Summit’s 1983 article to advance
their own legal arguments.90 Consequently, in 1992, in his article
entitled “Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome” Summit “attempted . . . to clear up some of the
confusion surrounding [CSAAS’s] proper use and reliability.”91
Following the publishing of his 1983 article, CSAAS was
used against criminal defendants on trial for child sexual
assault and in family courts. Some prosecutors and experts
argued that CSAAS was “akin to a diagnosis”92 and argued that
if children exhibited the “prototypical behaviors” of victims “a

Id.
Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Myers, supra note 18, at 309.
88 Id.
89 Lucy Berliner, The Use of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN
COURT 11, 17 (Stephen J. Ceci & Helene Hembrooke eds.,1998).
90 See generally Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153 (1992); Weiss & Alexander,
supra note 21, at 414.
91 Cara
Gitlin, Note, Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome: How Proper Screening Should Severely Limit its Admission,
26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 497, 515 n.120 (2008) (citing Summit, supra note 90).
92 Id.
83
84
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psychologist [could] infer that abuse ha[d] occurred.”93
Accordingly, judges generally allowed CSAAS testimony to be
admitted into evidence as proof that child sexual abuse had
occurred.94 For example, in Bussey v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky, one of the earliest cases to evaluate CSAAS evidence
by name, there was no dispute that CSAAS evidence was proof
of abuse.95 Rather, the dispute centered on whether CSAAS
evidence could be admitted against the defendant, the victim’s
father, when it was a proven fact that the victim was
previously sexually abused by her uncles.96
Today, the majority of state courts (“the majority states”)
to address the admissibility of CSAAS evidence have barred it as
proof that abuse has occurred.97 Most of these courts, however,
do permit CSAAS testimony for other purposes.98 “For example,
if the facts of a particular case show that the victim delayed
reporting the abuse, recanted the allegations, kept the abuse
secretive, or was accommodating to the abuse, then testimony
93 Margaret Bull Kovera & Eugene Borgida, Expert Scientific Testimony on
Child Witnesses in the Age of Dalbert, in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES:
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT 185, 197 (Stephen J. Ceci & Helene
Hembrooke eds., 1998).
94 Michael D. Stanger, Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Why
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome Should Be Allowed As A Rehabilitative
Tool in the Florida Courts, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 561, 581 (2001) (collecting cases).
95 Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ky. 1985).
96 Id.
97 Stanger, supra note 94, at 570 (citing State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 (Me.
1989); State v. Chamberlain, 628 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1993); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d
186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); State v.
Gokey 574 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jones, 863 P.2d 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
98 People v. Spicola, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he majority of states
‘permit expert testimony to explain delayed reporting, recantation, and inconsistency,’ as
well as ‘to explain why some abused children are angry, why some children want to live
with the person who abused them, why a victim might appear “emotionally flat” following
sexual assault, why a child might run away from home, and for other purposes.’” (quoting
1 MYERS, EVIDENCE § 6.24, at 416-22)); see People v. Sandoval, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 639
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly
held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents
of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); see also, e.g., W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933, 937-39 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253-54 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Bowker, 249 Cal.Rptr.
886, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 409-10 (Mich. 1990);
State v. Schnabel, 952 A.2d 452, 462 (N.J. 2008); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 749
(Wyo. 1993); but see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 580 n.5 (Fla. 1997) (finding
CSAAS evidence inadmissible because such evidence does not satisfy the Frye test);
Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Ky. 2009) (finding CSAAS testimony
to never be admissible under Kentucky law); State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d 804, 812 (Neb.
1993) (finding CSAAS evidence to be inadmissible because it takes the credibility
determination away from the trier of fact in violation of Nebraska law); Commonwealth v.
Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836 (Pa. 1992) (finding CSAAS testimony to be too speculative to
be properly admitted to a jury in a criminal trial).
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about that particular characteristic of CSAAS would be
admissible to dispel any myths the [trier of fact] may hold
concerning that behavior.”99 Because CSAAS is admitted only
for these limited reasons, experts who testify about CSAAS
often take the witness stand without ever having met the child
and with no knowledge of the case; his or her testimony only
conveys to the court the common characteristics of children
who have been sexually abused to rehabilitate the child’s
testimony.100 Some courts also allow CSAAS evidence to be
admitted to imply that the child’s behavior is consistent with
that of an abused child, but this implication evidence is still
only permitted as long as the expert “refrains from giving an
explicit opinion on whether the abuse occurred” in that
particular case101
Even under these limitations, CSAAS may still be
misleading to the fact-finder.102 Although today CSAAS expert
testimony is generally not introduced into evidence as proof of
abuse, the general message of this testimony is that the factfinder, “should believe the initial accusations made by a child
and disbelieve the recantation.”103 This is particularly
troublesome in criminal proceedings where lay members of the
jury will interpret this testimony to mean that the expert
believes the accusations to be true, taking away the credibility
determination from the jury.104 Judges generally give a limiting
instruction105 in criminal proceedings explaining that “such

Frenzel, 849 P.2d at 749.
See generally Spicola, 947 N.E.2d at 635 (finding the judge did not abuse
his discretion in admitting CSAAS testimony by an expert who did not know the facts
of the case and explained general information about CSAAS).
101 Stanger, supra note 94, at 570 (citing United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d
1329 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987);
Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277
(Kan. 1989); State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, (S.D. 1999); State v. Bachman, 446
N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989); Gokey, 574 A.2d at 766).
102 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 412-13 (“A clinician testifying that an
evaluee has one of these conditions and that the only explanation for it is the criminal
conduct of the defendant would tend to prejudice a jury . . . Overall, however, evidence
of syndromes in court proceedings has been criticized as a major source of confusion,
especially in sexual assault cases. This problem is particularly true of child sexual
abuse and CSAAS testimony.”) (internal citations omitted); see Berliner, supra note 89,
at 17 (“Unfortunately, in some cases, prosecutors offered and clinical experts testified
that this syndrome was akin to a diagnosis and its presence was proof of a sexual abuse
history. In part, the use of the term syndrome contributed to the confusion . . . .”).
103 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
104 See id. at 694.
105 See Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 749 (Wyo. 1993).
99

100
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testimony is admitted only to explain victim behavior and is
inadmissible on the issue of guilt.”106
Because CSAAS testimony may mislead the jury, courts
in criminal trials “struggle with balancing testimony on
CSAAS-related behaviors against the implication that the child
was, in fact, abused” and admittance of this evidence is often in
the face of many strong objections by defense counsel.107 This
balancing can be so difficult that “as a result of . . . the failure
of some courts to distinguish proper and improper use of the
syndrome, testimony that relies on or refers to CSAAS has
been virtually banned in some jurisdictions,” 108 including
Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania,109 and Nebraska110 (“the
minority states”).
In the majority states, experienced attorneys defending
those accused of child sexual abuse often challenge the
admittance of CSAAS testimony into evidence under the state
equivalent of Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
governs the admittance of expert testimony.111 In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,112 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the previously established “Frye test,”113 which
regulated expert testimony, finding that it was replaced by
Rule 703.114 The Supreme Court in Daubert established a twopart test for judges to employ to interpret Rule 703
accurately—the testimony must be “scientific knowledge” and

Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 412-13 (internal citation omitted) .
Id. at 414-15 (internal citation omitted).
108 Berliner, supra note 89, at 17 (internal citation omitted). This note, thus, is
meant to aid attorneys in jurisdictions where CSAAS has not been banned.
109 Stanger supra note 94, at 572 (citing Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d
457 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992)); see Hadden v.
State, 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
110 State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d 804, 812 (Neb. 1993).
111 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 415 (citing FED. R. EVID. 703). Rule
703 reads, “An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert
has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,
they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
112 509 U.S. 579, 570 (1993).
113 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test requires
expert testimony be “generally accepted in the scientific community.” David McCord,
Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
114 Dana G. Deaton, The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 60 AM. JUR. TRIALS 17-18 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
106

107
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must “logically advance[ ] a material aspect of the case.”115 The
trial court judges, in applying this two-part test, must act as
“gatekeepers” and determine, at the beginning of the trial,
whether the testimony will be admitted.116
A “Daubert hearing is an ideal venue to test the validity
and reliability of the syndrome.”117 Daubert hearings “allow [for
an] inquiry into whether the syndrome is diagnostic or
nondiagnostic.”118 If the court determines “the syndrome is
nondiagnostic,” as Summit intended, evidence of the syndrome
cannot be admitted as substantive evidence of abuse against
the accused.119 “If the syndrome is diagnostic, the hearing
affords an opportunity to locate the syndrome along the
continuum of diagnostic certainty.”120
In jurisdictions that allow for CSAAS evidence to be
admitted, judges must determine in what capacity this
testimony may be admitted against the accused. For example,
in 1993 the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. J.Q. held
“that CSAAS has a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to allow
an expert witness to describe traits found in victims of such
abuse to aid jurors in evaluating specific defenses.”121 Although
the New Jersey Supreme Court found CSAAS testimony to be
reliable, the court also found the lower court had erred in
admitting the CSAAS testimony against that defendant.122 The
court stated that the expert’s testimony “included opinions on
commonplace issues, such as credibility assessments derived
from conflicting versions of an event and not-yet scientifically
established opinions” which were the ultimate issues the factfinder was to resolve.123
III.

CSAAS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

There are few, if any, published family court judicial
opinions that rely on CSAAS testimony in custody and visitation
determinations; rather, published cases discussing CSAAS
testimony generally take place in child sexual abuse criminal

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Myers, supra note 18, at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1197 (N.J. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 1197-98.
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proceedings.124 Although there is vast difference between
criminal proceedings and family court proceedings—the burden
of proof, the stakes, the parties, the trier of fact—criminal
proceedings involving CSAAS can serve as a learning tool for
attorneys representing parents against whom CSAAS may be
admitted. These attorneys must keep in mind, however, that
family court and criminal court operate by completely different
rules and that family courts may treat CSAAS evidence
differently than criminal courts. The following cases outline the
three main avenues courts can take when determining whether
to admit CSAAS testimony.
A.

New Jersey: State v. J.Q.125

State v. J.Q. is a child-sexual-abuse criminal case in
which two young girls, Connie and Norma, accused their father
of sexually abusing them.126 The girls’ parents, Karen and John,
met in the early 1970s and began a relationship.127 The couple
did not marry, but gave birth to their daughters in 1977 and
1979.128 Due to financial issues and allegations of
unfaithfulness, Karen and John separated in 1984.129 The
couple officially ended their relationship shortly thereafter
when Connie was eight years old and Norma was six years
old.130 After the breakup, John would spend time on the
weekends with his daughters at his one-room apartment he
shared with a woman he later married in 1987.131
Two years later, “Karen learned that Norma, during
play, had attempted to pull down her younger sister’s underwear
and touch her buttocks.”132 After being questioned by her
mother, Norma identified her father as the person who taught
her to behave in that manner.133 Although incredulous to her
124 E.g., id. at 1197; W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010);
Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2009).
125 Under New Jersey law, child sexual abuse opinions should be written
using initials, rather than the parties’ names in order to protect the identities of the
parties. The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided to “use fictitious names to describe
the parents and children involved . . . refer[ing] to the mother as ‘Karen,’ the father as
‘John,’ and the two children as ‘Connie’ and ‘Norma.’” J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1198.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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daughter’s allegations initially, Norma eventually contacted a
counselor and the police.134
At John’s trial, Dr. Milchman, a psychologist, testified
“as an expert witness on child sexual abuse” about CSAAS.135
She described CSAAS “as a pattern of behavior that is found to
occur again and again in children who are victims of incest.”136
Dr. Milchman described the elements of CSAAS and testified to
their relevance in the cases of Connie and Norma.137 Dr.
Milchman testified that “in her expert opinion, Connie and
Norma had been sexually abused.”138
John was convicted “of multiple counts of first-degree
aggravated sexual assault on Connie and Norma for various
acts of penetration and oral sex, and of two counts of
endangering the welfare of a child . . . [and] sentenced . . . to
thirty years’ imprisonment, with ten years of parole
ineligibility.”139 The conviction was reversed, however, when
the Appellate Division found the trial court had admitted
CSAAS evidence to “establish the credibility” of the children
rather than to rehabilitate them, such as to explain why
disclosure of abuse was delayed.140
In affirming the decision, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey embarked on a lengthy discussion of the use of
behavioral science in child sexual abuse cases.141 Despite an
abundance of both legal and medical literature in favor of using
behavioral science evidence, the court stated that “most courts
do not approve such testimony as substantive evidence of
abuse.”142 Instead, the court found that many states permit
behavioral science testimony to be admitted for other purposes
such as “to rehabilitate” the victim after the defense argues the
victim is untrustworthy since she has recanted her story or
delayed in reporting her abuse.143
The court next considered whether behavioral science
could be used by an expert witness to state whether in his or
her expert opinion a child was sexually abused.144 Although
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172 (1991)).
Id. at 1200-03.
Id. at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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only citing two occasions where other courts allowed behavioral
science testimony to be used in this way,145 the court left open
“the possibility that a qualified behavioral-science expert could
demonstrate a sufficiently reliable scientific opinion to aid a
jury in determining the ultimate issue that the abuse had
occurred” under the right circumstances.146 Relying on the
literature, the court directed future trial court judges to
evaluate the witness’s qualifications to determine if the witness
possesses “the requisite degree of scientific reliability” before
allowing an expert to testify in this manner.147
Next, the court turned specifically to CSAAS
testimony.148 The court noted that CSAAS testimony “has been
placed within the category of behavioral-science testimony that
describes behaviors commonly observed in sexually-abused
children.”149 Despite the strength of the literature backing
behavioral-science testimony such as CSAAS, “[c]ourts rarely
permit the testimony for the purpose of establishing substantive
evidence of abuse, but [generally] allow it to rehabilitate the
victim’s testimony.”150 For example, CSAAS evidence may be
admitted after “the defense asserts that the child’s delay in
reporting the abuse and recanting of the story indicate that the
child is unworthy of belief.” 151 After a detailed analysis of
Summit’s work and the CSAAS elements, the court looked to
whether CSAAS testimony is admissible under New Jersey
law.152 It explained that expert testimony is only admissible
under Rule 56 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence153 when “it
relates to a subject-matter beyond the understanding of
persons of ordinary experience, intelligence, and knowledge,”154
and has “[a]cceptance within [the] scientific community.”155
The court acknowledged that the scientific community
has accepted the “theory that CSAAS identifies or describes

Id. at 1202 (citing Myers et al., supra note 30, at 80-85).
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1203.
149 Id.
150 Id. (internal citations omitted).
151 Id. at 1201 (internal citation omitted).
152 Id. at 1205.
153 Rule 56 has been replaced and amended by Rule 702 of the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence. State v. Berry, 658 A.2d 702, 707 (N.J. 1995).
154 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1205 (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1993);
Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984)).
155 Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1993)).
145

146
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behavioral traits commonly found in child-abuse victims.”156 It
noted, however, that there is criticism of CSAAS evidence
because there is overlap between the CSAAS behaviors and
those observed in other syndromes.157 Thus, the court came to
the single, most-important realization that attorneys must
remember when their clients are facing CSAAS evidence: “the
existence of the symptoms does not invariably prove abuse.”158
As a result, the court established that in New Jersey CSAAS
evidence could only be “presented to the jury in accordance
with its scientific theory,” namely why a child accommodated
the abuse or did not disclose promptly.159
Finally, the court analyzed whether in J.Q. Dr.
Milchman’s expert CSAAS testimony was properly admitted
before the jury.160 While the court was unclear whether Dr.
Milchman’s opinion that the children were sexually abused was
reached “on the basis of her credibility assessments or on the
basis of her understanding of CSAAS evidence,” the court held
that her opinion was improperly admitted.161 If her opinion was
based on her understanding of CSAAS evidence, the court held
that the evidence would be improperly admitted “because
CSAAS is not relied on in the scientific community to detect
abuse.”162 The court further explained:
Summit did not intend the accommodation syndrome as a diagnostic
device. The syndrome does not detect sexual abuse. Rather, it
assumes the presence of abuse, and explains the child’s reactions to
it . . . With child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome . . . one
reasons from presence of sexual abuse to reactions to sexual abuse.
Thus, the accommodation syndrome is not probative of abuse.163

The court further endorsed the use of CSAAS testimony
to rehabilitate children in the courtroom setting.164 Adopting
the comments of Professor John E. B. Myers and his colleagues,
the court stated that CSAAS can justify why many children
who have been abused recant their allegations or delay

156 Id. at 1206 (internal citation omitted); Chandra Lorraine Holmes, Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the
Law of Evidence, 25 TULSA L.J. 143, 158-59 (1989)).
157 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1206.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 Id. at 1207.
160 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1209.
161 Id.
162 Id. (internal citation omitted).
163 Id. (internal citation omitted).
164 Id.
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disclosing their abuse.165 Furthermore, the court found that, “[i]f
use of the syndrome is confined to these rehabilitative functions,
the confusion clears, and the accommodation syndrome serves a
useful forensic function.”166 Because Dr. Milchman’s CSAAS
testimony was not used for this rehabilitative function, the court
reasoned that her testimony was improperly admitted. 167
The New Jersey Supreme Court stuck as closely to
Summit’s intent as possible.168 As a result, the J.Q. decision
became instrumental in helping other states’ highest courts,
including the Supreme Court of Kentucky, to establish whether
and how their state would admit CSAAS evidence.169
B.

Kentucky: Sanderson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky170

One of the first states to consider CSAAS testimony in
1985, Kentucky has historically rejected the admittance of
CSAAS testimony into evidence.171 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky “has not accepted the view that . . . CSAAS or any of
its components has attained general acceptance in the scientific
community justifying its admission into evidence to prove
sexual abuse or the identity of the perpetrator.”172 Historically,
Kentucky courts have rejected CSAAS evidence on relevance
grounds, finding CSAAS evidence does not “make the existence
of any fact of consequence more probable or less probable than
it would have been without the evidence.”173 In Sanderson v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
further expressed its distaste for CSAAS, describing it as
165 Id. at 1210 (internal citation omitted) (“Since this ‘syndrome’ is only a piece
of the child sexual abuse machinery, testimony concerning CSAAS may only be offered
for the purpose for which it was defined—to explain the child’s irrational behavior.”).
166 Id. at 1209.
167 Id. at 1211.
168 See generally id. at 1209 (internal citation omitted).
169 E.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995); Sanderson v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2009); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50
(Mass. 1994); People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995).
170 291 S.W.3d at 610.
171 Id. at 617 (Scott, J. dissenting) (citing Kurtz v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d
409, 413, 414 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 571, 572 (Ky. 2002);
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 691-96 (Ky. 1996); Hall v. Commonwealth,
862 S.W.2d 321, 322, 323 (Ky. 1993); Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613,
614 (Ky.1992); Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647, 652-54 (Ky. 1991); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d 502, 503, 504 (Ky. 1991); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777
S.W.2d 930, 932, 933 (Ky. 1989); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky.
1987); Lantrip v. Commonwealth,713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986); Bussey v.
Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 140, 141 (Ky.1985)).
172 Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 693.
173 Id. (citing KY. R. EVID. 401).
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“generic and unreliable.”174 The facts of Sanderson are simple—
the complainant, B.T., alleged she had been sexually abused by
her step-father.175
In December 2000, the appellant married Mendy, the
mother of B.T.176 After the wedding, Mendy and B.T. “moved
into [the] Appellant’s house” which included a garage.177 In
2006, B.T. accused her step-father of abusing her multiple
times each week since the family moved in together.178 B.T.
testified that her step-father threatened to hurt her if she ever
tried to disclose the abuse.179 B.T. testified that the abuse
always “took place in the garage,” and after the family moved
to a new home, the abuse occurred “in the garage, in B.T.’s
room, and in Mendy’s room.”180
After Mendy and the appellant had a baby, they began
“experiencing marital problems.”181 The couple sought divorce,
and the appellant left the marital home on February 25,
2006.182 Two months later, a parent of one of B.T.’s friends told
Mendy that during a visit to the marital home years earlier,
her daughter “watched a pornographic movie with B.T. and
Appellant.”183 Although initially denying the story, B.T.
eventually admitted to Mendy that she had “watched the movie
and told Mendy about the abuse that had taken place.”184
The appellant was eventually indicted, and was
convicted by a jury “of two counts of Second-Degree Sodomy
and three counts of First-Degree Sexual abuse.”185 He “was
sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.”186 On appeal, the
Appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting
CSAAS evidence against him.187
The appellant objected to the CSAAS symptom
testimony “from Mendy, Brian Terrell (B.T.’s father), and Lori
Brown, a clinical psychologist.”188 All three witnesses testified
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 614.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1174

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

to “B.T.’s physical and psychological ‘symptoms,’” but “the most
damaging testimony came from Brown, a clinical psychologist
who counseled B.T. and gave testimony that B.T.’s addition of
new allegations of sexual abuse [wa]s normal.”189
The Supreme Court of Kentucky evaluated the State’s
precedent that generally rejected the introduction of CSAAS
evidence.190 The general rule against CSAAS testimony was
established in Miller v. Commonwealth:
[A] party cannot introduce evidence of the habit of a class of
individuals either to prove that another member of the class acted
the same way under similar circumstances or to prove that the
person was a member of that class because he/she acted the same
way under similar circumstances.191

Essentially, this means that “[w]here a victim had
delayed reporting of abuse, [it is] improper [to admit] testimony
of a seasoned child sex abuse investigator [to] state[ ] that it
was common, in her experience, for sexually abused victims to
delay reporting of the abuse.”192 Building off that rule, the
Kentucky Supreme Court further showed its distrust of CSAAS
testimony in Newkirk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky.193 There,
the court stated that there are many reasons to exclude CSAAS
testimony including: “the lack of diagnostic reliability, the lack
of general acceptance within the discipline from which such
testimony emanates, and the overwhelmingly persuasive
nature of such testimony effectively dominating the decisionmaking process, uniquely the function of the jury.” 194
With this precedent in mind, the court examined
Brown’s testimony.195 Although never mentioning CSAAS
specifically, “Brown testified that it is normal for child victims
of sexual abuse, like B.T., to add details about their abuse after
they have been in counseling for an extended period of time
and to appear happy in their outward life . . . .”196 The court
found error with this testimony, however, describing it as “the
exact type of generic and unreliable evidence this court has
repeatedly held to be reversible error.”197 The court reversed the
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id. at 613.
Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis in original).
Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996).
Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
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conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new
trial due to the improper CSAAS testimony admitted.198
The Sanderson case is an important tool for attorneys in
Kentucky defending against sexual abuse allegations.
Moreover, this case provides a basis for attorneys in other
jurisdictions to mount objections to the introduction of CSAAS
evidence to substantiate children’s claims of sexual abuse. In
fact, Sanderson outlines the key arguments against CSAAS
evidence, specifically noting its unreliable nature.
C.

Alabama: W.R.C. v. State199

Attorneys representing clients accused of sexual abuse
of a child in Alabama do not have the same precedential
backing to object to the use of CSAAS evidence at trial.
Recently, when faced with an analogous issue to that of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Sanderson, the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals,200 in W.R.C. v. State, declined to follow the
Sanderson holding and instead found that CSAAS testimony
may be admitted against the defendant when the testimony
relates to child victims generally and not to specific victims.201
At the trial of W.R.C., the prosecutor admitted CSAAS
evidence against him.202 A jury convicted W.R.C. of first degree
sodomy and sexual abuse, and he was sentenced to a total of 30
years imprisonment.203 W.R.C. appealed his conviction,
specifically objecting to the admittance of CSAAS evidence
against him at his trial.204
The alleged victim, L.O., who “lived with his
grandmother, E.O.,” accused his grandmother’s husband,
W.R.C., of sexually abusing him “over the span of a month”
when he was seven years old (10 years before the start of
trial).205 L.O. testified that following the abuse “W.R.C. told him
to ‘keep this between us’ and threatened that if L.O. told anyone,
he would kill both L.O. and E.O.”206
Id.
W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
200 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is the intermediate appellate court
in Alabama. Ala. Appellate Courts, Judicial System Chart, JUDICIAL.ALABAMA.GOV,
http://judicial.alabama.gov/chart_judicial.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
201 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 939-40 (citing Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 610).
202 Id. at 936.
203 Id. at 934.
204 Id. at 934-36.
205 Id. at 934.
206 Id. at 935.
198
199
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At trial L.O. listed a number of reasons to explain why he
did not disclose the abuse sooner: “because he did not want to
talk about it; because he knew no one else who was suffering
from something similar; because even though E.O. and W.R.C.
separated shortly after the incidents, they still communicated;
and because he did not want to hurt his grandmother.”207 L.O.
testified that when he was 15 or 16 years old, he finally disclosed
the assaults to an aunt with whom he was living.208
On appeal, W.R.C. argued “that the trial court erred in
allowing what he claims was expert testimony regarding
[CSAAS]209 and delayed disclosure by child sexual-abuse
victims from Maribeth Thomas, the clinical director of the
Prescott House Child Advocacy Center.”210 W.R.C. objected to
Thomas’s testimony at trial as well.211 In response to W.R.C.’s
objection, “the prosecutor pointed out that Thomas had never
interviewed or even met L.O. and that she was not going to
testify about L.O. at all,” but rather about behaviors common to
abused children across the country.212 Despite W.R.C.’s
objection, Thomas was deemed “an expert in child development
and child and adolescent sexual abuse.”213 During her
testimony, Thomas explained:
. . . that in her experience and based on research done in the subject
area, child victims of sexual or physical abuse do not always disclose
the abuse and that nondisclosure may be because the perpetrator is
an adult or a family member, because the child does not have the
vocabulary to describe the abuse, because the child fears the
consequences of disclosure, or because the perpetrator has
threatened the child . . . [;] “that both experientially and the research
Id.
Id.
209 As in Sanderson, the expert did not specifically testify to CSAAS evidence.
Nevertheless, the court, for purposes of the appeal, presumed that the expert’s
testimony related to CSAAS evidence. The court stated, “Thomas, however, did not testify
regarding any syndrome or about any ‘typical’ characteristics of abused children; her
testimony was limited to delayed disclosure by some child victims and the possible
reasons for such delayed disclosure. All of her testimony was based on her own experience
in working with abused children and on research that had been done in the field of
abused children. In addition, as noted above, Thomas specifically testified on crossexamination that all children are different and that every child victim reacts differently
to abuse. Thus, we seriously question whether Thomas’s testimony can be considered
testimony regarding CSAAS. That being said, delayed disclosure is considered one
element of CSAAS, and, as such, Thomas’s testimony in this regard is not necessarily
outside the realm of CSAAS testimony. For the purposes of this opinion, then, we
presume that Thomas’s testimony falls within the category of CSAAS testimony, and we
address it as such.” Id. at 938.
210 Id. at 936.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 937.
207
208
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indicates that male victims are less likely to disclose than female
victims” . . . and that there is a “significant difference” between
males and females with respect to delayed disclosure . . . [;] that
when the perpetrator is a family member, both her experience and
research in the area indicate that child victims are more likely not to
disclose or to delay disclosure . . . [;] that statistics indicate child
sexual-abuse victims “more often than not” delay disclosing the
abuse . . . [;] that such delayed disclosure may be the result of a lack
of understanding of how to make the disclosure, which is why
sometimes children will disclose in the fifth or sixth grade, when the
state begins sex education for students . . . [;] that delayed disclosure
could be the result of fear by the child victim of the consequences of
disclosing the abuse . . . [; that] when disclosure is made, it is
typically made to someone the child victim trusts . . . [; and] that it is
not unusual for a child victim not to be able to provide a specific date
that the abuse occurred unless the abuse occurred on a typically
memorable day, such as Christmas or a birthday. 214

On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to
challenge Thomas, leading her to admit “that every child is
different and that not all children react the same way to
abuse—some child victims show no signs of dysfunction at all,
while others show dramatic signs of dysfunction.”215 The other
witnesses on cross-examination also admitted that “L.O.
exhibited no signs of dysfunction, had good grades in school,
and was active in extracurricular activities at school.”216
On appeal, W.R.C. argued that at his trial Thomas’s
CSAAS testimony was improperly admitted in violation of
Alabama Rule 702,217 because, since “there is no consensus in
the scientific community as to the ‘typical’ characteristics or
behaviors of sexually abused children, testimony about CSAAS
cannot satisfy the reliability requirement for admission” of
scientific evidence pursuant to Rule 702 and the Daubert
standard.218 The court clarified, however, that under Alabama
common law, nonscientific expert evidence is not subject to the
Daubert standard.219 Instead, nonscientific expert evidence may
be admitted under Rule 702 if the witness is “qualified as an
expert in the field” and the testimony “assist[s] the trier of
fact.”220 Here the court found that Rule 702 (as well as Rule
Id.
Id. at 937.
216 Id.
217 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.” ALA. R. EVID. 702.
218 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 938.
219 Id. at 938-39 (internal citation omitted).
220 Id. at 939 (internal citation omitted).
214
215
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403)221 was satisfied since Thomas was declared as an expert by
the trial court in “child development and child and adolescent
sexual abuse,” and because her testimony about “delayed
disclosure” aided the jury in understanding why L.O. waited
almost a decade to disclose his abuse.222
Most importantly, the court pointed out that the
evidence was proper because Thomas did not testify specifically
about L.O., but instead about abused children generally.223
Thomas did not “testify that L.O.’s behavior was consistent
with children who had been sexually abused or that she
believed L.O.’s accusations.”224 Furthermore, Thomas never
said whether L.O. had suffered abuse.225
In Alabama, as a result of W.R.C., attorneys will most
likely have CSAAS evidence admitted against their clients.
They will, however, be able to limit the testimony to general
testimony about children who have been sexually abused, not
about the victim.
IV.

OBJECTIONS TO CSAAS EVIDENCE

Custody proceedings generally take place in a state’s
Family Court, in front of a single judge who will determine the
fate of the family.226 In these proceedings, the rules of evidence
are often relaxed in order to allow the judge to obtain as much
information about the child and the parties as possible.227 The
relaxed evidentiary rules, combined with the admission of
CSAAS evidence, will present challenges to attorneys defending
a parent accused of sexual abuse. Although in the majority of
states CSAAS testimony is admissible to rehabilitate the child,
221 “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” ALA. R. EVID. 403.
222 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 939.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 168 (“The tragedy rests on the fact that
judges are still called on to determine the disposition of fought-over children, even in
these supposedly enlightened days in which child advocacy is emerging as the
dominant trend in resolving custody battles.”).
227 See Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in A Unified Family Court, 32
FAM. L.Q. 147, 179 (1998); see generally Hon. Bruce A. Newman, Evidentiary Rules and
Standards of Proof in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 75 MICH. B.J. 1165, 1165-66
(1996) (explaining some of the unique rules in juvenile court including the admittance
of testimony of “prior bad acts” to show propensity and hearsay evidence); e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2013).
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attorneys representing the accused parent should object to the
admittance of CSAAS testimony and outline the many
shortcomings of CSAAS to the judge.228
Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its
state counterparts, parties seeking to admit expert testimony
of a witness during trial must put the court and the opposing
parties on notice.229 Consequently, attorneys representing the
accused parent will know in advance if opposing counsel
intends to admit expert testimony on CSAAS during the trial.
Once put on notice, the accused parent’s attorney should, prior
to trial, move to exclude any expert testimony on CSAAS under
a Daubert motion.230
Based on the shortcomings of CSAAS evidence
discussed supra, below I have delineated various arguments
attorneys representing clients accused of sexually abusing their
child should make in support of their motion to exclude expert
testimony on CSAAS. Each argument outlined below should, of
course, be briefed in their motion papers, as well. Attorneys
should not consider this to be a comprehensive list and should
make as many objections as possible.
A.

CSAAS is Not a Diagnostic Tool

The most troublesome defect of CSAAS is that it is not a
tool to discover whether a child has been sexually abused.231 In
fact, “[n]owhere in Summit’s 1983 article does he ever claim
that it should be used for this purpose.”232 Instead, Summit has
continuously stated that “such utilization is inappropriate and

See generally GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297.
Robert C. Morgan & Ashe P. Puri, Expert Witnesses and Daubert Motions,
5 SEDONA CONF. J. 15, 20 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26). The relevant part of Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads, “In addition to the disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may
use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
230 Morgan & Puri, supra note 229, at 20. The majority of states have adopted
Dalbert, and consequently a Daubert motion should be made. As of 2013, only a
handful of states have not adopted Daubert. In those states, a Frye motion should be
made. See generally Kat S. Hatziavramidis, Florida State Courts Adopt Daubert
Standard, Changing the Way Expert Testimony Operates, F ORENSISGROUP (July 7,
2014), http://www.forensisgroup.com/our-blog/florida-state-courts-adopt-daubert-standardchanging-the-way-expert-testimony-operates.
231 Myers, supra note 18, at 309 (quoting Mary B. Meinig, Profile of Roland
Summit, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991)); see Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss.
1992) (“[CSAAS] was not meant to be used as a diagnostic device to show that abuse
had, in fact, occurred.”).
232 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298; see generally Summit, supra note 2, at 177.
228

229
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goes beyond the intentions of his description”233 and sought to
clarify CSAAS’s purpose in his 1992 clarification article.234
Thus, if an opponent seeks to introduce CSAAS evidence as
substantive evidence of abuse, the accused’s attorney must
object to this inappropriate use of Summit’s work.235 The
attorney’s objection to this misappropriation should be as
follows: “Your honor, CSAAS evidence should not be admitted
in this trial. Mrs. Smith’s attorney is seeking to admit CSAAS
evidence as proof that Jane was sexually abused. This, however,
is an incorrect use of CSAAS evidence. The scientific community
does not consider CSAAS as a tool to determine whether a child
has been sexually abused or not. All CSAAS does is explain how
children who have been abused respond to their abuse. CSAAS,
does not, however, tell us whether a child, like Jane, has been
abused. In fact, following Dr. Summit’s 1983 article identifying
CSAAS, prosecutors and defense attorneys used CSAAS evidence
in exactly this way, and Dr. Summit wrote a follow-up article
criticizing this improper use of his article. Furthermore, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. J.Q. explained, the
majority of courts across the nation do not admit CSAAS
evidence ‘as substantive evidence of abuse.’”236
B.

CSAAS is Obsolete

The second weakness of CSAAS testimony is that it is
inapplicable to our modern world.237 CSAAS is relatively
outdated, having been established in 1983.238 Relying on the
stories of sexual abuse victims of the early 1980s, CSAAS
explains that children may delay disclosure of their abuse or
recant their stories because of fear of not being believed by
adults, specifically their mothers and the police.239 Today,
however, sexual abuse allegations are progressively more
common.240 In fact, unlike in 1983, modern “mothers are much
more likely to believe the child[,] and the police and child
protective services . . . are likely to [err on the side of caution
and] accept as valid even the most frivolous and absurd
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
Summit supra note 90; Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 414.
235 Hall, 611 So. 2d at 919; see Myers, supra note 18, at 318.
236 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1201 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Myers et al., supra
note 142, at 68 (internal citations omitted).
237 See generally GARDNER, supra note 1 at 297-98.
238 Id. at 298.
239 Summit, supra note 2, at 187-89.
240 Paquette, supra note 7 (internal citation omitted).
233

234
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accusations.”241 With this change in society, it is no longer
appropriate to use CSAAS evidence to explain delays in
exposure or recantations. Consequently, when the accusing
parent’s attorney seeks to introduce CSAAS evidence to
rehabilitate the child, the accused parent’s attorney must
object to the obsolete nature of CSAAS evidence. The attorney
may object by arguing: “Your honor, CSAAS is incredibly
obsolete and inapplicable to our case. CSAAS was developed in
1983, a time when sexual abuse allegations were less common
and children who accused their parents of sexually abusing
them were not believed, especially by their mothers. It was
under these circumstances that Dr. Summit created CSAAS. Dr.
Summit explained that children often delay disclosure of their
abuse or recant for fear that they would not be believed. This is
no longer the case. Children are taught now from an early age
that if an adult touches them inappropriately they should tell
an adult immediately. Children are no longer under the
pressure Dr. Summit described. In fact, Dr. Summit specifically
said many girls recant their stories because mothers do not
believe them, but here, not only does Mrs. Smith believe the
accusation, she was the one who brought the accusation to the
court’s attention. As a result, evidence that Jane recanted is not
evidence that she was abused and felt pressure from her mother
to recant, but rather it is evidence that she is less credible
because she has changed her story.”
C.

CSAAS Creates a “No-win Situation” for the Accused

The third problem with CSAAS evidence is that it
creates a “no-win situation” for the accused.242 According to
CSAAS, a common characteristic of children who have been
sexually abused is that they often recant their allegations and
deny abuse ever occurred.243 This characteristic of CSAAS
creates a “lose-lose battle” for the accused.244 “If the child
admits sexual abuse, then the allegation is considered
confirmed. If the child denies sexual abuse, then the allegation
is still considered confirmed by concluding that the denial is
241 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297; see Mark Steller & Tascha Boychuk,
Children as Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases: Investigative Interview and Assessment
Techniques, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 47, 47 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds. 1992)
(“[C]hild sexual abuse allegations . . . historically were dismissed as untrue.”).
242 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
243 Summit, supra note 2, at 188.
244 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
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merely a manifestation of the child being in the secrecy phase
of the CSAAS.”245 For an attorney defending the accused, this is
really the main reason to fight the admission of CSAAS
evidence against their client. The attorney should make
vehement objections such as: “Your honor, if this evidence
comes in against Mr. Smith, we will not need to have the rest of
the trial because your mind will already be made up. If evidence
is presented that Jane said on multiple occasions that her father
abused her, then Jane will be presented as an abuse victim. But
if evidence is presented that Jane told her mother that her
father abused her, but then told the social worker her father did
not abuse her, then under CSAAS Jane is again presented as an
abuse victim. Either way, Jane is automatically presented as an
abuse victim. Mr. Smith should be able to expose the
inconsistencies in Jane’s disclosure to her mother and the
interviews with the social worker, but CSAAS will take away
any benefit from that cross-examination.”
D.

CSAAS Rejects Other Causes of Helplessness and
Accommodation Emotions

The fourth weakness with CSAAS lies with the
“helplessness” and “accommodation” elements. According to
CSAAS, child victims often have feelings of helplessness and
rage. Summit explains that many of these children express
these emotions through “self-hate, self-mutilation, suicidal
behavior, promiscuous sexual activity and repeated
runaways . . . .”246 CSAAS does not, however, consider other
explanations for the child’s rage or sense of helplessness.247 In
fact, there are many reasons a child may be angry; reasons
“that have absolutely nothing to do with sex abuse,”248 but
everything to do with something else, such as their parents’
custody dispute.249 A defense attorney must point out the
inadequacy of these elements to the court. An attorney may
argue, “Your honor, CSAAS explains that if a child feels
helpless or full of rage and acts out, she is more than likely
expressing her rage after years of abuse. CSAAS, however, does
Id. (emphasis in original).
Summit, supra note 2, at 185.
247 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298-99.
248 Id. at 299.
249 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1424 (internal citation omitted) (“Emotions
displayed by a child involved in a bitter custody dispute are similar to those emotions
displayed by a sexually abused child.”).
245
246
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not consider any other reason the child may be helpless or
angry. Perhaps she is feeling these emotions over this current
custody dispute? For example, Jane may feel helpless because
she is being treated “like a rope in a tug-of-war” between her two
parents. Maybe she has been throwing temper tantrums to get
her parents’ attention, not because she has been abused by Mr.
Smith. Maybe she threw her book at her teacher last week
because she is angry her parents are getting a divorce, not
because she has been abused. Who knows? But what we do know
is that there are many reasons Jane may be acting out, not just
because she may have been abused.”
E.

CSAAS is Extremely Prejudicial

Finally, the fifth weakness of CSAAS testimony is that
it has little probative value and is highly prejudicial to the
accused.250 Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and its state counterparts, evidence may be inadmissible “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”251 CSAAS “is not probative of
abuse;”252 it does not make the fact that the child was abused
“more probable or less probable than it would have been
without the evidence.” 253 Consequently, CSAAS testimony does
not assist the fact-finder, and thus, is barely probative.254
CSAAS testimony is, furthermore, highly prejudicial to the
accused because of its misleading qualities.255 For example, the
symptoms of CSAAS are present in other syndromes256 and may
appear in children who have not been abused.257 Additionally,
children who have been abused sometimes do not show any of
these characteristics.258 Furthermore the “overwhelmingly
Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
252 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993) (citing Myers et al., supra
note 30, at 67).
253 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (citing KY R.
EVID. 401).
254 Id.
255 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506.
256 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1203.
257 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506 (citing People v. Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345,
349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)) (“The concern of unfair prejudice to the defendant is
particularly acute in child sexual abuse cases, because CSAAS evidence ‘can be highly
prejudicial if not properly handled by the trial court . . . [since] the particular aspects of
CSAAS are as consistent with false testimony as with true testimony.’”).
258 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298.
250
251
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persuasive nature of such testimony effectively dominat[es] the
decision-making process” taking the power away from the factfinder.259 Therefore, “admitting CSAAS evidence during trial has
resulted in nothing short of ‘widespread misunderstanding.’”260
As a result, attorneys for the accused must object to CSAAS
testimony on relevance grounds. They may consider saying:
“Your honor, CSAAS is not relevant under a 403 balancing test.
First, CSAAS has little probative value as it does not detect
abuse. In fact, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has described it
as ‘generic and unreliable.’261 It only describes common
characteristics of abuse victims. For example, if Mrs. Smith
proves that Jane has the characteristics of CSAAS, she has not
proven anything, most especially not that Jane has been abused.
Furthermore, these characteristics appear in children who have
not been abused and are characteristics of many other
syndromes. Thus, CSAAS evidence is just meant to mislead you
and further prejudice Mr. Smith.”
V.

CROSS EXAMINING EXPERT WITNESSES

Regardless of the above objections, in the majority
states CSAAS evidence will most likely be admissible at the
trial to explain why the child may have delayed in disclosing
her abuse or why she may have recanted her story.262 This is
particularly the case in family court where the rules of
evidence are relaxed.263 In criminal cases involving accusations
of child sexual abuse, such as those surveyed supra, the judges
will take their gate-keeper role seriously before admitting
CSAAS testimony since the stakes are so high—mandatory
sentences and sexual offender registration;264 in family court,
however, judges are more likely to admit expert evidence on
259 Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Ky. 2009) (internal
citation and quotations omitted).
260 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506 (citing Myers et al., supra note 30, at 68).
261 Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 614.
262 People v. Spicola, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (N.Y. 2011); State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d
1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993).
263 See Hardin, supra note 227, at 179; see generally Newman, supra note 227
(generally explaining some of the unique rules in juvenile court including the
admittance of testimony of “prior bad acts” to show propensity and hearsay evidence);
e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.120 (West 2013).
264 See STATE STATUTES RELATED TO JESSICA’S LAW, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/
sexoffenders/NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2015); e.g.,
CONSEQUENCES FOR SEX OFFENSES AGAINST A CHILD IN VERMONT, available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/Sex_offense_penalty_chart.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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CSAAS in order to gain as much evidence as possible to make
their custody and visitation determinations.265 That is not to say
that the stakes are not high in family court; a parent accused of
sexually abusing his or her child could lose custody of the child,
could be required to have only supervised visitation with the
child, or could lose visitation all together.266 Because this evidence
is likely to come in, with a limitation as to its purpose, attorneys
for the accused need to expect to lose their motion to exclude the
expert testimony. As a result, they should be prepared to
highlight the weaknesses of CSAAS testimony in their
examination of the expert witness and be prepared to expand on
these weaknesses in their opening and closing arguments.
A.

“Battle of the Experts”

Once the motion to exclude the expert testimony on
CSAAS is denied, the attorney of the accused parent must then
seek to present an expert as well, creating a “battle of the
experts.” Although the testimony, if admissible, will most likely
only be used to rehabilitate the child, its inclusion is inherently
accusatory. When the witness testifies to the common
characteristics of an abused child, he or she is, in a way, saying
that the child was probably abused if she has that
characteristic.267 For example, an expert witness may say, “It is
very common for a child who has been sexually abused to recant
her allegations.”268 Because Jane has recanted, the judge may
infer that she has been abused, despite the fact that the expert
did not specifically say so.
In order to combat this type of testimony, the accused
will also need an expert.269 A good expert is one who believes in
the accused parent’s case, has had substantial training, is a
member of “professional societies,” has experience lecturing,

265 See generally United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, n.7 (D. Mass.
2006) (“Although the rules of evidence apply equally in civil and criminal cases, the
Court must be especially vigilant in applying evidentiary rules in the criminal context,
given the stakes for the defendant and the fact that, ultimately, the government bears
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a person’s life is at stake . . . a
requirement of greater reliability should prevail.”).
266 See generally Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420.
267 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
268 Summit, supra note 3, at 190.
269 GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 42 (“[T]he lawyer would probably want to use
psychiatric evidence to support his position, and also to combat possible psychiatric
evidence introduced by the opposition.”).
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perhaps as a professor at a university, and is board certified.270
The lawyer can search for these qualities by interviewing
potential experts and reading each candidate’s curriculum
vitae.271 Additionally the expert must have certain experience in
the field of child sexual abuse in order to be qualified to testify:
The expert must possess specialized knowledge of child development,
individual and family dynamics, patterns of child sexual abuse, the
disclosure process, signs and symptoms of abuse, and the use and
limits of psychological tests. The expert is familiar with the
literature on child abuse, and understands the significance of
developmentally inappropriate sexual knowledge. The expert is able
to interpret medical reports and laboratory tests. The expert also is
trained in the art of interviewing children, and is aware of the
literature on coached and fabricated allegations of abuse. Of
tremendous importance is the expert’s clinical experience with
sexually abused children.272

In order to combat CSAAS testimony, the accused’s
expert will need to point out the weaknesses in the study. For
example, if the accusing parent’s witness testifies to the
common characteristics of CSAAS, the accused parent’s expert
witness must counter with other scientific evidence. For
example, it is important to point out that other studies show
that “there are no markers of abuse[; c]hildren who are
sexually abused experience a wide range of symptoms . . . [and]
there is no unique pattern of symptoms exhibited by the
sexually abused child.”273 As a result, it will be important for
the accused’s expert witness’s responses on direct examination
to explain this by saying, “There is no clear indicator of child
sexual abuse, and there is no set of characteristics exhibited by
all abused children. Some abused children show none of the
symptoms, and some children who have not been abused show
them all.”274 Additionally, it will be important to really drive
home that CSAAS does not necessarily mean the child was
abused. Consequently, the attorney for the accused should be
sure to question the expert in such a way that he or she explains
to the judge by testifying, “The theory that a child has been
abused because she has or does not have a characteristic of
CSAAS is an improper use of CSAAS because CSAAS was never
GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 55-59.
Id.
272 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1993) (quoting E.B. MYERS,
EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 284-85 (2d ed. 1992)).
273 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298 (internal citations omitted); see State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 401 (Utah 1989) (internal citations omitted).
274 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298 (internal citations omitted).
270
271
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meant to detect child abuse. Also, there are many other reasons
that a child may be experiencing these characteristics, most of
which probably stem from this custody dispute.”
B.

Cross-Examination of the Accusing Parent’s Expert
Witness

Although the two experts should, in a way, cancel out
each other, the attorney for the accused parent must still crossexamine the accusing parent’s expert witness by focusing on
the weaknesses of CSAAS. The attorney must also remember
to focus on the fact that CSAAS is a non-diagnostic tool that is
not probative of abuse.275
The first step the defense attorney should take is to
point out that this expert has no knowledge of whether the
child was sexually abused by the accused parent since CSAAS
is a nondiagnostic tool. Experts on CSAAS will be permitted to
testify on common characteristics of sexually abused children,
but not on individual victims.276 On this cross-examination, the
accused’s attorney must remind the trier of fact that this
witness is not testifying about the child, but only general
information. A defense attorney could ask the following
questions: “You testified on direct examination that you never
interviewed Jane, correct? Rather, all you testified to is common
characteristics of abused children, correct? And since CSAAS is
not a diagnostic tool, you cannot definitively say whether or not
Jane was sexually abused by Mr. Smith, correct? In fact, it
would be an improper use of Dr. Summit’s research to state
definitively whether a child was abused, isn’t that correct?”
The next step the attorney for the accused parent
should take is to point out how CSAAS is obsolete. Since sexual
abuse allegations are no longer immediately dismissed, the
pressures Summit describes that cause children to recant are
no longer relevant.277 As a result, it is important to point out
that Jane recanted not because she felt pressure from society
or from her mother. The attorney for the accused should
consider asking the following questions of the expert: “You
testified on direct examination that after a child discloses his or
her abuse, the child may recant because their biggest fears have
come to life, correct? They feel that they have ruined their
275
276
277

State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989).
See W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297.
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families, correct? You testified that their mothers guilt them into
recanting in order to save the family, correct? When Dr. Summit
wrote his article, mothers and fathers were blaming their victim
children for the hardships facing their families, correct? But
this is no longer the case anymore, is it? Today, children are
taught to immediately tell a teacher, parent, or coach if an adult
touches them in any way. Isn’t that correct? Aren’t children
programmed now to understand that if they report abuse that
their parents will stand by to support them, to protect them?
Aren’t children told to report abuse to the police, no matter who
the abuser is? Isn’t it true the environment that Dr. Summit
wrote his article in has disappeared?”
Next, the attorney for the accused parent must clarify
that the child’s initial accusation was not “delayed” (Jane
accused her father of abusing her for four weeks, but did not
disclose until after the fourth week) to accommodate the abuse
but rather was a false allegation. Summit believed that
children delay their disclosure and do not seek help because
they love their abusive parent and do not want to get their
parent in trouble.278 It is the job of the accused parent’s
attorney to point out that this is not necessarily true; that if
abuse had truly happened, the child would have disclosed
sooner. The attorney should lead the expert into saying there
are other reasons the child may have accused her parent of
sexual abuse after the fact because the allegation is fabricated.
This is incredibly important because it is very possible that
Jane is lying because Mrs. Smith has suggested or told her to
lie, with hopes of keeping Mr. Smith from his daughter.279 It is
also possible that Jane wants to live with her mother, either on
her own accord or because of her mother’s suggestions, and as a
result, is making up a story about her father.280 Without
intending to, parents can easily make suggestions to their
children causing the children to make up false stories and
accusations.281
To do this, the attorney should ask: “You testified on
direct examination that children may wait long periods of time
Summit, supra note 2, at 186.
O’Donohue, supra note 8; see Alexander, supra note 10.
280 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1421 (citing Blush & Ross, Sexual Abuse
Allegations in Divorce: The SAID Syndrome, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN
DIVORCE CASES 67, 82 (1988)) (footnote citation and quotation omitted).
281 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 302 (citing Poole, D.A., & Lindsay, D.S.,
Interviewing Preschoolers: Effects of Nonsuggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and
Leading Questions on Reports of Nonexperienced Events, 60 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1,
129-54 (1995)).
278

279
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to disclose their abuse because they fear their allegations will be
dismissed outright as lies, correct? And that these children
would rather accommodate the abuse than face adults or the
police who may not believe their allegations, correct? But as we
just discussed, children today are taught to come to an adult
immediately if another adult touches them, correct? Under that
reasoning, we would expect Jane to tell someone that her father
had abused her, wouldn’t we? But Jane did not tell anyone her
father had abused her, did she? She didn’t tell her mother? She
didn’t tell her teacher? Her dance instructor? Her soccer coach?
She didn’t tell anyone she was being abused, did she? So isn’t it
possible that she did not delay disclosing her abuse because it
just never happened? Couldn’t it instead be possible that she
made the allegations when she did because of other reasons?
Isn’t it possible that Mrs. Smith told Jane to make up this
story? Isn’t it possible that Mrs. Smith suggested to Jane that
her father had harmed her? Isn’t it possible that Jane just
wants to be sure that she does not live with her father? And
since CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool, you cannot be certain that
there was a delayed disclosure rather than a fabricated
allegation, can you?”
Finally the last step the accused parent’s attorney
should take is to point out the issues with the “helplessness”
and the “accommodation” elements. According to CSAAS, child
victims often have feelings of helplessness and rage.282 Because
CSAAS does not consider other explanations for the child’s rage
or sense of helplessness,283 the attorney for the accused parent
must point out the other potential causes of the emotions,
namely the custody dispute.284 The attorney may consider
asking the expert the following questions: “You testified on
direct examination that a child may experience feelings of
helplessness and rage, correct? You said a child may harm
herself, correct? She may cry, correct? She may lash out at
school, correct? But there could be other reasons that a child
lashes out at school correct? In fact, isn’t it possible that a child
whose parents are getting divorced may begin to act out in
school? The child may be upset that one parent has left the
marital house, correct? The child may be upset that she does not
Summit, supra note 3, at 186.
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298-99.
284 Paquette, supra note 8, at 1424 (citing Daniel C. Schman, False Allegations
of Physical and Sexual Abuse, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 16 (1986))
(“Emotions displayed by a child involved in a bitter custody dispute are similar to those
emotions displayed by a sexually abused child.”).
282

283

1190

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

see the nonresidential parent that often, correct? The child may
feel she is to blame for the breakup, correct? She may feel that
she is a pawn in the parties’ custody case, correct? She may feel
that the visitation schedule is overwhelming, correct? In fact
there are many reasons the child may act out in school, correct?
And since CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool, you can’t be sure that
a child acting out in school has been sexually abused, can you?”
Thus, with each set of questions, the elements of CSAAS are
combatted. When the accused parent’s attorney uses these
questions to point out the inconsistencies between what CSAAS
stands for and the facts of reality, the judge will not
automatically assume the child has been abused and will
instead rely on the facts of the trial.
CONCLUSION
CSAAS evidence may present huge obstacles for an
attorney representing a client accused of sexually abusing his
child during a custody dispute. The most challenging element
is that CSAAS creates a “lose-lose” situation for the accused
father.285 It may seem that if CSAAS testimony is admitted into
evidence, the accused father will automatically be found to
have abused his daughter and he will lose all visitation rights.
The attorney, however, can rely on the weaknesses of
CSAAS in order to still advocate for his client. First, the
attorney should move to exclude any expert testimony on
CSAAS. When arguing on the motion to exclude, attorneys for
the accused parent should use CSAAS shortcomings to object to
the admittance of expert testimony. If the judge admits expert
testimony nonetheless, the attorney should cross-examine the
expert witness pointing out all the vulnerabilities of CSAAS
testimony. With these two steps, the attorney for the accused
parent can not only vindicate his client, but also ensure that
his client still has the opportunity to raise his daughter and
watch her grow.
Rebecca Naeder†
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
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National Security Whistleblowing vs.
Dodd-Frank Whistleblowing
FINDING A BALANCE AND A MECHANISM TO
ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS
INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 2013, five days after Edward Snowden
revealed himself as the person who leaked classified documents
to Glenn Greenwald, the United States filed a criminal
complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia, charging
Snowden with “theft, ‘unauthorized communication of national
defense information,’ and ‘willful communication of classified
communications intelligence information to an unauthorized
person.’”1 The recent release of scores of information regarding
the surveillance programs of the National Security Agency
(NSA) was first reported by Greenwald, a reporter at the
British national newspaper, The Guardian.2 Charging Snowden
is reflective of an aggressive policy of the U.S. government to
discourage whistleblowing about national security issues.
Snowden began his whistleblowing in January 2013, when he
reached out to a documentary filmmaker to discuss the extent
of the NSA’s surveillance program.3 In February 2013,
Snowden contacted Greenwald to reveal what he knew.4
Snowden then began sending secured documents that he had
obtained through his work with Booz Allen Hamilton, a defense
1 Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.
POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-chargessnowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.
2 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps In To User Data
of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
3 Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked
Out: The Full Story Behind the Scoop and Why the Whistleblower Approached the
Guardian, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile.
4 Id.
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contractor that was working for the NSA.5 Some of the
documents included information about the “Prism” program,
which collects “information from the world’s leading technology
companies”6 about Internet communications, and a U.S. court
order compelling Verizon to turn over phone records of
American citizens.7 Public reaction has been divided, with some
touting Snowden as a hero and others calling him a traitor.8
The government responded by filing the aforementioned
charges against him for violations of the 1917 Espionage Act,
as well as theft.9 Currently, Snowden has been granted asylum
for one year in Russia and has supposedly started a job helping
to maintain a website there.10
The Obama Administration has brought charges for
violations of the 1917 Espionage Act against national security
whistleblowers with some frequency.11 At least one of those
5 Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance?guni=Network%20
front:network-front%20aux-1%20mini-bento:Bento%20box%208%20col:Position1:sublinks.
6 Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked
Out: The Full Story Behind the Scoop and Why the Whistleblower Approached the
Guardian, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/
11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile.
7 Id.
8 See Ariel Edwards-Levy & Sunny Freeman, Americans Still Can’t Decide
Whether Edward Snowden is a ‘Traitor’ or ‘A Hero,’ Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
30, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/30/edward-snowdenpoll_n_4175089.html (reporting a poll that found 51% of Americans thought Snowden
was “something of a hero” while 49% thought Snowden was “more of a traitor”); Robert
Kuttner, Time to Thank Edward Snowden, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2013, 9:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/time-to-thank-snowden_b_4252208.html
(arguing, as the title suggests, that we should and someday may be grateful for
Snowden’s leaks despite their illegality because they sparked the conversation regarding
the extent of America’s surveillance programs). Interestingly, Daniel Ellsberg, the
whistleblower who released the Pentagon Papers, has joined the national dialogue
regarding whether Snowden is a traitor or a hero. See infra Part I.A. In addition to
praising Snowden for making these disclosures in a Washington Post editorial, most
recently, Ellsberg took to the popular social news website Reddit.com to answer any
questions users wanted to ask him. The title of the post and the beginning of the “thread”
reads “I am Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg. Edward Snowden is my Hero. [Ask
me Anything].” See Daniel Ellsberg, Daniel Ellsberg: NSA Leaker Snowden Made the
Right Call, WASH. POST (July 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/danielellsberg-nsa-leaker-snowden-made-the-right-call/2013/07/07/0b46d96c-e5b7-11e2-aef3339619eab080_story.html; Daniel Ellsberg, I am Pentagon Papers Leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Edward Snowden is My Hero. AMA, REDDIT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.reddit.com/
r/IAmA/comments/1vahsi/i_am_pentagon_papers_leaker_daniel_ellsberg/.
9 Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.
POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-chargessnowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.
10 Alla Eshchenko, Edward Snowden Gets Website Job in Russia, Lawyer Says,
CNN (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/world/europe/russia-snowden-job/.
11 Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National
Security Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 75-76 (2012).
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cases involved prosecuting a whistleblower who disclosed
information regarding wasted funds at the NSA—information
which
the Inspector
General
Report substantiated.12
Notwithstanding the substantiated claims of the whistleblower,
after a five year investigation, the whistleblower “pled guilty to a
misdemeanor charge of ‘exceeding authorized use of a
computer.’”13 More recently, Private First Class Chelsea Manning
(born Bradley Manning) was sentenced to 35 years in prison for
charges under the Espionage Act for being the source of the
WikiLeaks documents.14 In total, President Obama has charged
eight individuals with violations of the Espionage Act for leaking
classified information, which is more than all other presidents
combined.15 It is for this reason that “[h]aving watched the Obama
Administration prosecute whistleblowers at a historically
unprecedented rate, [Snowden] fully expects the US government
to attempt to use all its weight to punish him.”16
Now consider the recent Dodd-Frank legislation and the
reward program for corporate whistleblowers who report
corporate fraud and abuse to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
became law.17 The Act was passed and signed into law by
President Obama in “response to the 2008 financial crisis that
tipped the nation into the worst recession since the Great
Depression.”18 One goal of Dodd-Frank is “to encourage
whistleblower participation in the promotion of corporate
governance.”19 To date, the SEC has issued three whistleblower

Id.
Id.
14 Luis Martinez & Steven Portnoy, Bradley Manning Guilty on Most
Charges, But Not Aiding Enemy, ABC NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/bradley-manning-guilty-charges-aiding-enemy/story?id=19797378. Julie Tate,
Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradleymanning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
15 Daniel Politi, Obama Has Charged More Under Espionage Act Than All
Other Presidents Combined, SLATE (June 22, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
slatest/2013/06/22/edward_snowden_is_eighth_person_obama_has_pursued_under_
espionage_act.html.
16 Greenwald et al., supra note 5.
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
18 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html?_r=0.
19 Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 429 (2010).
12
13
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awards.20 The first award occurred within a year of Dodd-Frank
becoming law and was in the amount of $50,000 (or 30% of the
judgment), while the second award, 15% of the $7.5 million
judgment, occurred recently in June 2013.21 The most recent
award was in the amount of $14 million for information that
resulted in an SEC enforcement action to recover investor
funds.22 Although only three awards have been given out, the
SEC received 3001 tips in the Fiscal Year 2012, which is an
average of about eight tips per day.23 These statistics suggest
that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are at least
minimally effective. But, regardless of the provision’s effects,
the message is clear: the U.S. government encourages
whistleblowing within public companies.24
This note will examine the Dodd-Frank Act and related
whistleblowing provisions that apply to the corporate world
and the whistleblowing provisions in place within the
government, especially as they pertain to the release of
information related to national security. Upon examination, it will
be clear that there is an inconsistency between the objectives of
the different whistleblower provisions. It will also become evident
that a different standard exists for public companies pursuant to
Dodd-Frank that does not apply to the government itself. Under
Dodd-Frank, the U.S. government policy objective is obvious: the
federal government wants whistleblowers to report corporate
wrongdoing that may result in financial losses to the SEC. Yet,
when it comes to enabling government employees and
contractors to blow the whistle on government perpetrated
fraud or abuse, including possible violations of constitutional
rights, the existing patchwork of federal legislation does little
to provide a meaningful way for individuals to raise appropriate
concerns without fear of retaliation or prosecution. This lack of a
functional system within the government has arguably
contributed to the leaking of confidential documents by Edward
20 Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Awards
More than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539854258#.UtlejHn0Bdg; see also Erika
Kelton, SEC Whistleblower Rewards: Larger Ones Are Coming, FORBES (June 26, 2013,
5:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/06/26/sec-officials-on-whistleblowerrewards-the-best-is-yet-to-come/.
21 Kelton, supra note 20.
22 Press Release, supra note 20.
23 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 4-5, 11 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2012.pdf.
24 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Snowden. The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, a more
functional whistleblower system, have arguably prevented or
addressed frauds reported as well as contributed to the
development of more effective internal reporting mechanisms
within companies.25
Drawing on the lessons from these inconsistencies, this
note argues that the federal government should adopt a
whistleblower scheme that is based on both the whistleblower
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the basic premise of
checks and balances. Through Congress’s power to create
courts pursuant to Articles I and III of the Constitution,26 a
separate court should be created roughly based on the United
States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to respond to
whistleblowers within the intelligence community. The new
whistleblower court is certainly a starting point in an effort to
balance both the interests of the United States citizen and the
interests of an effective United States government and to
provide an adequate solution to the age-old question of “who
watches the watchers?”
Part I will discuss the relevant national security
whistleblower laws as well as the relevant provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Part II will highlight the differences between
the laws in both their structure and application. Finally, Part
III will propose a new whistleblower court that is based on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to address the
shortcomings of the national security whistleblower provisions.
This new whistleblower court will adequately deal with the
issues unique to national security, namely the need for secrecy,
while still protecting individuals’ rights.
I.

THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS

Whistleblowers in the national security industry of the
United States government face a more complex, unclear, and
inhospitable landscape than their counterparts in the corporate
world. There is an inherent tension between national security
and whistleblower laws because of the secrecy demanded by
national security.27 The tension has been described as the need
for a “private space” where the President and his advisors can
make the best decisions without the pressures of public
See infra Part I.C.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27 ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER
LAWS 212 (2012).
25

26
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scrutiny.28 Despite this, “the Constitution promotes government
transparency and Congressional oversight of the executive
branch.”29 The following discussion will summarize the
whistleblower protections relevant to national security and the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
A.

National Security Whistleblower Provisions

One commentator described generally whistleblower
protections in national security:
The laws affecting national security whistleblowers differ dramatically
from general [whistleblower] provisions . . . . [E]mployees may report
misconduct related to national security to a more limited group of
people, excluding most of Congress and all of the public. Moreover,
less protection from retaliation exists, and the judicial branch has no
oversight of retaliation claims because the claims are adjudicated
administratively within the executive branch and often within the
whistleblower’s own agency, if at all.30

The origins of whistleblower protection law reform can be
traced to the Watergate scandal.31 Daniel Ellsberg played a major
role in the Watergate scandal and, as a result, has been described
as “one of the best-known whistleblowers in US history.”32 Daniel
Ellsberg released what became known as the Pentagon Papers to
two newspapers.33 As a Rand Corporation employee, he contributed
to a study conducted by Robert McNamara concerning United
States involvement in Vietnam; the result was the highly critical
Pentagon Papers.34 Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers first to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969 and then to the
New York Times and the Washington Post in 1970.35 After
releasing the study to the newspapers, the federal government
prosecuted him “for illegal possession of classified documents
and a failure to return them to proper custody,” but the case
was dismissed because, among other illegal activities, the
executive branch was illegally spying on Ellsberg and his
attorney, and executive branch employees broke into Ellsberg’s
Moberly, supra note 11, at 91.
Id.
30 Id. at 95-96.
31 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 72 (noting that “[w]ithout Watergate it is unlikely
that Congress would have enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), and
without that Act the whistleblower provision might have been delayed for years”).
32 Id. at 73, 215-17.
33 Id. at 73.
34 Id.
35 Id.
28

29
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psychologist’s office.36 President Nixon justified the illegal
activity in the name of national security.37 In response to the
Watergate Scandal, Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 (CSRA)38 and the Inspector General Act of 1978.39 Both of
these acts are considered “Watergate-reform legislation.”40
The Inspector General Act of 1978 is a statutory scheme
that offers protection to federal employee whistleblowers. The
Inspector General Act “authorizes the inspectors general to
receive and investigate complaints or information received
from agency employees concerning a violation of law, rules, or
regulations; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to the public
health and safety.”41 Unlike the other statutes discussed below,
there is no exemption from protection for federal employees in
the intelligence community.42 For example, whistleblowers from
the NSA and DIA (two intelligence community agencies under
the Department of Defense)43 are protected.
The law provides that the inspector general’s office of
the Department of Defense investigate complaints concerning
fraud or abuse or other information revealed to them by
whistleblowers.44 Among other possible violations, a revocation
of security clearance is grounds for an investigation into
whether retaliation occurred.45 There have been some
successful investigations into retaliation for whistleblowers
under this scheme.46
The CSRA created the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC),
which is in charge of investigating allegations that a whistleblower
was fired as retaliation.47 The OSC has the power to remedy and
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
38 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
39 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978).
40 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 217 (2012).
41 Lindsay Boyd & Brian Futagaki, Intelligent Whistleblowing, J. OF PUB.
INQUIRY, Spring/Summer 2010, at 20, 21, available at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/
files/files/sp10jpi.pdf.
42 Id.
43 U.S., DEP’T OF DEF., ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD),
available at http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%
20Portfolios/Organizations%20and%20Functions%20Guidebook/DoD_Organization_Ma
rch_2012.pdf.
44 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21-22.
45 Id. at 22.
46 Id. at 22-23 (describing three instances of retaliation that were corroborated by
the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General in the past three years).
47 Lilyanne Ohanesian, Protecting Uncle Sam’s Whistleblowers: All-Circuit
Review of WPA Appeals, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 615, 618 (2013).
36
37
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punish accordingly any claims of retaliation.48 Nevertheless,
despite this big step for whistleblower protection from retaliation
for government employees, the CSRA was largely ineffective.49
Most importantly, the law was limited in scope; in particular,
whistleblowers were not protected when it came to “information
classified in the interests of national defense or foreign
affairs.”50 There was also no “legal protection [from retaliation]
for many important disclosures by national security
whistleblowers” because the CSRA excluded “the FBI, the CIA,
the [DIA], the NSA, and other national security agencies.”51
Further, the definition of “agency” in the CSRA excludes any
agency whose function the President determines is “the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities.”52 The practical effect of these exceptions is to carve
out a large area where no protection exists—arguably where
whistleblowing is needed most. The excluded agencies are
granted broad authority, and the abuse of such power poses a
threat to civil liberties. In practice, federal employees felt the
law was hostile toward them; there were no cases brought on
behalf of a whistleblower since the year of its passage, and
contrary to the idea of whistleblower protections, the OSC
revealed whistleblower identities after failing to investigate
and prosecute claims.53
As a result of these failures, Congress responded by
passing the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.54 The purpose
of the Act, as stated by Congress, “is to protect employees,
especially whistleblowers, from prohibited personnel practices.”55
The CSRA originally made it “illegal to retaliate against
whistleblowers for making a disclosure that evidenced illegality or
specified misconduct.”56 Congress amended the language in the
Whistleblower Protection Act by changing “a disclosure” to “any
disclosure.”57 Previously, the Court interpreted “a disclosure” to
Id.
Id. (stating that “the CSRA’s whistleblower protections proved a
disappointment in the decade that followed [its enactment]”).
50 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 217.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 217-18; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2014).
53 Ohanesian, supra note 47, at 618.
54 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16;
Ohanesian, supra note 47, at 619.
55 Whistleblower Protection Act § 2(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
56 Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation
for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 551 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2012); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 § 4(a)(3).
48
49
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allow for loopholes in which a whistleblower would not be
protected after they blew the whistle.58 For example, in Fiorillo v.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, the court held that the
whistleblower’s “primary motivation . . . must be the desire to
inform the public on matters of public concern, and not
personal vindictiveness”59 and that the whistleblower’s motives
were related to personal vendettas and therefore not “a
disclosure” protected by the act.60 The amendment had the
practical effect of “making protection mandatory whenever
justified by the evidence in a disclosure.”61 As a result,
disclosures, even when made for personal reasons rather than
the desire to inform the public on matters of public concern,
would qualify as “any disclosure” as long as they stated a claim
substantively. Despite these improvements, the problems
previously noted with the CSRA as it pertained to national
security whistleblowers were not addressed in Congress’s
amendments. It was not until the Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA)62 that Congress
addressed the issue of protecting national security
whistleblowers. Congress’s findings were that:
(5) the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of the
Intelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to
Congress may have impaired the flow of information needed by the
intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities; and
(6) to encourage such reporting, an additional procedure should be
established that provides a means for such employees and
contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classified
information involved in such reporting.63

Under this law, intelligence community whistleblowers can now
report to Congress but must report to the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) first, who then makes the determination whether
it is credible enough to send to Congress.64 However, according to
Thomas Gimble, then-acting Inspector General of the
Department of Defense in 2006, the ICWPA is a complete
58 See, e.g., Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the personal motives of the whistleblower disqualified
him from protection under the CSRA).
59 Id. at 1550
60 Id.
61 Devine, supra note 56, at 551.
62 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
112 Stat. 2413 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ272/
pdf/PLAW-105publ272.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Id. § 702(a).
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misnomer.65 He contends that the Act more properly is a device
that “protect[s] communications of classified information to the
Congress from executive branch employees engaged in
intelligence and counterintelligence activity.”66 That is because
there is no actual retaliation provision protecting a whistleblower
who follows these procedures, but it does allow someone to
communicate to Congress allegations of whistleblower retaliation.67
At the time of Mr. Gimble’s comments, only three complaints had
been made under the ICWPA.68 Thus, the same recurring problem
is faced by national security whistleblowers; that is, there is no
protection from retaliation in the statutes for employees of the
intelligence community.69
Finally, on October 10, 2012, President Obama issued
Presidential Policy Directive Nineteen (PPD-19), which
purports to prohibit retaliation against employees who serve in
the intelligence community or “who are eligible for access to
classified information” who report waste, fraud, and abuse.70
This is an attempt to fill in the shortcoming of the ICWPA; that
is, the lack of protection for a whistleblower who tries to report
to Congress.71 These protections, however, are practically
nullified by the inclusion of the following text: “This directive is
not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies,
or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.”72 This means that there is no legal cause of action for a
whistleblower who is fired, and the whistleblower has to
depend on the previously discussed protections for redress.73
65 National Security Whistleblower Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
109th Cong. 6-7 (2006) (statement of Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General of
the U.S. Dep’t of Defense), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/
021406gimble.pdf.
66 Id. at 7.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (2012).
70 Presidential Policy Directive-19, Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to
Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
ppd/ppd-19.pdf.
71 Daniel D’Isidoro, Protecting Whistleblowers and Secrets in the Intelligence
Community, NAT’L SEC. J. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://harvardnsj.org/2014/09/protectingwhistleblowers-and-secrets-in-the-intelligence-community/.
72 Presidential Policy Directive-19, supra note 70.
73 National Security Whistleblowers Not Effectively Protected by New
Whitehouse Directive: Directive Lacks Due Process and Real Legal Protections, NAT’L
WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1426&ItItem=229
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Critics of PPD-19 argue that (1) “[t]he authority to protect the
whistleblower is vested solely and absolutely with the [h]ead of
the Agency that retaliated against the whistleblower;” (2) “[t]he
Directive incorporates the ‘State’s Secrets’ privilege that
permits agency heads to fire whistleblowers regardless of the
Directive;” and, as previously discussed, (3) “[t]he Directive
explicitly neglects to create any real legal protection.”74
However, President Obama, regarding the Edward Snowden
NSA leaks,75 stated:
So the fact is, is that Mr. Snowden has been charged with three
felonies . . . . If the concern was that somehow this was the only way
to get this information out to the public, I signed an executive order
well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that provided
whistleblower protection to the intelligence community—for the first
time. So there were other avenues available for somebody whose
conscience was stirred and thought that they needed to question
government actions.76

Based on these comments, it seems that PPD-19 is at least a
signal that the Obama Administration has recognized a need to
respond to intelligence community whistleblowers and to create
a workable whistleblower environment in the national security
arena. Nevertheless, the current patchwork of legislation and
executive action falls short and does not provide a clear path
for the national security whistleblower who may perceive his or
her only option as going to the press.
B.

The Classification System

National security whistleblowers are often left without
any option but to go to the media.77 Compounding this problem is
the government’s use of the classification system. The
classification system is used as both a shield and a sword for the
74 Stephen Kohn, Where We Stand on President Obama’s “Policy Directive”
On National Security Whistleblowers, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2013/09/articles/whistleblowers-governmentempl/terrorism/where-we-stand-on-president-obamas-policy-directive-on-nationalsecurity-whistleblowers/#more.
75 See infra Part III.
76 Joe
Davidson, Obama’s ‘Misleading’ Comment on Whistleblower
Protections, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0812/politics/41333716_1_edward-snowden-executive-order-policy-directive.
77 Melissa Khemani, The Protection of National Security Whistleblowers:
Imperative but Impossible 23 (Working Paper, May 30, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412112 (describing the options left
for national security whistleblowers as a result of the legal framework within which
they report).

1202

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

government when it comes to national security whistleblowers. It
has been argued that the power of the executive branch to classify
documents “seem[s] to be invoked more as a shield to cover up
government incompetence or misconduct rather than to protect
classified information or national security interests.”78 At the
same time, the executive branch’s power to revoke security
clearances can be a sword in the sense that it is a form of
retaliation used to punish whistleblowers.79 The Supreme
Court has strengthened the power to revoke security clearances
as a result of its decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan.80
The Court held that the Merit Systems Protection Board could
not review the Department of the Navy’s reasons for revoking an
employee’s security clearance that led to an employee’s discharge.81
Accordingly, there is a “limitation placed on administrative and
judicial review of the revocation of security clearances”82 making
it easier for security clearance revocation to be used as retaliation.
The effects of having a security clearance revoked prevent an
employee from advancing or even retaining a position in the
federal government where such a clearance is required.
To summarize, the whistleblower provisions discussed
above, when they do protect a whistleblower, rely primarily on
internal reporting and monitoring. The mechanisms for
protection are all internal “external” review boards; that is, the
boards consist of executive branch employees who review the
complaints of whistleblowers who may or may not have been
unfairly removed from their post or had their security clearance
revoked.83 Additionally, when there is Congressional oversight, it
is limited because the OIG screens the information before it
reaches Congress pursuant to the ICWPA. The inspectors general
are also internal “external” review mechanisms. The President
appoints them “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”
and has the power to remove them with notice to Congress of his
or her reasons for doing so.84 Although few question that the
inspectors general are capable of doing a fair and impartial job,
it is noteworthy that the Government considers itself more
prepared to handle internal reports from whistleblowers than a
private corporation is, even when it comes to protecting U.S.
Id. at 20-21.
VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 218-19.
80 Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
81 Id. at 525-33.
82 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 218.
83 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 3(a)-(b), 92 Stat.
1101 (1978).
84 Id.
78
79
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citizens’ constitutional rights. Further, the classification
system and its possible manipulation by the government places
added burdens on a potential national security whistleblower.
C.

Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions

Two parts of the Dodd-Frank Act are relevant for
purposes of this note. The first part is the bounty program. The
Act reads, in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission, under regulations prescribed by the Commission
and subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 or
more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information
to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the
covered judicial or administrative action, or related action . . . .85

The second part is the protection afforded the whistleblower in
the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act provides that:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly
or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are
required or ordered under the Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .86

The term “whistleblower” for purposes of the Dodd-Frank
Act is defined as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”87 This
distinction is important because Dodd-Frank has the effect of
“limit[ing] its protections to those who report externally” to the
government (not the press).88 The implication of defining the
whistleblower as someone who reports to the SEC is that
anyone who only reports within their company, or internally,
does not qualify for the bounties or the protections (although
they may be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).89
Despite this narrow definition of “whistleblower,”
another provision of Dodd-Frank purports to offer protection
for whistleblowers who “mak[e] disclosures that are required or

85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
86 Id. § 922(h)(1)(A).
87 Id. § 922(a)(6) (emphasis added).
88 Harvard Law Review Association, Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—
Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1832 (2011) [hereinafter HLRA, Congress Expands Incentives].
89 Id.
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protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .”90
According to the Harvard Law Review Association, this
provision might cover whistleblowers who only report
internally because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act) includes
a provision that protects whistleblowers who report
internally.91 However, despite including this provision, the
definition of “whistleblower” as someone who only reports to
the SEC restricts the bounty awards and protections for
whistleblowers in Dodd-Frank to those who report to the SEC.92
This has the practical effect of excluding whistleblowers who
only report internally from the bounty program and
protections, therefore discouraging internal reporting.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had the
opportunity to determine whether the Dodd-Frank Act protected
whistleblowers who only reported internally.93 In this case, the
plaintiff, Khaled Asadi, reported to his supervisors at G.E. Energy
(G.E.) that Iraqi officials believed G.E. had hired a woman
associated with a particular Iraqi official in order to “curry
favor with that official in negotiating a lucrative joint venture
agreement.”94 In interpreting the statute, the court found that the
definition of whistleblower “expressly and unambiguously
requires that an individual provide information to the SEC . . . .”95
The court further found that the SOX Act provision within DoddFrank does not add another definition of whistleblower; rather, a
whistleblower still has to report to the SEC to fall within the
SOX Act provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.96 This ruling is in
contrast with other district courts faced with the same issue.97
More recently, the Southern District of New York found
that because there is an ambiguity in the statute (created by
the conflict between the definition of “whistleblower” as
someone who reports to the SEC and the anti-retaliation
provision not requiring the whistleblower to report to the SEC),
it is appropriate to consider how the SEC interprets the
90 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
91 HLRA, Congress Expands Incentives, supra note 88, at 1832 n.31.
92 Id. (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
93 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
94 Id. at 621.
95 Id. at 623.
96 Id. at 627.
97 See, e.g., Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424, 2012 WL 4444820, at
*4 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 993-94 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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statute.98 The court found that the SEC interpreted the statute to
“not require a report to the SEC in order to obtain whistleblower
protection.”99 So, unless and until the Supreme Court decides to
hear this issue or the law is amended to fix the inconsistency in
the definition of “whistleblower,” the Dodd-Frank Act will
continue to highly discourage any type of internal reporting
because the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions100 will not protect
the employee if they have not also reported to the SEC, and they
will be ineligible for the bounty awards.
In sum, Dodd-Frank is effective at generating tips from
whistleblowers for the SEC101 in their pursuit of fixing what
President Obama described as, “a crisis born of a failure of
responsibility from certain corners of Wall Street to the halls of
power in Washington.”102 Specifically, the Act contributes to the
solution by providing “clear rules and basic safeguards that
prevent abuse, that check excess, that ensure that it is more
profitable to play by the rules than to game the system.”103
Since the Act was signed into law, three awards have already
been distributed,104 demonstrating that the whistleblower
provisions of Dodd-Frank are having an impact on detecting
and preventing financial abuses.
The objectives of the program are clear: vigorously
protect whistleblowers and motivate whistleblowing to the
government through monetary reward. The head of the SEC’s
whistleblower office, Sean McKessy, said, “[q]uality information is
the lifeblood of the program. If people think if they report
wrongdoing they get fired or risk other retaliation, that well will
dry up quickly.”105 Despite the recent ruling in Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C.,106 McKessy believes “companies are
generally investing more in internal compliance as a result of
[the] whistleblower program” and “[t]he vast majority of people
who come to [the SEC] about their current or former company

98 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 14748 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
99 Id.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010).
101 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 4-5, 11.
102 Press Release, White House, Statement by President Barack Obama Upon
Signing H.R. 4173 (July 21, 2010).
103 Id.
104 Press Release, supra note 20; see also Kelton, supra note 20.
105 Cheryl Soltis Martel, SEC Whistleblower Office Preps for Additional Tips,
NACD DIRECTORSHIP (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.directorship.com/sec-whistlebloweroffice-preps-for-additional-tips/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
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do say they tried to report internally.”107 For example, the
recent payout of $168 million dollars to an unspecified number
of whistleblowers related to the settlement of Johnson &
Johnson with the United States over “charges that J&J
marketed drugs for unapproved uses and gave kickbacks to
doctors and nursing homes.”108 A robust internal reporting
system could have been an effective remedy for Johnson and
Johnson before it ever reached the point of negotiating a $2.2
billion settlement. This example suggests that other companies
will do as McKessy suggests and invest more in their internal
reporting systems to prevent exorbitant losses.
II.

THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DODD-FRANK
AND NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWING

The Dodd-Frank whistleblower structure encourages
someone to go outside the company and report to the SEC (which,
although independent, is a part of the executive branch) which
then investigates the tip.109 If the tip is credible enough, the SEC
could bring an enforcement action against the company.110 These
claims have resulted in investigations, penalties, and bounty
rewards in the millions of dollars against violating corporations.111
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower still receives protection from
retaliation if they report internally (under the SOX Act), but there
is less incentive to do this if in doing so the whistleblower becomes
ineligible for the bounty.112
The national security whistleblower structure is less
clear. Based on current events and the current state of the
law,113 the structure is almost exclusively internal (the
exception being congressional oversight under the ICWPA,
which is limited).114 A flowchart diagraming the line from the
107 Rachel Louise Ensign, Q&A: Sean McKessy, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://stream.wsj.com/story/latestheadlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-336403/.
108 Gregory
Wallace, $168 Million Payout to Johnson & Johnson
Whistleblowers, CNN MONEY (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2013/11/04/news/johnson-and-johnson-whistleblower-payout/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.
109 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 5-6.
110 See, e.g., Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC
Announces Whistleblower Action (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2013/2013-06-announcement.htm.
111 Kelton, supra note 20; Press Release, supra note 20.
112 See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
113 See supra Part I.B-C.
114 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112
Stat. 2413 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ272/
pdf/PLAW-105publ272.pdf. Although it is not problematic for national security
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national security whistleblower as she reports her complaint
within the confines of the law is a straight line all the way up
to the President with stops along the way in the relevant
inspector general’s office and the head of the agency where the
whistleblower works. Conversely, the line for the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower begins in the private sphere of the corporation
and, with the exception of internal reporters (which DoddFrank discourages), goes outside the corporation and across to
the public sphere of the SEC and thus up to the President.
These structural differences represent the tension
discussed115 between the President’s need to protect national
security information and the need to prevent abuses within the
government by exposing fraudulent and abusive practices.116 It
might also be suggested that the government does not want to
encourage whistleblowing when it is the subject of the
whistleblower’s allegations. Therefore, with this in mind, it is
critical to try and address this tension while still allowing for
an effective whistleblower culture within the national security
community. Otherwise, we are left with major news headlines
and scandals as would-be whistleblowers, perceiving themselves
as without options (e.g., Edward Snowden), go to the press. A
scandal never looks good, but it is also possible that these leaks to
the press have caused serious, real damage. Members of Congress
say that a recent Pentagon report suggests that Snowden’s leaks
“have set back U.S. efforts against terrorism, cybercrime, human
trafficking, and weapons proliferation.”117
Corporations and the government are similar enough
that corresponding structures should and could be applied to
both effectively. Corporations and government share four
important characteristics that make them agreeable to similar
whistleblower provisions. First, shareholders of the corporation
are similar to citizens of the government.118 Both shareholders
and citizens generally have a right to vote on important matters
ranging from leadership to amendments of bylaws119 and state
whistleblowers to begin whistleblowing internally considering the sensitive nature of
protecting our national security (after all even SOX protects internal whistleblowers), the
problem is national security whistleblowers are not even protected at any preliminary,
internal stage, arguably leaving them with little to no options but to go to the press.
115 See supra Part I.A.
116 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 212.
117 Ken Dilanian & Richard A. Serrano, Snowden Leaks Severely Hurt U.S.
Security, Two House Members Say, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
2014/jan/09/nation/la-na-snowden-intel-20140110.
118 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146 (2010).
119 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
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and federal constitutions. Second, the CEO of the corporation is
analogous to the President of the government.120 The CEO is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the corporation
much like the President has control over the executive branch
and its day-to-day operations. Third, the board of directors of the
corporation is very similar to Congress.121 Both have oversight
powers. Fourth, the Judiciary serves similar functions to both
the corporation and the government.122
In practice, both corporations and the government have
similar hierarchical organizational and reporting structures. As a
result, the whistleblowing employee in both organizations is faced
with the same challenges. Their direct supervisors and those
above them may be involved in the concerning conduct. The risk
of retaliation through demotion or termination is the same for
both. The consequences of the wrongful conduct directly affect the
principal stakeholders in both organizations, shareholders in the
case of corporations and citizens in the case of the government.
Both organizations should have the same objective of promoting
lawful conduct by its employees, including its leadership.
Whether the offending conduct is accounting fraud or the
violation of constitutional rights, both are worthy of prevention.
Protection from retaliation and whistleblowing incentives are
appropriate tools to motivate appropriate conduct by both
organizations. Of course, where issues of national security are
involved, the process must take into account the need for a
potentially higher level of confidentiality.
III.

A NEW WHISTLEBLOWER COURT

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is a
workable, constitutional way for the government to obtain prior
judicial approval to engage in surveillance. The purpose of the
FISC is to balance the government’s need to investigate and seek
out national security threats with the rights of individuals by
gaining judicial approval first.123 A whistleblower court would
balance these same needs, and a court like the FISC is a working
model upon which to base the whistleblower court.

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
122 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
123 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/courts_special_fisc.html.
120
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The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

Congress approved the creation of the FISC pursuant to
its Article III power.124 The FISC was created pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).125 First, the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court appointed “11
district court judges from at least seven of the United States
judicial circuits.”126 In the FISC, any time a judge denies an
application for an order of surveillance, that judge must write
an opinion that is filed under seal.127 FISA also creates a review
court for the FISC consisting of “three judges, one of whom
shall be publicly designated as the presiding judge, from the
United States district courts or courts of appeals” to review
denials of applications, subject to Supreme Court review.128
In order to obtain an order of surveillance, (1) the
lawyers from the Department of Justice prepare an application
for surveillance on behalf of the agency requiring the order,
which is submitted to the FISC, (2) the FISC either approves or
denies the application (since 1979 only 11 out of 33,946 have
been denied),129 and (3) the applying agency executes the
surveillance, which ultimately may or may not lead to criminal
prosecution.130 The applications by the government and their
contents are classified.131
In United States v. Cavanagh, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the FISC, holding that it did not violate
Article III of the Constitution.132 First, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s argument that because the FISC judges are not
tenured for life with fixed salaries, it violates Article III.133 The
court then dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that the
surveillance applications need to be “passed upon by [A]rticle
III judges” because “the judges assigned to serve on the FISA
court are federal district judges, and as such they are insulated
from political pressures by virtue of the protections they enjoy

STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 593 (5th ed. 2011).
50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2010).
126 Id. § 1803(a)(1).
127 Id.
128 Id.§ 1803(b).
129 Todd Lindeman, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, WASH. POST
(June 7, 2013 11:53 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-foreign-intelligencesurveillance-court/2013/06/07/4700b382-cfec-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_graphic.html.
130 DYCUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 594.
131 Lindeman, supra note 129.
132 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987).
133 Id. at 791.
124

125
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under [A]rticle III.”134 Moreover, “[A]rticle III courts are not
foreclosed from reviewing the decisions of the [FISC].”135 Next,
the court rejected the proposition that the temporary
assignment to the court implicates “the principles of judicial
interpretation and separation of powers that underlie [A]rticle
III.”136 The court found that the “temporary designation within
the federal judicial system has never been thought to undermine
the judicial independence that [A]rticle III was intended to
secure.”137 Finally, the court rejected the argument that Article
II of the Constitution was violated by having the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court appoint the judges to the FISC stating that
“temporary assignment of a federal district judge to another
district did not violate the President’s appointment power
under the Constitution.”138 Therefore, with these basic
provisions in place and approved by at least the Ninth Circuit,
a similarly structured national security whistleblower court
should have an appropriate and constitutional basis.
B.

The Whistleblower Court

The national security whistleblower court would
structurally mirror the FISC. It would consist of 11 judges,
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. A review court would consist of three judges to review
dismissal of whistleblower complaints. In support of the
staffing structure of the whistleblower court, it is useful to
consider the staff and amount of complaints handled by the
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower. The staff of the SEC’s Office
of the Whistleblower consists of nine attorneys and three
paralegals in addition to the head of the office, Mr. McKessy,
and the deputy chief of the office, Ms. Jane A. Norberg.139
During the fiscal year 2013, the Office of the Whistleblower
received 3238 tips (a 7.9% increase from fiscal year 2012).140
Considering the success of the Office of the Whistleblower in
addressing and investigating over 3000 complaints, it is very
likely the whistleblower court would be more than capable to
handle complaints of this volume.
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id.
Id. at 791-92.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (citing Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 118 (1916)).
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 5.
Id.
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If any change would be made to the number of
whistleblower court judges, then it would likely be to increase
the whistleblower court staff because there were more DoddFrank Act whistleblower tips than there were applications to
the FISC (the FISC received between 1750 and 2000 applications
for orders of surveillance in the year 2012).141 Further, there are
complaints that the FISC is a “rubber stamp” because it
overwhelmingly approves government applications for orders of
surveillance.142 Therefore, any reduction in staff might call into
question the legitimacy of the process of the whistleblower court;
that is, the process might be considered suspect if there are a
large amount of complaints and an even smaller amount of
staff than the FISC.
The process by which whistleblowers in the intelligence
community would be heard in this new court is relatively
straightforward and simple. First, a whistleblower would file a
complaint, much like a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. The
complaint would be similar to those in the Inspector General
Act,143 detailing any “violation of law, rules, or regulations; or
mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority; or a
substantial and specific danger to the public health and
safety.”144 The phrase “intelligence community” would be
defined the same way that the National Security Act of 1947
defined the term to include various intelligence agencies.145 This
includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
CIA, the NSA, the DIA, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, among
others.146 Additionally, intelligence community contractors would
be covered as in PPD-19.147 PPD-19 included supposed protection
for those “who are eligible for access to classified information.”148
In 2010, “out of 854,000 people with top secret clearances,
265,000 [we]re contractors.”149
Lindeman, supra note 129.
Dina Temple-Raston, FISA Court Appears to be Rubber Stamp for
Government Requests, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2013/06/13/191226106/fisa-court-appears-to-be-rubberstamp-for-government-requests.
143 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(a) (1978), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title5/pdf/USCODE-2011-title5-app-inspector-sec7.pdf.
144 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 7 (2012)).
145 See Moberly, supra note 11, at 72 n.129 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2012)).
146 Id. at 72-73.
147 Presidential Policy Directive-19, supra note 70.
148 Id.
149 Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. POST (July
20, 2010, 12:24 AM), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/
national-security-inc/.
141
142
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Any employee or contractor of the intelligence community
with any complaint that is enumerated in the Inspector General
Act could submit a complaint to the court. At the same time that
the complaint is submitted to the whistleblower court, the
complaint should be submitted to the Inspector General office of
the relevant agency. This notifies the agency that there is a
complaint, and this allows them to investigate the claim. All of
the intelligence community agencies enumerated in the National
Security Act of 1947 have an Inspector General office.150 This
would obviate the need to create any new department within an
agency to address whistleblower complaints.
It may seem that by inserting a whistleblower court into
the process this note is creating a middle man; however, in the
national security context, where whistleblowing is treated
generally with “outright hostility[,]”151 at least under the Obama
Administration, it is necessary to add a layer of protection for the
whistleblower. This is achieved by inserting the independent
judiciary into the process. Such a court addresses the tension
between the executive’s compelling interest in national security
and the interest of the public in transparency. In this case, the
phrase “transparency” is a misnomer because the whistleblower
court would be under seal and thus not transparent in the
traditional sense of the word. Nevertheless, by including
another branch of the government in the process, the judiciary,
the potential for abuse and the concentration of power to
address whistleblower complaints in the executive is very much
limited. Additionally, filing under seal to the judiciary is not a
new process because sealing different stages of the judiciary
process occurs with enough frequency that there exists a guide
on how to do it.152
Just as in ordinary litigation, the relevant inspectors
general office has the opportunity to respond to the complaint,
which it would submit to the whistleblower court. It is important
to note that there would be no jury trial. Rather, it would be much
more in line with a bench trial, with the judges playing the role of
fact finder. The inspectors general’s investigation, in line with
150 See Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
Inspectors General Directory & Homepage Links, http://www.ignet.gov/igs/
homepage1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
151 Moberly, supra note 11, at 73.
152 See, e.g., Robert Timothy Reagan, Sealing Court Records and Proceedings: A
Pocket Guide, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/Sealing_Guide.pdf/$file/Sealing_Guide.pdf (describing the different aspects of
the judiciary as they related to being put under seal including national security issues).
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their traditional role of neutral investigator,153 should present to
the whistleblower court its findings regarding the whistleblower’s
complaint. The whistleblower court, having the information
necessary to make a decision on the merits of the complaint,
would then decide whether or not there is a real issue raised by
the complaint. This differs from the usual role of the courts
deciding whether someone has a “winning” claim. But this
difference is in line with the function of whistleblowing; that is,
to seek out and prevent or fix abuses.
Next, there are two possible outcomes for the
whistleblower’s complaint. First, if the whistleblower court finds,
after consideration of the inspectors general’s investigation and
the whistleblower’s complaint, that no “violation of law, rules, or
regulations; or mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to the public
health and safety”154 has been made out, then the complaint
will be dismissed. Second, if the whistleblower court does find
that there is a real allegation, then the best process forward
would be a collaborative effort to redress the complaint,
including input from the whistleblower court and its staff, the
inspectors general’s office and their staff, and the original
whistleblower, either pro se or represented by counsel.155 In this
way, the whistleblower court would be able to collaboratively
make a determination as to the best remedy of the complaint
after considering the input from the inspectors general office,
the whistleblower, and the court.
As an example, if Snowden were to decide that he does
not like the extent of the NSA surveillance program and
believes that it is a complete overstepping of the executive’s
power, he can file a complaint with as much detail as possible
and submit it to the whistleblower court for consideration. This
would be in lieu of going to The Guardian news outlet and then
fleeing the United States for fear of prosecution. One possible
153 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2, 92 Stat. 1101,
available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/leg/igactasof1010.pdf (describing the purpose
as “to create independent and objective units”).
154 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21 (citing 5 U.S.C. App. § 7 (2012)).
155 This process is being used by the newly created New York State Human
Trafficking Courts. Recognizing that many people arrested for prostitution are likely
victims of human trafficking who need help rather than to be punished, the new court is a
“collaborative effort[ ] of the court system’s criminal justice partners, service providers
across the state and other stakeholders . . . where [the victim] will be evaluated by the
judge, defense attorney and prosecutor.” Press Release, New York State Unified Court
System, NY Judiciary Launches Nation’s First Statewide Human Trafficking
Intervention Initiative (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
press/PR13_11.pdf. In this way, the best result regarding the issue at stake is reached.
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complication in Snowden’s case is the fact that he is employed
by Booz Allen rather than the NSA. The whistleblower court,
however, in addition to hearing complaints from government
employees, would also hear complaints from people who work
for government contractors.
Next, the whistleblower court would read through the
complaint and send it to the NSA Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) so that it can begin its investigation. In due
time, the OIG completes its investigation of the surveillance
being conducted and gives the whistleblower court its analysis
of the issues raised in the complaint. Much like the debate
going on today, the whistleblower court would consider
whether what Snowden revealed is a violation of the law.
Although it may seem that the whistleblower court would have
to undertake the strenuous task of deciding if the NSA’s
conduct is illegal, the complaints can also be considered under
the Inspector General Act’s standard, which includes
complaints relating to “a substantial and specific danger to the
public health and safety.”156 This broadens the whistleblower
court’s analysis by considering, along with the inspectors
general and the whistleblower, the potential harm that the
practices would have on the public’s health and safety.
The legal issue regarding the surveillance has been
considered by the FISC in the past at least once, and there
have also been two district court opinions relating to the NSA’s
surveillance program. The FISC opinion that was declassified
with redactions, written by Judge John Bates, revealed that
the FISC did find the NSA surveillance program improper.157
After the government made improvements to their applications
by fixing the problems noted by Judge Bates, the FISC approved
the program once again.158 But there is now a split in the district
courts about the constitutionality of the NSA surveillance
program. First, in Klayman v. Obama,159 the District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the surveillance “almost certainly”
156 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(a) (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title5/pdf/USCODE-2011-title5-app-inspector-sec7.pdf.
157 See Judge Bates’s Opinion on N.S.A. Program, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court 32 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/fisc0912.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (finding that the minimization procedures
used by the government in the collection of data were inadequate to protect citizens);
Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/2011-ruling-found-an-nsa-programunconstitutional.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.
158 Savage & Shane, supra note 157.
159 Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881 (RJL), 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
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violated a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.160 Closely following the Klayman decision, the
Southern District of New York ruled that the NSA surveillance
was not only constitutional but that it was also “the
Government’s counter-punch: connecting fragmented and
fleeting communications to re-construct and eliminate alQaeda’s terror network.”161 Given the different opinions reached
in the two courts, it is possible that the Supreme Court could
end up hearing the case.162 The constitutionality of the
surveillance program is beyond the scope of this note, but the
fact that the FISC and two district courts are in disagreement
with the government and each other over whether the
surveillance is proper, it almost certainly could be argued it
poses a substantial danger to public health and safety.
In addition to the legal analysis, the whistleblower court
could make recommendations to the NSA and the executive
branch or even permit legal action to be taken against the NSA,
much like the SEC can bring actions against corporations that
are violating laws or regulations. The whistleblower court could
also issue opinions similar to the Judge Bates opinion, discussed
above, finding that the NSA surveillance was improper, if the
whistleblower’s complaint warranted such a finding.163
C.

Merits and Drawbacks of a Possible Whistleblower
Complaint Court

The whistleblower court would enable someone like
Snowden to proceed through channels that adequately balance
the national security issues with the transparency, checks, and
balances required to run an efficient government. Some of the
drawbacks are exemplified by the Snowden example as well.
The main problem is what the whistleblower court does with the
information it hears. Does it have the authority to intervene and
order the government to do anything? Considering that the FISC
has the authority to deny or approve surveillance applications, it
is likely that the whistleblower court would be able to issue
orders to the offending government agency. The answer to this
question may in fact improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of
Id. at *19.
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
162 Orin Kerr, Will the Supreme Court Review the NSA’s Telephony Metadata
Program?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2008, 8:47 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2014/
01/02/supreme-court-take-bulk-telephony-case-circuit-courts-dont-invalidate-program/.
163 See Judge Bates’s Opinion on N.S.A. Program, supra note 157, at 31.
160
161
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the whistleblower court. If Congress creates the whistleblower
court as it did the FISC, then it can find the appropriate balance
between the whistleblower court’s new power and the executive’s
existing power. This adds to the legitimacy of the court and of
the whistleblowing process as a whole because now all three
branches of the government are represented and active in the
process. With the three branches having input, the proper
amount of checks and balances will be effective to ensure that
the new whistleblower court does not exert too much control
over the executive and that the executive is not dangerously
untethered in its clearly legitimate goal and responsibility of
providing for the national security of the United States.
There could also be the issue of whether the national
security whistleblower needs to exhaust internal reporting
mechanisms available to her. If it appears that requiring
exhaustion of remedies is too onerous for the national security
whistleblower, this suggests that requiring exhaustion before
filing a complaint is not a good idea. In fact, requiring
exhaustion would give the current government whistleblower
apparatus control over whether the complaint ever makes it to
the whistleblower court. For example, in the ICWPA, the
complaint only went to Congress if the Office of the Inspector
General deemed it credible. Therefore, requiring exhaustion
would likely have the same effect and is thus not advisable.
There are still other considerations that would need to
go into the formation of the whistleblower court. For instance,
what kind of standard would be used to decide whether a
complaint should be dismissed? These types of questions would
best be answered in practice. The whistleblower court would
create its own jurisprudence and precedent as issues arise.
One thing is certain: the whistleblower court (rather
than a leak to the media) is a much more appropriate and
efficient way to expose government wrongdoings. Attorney
General Eric Holder said that “‘the mechanisms that [Snowden]
used’ to publicize his concerns with the government’s surveillance
aren’t ‘worthy of clemency.’”164 Nonetheless, he admitted that
“Snowden sparked a necessary conversation.”165 This conversation
has resulted in President Obama “announc[ing] the end of the
telephone metadata program, the way it exists now, after the
164 Evan Perez & Leigh Ann Caldwell, CNN Exclusive: Holder Fears ‘Lone Wolf ’
Terrorist Attack, Doesn’t Want TSA Armed, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/11/05/politics/holder-terror-snowden-interview/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.
165 Id.
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disclosure of the practice by the former National Security Agency
contractor Edward J. Snowden.”166 The obvious question then, is
how would this conversation have been started if Snowden did
not do what he did? This is the role that the whistleblower
court would play. It would, at least when the public health and
safety is concerned, start the conversation. It is true that the
whistleblower court would be under seal but, at a certain point,
the findings, much like the announcements of the SEC’s
actions after investigating whistleblower tips, would be made
public to the extent the information did not endanger national
security. At worst, if the whistleblower court found itself in a
gray area such as the legality of the NSA’s surveillance
program, then it could have begun the conversation by
notifying Congress through the appropriate channels.
Importantly, the whistleblower court begins to look more
like the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that the executive branch has
fully embraced and encouraged. Reverting back to the flowchart,167
the national security whistleblower’s complaint no longer goes
straight up to the President. Rather, it now looks much more like
the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower’s line, which begins in the
private sphere and goes outside the corporation, across to the
SEC, and thus up to the President. The national security
whistleblower’s complaint now goes outside the internal
structure of the executive branch of the government and into
the judiciary that was legislated by Congress. From there, the
judges and other parties concerned have a much better chance
at resolving any issues that may exist.
CONCLUSION
A whistleblower court would push the executive branch
toward the middle of a spectrum that has at one end the DoddFrank Act whistleblowing apparatus, which highly encourages
the practice, and at the opposite end, the Obama Administration
prosecuting whistleblowers under the 1917 Espionage Act.
Although not enjoying the robust protections and the monetary
rewards that corporate whistleblowers have under the DoddFrank Act, national security whistleblowers will no longer need
to disclose confidential information to the public because of the
ability to report government fraud or abuse to the whistleblower
166 Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on
Phone Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/
us/politics/obama-nsa.html?_r=0.
167 See supra Part II.

1218

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

court. The debate in this country over Snowden’s disclosure
definitely suggests that the NSA surveillance program is a hotly
contested issue. Rather than suffer the problems caused by
uncontrolled public disclosures that the Obama Administration
now faces, encouraging whistleblowing and having an effective
mechanism in place to foster an appropriate environment for
whistleblowing are steps toward preventing and addressing
frauds and other violations of law while at the same time
protecting the government’s legitimate need for secrecy when it
comes to our national security. The whistleblower court is an
effective mechanism and strikes this balance by providing a
legitimate means for national security whistleblowers to safely
transmit their concerns to the judiciary thereby preventing the
leaks of classified information to the press.
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Librarians
JUDY BAPTISTE-JOSEPH, B.A., M.L.S., Cataloging Librarian
ROSEMARY H. CAMPAGNA, B.A., M.S.L.I.S., Reference/Government Documents Librarian
GILDA CHIU, B.A., M.L.S., Collection Development/Acquisitions Librarian
KATHY DARVIL, A.B., M.S.I., J.D., Access Services/Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of
Law
JEAN J. DAVIS, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Associate Librarian for International Law and Adjunct Professor of Law
JEFF GABEL, B.F.A., M.F.A., M.L.I.S., Catalog & E-Resources Manager
LINDA HOLMES, B.A., M.S., Associate Librarian
HAROLD O’GRADY, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law
LOREEN PERITZ, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law
JANET SINDER, A.B., J.D., M.S., Director of the Library and Associate Professor of Law
HAINAN YU, B.A., M.S., Systems Librarian
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